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1.l 
This thesis is an examination of the National Party's policy 
of decentralisation of powers to local authorities in the 
1980s. The thesis concentrates primarily on urban local 
government and its objectives are: 
1. To trace the evolution of the south African state's 
policy of devolution of powers to local authorities in 
the 1980s; 
2. To examine critically the main features of new local 
government legislation in this period, with particular 
reference to the devolution of powers policy; 
3. To apply a normative framework for analysis, which can 
help serve as a heuristic device, in determining the 
extent of decentralisation that has occurred, to 
selected local authorities in the western Cape. 
The primary sources of research material that were 
consulted were Hansard, Acts of parliament, government 
commissions and gazettes, year books, provincial debates, 
ordinances, gazettes, circulars and local authorities' 
minutes and publications. Approximately 50 qualitative 
interviews were also conducted. 
iii 
The framework of analysis utilised certain indices, 
namely personnel, acc~ss, functions, party politics, finance 
and hierarchical relations, to measure the extent of 
decentralisation that has occurred in three local author-
ities in the Western Cape. This framework helped determine 
that limited devolution of power~ had occurred. 
There were four major reasons for the reluctance of the 
National Party to devolve extensive powers to local author-
ities. First and foremost, reform policy was made in an 
elitist, top-down manner by a small group of reformers in 
order to ensure that the government could share power 
without losing control. The corollary of this centralised 
policy-making was the tendency of centr.al and provincial 
authorities not to devolve extensive powers to local 
authorities. Secondly, there was the viewpoint of the 
central government that the local government development 
process had to be controlled from the top because of the 
lack of sufficient skills, experience and finance at local 
level. Thirdly, the need for macro-economic financial 
control was· also a brake on the devolution process. 
Fourthly, the government believed that, in a unitary state, 
central government should always have ~ relative degree of 
control over local authorities' activities. 
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1.1 Background to and Reasons for study 
Up to the beginning of the 1980s local government was very 
much a cinderella discipline in South Africa, ranking low in 
the priorities in the fields of both Public Administration 
and Political Studies. Furthermore, there had been very 
little critical or theoretically informed approaches to the 
subject; what little literature existed fell largely into 
the category of 'nuts and bolts' studies of the structure 
and functioning of local government (see 1.4 Public 
Administration Approach) . 
Large-scale state restructuring, however, thrust local 
government into the limelight in the 1980s. Prior to that 
decade the central government had largely left the 
regulation of local authorities1 to the various provincial 
authorities. According to the Classified Statutes of the 
Republic of South Africa (cited hereafter as RSA; 1989), 
from Union in 1910 until the 1980s there had only been eight 
central government Acts directly pertaining to local 
government (with the exception of Black local government) . 2 
In the 1980s the amount of central legislation in respect of 
local government more than trebled (26 Acts in total) 
compared with the. preceding 70 years .. New local government 
structures, Regional Service Councils (cited hereafter as 
RSCs) and Black Local Authorities (cited hereafter as BLAs} 
were established, and there were also a number of 
1 
legislative changes affecting the operation of existing 
local authorities. 
As a direct result of these new policy measures, local 
government took off as an academic discipline in the 1980s. 
A number of younger scholars, particularly in Social Science 
disciplines, chose to specialise in this area. Furthermore, 
a numbeF of established academics turned their attention to 
local government and sought to apply their knowledge to an 
analysis of these policy changes. There were a number of 
publications in Public Administration and Political Studies 
journals on local government. There was also a spate of 
conferences on local government held at universities. 
One of the major features of the new local government 
scheme has been the government's policy of devolution of 
powers to local authorities. This issue is the particular 
concern of this thesis. The question of devolution of 
powers has been one of the most hotly debated local govern-
ment issues among South African academics, local government 
practitioners and urban observers. This debate was started 
by Dewar (1985) who suggested that the new local government 
system could lead to local authorities having the capacity 
to enact legislation which could precipitate fundamental 
changes to national level structures. This hypothesis was 
disputed in this writer's 1986 article, where it was argued 
that there is a great difference between the stated 
government commitment to devolution of powers and the 
reality o~ local government legislation, which was 
characterised by increased centralisation of powers. A 
2 
.number of other academics also contributed to this debate. 
Bekker {1988) Bekker and Jeffery (1989), Heymans {1987A, 
19878 and 1988) and Atkinson (1987) also placed doubts on 
the govern~ent's commitment to devolution. Friedman {1987) 
and Breytenbach (1987) seemed to suggest that the truth is 
somewhere in between, with elements of both centralisation 
,and devolution present in new local government legislation. 
A then-senior official of the Department of Constitutional 
Development and Planning (cited hereafter as DCDP), Fanie 
Cloete (1988A), sprang to the government's defence by 
arguing that it was fully committed to devolution. 
Most of these articles were of a much more,critical 
·bent when compared to the pre-1980 material and they 
substantially advanced the reservoir of academic literature 
on local government in South Africa. However, despite this 
advancement, the writer still felt that most of these 
publications (including his own contribution) had covered 
the topic in an empirical and atheoretical way. There had 
been little attempt to locate these local government 
developments in terms of some theoretical paradigm which 
could help illuminate these changes in a more schematic 
fashion. Accordingly, background research into relevant 
local government theory was undertaken over the past few 
years. As a result of this research, the writer was able to 
utilise an analytical framework which could help determine 
the degree of decentralisation that had occurred in South 
Africa in the 1980s. It was decided that this. framework 
should be a major thrust of this thesis. 
3 
Another source of concern was the way that 
decentralisation had been bandied around in a loose way by 
both academics and government actors. As its title 
indicates, this thesis attempts to distinguish between 
different forms of decentralisation; namely, devolution, 
delegation and deconcentration. There are important 
d . ff th t f d 1 . ' . h . ] 1 erences among ese ypes o ecentra isation (w ich are 
examined in 2.2 Terminology). It was felt that the 
framework of analysis could help one distinguish between the 
different forms of decentralisation. 
It was also felt that this issue of devolution had to 
be covered in a more comprehensive way than had been the 
case hitherto. Most of the recent material on devolution 
had been approximately 20-page articles. There was a need 
for a greater in-depth look at the issue. Accordingly, it 
was decided to study the factors leading to, and the major 
features of, new local government legislation in extensive 
detail. For this,section it was also felt that theoretical 
public policy analysis material would be useful when 
dissecting the factors which led to the south African state 
introducing devolution as a policy. Public policy concepts 
were accordingly applied in this section of the thesis. 
1.2 Objectives of this Study 
The primary objectives of this study are: 
i) to trace the evolution of the South African state's 
pol'1cy of devolution of powers to local authorities in 
the 1980s; 
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ii) to examine critically the main features of new local 
government legislation in this period, with particular 
reference to the devolution of powers policy; 
iii) to apply a normative framework for analysis, which can 
help serve as an heuristic device in determining the 
extent of decentralisation that has occurred, to 
selected local authorities in the Western Cape. 
The choice of these particular objectives warrants 
further explanation. Firstly, objectives (i) and (ii) look 
at the policy dynamics and new legislative measures at 
central level, while objective (iii) entails the application 
of the framework of analysis at local government level. 
There are inextricable links between these macro- and micro-
levels. It will be argued that the devolution policy was 
made in an elitist top-down fashion to ensure that central 
control was kept over the reform process. The National 
Party (cited hereafter as NP), while committed to +imited 
power-sharing, had no intention of allowing· the reform 
process to spiral out of control. This had as a corollary a 
reluctance on the part of the national government to devolve 
extensive powers to local authorities because of the fear 
that it would give opposition·groups a platform which could 
be used to undermine central policy. This issue will be 
highlighted in the case studies on local authorities. 
Furthermore, while it is axiomatic that an examination 
of local authorities cannot take place in isolation from 
national political developments, in south Africa this is 
doubly so. It became apparent during the course of the 
5 
research that a thorough examination of the complex neo-
apartheid central government system that was introduced in 
the 1980s was needed in order to make sense of developments 
at local government level. 
Secondly, why was the 1980s chosen as the selected 
time-period? One obvious answer is that a decade is a 
logical era to study. However, there is a more substantial 
reason than this. The 1980s also neatly co-incided with 
developments in South African local government. 1980 saw 
the release of the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
the Financing of Local Authorities in South Africa (Browne 
6 
Committee) which served as the catalyst for local government. 
restructuring later in the decade. Furthermore, this period 
is known as the era of the limited Botha/Heunis reforms. 
P.W. Botha was. first Prime Minister (1978-1984) and 
subsequently State President (1984-1989) and Chris Heunis 
' was Minister of DCDP from 1982 to 1989. The government 
abandoned certain traditional apartheid tenets in the 1980s 
and this, as a consequence, led to the restructuring of 
local government. The person~lities, management styles and 
the basic ideological orientations of both these individuals 
played a major role in determining the shape of the new 
local government system (as will be discussed in Chapter 
VI). Botha was effectively forced out of office in 1989 and 
Heunis decided not to stand for re-election in the October 
1989 general election. During the early 1990s the new State 
President, F.W. de Klerk, has moved beyond the limited 
reformist framework of his predecessor towards a more 
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democratic South Af~i6a. The drawing of previously excluded 
groups into the policy process involves further local 
government policy changes. Thus, 1989 is an ideal cut-off 
point, because it was the high point of the particular 
system of neo-aparth~id local government that was introduced 
earlier in that decade, and which is slowly being phased out 
in the 1990s. 
The question may be raised about the relevance of this 
thesis in the rapidly changing political terrain of the 
1990s, which is likely to see substantial central and local 
policy changes. It can, however, be argued in turn that 
these nee-apartheid local government structures were 
introduced only in the late 1980s and are not likely to be 
swept away overnight. As the reforms associated with the 
introduction of the tricarneral parliament in 1984 have 
shown, even if a political settlement is reached in the 
early 1990s, administrative reorganisation will take longer 
to achieve. 
In addition the existing structures, while not exactly 
building blocks of the new system, are a force that must be 
reckoned with and are likely to have a shaping effect on 
future post-apartheid administrative structures. These 
factors mean that a thorough examination of these existing 
structures is indispensable as one makes the transition to 
the new political order. 
Why was the particular framework for analysis applied 
primarily to local level and not central level? As will be 
argued in Chapter III, there are a number of methodological 
problems associated with applying such a model at central 
level. Accordingly, ·such a framework is better utilised in 
comparing different local authorities within a particular 
nation state. This leads to another issue. Which local 
authorities were chosen for analysis? It was decided to 
concentrate on the different forms of ethnic3 local 
authorities in the Western Cape. This would involve looking 
at White, Coloured and Black ethnic local government 
structures as well as the only racially mixed structure in 
the region, the Western Cape Regional Services Council 
(cited hereafter as WSRSC) 4 . This was not only because of 
ethnic differences per se but was also due to the fact that 
different intergovernmental institutional relationships 
existed for all these structures. This had important 
implications for the autonomy of these respective bodies. 
Unfortunately, it soon .became clear that it would not 
be possible to research a BLA structure. The initial choice 
was Ikapa Town Council (previously Cape Town Town 
Committee). However, due to the continued problems of BLAs 
(which will be described in Chapter VIII) , this body was not 
formally functioning for large periods of the 1980s. In 
fact, in the latter part of the decade it was under the 
control of a White Administrator. It did not seem justified 
to research the body under such circumstances. The second 
choice was Lingelethu West in Khayelitsha. However, it 
began'functioning only in late 1988. Furthermore, 
continuous violent unrest in the area in which dis-
satisfaction with local government administration played a 
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large role, made systematic. access to this council's 
premises extremely difficult. The other BLA in the region, 
Old crossroads, was subject to the same constraints as 
Lingelethu West, namely that it only started functioning in 
late 1988 and that there was continuous violent unrest in 
the area. It was accordingly decided, to omit this 
component of the thesis. 
Merely because there is no case study on BLAs does not 
mean that they are not analysed. There is a comprehensive 
chapter on legislative measures in respect of these bodies 
in the 1980s as well as nation-wide community resistance to 
them. Furthermore, the case study on the WCRSC also touches 
on the problems of BLAs. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that this thesis 
concentrates primarily on urban local government. It does 
The not comprehensively examine rural local government. 
latter field, which would encompass tribal local 
authorities, is in itself a vast area which is best dealt 
with in a separate study. 
1.3 Research Content 
The body of this thesis is divided fnto four main sections. 
The first section covers the theoretical basis of 
decentralisation. Chapter II consists of a survey of 
international literature in respect of a whole range of 
dimensions affecting decentralisation. In Chapter III the 
discussion will turn to the framework of analysis which is 
used to determine the degree of decentralisation that has 
occurred in South Africa. 
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The second section is an examination of the history of 
local government in South Africa prior to the 1980s. This 
is split into two chapters. Chapter IV deals with White, 
Coloured and Indian local authorities, while Chapter V deals 
with Black local governments. The reason for having two 
separate chapters is that Black local government constitu-
tionally and politically took a different route from that of 
White, Coloured and Indian local government. This section 
does not attempt to make any new contribution to the 
literature; it merely attempts to provide a brief overview 
of the system that existed prior to the 1980s. 
Section three deals with central state restructuring of 
local government in the 1980s. Chapter VI deals with the 
policy process of local government. It examines, with 
particular emphasis on the central theme of devolution, how 
policy proposals were formulated to deal with particular 
problems and how specific proposals were chosen for 
adoption. Chapter VII concentrates on the analysis of the 
policy content of the new local government legislation in 
order to determine whether its main features embody 
devolution of power or not. Chapter VIII looks at 
developments in Black local government in the 1980s, with 
particular emphasis on the introduction of BLAs and its 
consequences. 
The fourth section deals with the various case studies. 
Chapter IX looks at the extent to which the government 
decentralised power to the Cape Town City Council (cited 
hereafter as CCC) in the 1980s. · Chapter X examines the 
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extent to which the government decentralised power to the 
Athlone and District ·Management Committee (cited hereafter 
as ADMC) in the 1980s. Chapter XI deals with the degree to 
which the government decentralised power to the WCRSC in the 
1980s. In the Conclusion, and with reference to the 
fr~mework of analysis, these various local bodies are 
compared. An overall evaluation of the devolution policy is 
also undertaken. 
1.4 Public Administration Approach 
This thesis does not deal with Public Administration theory 
per se. However, it is still considered a useful exercise 
to give a brief exposition of the Public Administration 
approach that will be adopted in this thesis. 
Public Administration, as a discipline in South Africa, 
has traditionally been dominated by the administrative 
processes approach of J.J.N. Cloete, the dominant figure in 
the academic study of Public Administration in South Africa 
(see J. Cloete, 1967). Such an approach posits that Public 
Administration should consist exclusively of the study of 
certain work processes, viz. policy-making, organising, 
financing, personnel provision, the establishment of pro-
cedures, and the control over the execution of activities. 
Most of the pre-1980 local government literature had been 
from this administrative processes school. However, such an 
approach has been increasingly criticised. Its academic 
pedigree has. been questioned on the grounds that it is a 
'nuts and bolts' descriptive account of the work process. 
It lacks a theoretical basis and has accordingly lost touch 
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with Public Administration's mother discipline, Political 
· science. This has led to the subject being taught in a 
narrow technocratic way with an over-emphasis on 
organisational efficiency at the expense of broader social 
issues such as ethics and values. This contributed to a 
generation of technocratic bureaucrats who.were insensitive 
to public needs, in particular to disenfranchised Blacks 
(see Marais, 1988; Schwella, 1990). 
In the last.couple of years there has been a shift 
among a small number of scholars towards what is termed New 
Public Administration. These scholars call for a more open-
ended contingency approach to the study of Public Adminis-
tration, believing that it is impossible to confine this 
eclectic, diverse subject in an intellectual strait-jacket 
as the administrative processes theorists attempt to do. 
They do not reject the administrative processes approach in 
toto; rather they believe there is a need for a more 
flexible approach encompassing both traditional principles 
of management as well as a more adaptive view of Public 
Administration to its total environment. Such an approach 
places a far greater emphasis on the study of the political, 
economic and social values in which Public Administration 
operates. Self-evidently, this involves a greater awareness 
of the needs and problems of those without full citizen 
rights, viz. Blacks (see Gildenhuys, 1988). The approach of 





However, something this new school of open-ended 
contingency theorists has hitherto not done is to define 
exactly what this new Public Administration is. Although 
Public Administration is a broad discipline, it is necessary 
to delimit its boundaries, otherwise there is a da~ger that 
it could degenerate into a 'smorgasbord' approach, 
encompassing anything vaguely relating to administration. 
It is suggested that a useful definition, .which captures the 
spirit of this new open-ended contingency school while 
delimitating disciplinary boundaries, is that of R.A.W. 
Rhodes. He describes Public Administration as the "multi-
disciplinary study of the political management systems 
(structure and propesses) of public bureaucracies" (1979 
7). The strength of P~odes's definition is that it 
correctly recognises that Public Administration combines the 
disciplines of politics and public management. Hopefully, 
the content of this thesis reflects this fusion. 
1.5 Methodology 
( 
Documentary sources are the main f orrn of primary research 
material. In the case of central government level this 
involved the perusal of Hansard, Acts of parliament, 
government commissions, gazettes and year books. At 
provincial level it involved the scrutiny of provincial 
debates, ordinances, gazettes and circulars. At local 
level, local authorities' minutes and publications were 
consulted. Secondary ·materials utilised were newspapers, 
periodicals, journals and books. 
For the theoretical section of this thesis, the 
Institute of Local Government Studies at the University of 
Birmingham, one of the foremost institutions in the world in 
this field, was visited for three months. Both primary and 
secondary data were gathered from the Institute's extensive 
collection of local government material. 
Part of the methodology utilised in this thesis 
involved the appl,ication of a normative framework of 
analysis, which could help determine the extent of 
devolution that has occurred to selected local authorities 
in the Western Cape. 
Approximately 50 qualitative interviews were also 
conducted. At the University of Birmingham certain of their 
staff members, who have done extensive consultancy in both 
developed and developing countries, were interviewed. 
Central, provincial and local actors involved with local 
government in South Africa were also interviewed. A number 
of interviewees, in particular central and local bureau-
crats, specifically requested that they did not wish to be 
quoted. In such cases the anonymity of the interviewees is 
respected. 
It was originally intended that such interviews should 
form background material to the thesis, with the primary 
material consisting of documentary sources. This was 
" ' 
achieved at the University of Birmingham where interviewees 
often provided the writer with the necessary documentary 
resources to substantiate the oral points they made. 
However, in South Africa neither the common law nor statute 
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bestows any rights µpon citizens ta obtain access to recent 
public sector documents and files. As a result, access to 
contemporary public sector information has always been 
rather restricted (Mathews, 1978 : 168). This already 
restricted access was further curtailed by the promulgation 
of the Protection of Information Act of 1982, which 
substantially increased the range pf classified information 
in Publ.ic Administration (RSA, Protection of Information 
Act, No. 84 of 1982). These restrictions meant that there 
was difficulty in getting access to any written or printed 
information besides formal documents. ·This was, however, 
countered by the willingness of certain interviewees to 
reveal certain, otherwise unavailable, information. While 
documentary sources still form the bulk of the primary 
material, in view of the foregoing restrictions, it was 
decided to use some of this information gleaned in 
interviews for certain sections of this thesis. Because of 
the inherent subjectivity of qualitative interviewing (see 
Annexure A for a more comprehensive discussion of the 
methodology adopted}, the writer was highly selective about 
what type of material was used in the thesis. Where 
possible, information drawn from interviews was corroborated 
and double-checked with other interviewees for authenticity. 
For the sake of clarity, it is necessary briefly to 
discuss the tenses adopted in this thesis. As a general 
rule, processes and institutional structures in the 1980s 
which are no longer in existence (as at the end of April 
1991) are referred to in the past tense, e.g. the nature of 
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policy-making under P.W. Botha. On the other hand, 
processes and instit~tional structures which are still in 
existence are referred to in the present tense, e.g. the 
Management Committee system. 
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A full list of acronyms is provided at the beginning of 
the thesis. In addition, the practice will be to give 
acronyms their full title the first time they are used in 
the text; e.g. Department of Constitutional Development and 
Planning (cited hereafter as DCDP). Thereafter only the 
acronym will be used, with the exception of legislation and 
in chapter and sub-section headings, where titles will be 
cited in full. 
When referencing publications of state departments, the 
name of the department will follow 'RSA', e.g. (RSA, DCDP, 
1980). Where cross-referencing occurs it will indicate 
other numbered sub-sections. For the sake of brevity, the, 
term 'sub-section' is not included. Cross-referencing will 
accordingly take this format: (see 4.2 Constitutional 
Relations). Finally, notes to each chapter are situated at 





LOCAL GOVERNMENT: INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The optimal division of governmental powers has held the 
attention of policy-makers since the time of Aristotle and 
the Greek City States (Fesler, 1949 : l; Maass, 1959 : 1) .• 
This problem has traditionally been defined in terms of the 
division of functions at the capital city of a country 
(Fesler, 1968 : 370). The classical expression of this 
relationship was Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws (1749) 
where he argues for'a tripartite division between 
legislative, executive and judicial powers (cited in 
Beekman, 1973 : 1). 
Important as this capital division of powers is, it is 
not the concern of this dissertation. The focus here is 
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rather on the question of governmental power by area. The 
latter field has traditionally been the poor relation of the 
capital division of powers. It is only. since the emergence 
of the federal polity in regional and local governments 
sometime in the second half of the 18th century that serious 
academic attention has b~en focused on this areal division 
of powers (Mutlalib and Ali Kahn, 1982 : 97) . 
This areal division of powers is more commonly known 
today as intergovernmental relations. Within this broad 
generic field it is possible to identify different areas of 
analy~is. The precise concern of this thesis is central-
local relations, viz. the relationships of control and power 
between central and local government. In this chapter the 
normative basis of this field will be examined. This will 
be done with reference to international literature on the 
subject. 1 
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This thesis concentrates exclusively on the question of 
decentralisation of governmental power to. local authorities. 
Decentralisation is not synonymous with autonomy. The 
former concept is a necessary, but not sufficient condition 
of local autonomy (Smith, 1985A : 92). This means that the 
studies of community power which analyse local autonomy are 
excluded from the orbit of this examination. The concern 
of analysts in this field is the extent of community 
autonomy, viz. the proportion of community decisions taken 
by local actors within sub-national jurisdictions (Clark, 
1974 : 22-24). 
Also excluded from its scope are a number of neo-
Marxist theories. The strength of these theories is their 
highlighting of the deficiencies of traditional inter-
governmental approaches which ignore .issues such as who has 
wealth and power and, accordingly, the ability to influence 
local policy-making disproportionately. However, as Rhodes 
(1981 : 13) points out, "The contributions of this 
tradition have been negative rather than positive - i.e. it 
has highlighted the defects of conventional forms of 
analysis rather than providing a redefinition of the subject 
matter of research with supporting empirical 
investigations." 
2.2 TERMINOLOGY 
There is little co~formity when it comes to the use of 
concepts in the field of intergovernmental relations. It 
is contended that the most useful classification is that of 
Rondinelli (1981), who clearly distinguishes the various 
forms of decentralisation in a way that other definitions 
fail to achieve. Another reason is that this 
classification has been used extensively in South Africa in 
official reports and by government officials. 
Decentralisation is defined as: 
the transfer of responsibility for planning, 
management.and resource use and allocation from 
the central government and its agencies to field 
organisations of these agencies, subordinate units 
of government, semi-autonomous public 
corporations, or non-governmental private or 
voluntary organisations (Rondinelli, 1981 : 137). 
Territorial decentralisation (or vertical distribution) 
involves the central government vesting power in entities 
which exercise authority with reference to some geographical 
unit such as a region or local government. Functional 
decentralisation (or horizontal distribution) is the 
distribution of authority outside the centre, with reference 
to function and not territory, for example the Department of 
Posts and Telecommunications, which has regional offices 
throughout the country providing postal services (Calvert, 
1975 : 5-11 and Rondinelli, 1981 137) . It is this 




Devolution is ~he most extensive form of decentral-
isation. It is the "conferment of rule-making and 
executive powers of a specified or residual nature on 
formally .constituted sub-national units" (Vosloo, Kotze and 
Jeppe, 1974 : 10). This is the classical English local 
government model and it has the following characteristics: 
1. Local authorities should be constitutionally separate 
from central government and be responsible for a 
significant range of services. 
2. They should have their own treasury, separate budget 
and ac.counts and their own taxes to produce a 
substantial part of their revenue. 
3. Local authorities should have their own personnel with 
the right to hire and fire such staff. 
4. Policy should be decided by local councils, 
predominantly consisting of elected representatives. 2 
5. Central government administ.rators should only play an 
indirect advisory, supervisory and inspectorate role. 
These characteristics distinguish autonomous local 
governments from other forms of sub-national units (Mawhood 
and Davey, 1980 : 405; Mawhood, 1983 : 9-10 and 1987 : 12). 
However, devolution does not mean that local authorities 
have carte blanche to do as they wish. They are not city 
states; their ability to make policy, is limited in a num0er 
of ways, for example they cannot make laws which conflict 
with national legislation and their powers are often 
specified by a higher tier of government (see 2.4 Federalism 
vs. Unitarism). Furthermore, provision often exists for a 
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higher tier of government to approve local government 
legislation before it becomes law (see 3.7 Hierarchical 
Relations) . 
22 
Deconcentration is normally the least extensive form of . 
decentralisation. It often involves the transfer of the 
·workload from the central government head offices to 
regional branches located outside of the executive capital 
(Rondinelli, 1981 : 137 and Maddick, 1963 : 23). · It may 
involve limited discretion for field staff to perform 
functions within central government guidelines. Effective 
control over major policy decisions normally resides at 
central level. However, in certain instances, such as the 
case of British District Commissioners in colonial Africa, 
fairly extensive powers were vested in deconcentrated 
officials (see contributors to Mawhood, 1983). 
Delegation falls somewhere along the continuum between 
decentralisation and deconcentration. Delegation can 
entail the transfer of b,road authority to plan and· implement 
decisions concerning specific activities to organisations 
such as local authorities that are technically and 
administratively capable of performing them (Rondinelli, 
1981: 138). Although delegated power is normally 
controlled by the attachment of conditions by the delegating 
body, this form of delegation leads to the exercise of a 
certain amount of judgement and discretion on the part of 
local authorities. A weaker form of delegation is when 
local authorities execute policies made at central 
government level in a way which allows them little 
,. 
discretion. What i~ common to all forms of delegation is 
that the delegating body has the authority to modify, reduce 
or withdraw such powers if it so desires (Fesler, 1968 
372-3). Delegation highlights the fact that a large 
workload at local government level does not necessarily meari 
extensive devolution. 
Fesler (1968 : 373) calls what has been defined as 
delegation and deconcentration 'pseudo-decentralisation' 
because its motivation is administrative convenience, 
namely, to reduce the workload in the capital. ·This 
administrative overburden often leads to excessive delays 
and inefficiency (Maddick, 1963 : 34)~ Dear and Clark 
{1981 : 1280-81) go even further and argue that these forms 
of decentralisation are motivated by a crisis-avoidance 
strategy of central government. By transferring the 
execution of contentious policy issues to local government 
level, it is hoped that the legitimacy crisis of the central 
state will be reversed. In other words, the aim is to 
ensure that citizen demands for services are directed at a 
local level which consequently removes some of the pressure 
from the national level. However, policy-making still 
resides at the national level. Any dissatisfaction about 
service provision would_ be at local government lev~l, which 
would have to deal with effects that are not of its own 
making. 
As pointed out, deconcentration and delegation can lead 
to a certain amount of discretion in planning and 
implementing national policies at local level and adjusting 
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central directives tq local conditions within national 
guidelines (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984 : 10). It 
has been argued that this process could be the first step 
towards greater decentralisation (Rondinelli, 1981: 137), 
but there is no guarantee that this will necessarily be the 
case. 
Centralisation generally has negative connotations, 
often being associated with red tape, rigidity and 
remoteness. This term is often used in a pejorative way to 
label things that are disliked about political and 
administrative systems (Smith, 1979 : 215). However, 
centralisation needs to be defined in a more schematic way. 
Sherwood (1969 : 68) suggests that "centralisation is 
best defined as involving the concentration of power at the 
top of the pyramid". A more comprehensive definition is 
that of Kaufman: 
A centralised organisation or institution is 
one in which the lower levels and employees 
assigned thereto are subject to central directives 
and discipline and identify in one way or another 
with the centralised leadership, for example, 
professionally, by interests, or in goals and 
values. Central control of finances and public 
policy are basic elements. Machinery for 
communications, reporting, inspection, record-
keeping and conflict resolution will exist at the 
higher level or at least be responsible to the 
central unit (cited in Stephens, 1974 : 68). 
Each of these various forms of power relationships will 
reflect a quite different set of central-local relationships 
with the distribution of power being located at different 
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levels along the centralisation-decentralisation continuum. 
However, the local administrations of most countries in the 
world contain elements of devolution, deconcentration and 
delegation. The important aspect is how these elements are 
balanced (Wraith, 1971 : 156-157). There is also no such 
thing as absolute centralisation and decentralisation. 
Fesler {1949 : 62 and 1968 : ~71) points out that total 
decentralisation would lead to the withering away of the 
state and as a corollary, anarchy. Conversely, total 
centralisation would mean that the state's capacity to 
perform its functions would be hindered by excessive 
rigidity and overload. 
Decentralisation is a re~atively complex phenomenon. 
It is not merely a matter of one form of decentralisation or 
another. It must be seen as a process rather than a 
product (Calvert, 1975 : 10). As Kochen and Deutsch (1980 
: 205) and Fesler (1965 : 536) point out, this concept is 
not static but dynamic and contains within it ubiquitous 
tensions. A state may be more centralised than another in 
respect of one measure, but more decentralised in terms of 
another (Page and Goldsmith, 1985: 176). For example, 
devolution can be looked at in respect of both policy and 
financial measures. A state is devolved in the former 
measure and centralised in the latter aspect when the 
central government can limit the amount that local 
authorities can spend on particular functions, while 
allowing considerable latitude in respect of policy goals. 
Conversely, a state is centralis·ed in the former aspect and 
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devolved in the latter measure when the amount that can be 
spent is left to the discretion of the local authority ' 
concerned, while the central government lays down certain 
policy goals and standards (Hansen and Kjellberg, cited in 
Paddison, 1983 : 153). 
Although it is these concepts that are going to be 
utilised, it is worth mentioning some of the other 
classifications. In terms of Mawhood's classification 
(1983 : 1-5), decentralisation would be equivalent to the 
stated definition of devolution. Deconcentration would 
seem to cover both the stated definitions of deconcentration 
and delegation. A number of other authors (see Maddick, 
1963 : 23 and Conyers, 1983 : 102) also fail to make this 
distinction between intergovernmental decentralisation to 
local government units and intragovernmental decentral-
isation to central government field offices, using 
deconcentration as this broad encompassing term. Sherwood 
(1969 : 68) offers a further alternative classification.· 
He argues that devolution is the creation of new units of 
government outside the control of central government, viz . 
.. 
interorganisational patterns of power relations, while 
decentralisation is the transfer of power within a 
hierarchical organisation, viz. an intraorganisation pattern 
of relationships. 
Finally, although all these definitions are 
analytically useful, they are not sufficient explanations 
unto themselves. An over-reliance on formal relationships 
glosses over the fact that the wishes of central government 
are not always carried out uncritically by local 
authorities. Government policies can often be modi£ied, 
amended and subverted at local level, leading to unintended 
consequences (see 2.11.2 Intervention and Control and 2.11.3 
Implementation Studies). 
2.3 THE VALUES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (OR ARGUMENTS FOR LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT) 
The text edited by Maass (1959) has been one of the most 
influential works on local government. The book argued 
that the justification of the existence of local government 
was that it promoted the values of liberty, participation 
and efficiency. 3 These claims will be examined in detail. 
2.3.1 Liberty/Democracy 
Maass (1959 : 9-10) argues that local government promotes 
the value of liberty. If power is divided on an areal 
basis, it can protect individuals/groups against arbitrary 
government action. Ylvisaker (1959 : 32) suggests this 
value can be realised by 
1. providing additional and more readily available points 
of access, pressure and control; 
2. making it possible for minorities to avail themselves 
themselves of governmental .position and power; 
3. serving to keep governmental power close to its origin 
and governmental officials within reach of their 
masters. 
This liberty value has its origins in De Tocqueville, 
who argued that local government, if effective, is a major 
source of the pluralist diffusion of power, contributing not 
27 
only to the greater liberty of communities, ~ut also to that 
of individuals, by imposing restraints on the 'power 
appetites' of central government (cited in Mutlalib and 
Khan, 1982 : 96). 
Strong local government is accordingly viewed as an 
important mechanism of limiting or counter-balancing the 
power of central government (Werlin, 1980 : 186). 
Decentralisation, by dispersing resources, tends to dilute 
the power of the strongest (Kochen and Deutsch, 1980: 201). 
This type of argument strongly influenced the framers of the 
United States of America (cited hereafter as USA) 
constitution and is part of its checks-and-balances system. 4 
This argument has been substantiated by events; for 
example, in France in 1789 and at the end of the 19th 
century (Mutlalib and Khan, 1982 : 96), as well as by 
developments in Africa after decolonisation (Diamond et al., 
1988) . 
However, while these arrangements have undoubtedly 
prevented the growth of central tyrannies, they have not 
always stopped the development of local tyrannies. Sharpe 
(1970 : 156-8) argues that there is no reason why a local 
government cannot infringe individual rights in the same way 
as certain central governments have done. Central 
government does not have a monopoly on arbitrariness. He 
suggests that the concept of liberty propounded by Maass and 
Ylvisaker is not based on individual rights, but rather 
corporate policy decisions. He sees "a mistaken 
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·identification of the ·liberty of individuals with the 
liberty of communities" (Sharpe, 1970 : 157). 
A related point is, to what extent do local authorities 
promote democracy? It is pointed out that decentralisation 
is often used as a near-synonym for terms.like democrat-
isation and self-determination (Kochen and Deutsch, 
1980 : 4). Fesler (1965 : 538-534) calls this the doc-
trinal approach in.which decentralisation is treated as an 
absolute goal in itself rather than ·as a means to an end 
value. It tends to be used as an article of faith rather 
than a concept that should be subjected to critical 
analysis. 5 Schmandt (1973 18) says "that once this 
occurs understanding ceases and obfuscation triumphs." 
There is nothing inherently progressive about de-
centralisation. F~sler {1965 : 545) points out firstly, 
that both local and national government can take a number of 
forms and neither has a distinctive impulse towards 
democracy. Secondly, decentralisation can quite happily 
co-exist with the absence of local democracy. Local 
autonomy can quite feasibly operate in an autocratic 
environment; for example, in the United States, dis-
crimination by southern sub-national units towards their 
Black minorities led to greater federal control. De-
centralised powers allowed such localities to neglect civil 
rights and the demands of the poor (Dye, 1975 41-67) • 
Further, the origins of the centralised form of government 
that existed in France (until the decentralisation reforms 
of the Socialists in the 1980s) can be traced to the pre-
29 
revolutionary experience in which notables used local 
institutions as instruments to block social reform. 
support for decentralisation was construed as support for 
privilege and reaction. ·conversely, centralisation had 
progressive connotations, being associated with the 
furtherance of democracy (Gourevitch, 1981: 133-4). 
In certain instances, it has been central government 
that has ~romoted social and economic equality of 
opportunity, for example through the provision of social 
welfare services to the less privileged (Fesler, 1965 : 
549) . As Fesler (1965 549) points out: 
One of the most curious aspects of 
decentralisation is the responsibility that a 
. national government must assume to assure 
realisation of the goals that decentralisation, as 
doctrinally advocated, is supposed to serve. 
National legislation, overriding local objections 
and implemented by national administrative action, 
is often required to democratise the selection of 
local officials, to establish viable units of 
government with the size, resources and diversity 
of interests that are preconditions for effective 
local government, to recruit and train skilled 
staff for local administration, to minimise 
corruption and regularise fiscal practices, and to 
provide grants from national revenue to help 
finance the more impoverished communities. 
Probably the most forceful intellectual challenge to 
local government in recent times has been Langrod's argument 
in 1953. Not only does he argue that local democracy 
promotes inequality, but he also claims that there is a 
fundamental contradiction between local government and 
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democracy. Local government is anachronistic; it often 
· serves local oligarchies, has outdated work methods, is . 
characterised by disproportionate influence of bureaucrats 
vis-a-vis temporary councillors, and is a brake on modern-
isation. Accordingly, it is anti-democratic and "local 
government has within itself, inevitably, the seed of its 
own death once the process of democratisation is 
accomplished" (Langrod, 1953 : 32-33). 
Langrod was a professor of Public Administration in 
Paris and his argument was a reflection of the French 
administrative system which was supposedly based on the 
Rousseauian general will; viz. that interests of the 
popular will must take predominance over any minority 
interests. 6 While, as already pointed out, Langrod was 
correct to point out that local government and democracy are 
not historically associated, 7 he overstates his case. In 
many respects, his argument is a c.entralised version of the 
decentralised article of faith viewpoint, whereby 
centralisation is treated as an absolute good in its own 
right and not subject to critical analysis. While local 
authorities are undoubtedly responsible for a certain amount 
of social and economic inequality, it is fallacious to label 
all local authorities as reactionary. As Jones and Stewart 
(1982 : 12) remark: "If a local authority makes a bad 
decision, it is a case against local authority and for 
centralism, but if central government makes a bad decision, 
the reverse does not apply. 11 
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Summing up this liberal value debate: while it is true 
to say that the dispersal of power makes it more difficult 
for a central tyranny to develop, this in itself is no 
guarantee that local authorities will ipso facto promote 
liberty or democracy. 
2.3.2 Participation/Equality 
The second value is that of equality. Government power can 
be divided so as to provide broad opportunities for citizen 
participation in public policy (Maass, 1959 : 9-10). Now-
adays, equality is seldom used in its old-fashioned sense of 
political equality. Sharpe (1970 : 155-6) says this term 
is confusing because local government (as we have already 
shown) can also promote social and economic inequality. 
For this reason he prefers the term "participation" (156). 
He also thinks this claim has more substance than the 
liberty argument. Participation at local government level 
is superior to that of central government level, because it 
enables more citizens to participate in smaller local 
government units that directly affect their local 
environment. This is of particular salience in larger 
democracies (Sharpe, 1970 : 166}. 
This is a forceful argument, but there is a caveat 
which is conceded by Sharpe: "The key question is 
participation in the government of what?" (1970 : 160). 
Participation tends to be somewhat meaningless unless there 
are sufficient functions over which local authorities have a 
broad range of decision-making powers and sufficient 
-, 
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financial resources to carry them out. As will be pointed 
out (in 2.7.6 Centralisation Trends) the general trend in 
the 20th century has been for local authorities to lose both 
powers and functions to central government. 
A related facet of participation is that of local 
government as a political educator, viz. as a mechanism for 
promoting a democratic political culture through the medium 
of self-government. This view dates back to the time of 
James Mill and De Tocqueville. The problem with this claim 
is that it is difficult to envisage councillors( a small 
percentage of most countries' population) by virtue of the 
precept example, promoting·a democratic political culture 
and extolling the virtues of.democracy to the wider 
population (Sharpe, 1970 : 160-2). Further, such a claim 
ignores the effect to which political education is the 
function of wider processes and institutions (such as class 
and education generally) (Smith, 1985A : 22). 
Another participatory value is that as a training 
ground for democracy. Both representatives and councillors 
benefit from this process (Sharpe, 1970 : 163; Maddick, 
1963 : 58). This claim is also inconclusive. Firstly, 
councillors and Members of Parliament (cited hereafter as 
MPs) tend to perform different roles. Secondly, the private 
sector milieu can provide training. comparable to local 
governments. Such organisations can.provide experience in 
terms·of policy-making, budgetary allocation, etc. (Smith, 
1~85A: 22-3). Secondly, such training could also be 
undemocratic if local authorities promote sectional 
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interests rather than the (putative) general will (Langrod, 
1953 31). 
A more recent variant of this value is participation in 
the actual delivery of services (Widdicombe, 1986 : 49-50). 
The argument is that consumers should actually have a say in 
the nature of local authorities' services that are delivered 
to them. This is currently a major issue in England with 
Neighbourhood Area Committees, User-based Committees and 
Tenants' Associations advocating that they should have a 
certain amount of control over services that are rendered to 
.them (Stoker, 1988 : 204-206). 
summing up, one would agree with Sharpe that this value 
is still valid, although perhaps not to the extent that its 
19th centu;-y promoters advocated (cited in Stewart and 
Greenwood, 1985 : 4). However, this move towards consumer 
participation in the 1980s seems. to have resurrected this 
value. 
2.3.3 Responsiveness/Efficiency 
The third value of local government is that it can act as a 
more responsive agent for the provision of services that are 
essentially local in nature. It is accordingly a more 
efficient way of managing local affairs and providing local 
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services. This is sometimes known as the welfare function -
of local government (Ylvisaker, 1959 
28) . 
32 and Smith, 1985A : 
The basis of this justification is that central 
government has neither the time nor inclination to establish 
the optimal mixture of services desired by each locality. 
Local governments, because of the greater closeness to their 
voters, are likely to have greater knowledge of the needs 
and conditions of their respective localities than the 
remote central governments (Sharpe, 1970 : 166; Stewart, 
1983 : 16; Smith, 1985A·: 28-30)~ Why can the field 
agencies of central government departments not perform these 
local tasks of identifying the optimal amounts of services 
desired by various localities? The problem is that such 
single-function agencies based on functional specialisation 
and departmentalism would not be able to coordinate all 
these diverse activities in an efficient way. Local 
authorities, being multi-functional organisations, would be· 
better capable of doing so (Sharpe, 1970 : 166) . 
Both Sharpe (1970 : 168) and Stewart (1983 13-14) 
think that this claim for local government as a responsive 
service provision agency has much validity. Sharpe argues 
the justification for the responsiveness value is on much 
stronger ground than that for the liberty value. It has 
been suggested, however, that there are certain problems 
with this proposition. Firstly, it fallaciously presumes 
that "local people whose wisdom is accumulated for this 
purpose are presented as a unified mass with a common 
interest in getting things right" (Smith, 1985A : 29). 
However, although local people undoubtedly do not have a 
superior wisdom, they are likely to know better than central 
government what local needs are and the optimal amount of 
services needed to meet them. This claim for local 
government as a responsive service provision agency does, 
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however, ignore the reality of conflicting needs in the same 
community and the fact that certain classes/interest groups 
have greater ability to influence local policy-making 
(Smith, l985A: 29). 
Thirdly, in the complex contemporary world of inter-
governmental relations there are few functions which are 
essentially local in nature (Page, 1981 : 31). Even in a 
. federal state like Switzerland, which is generally 
considered to be highly decentralised, functions which are 
the exclusive domain of one level of government tend to be 
the exception rather than the norm (Bieri, 1979 : 45). The 
only functions where there is littl~ overlapping or sharing 
are traditional central government functions, e.g. law and 
order, military defence, tariffs and fiscal policy, 
communications and coinage (Maddick, 1963 : 29) (see 2.4 
Federalism vs. Unitarism). 
Fourthly, the question of responsiveness is intimately 
linked to the issue of accountability and control. It is 
argued that decision-makers are responsive to local demands 
precisely because they are accountable to local voters, viz~ 
voters hold decision-makers responsible for their actions. 
Councillors who ignore the wishes of the electorate will be 
voted out of office. Voters' control is regarded as an 
effective check on the actions of councillors (Rondinelli, 
1981 : 135). The problem with this argument is that it 
ignores the fact that there is large~scale ignorance and 
apathy about local government. Turnouts are often low at 
local elections which are often decided· not by local but 
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rather by national ~ssues (Foster, Jackman and Perlman, 1980 
: 16). A summary of European Economic Community (cited 
hereafter as EEC) countries showed that there was smaller 
participation in local elections than in national elections 
in six of these states. There was equal participation in 
the other three countries (Council of Europe, 1978 : 9). 
However, such factors are to a certain extent problems 
of representative government generally rather than of local 
government specifically. Election turnouts are low at 
national level in certain countries such as the United 
States. A case can also be made for flawed accountability 
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at this level by arguing that it is impossible for voters to 
make an informed judgement about government policy when 
faced with making choices about such a large number of 
disparate issues at election time. Voters tend to make 
their electoral judgements on the basis of only a few issues 
and the belief that a particular political party will 
adequately represent their interests. 
Fifthly, concern has been expressed that because of 
varying tax bases, an essential feature of local government 
is inequality of services between units (see 2.10.4 
Equity/Territorial Justice). Although this is true, local 
government is not the pri~ary source of inequality in 
society. Central governments, as the supreme political 
power in states, are able to produce inequalities that can 
at least match that of local governments (Sharpe, 1970 
169-70). Market forces are another source of inequality 
because of their propensity to aggravate intense class 
divisions in society. 
However, despite these shortcomings, local government 
is still. a more preferable service-providing body than 
deconcentrated administration which merely carries out 
functions whose policy has been determined by central 
government. There is generally greater scope to influence 
representative local authorities through the electoral 
process than there is to persuade non-representative 
deconcentrated administrations to alter their policy (Smith, 
l985A : 27). 
2.4 FEDERALISM vs UNITARISM 
Until recently it has been regarded as almost axiomatic that 
the constitutional first tier framework is the definitive 
factor affecting local government autonomy. Federal states 
were thought to facilitate decentralisation (Riker, 1975; 
Ostrom, 1973). In fact Lockard (1968 : 452-453) refers to 
the federalist/decentralised model in the authoritative 
International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. It was 
argued that in federal states power is shared among the 
various tiers of government and the rights of sub-national 
units generally are derived from the constitution and cannot 
be abridged by national legislation8 (Wheare, 1981 : 10; 
Alexander, 1982 : 3~4). 
Conversely, it was held that in a unitary state power 
is indivisible and local government is subordinate to tha 
supremacy of national level legislation (Alexander, 1982 
3-4) . For example, under the British system of local 
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government which was inherited by most of its former 
colonies, including South.Africa, the doctrine of ultra 
vires applied; viz .. that local authorities could only pass 
a statute if it was specifically authorised by a higher tier 
of government. Such higher tiers of government could also 
countermand legislation by local authorities (Byrne, 1986 : 
54-56). 
Howev~r, this equation of unitarism = centralisation 
and federalism = decentralisation is too simplistic. 
Lijphart (1984 169) points out that _federalism is neither 
a necessary nor sufficient condition for decentralisation. 
Reality is far more complex. There are different forms of 
federal states. The common conception of federalism is 
that of divided sovereignty. Yet, as Calvert (1975 : 8) 
points out, this is a legal definition. In practice, the 
location of power may be centralised or decentralised, so 
that it can range from resembling a confederation on the one 
hand to a unitary state on the other. A federal state can 
have both autonomous and dependent local governments 
(Gelfand, 1985 : 239). In West Germany, Bavaria is, among 
all states, the most federalist in relation to Bonn and the 
most centralist in relation to its own provinces (Dagtoglou, 
1975_: 147). In fact, in the Third World there seems to be 
an inherent conflict between· federal arrangements.· and de-
centralisation of powers to local authorities. In countries 
such as Nigeria and Brazil, second tier authorities have 
been particularly centralist towards local authorities, 
often denying them financial resources. This is because 
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they regard third tier structures as a threat to their own 
power (Mawhood, 1989A ! 5-6). 
Further, there exists a'perception of federalism as a 
constitutional division of authority between central and 
subordinate tiers of government, with each tier exercising 
their powers independently of each other; viz. dual (or 
'layer cake') federalism. This existed in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries but is nowadays rejected as obsolete by 
intergovernmental relations theorists. The general trend 
in the 20th century in both unitary and federal states has 
been the expansion of central government at the expense of 
sub-national .... units of government. A more plausible concept 
to describe contemporary intergovernmental relationships is 
that of co-operative (or 'marble-cake') federalism; viz. 
national and subordinate governments working together in the 
same areas, sharing functions and powers (see 2.7 
Centralisation Trends for the reasons for this trend) 
(Reagan and Sanzone, 1981: 28). 
Similarly, there are different forms of unitary states. 
As Calvert (1974 : 8-9) points out, the idea that 
sovereignty is undivided and wholly located at the centre in 
a unitary state is also a legal definition. It does not 
preclude the distribution of authority, both vertically and 
horizontally. Some unitary states have devolved not 
insignificant powers to local level. For example, local 
governments in Sweden and Holland (both unitary states) have 
a high degree of local autonomy (Lockard, 1968 : 454). In 
both these countries, the historical tradition of local 
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government is an explanatory factor, and in Sweden the 
• 
rights of local government are enshrined in the constitution 
(which is unusual for a unitary state) (Gustafsson, 1981 : 
76-92). Furthermore, while the ultra vires doctrine, one of 
the prominent features of many unitary states, is 
restricti~e in that it prevents local authorities from 
responding to newly emerging needs it can, in certain 
instances, enhance autonomy too. Those functions conferred 
upon local authorities by statute very clearly belong to 
'\' ., 
them and are usually performed exclusively by them (Davey, 
1989 : 16-17). 
Calvert (1975 : 8-9) goes on to suggest that the extent 
of autonomy is influenced by other factors, in particular 
the power of sub-national units to tap major sources of 
revenue. If too much of this power is located in 
subordinate institutions, there may be a tendency for the 
unitary state to resemble a federation. Conversely, if too 
much power is located at the centre, decentralisation may 
exist on paper only. This relationship between finance and 
decentralisation is, as will later be examined, also a 
highly complex issue with no clear-cut answers. Perhaps 
the most illuminating suggestion is that of Dagtoglou (1975 
: 135-6), who argues that the choice between federalism and 
unitarism is a constitutional one~ while the choice between 
centralisation and decentralisation relates mainly to public 
administration. _Thus, there can be a difference between 
the formal constitutional provisions of a state and its 
actual political functioning. 
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It has been argued that one distinctive feature of 
federalism is that the percentage of central government's 
share of tax receipts is lower in federal than in unitary 
states (Lijphart, 1984 : 176-179). However, this is an 
unreliable index of autonomy. Lijphart does not examine 
constraints on subordinate units' ability to spend the money 
they raise, nor does he adequately deal with the issue of 
how central grants distort such figures (also see 3.6.4 
Local Expenditure as Percentage of Total central 
Expenditure). 
These factors have tended to blur the differences in 
decentralisation between federal and unitary states. In 
fact, Gelfand (1985 : 234-5) argues that until the 
introduction of legislation by the Thatcher government in 
the 1980s, which has severely eroded local autonomy, local 
government in unitary Britain was somewhat more autonomous 
than the federal arrangement in the USA. Smith (1985A 
15) says that the only crucial difference is in the 
procedures required to amend the intergovernmental 
relationships. In federal states this involves independent 
adjudication and the representation of the states, regions 
or provinces at central government level. In unitary 
states, it is theoretically possible for the central 
government to revoke all sub-national unit autonomy. 
2.5 DIFFERENT FORMS OF FIELD ADMINISTRATION 
Field administration is a form of deconcentration in that 
agencies exist at local level and are part of the country's 










are usually manned by civil servants (Smith, l985A : 142-
143). The need for deconcentrated field administration has 
already been pointed out (see 2.2 Terminology). In this 
section three main types of field administration, namely 
prefectoral, functional and communist, will be briefly 
discussed. 
In terms of the prefectoral system, the central 
government divides the whole country into regions/provinces 
and appoints a prefect for each area. The central 
government department (or departments) issues instructions 
to the prefect, who in turn issues instructions to the field 
agents, including elected mayors, under his control after 
adapting these instructions to the conditions of the area. 
This ensures that a pyramid of central command can be 
applied nation-wide. The best example of a prefectoral 
system is France (Fesler, 1968 : 324; Smith, 1985A : 153-
155) • 
In terms of the functional system, government is 
organised in terms of special tasks or a related set of 
activities. This entails dividing the country into 
suitable areas for the particular function and the creation 
of watertight departments to administer these different 
functions. There is a hierarchic chain of command from the 
centre to regional/provincial and then to local agencies. 
Responsibility for the implementation of central policy can 
also oe delegated to local level. Functional systems of 
administration are found in the United Kingdom and most of 
its erstwhile colonies. Such systems often co-exist with 
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elected local governments (Fesler, 1968 324; Gunlicks, 
-1986 : 202-3; Smith, 1985A : 152-153). 
The general characteristics of the traditional 
communist model are: 
1. Theory of mass participation and control. Theoretic-
ally, local government activities are subject to 
supervision by democratically elected councils. 
2. Integration of party and state. In U.S.S.R., Soviets 
are expected to function under the supervision of the 
appropriate local party organs. 
3. Extent of government responsibilities and the complex 
interrelationships between local councils and the other 
state organisations at the lower level. Smith (1985A 
: 140) suggests that decentralisation, state socialism 
style, is a smokescreen for the centralisation which 
the single-party system makes possible. Jacobs (1983 
: 17) concurs, arguing that local government is 
subordinate to the Communist Party. 
4. Democratic centralism; viz. local administrative 
agencies are answerable to both the local elected body 
and higher level administration (Smith, 1985A : 137-
40) . 9 
The issue of these different types of local government 
administrative systems tends to cross-cut the federal-
unitary debate. All these systems can be either federal or 
.unitary. Nor is the issue particularly informative when it 
comes to the question of decentralisation. It is not 
universally accepted that the prefectoral system in France 
44 
is less decentralised than the functional British model 
(Ashford, 1982}. Nor is it accepted that .socialism is 
necessarily synonymous with centralisation. Yugoslavia has 
a federal constitution and has adopted policies that can be 
described as genuinely decentralist, so much so that Volgyes 
(1986 : 165) claims that "the autonomy of republics and 
provinces of Yugoslavia certainly matches and often exceeds 
the.autonomy that the individual American states·have." 
2.6 FACTORS FAVOURING DECENTRALISED SYSTEMS 
One of the few systematic attempts to explain different 
degrees of decentralisation within different countries was 
the 1967 doctoral dissertation by Professor Vieira, who 
examined the relative levels of devolution in 45 countries. 
He computed a devolution score for these countries, based 
upon the ~atio of local government expenditure and receipts 
over a ten-year period (1953-1963) in both developed and 
developing nations. He also examined the extent to which 
certain factors in the environment seemed to correlate with 
devolution. His findings were: 
1. The age of the nation - older, well-established 
governments have a higher degree of devolution than 
newer ones. 
2. The size of the Gross National Product (cited hereafter 
3. 
as GNP} - those countries with high levels of GNP 
tended to have a higher degree of devolution than 
poorer countries. 
The level of development of mass media. Those 
countries with a more sophisticated and widespread mass 
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communication system tended to be more decentralised 
than those with incipient or weak systems. 
4. The level of industrialisation - industrialised 
countries tended to be more decentralised than those 
with agricultural economies. 
5. The number of local governments. 
The size and density of population and the physical 
size of the country were not significant, nor were the level 
of urbanisation, type of constitutional structures, ethnic 
composition of the population and public expenditure as a 
percentage of. GNP (cited in Sherwood, 1969 : 70-75 and 
Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984 : 7-8). 
Rather surprisingly, industrialisation and 
urbanisation show opposite tendencies, with the former being 
associated with devolution and the latter not. Sherwood 
{1969 : 74-5) postulates that industrialisation with high 
technology and elaborate specialisation may be a pre-
condition of a move towards a plurality of structures, in 
order to resolve the ensuing conflicts that complexity 
brings. 
Besides these correlations, Vieira made two other 
significant findings. Firstly, that pluralist structures 
only seem to be tolerated when the integrity of the system 
was not threatened, viz. national unity seems a necessary 
precondition for devolution (Sherwood, 1969 : 75). The 
other- issue is the relationship between structure and 
function. Did local government units or devolution come 
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circular causation, in that "organisations act on their 
environments, as well as being recipients of environmental 
demands." 
Although there are certain methodological problems with 
this survey in that the fiscal indices used would not be 
able to distinguish between the different forms.of 
decentralisation, it is nevertheless an invaluable attempt 
to compare devolution on a cross-national.basis.· 
2.7 CENTRALISATION TRENDS 
The general trend in both unitary and federal states in the 
20th century, particularly since World War II, has involved 
an increased growth of central government powers at the . 
expense of subordinate tiers of government. What are the 
reasons for this? 
Firstly, the creation of .a modern industrialised state 
as a single political entity with a fixed boundary itself 
engendered an ineluctable centralising impetus {Sharpe, 1979 
: 10) . Secondly, there has been the move from the country-
side to the cities following the development of industry in 
the latter. Mobility has also increased with car ownership 
and development of communications. This has led to a 
decline in the "sense of the locality and the corresponding 
nationalisation of attitudes and culture" {Sharpe, 1979 : 
12). Thirdly, there has been the development of the modern 
welfare state, which has led to central government 
redistributing wealth to the less privileged. This has 
caused central government powers to grow at the expense of 
sub-national units, specially in welfare functions such as 
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education, social security and health. Citizens living in 
poorer regions now demand and expect similar public service 
to those living in more affluent regions. There is a 
widespread belief that only central government can bring 
about territorial equality, because local governments with 
limited jurisdictions are unable to achieve national 
equality (Dagtoglou, 1975 156-157; Paddison, 1983 107-
108; Smith, 1985A : 80-81; May, 1969 : 445; Sharpe, 1979 
: 14). This growth in the uniformity of service and 
standards has led Gunlicks ( 19.86 : 198) to suggest that "the 
democratic welfare state may well .be the enemy of local 
self-government" (see 2.10.4. Equity/Territorial Justice for 
a more detailed discussion of this issue). 
Fourthly, with greater mobility has come the problem of 
spillover. effects. In functions such as education, 
decisions made by regional/local jusdictions will affect the 
whole of the country. certain central control is needed to 
ensure there are no adverse spillover effects. Concern for 
these externalities has often been used as a motivation to 
transfer local government functions to higher tiers of 
government (Paddison, 1983 : 107; Sharpe, 1979 : 14-15). 
Fifthly, there has been a massive expansion in the size 
and variety of government activities in the 20th century. 
Besides the factors already mentioned, wars, economic 
recessions and external economic, military and political 
threats have caused the role of central government to expand 
vis-a-vis sub-national units (Wheare, 1981 : 111-116 and 
238-240; Smith~ 1985A : 82). There have also been 
48 
---.__ 
complaints that this ever-increasing role of central 
government has been at the expense of civil liberties 
generally (Sharpe, 1979 : 12) . 
sixthly, economic management has caused central 
government to grow at the expense of local units (Smith, 
1985A: 180). It is widely believed that only central 
governments can achieve macro-economic objectives Of full 
employment, price-level stability, rapid economic growth and 
balance of payments equilibrium (see 2.10.2. Macro-Economic 
Objectives). Further, modern economies are dominated by 
large financial, commercial and industrial institutions. 
Only central government has the capacity to regulate these 
conglomerates (Smith, 1985A: 79). 
Many countries have attempted to arrest this drift 
towards centralisation by introducing decentralised policies 
(see Council of Europe, 1978). Although some countries have 
decentralised a reasonable amount of power in recent years, 
in the case of federal states it is still within the 
framework of co-operative federalism, where central and sub-
ordinate tiers of government share functions and powers. 
There has not been a return to the dual federalism system 
where different tiers of government operate independently of 
each other. A similar argument can be made for unitary 
states. (Also see 2.12 Decentralisation and Development for 
specific reasons why centralisation has occurred in the 
Third World.) 
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2.8 CONSOLIDATION OF LOCAL UNITS 
The question of consolidation of local units has 
important implications for local autonomy. It has already 
been mentioned that decentralisation is ineffective if local 
authorities have inadequate financial, human and.physical 
resources at their disposal (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 
1984 : 63-6~). It is often argued that one of the major 
reasons why local authorities lack these resources is .that 
they'are geographically too smal1. 10 This has often led to 
central authorities consolidating local units. This can 
take the form of either reducing the number of existing 
units and creating fewer, but larger local governments, or 
alternatively creating an additional metropolitan tier of 
government (Rowat, 1980) . 
It is a commonly held view that there is a trade-off 
between efficiency and democracy. Larger units can provide 
services more efficiently than fragmented local authorities 
but at the expense of reduced opportunities for local 
office-holding and access to decision-making. Larger 
units, in particular metropolitan governments, have been 
accused of being too remote from the man in the street and 
as a corollary, unresponsive to citizen demands (Gunlicks, 
1981 : 212-213; 'Johnson, 1979 : 236-237). 
However, this efficiency/democracy dichotomy is fraught 
with problems. Firstly, it can be cogently argued that 
consolidation inhibits greater centralisation. Central 
government often intervenes in the affairs of poorer units 
because of the demands of citizens for a minimum standard of 





creation of larger local units with sufficient financial and 
human resources .thus pre-empts the need for central 
government to intervene in local government affairs (Rowat, 
1980 : 290-211; Paddison, 1983 : 107-108). 
Further 1 there is not conclusive evidence that large 
local authorities are more effective or efficient than 
smaller local authorities. The economie.s of scale of 
larger units has never been satisfactorily proved (Stewart, 
1983 : 30; Smith, 1985A : 68-70). It is also extremely 
difficult to quantify the efficiency of certain local 
authorities' activities, e.g. creating public awareness 
about certain issues. Effectiveness is notoriously 
difficult to measure in the public sector generally because 
it often involves the harnessing of non-quantifiable social 
objectives. 11 
Finally, there is a viewpoint which acknowledges the 
inefficiencies of fragmented local government, but argues 
that decentralised government, warts and all, is better than 
consolidated units, because it is inherently more demo-
cratic12 (Hart, 1972 : 605 - 606). 
Another issue pertaining to consolidation is the 
relationship between devolution and equity. The under-
privileged are more adversely affected by fragmentation. 
Poorer local governments often fail to attain a minimum 
standard of services. Conversely, richer local governments 
are able to reap the benefits of metropolitan wealth, while 
largely escaping the costs thereof, e.g. they do not 
contribute to the cost of working class housing, while 
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accruing the advantages of their labour (Magnusson, 1981 
570) . There is a whole battery of zoning measures that 
richer local authorities can use to exclude potentially high 
cost residents who would increase the costs of public 
services, e.g. minimum plot sizes, the regulation of the 
value, type and size of dwellings, minimum building 
regulations (Wood, 1966; Dimond, Chamberlain and Hillyard, 
1978). A metropolitan body is potentially.progressive in 
that under certain conditions it can ensure the 
redistribution of wealth from richer local authorities/areas 
to poorer local authorities/areas of a metropolitan region. 
However, international and local evidence has shown that 
local authorities rarely organise effective co-operation 
voluntarily in respect of metropolitan-wide problems {CCC, 
1982: 776). Thus, for a metropolitan body to work 
effectively, it seems that participation must be mandatory 
indicating a trade-off between devolution and equity. 
2.9 NATIONAL UNITY 
An important issue is that of national unity. If the very 
fabric of a state is threatened, democracy is not likely to 
exist at all levels of government. Vieira (cited in 
Sherwood, 1969 : 75), Maddick (1963 : 40-41, 111), Mawhood 
(1974 
(1980 
514; 1987 : 20-22), Dawson {1978: 80) and Tordoff 
387) all argue that insecure·governments with a 
narrow basis of legitimacy will be reluctant to decentralise 
powers to local authorities because of the fear that they 
may be building up centres of opposition to their own rule. 




government powers; in particular, weak party systems are 
not conducive to decentralisation. Under such systems local 
authorities are viewed as dangerous rivals that must be 
suppressed.lest they threaten the centre's power; Lesotho 
and Kenya being cases in point. 
_Rather paradoxically, it is secure autocratic 
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governments, such as military regimes and one-party states, 
which tend to decentralise powers to local authorities. 
such regimes are often secure enough in their power to 
decentralise powers to local authorities. They often feel 
that oppositional groups lack the capacity to organise 
effective resistance against them. The motivation is often 
the need to allow an outlet for popular representation at a 
level. well removed from their own (Davey, 1983 : 21; 
Mawhood, 1987 : 20-22). 
Fesler (1968) shows the contradictory nature of 
centralisation and decentralisation during the historical 
stages of national integration. He argues that a 
politically developing nation needs to promote integration 
and accordingly centralisation in order to overcome 
parochial loyalties that threaten the break-up of the 
nation. However, the geographically fragmented power 
structure often requires deference to local notables. He 
suggests that the successful balancing of these 
contradictory tendences is often the essense of nation-
building. 
conversely, a politica],ly developed nation, where 
national loyalty to the state exists, can adopt an 
intergovernmental system with an extensive degree of 
decentralisation. This consensus is possible "because 
there already exists a fundamental social centralisation -
in the face of people's national identification, widely 
shared values and internalised restraints on highly 
parochial and norrn-cha.llenging negotiations" (Fesler, 1968 
372) . 
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Olowu (1988 : 18-19) points out that the·view that 
political integration can be achieved by the imposition of 
core cultures and values came under severe criticism in 
Africa because it stimulated further strife and even 
secessionist movements. As a result there was a move 
towards promoting national identity through decentra·1-
isation. Decentralisation was thus used as an instrument of 
state-building and as a counter to secessionist pressures 
and other centrifugal forces that threaten political 
stability (Paddison, 1983 : 151.). It sometimes resulted 
.from the demands of ethnic/linguistic/regional minorities 
for greater autonomy. The argument is that political 
stability and national unity can be enhanced by giving 
minorities that are territorially based in different parts 
of the country the ability to participate more directly in 
decision-making at sub-national level. The objective is to 
improve the legitimacy of the system by giving minorities 
'stake' in the system (Rondinelli, 1981 : 136; Rondinelli, 
Nellis and Cheema, 1984 : 20; Johnson, 1979 : 238). 
------
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2.10 FINANCE AND AUTONOMY 
2.10.1 Intergovernmental grants 
In virtually every country in the world, federal and 
unitary, central governments subsidise the revenue of 
subordinate tiers of government. The reasons for inter-
governmental grants to local authorities are: 
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1. To ensure that local authorities can offer a minimum 
national standard for services which central government 
deems it is in the national interest to subsidise. It 
is of particul_ar importance for functions where there 
are externalities, e.g. education. 
2. 
To equalise disparities between the revenue bases of 
rich and poor local authorities. There is often 
- ..... 
intolerable burden on the local taxpayer (Byrne, 1986 : 
201-202; Travers, 1982 : 4-5; Maynard and King, 1972 
: 27; Smith, 1985A : 110-114). 
The conventional view of the relationship between 
central government grants and local autonomy is that 'he who 
pays the piper calls the tune', viz. the greater the degree 
of central government subsidisation of local authorities, 
' 
the greater the degree of control (Davey, 1971 : 45; Byrne, 
1986: 202). However, matters are sometimes more complex 
than this simple equatio~ suggests. Smith (1979 : 22) 
proposes that there is no consistent relationship between 
central control and f inanc.ial independence. For example, 
French local government (until reforms of the 1980s) was 
generally recognised to be highly centralised. In 1948.the 
communes and departments' current· revenue was subsidised 
only to the extent of 12% and 34% respectively by the 
central state. In Japan local authorities raised 69% of 
their revenue from direct taxation, yet were highly 
controlled by the central government (Davey, 1971 : 48). 
In Netherlands, local authorities are highly subsidised by 
the central government (about 90% of revenue), yet they 
retain a great deal of autonomy. However, in the Third 
World, central financial control invariably leads to loss of 
autonomy (Mawhood, 1983 : 14). 
There are a number of other issues affecting financial 
autonomy that have to be taken into consideration. Another 
important factor is the type of grants. General (block or 
unhypothecated) grants are untied funds which local 
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authorities can use to determine their budgetary allocation 
in the way they deem fit. Specific (hypothetical grants) 
are tied funds for a particular service or section of a 
service. There are generally detailed rules and checks for 
expenditure and accordingly little discretion for the 
recipient governments. Local authorities sometimes have a 
mi~-of general and specific grants in respect of different 
functions (Hepworth, 1984 : 51; Reagan and Sanzone, 1981 : 
57). Yet as Smith (1985A : lli) points out, irrespective 
of the nature of the grants, the centre can control local 
governments through other means, e.g. administrative/legal 
controls. Furthermore, a problem with grants generally, 
even where there are formulae calculating the degree of 
subsidisation to local governments, is that central govern-
ment often arbitrarily reduces the anticipated amount for a 
particular financial year. This makes balancing expenditure 
and income very difficult for local authorities. 
There is a certain viewpoint that all grants undermine 
local accountabili~y, vi~. that councillors need to be 
answerable to the local electorate_for the raising of taxes 
to finance their budgets. If local authorities are 
dependent on grants, this weakens and confuses local 
accountability (Jones and Stewart, 1982 : 96-98; Bramley, 
1987 : 71-72). This claim is disputed. Smith (1985A: 118) 
argues that an increase in the level of grants is not 
inconsistent with local governments choosing budget 
priorities and local electorates holding their represent-
atives accountable for their decisions. However, grants 
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can sometimes distort local budgets. In America central 
grants require matching funds from the recipient state or 
local government. Local authorities are forced to allocate 
money to these functions even if they are in areas where 
there is not the greatest need (Reagan and Sanzone, 1981 
78-79). 
Finally, it is argued that grants in one sense promote 
decentralisation by enabling local governments to perform 
functions that they would otherwise be unable to perform 
(Smith, 1985A: 117). 
2.10.2 Macro-Economic objectives 
The standard argument used by central authorities to justify 
control over local authority expenditure is that the centre 
is responsible for macro-economic management of the economy 
as a whole. Fiscal and monetary policy instruments are 
used to achieve this stabilisation function. e.g. price 
level stability, balance of payments equilibrium. Local 
authorities are responsible for a significant proportion of 
public expenditure and accordingly their spending has to be 
curtailed (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1976 : 15-17; Byrne, 1986 
231; Davey, 1971 : 48; Hepworth, 1984 : 283). 
The basis of this control is that central government 
sets guidelines (normally ceilings for local expenditure}, 
but does not set expenditure levels for individual local 
authorities or involve itself in the expenditure total of 
these local authorities (Barlow, 1981: 3}. This is 
normally enforced by the direct approval of local 



















by approval of loans for capital expenditure (Davey, 1971 
'48-49). 
However, this viewpoint is not universally accepted. 
Evidence has shown "that an increase in public expenditure, 
financed from taxation and involving the provision of 
services which contribute to households' current standard of 
living, has no net impact on aggregate demand" (Jackman, 
1982 : 80). Alexander (1982 .: 107) suggests th~t macro-
economic management does not entail control of local 
government expenditure. He argues that to achieve this 
objective the government needs only to control the level of 
the grant. Byrne (1986 : 30) argues that central government 
only has to control local government expenditure financed 
through borrowing and central grants. Further, rate-borne 
expenditure does not affect money supply and interest rates 
(viz. monetary policy). It appears that the case for 
control over current expenditure (with the exception of 
grants} is questionable, while there appears to be a more 
solid case for control over capital expenditure financed by 
borrowing. 
Finally, reasons for central government control of 
local expenditure sometimes have little to do with fiscal 
reasons. For example, the Thatcher government's controls 
over local expenditure in England were motivated at least as 
much by attempts to emasculate left-wing councils as they 
were by macro-economic reasons, or both, as apparently was 




Another form of control is audit. While there seems 
general consensus that central government or their agents 
should have the right to audit local authorities' accounts, 
there is disagre~ment about the extent of this audit. 
Foster, Jackman and Perlman (1980 : 29-30) claim that the 
government district auditors in Britain' have greater powers 
than their counterparts who audit company accounts. These 
powers include: 
1. to see if expenditure is authorised by law; 
2. to see if accounts comply with statutory requirements 
relating to such matters as capital and renewal fund 
contributions, balances and proper provision for loan 
repayment; 
3. to see if income raised is in accordance with the law 
and that reasonable rents are charged. 
Auditing (along with budgetary review) is the major 
financial technique used by central government to check on 
the administrative efficiency and to ensure whether minimum 
standards are enforced (Davey, 1971 : 49; Mawhood, 1983 : 
The latter issue is quite problematic. As Mawhood 22) . 
(1983 21) points out, "There is often an unexpressed 
tension here : should they be elite standards or mass 
standards? The higher the standards, the less the autonomy 
of local authorities" (Hepworth, 1984 : 284). 
Other variables affecting financial autonomy are the 
kind of central controls there are over the setting of local 
tax rate and central limitations on local fees and charges 










2.10.4 Equity/Territorial Justice 
It is not generally argued, even by many on· the Left, that 
local government should be the tier of government that 
subsidises the poor. One of the reasons for greater 
centralisation of local government powers is the belief that 
the centre is the only tier of government able to secure the 
equitable distribution of public resources on the basis of 
need (Bogdanor, 1979 : 195} (see 2.7 Centralisation Trends). 
A highly decentralised taxing system would violate the 
principle of equitable taxation. Such a system would in 
all probability lead to identical individuals in different 
localities receiving different levels of services by local 
governments with varying tax bases. It would exacerbate 
regional/local inequality and contravene Buchanan's 
principle of fiscal equity, viz. equal treatment of citizehs 
whatever their geographical location (Oates, 1977 12-13; 
Paddison, 1983 168-169; Bramley, 1987 : 77). 
Further, it is argued that local government is an 
inappropriate site of redistribution because local 
authorities that adopt redistributive policies will find 
themselves losing their richer taxpayers (in particular, 
businesses who contribute the largest proportion of local 
tax), who object to paying higher taxes to fund local social 
security systems, and attracting less well-off citizens 
(Foster, Jackman and Perlman, 1980: 338). 
This problem of geographical inequality is not 
irresolvable. Intergovernmental grants can be used both to 
equalise disparities between the revenue bases of richer and 
poorer local authorities and to equalise varying expenditure 
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needs of local authorities. Countries such as Britain have 
made use of a scientific formula based on both resources and 
need, which has been used to equalise disparities in wealth 
at local level (Byrne, 1986 : 203-206). Grants can 
sometimes lead to greater central control. However, as 
pointed out,. there is no consistent relationship between 
central control and financial independence. 13 
,.,_further contentious issue is the efficacy·of grants. 
It is argued that intergovernmental grants is a system which 
gives unequal benefits to equals; viz. both ticher and 
poorer citizens in poorer localities will re1cei ve the 
benefits of such grants. Redistribution is therefore 
better served by central government welf~re grants directly 
to individuals (Oates, 1977' : 14-15; MAynard and King, 
1972 : 42-43). Finally, as already mehtioned, another 
problem of using grants to equalise living conditions is 
that subsidisation tends to blur fi~ancial accountability. 
2.11 POWER AND CONTROL (HIERARCHICAL RELATIONS) 
2.11.1 Intervention or control 
Stewart (1983 : 61) distinguishes between central government 
intervention and control. Intervention refers to activ-
ities that impinge upon local authority activities~ 
Control implies that the intervention will help achieve 
government purposes. Although control implies inter-
vention, intervention does not necessarily imply control. 
It can be seen that there is no simple correlation between 
government intentions and actual outcomes. The reason for 













organisational context. All delegated tasks involve some 
degree of discretion, the definition of which is: "A public 
. 
officer has discretion wherever the effective limits on his 
power base leave him free to make a choice among possible 
courses of action and inaction'' (Davis, 1969 : 4) . The 
delegating body ipso facto loses control when it delegates 
power to lower tiers of government. Simon has shown that 
even in the military, the most hierarchical and 
authoritarian organisation, a certain amount of discretion 
exists when delegation takes place (cited in Ham and Hill,. 
1984 151). 
Stewart (1984 : 60-61) argues that the traditional 
intergovernmental relationship is based on the misleading 
model of purposive organisation; viz. that central govern-
ment has clear aims for the range and scope of services and 
that the influence of central government can be measured 
quite simply by the extent to which these aims have been 
achieved. 14 He suggests that the problems with this model 
are: 
1. Central government is not a monolithic organisation, 
but a collection of disparate departments whose 
interests do not necessarily coincide. Further, as 
Rhodes (1981 : 30) points out, different sections of 
the same central government depar,tment may have 
different attitudes and behave differently towards 
iocal authorities. 
2. Central government has no clearly defined policies in 
certain areas, preferring to decide issues on merit. 
-·-. 
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3. Central government instruments for intervention have 
not been systematically deveioped and are not 
necessarily consistent with each other or clearly 
related to government objectives. 
2. 11. 2 Implementation Studies 
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A related point to the previous issue is the question of 
policy being made during the so-called implementation stage .. 
Ripley and Franklin (1982 : 5-6) define policy 
implementation as "what happens after laws are passed 
authorising a program or policy or benefit or some kind of 
tangible output". Two major models of implementation are 
that of the classical (top-down) and integrationist (bottom-
up). 
The classical model views policy-making and policy-
implementation as two distinct fields. It rests on the 
politics/administration dichotomy, viz. legislators make 
policies and bureaucrats passively im~lement them. 
Implementation is regarded·as an important area of concern, 
but the top-down theorists limit their analyses to the 
problems of the process flow and the institutions 
responsible for executing the policies. The behaviour of 
bureaucrats is not important; they are seen as uncritical 
implementers of policy. 
For integrationist theorists, however, policy-making 
and policy-implementation are inextricably linked. Very 
few decisions are self-executing. The nature of 
bureaucracies is important. The actions of bureaucrats can 
substantially affect the implementation of policies. 
They would argue that there are a number of reasons why 
policy may continue to be made during the implementation 
stage. Some of the important ones are:. 
1. because some conflicts cannot be resolved during the 
policy-making stage; 
2. because it is regarded as necessary to let key 
decisions be made only when all the facts are available 
to implementers; 
3. because it is believed that implementers 
(professionals, for example) are better equipped to 
make key decisions than anyone else; 
4. because little is known. in advance about the actual 
impact of the new measures; 
5. because it is recognised that day-to-day decisions will 
have to involve negotiation and compromise with 
powerful interest groups (Hagwood and Gunn, 1984 
209; Bain, 1986 : 37-38). 
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However, policy is not only made during this 
implementation process; it is the stage where policies 
stand or fall. It has been viewed as the "Achilles heel of 
the entire policy process" (Hanekom, 1987 : 55) and it has 
been said that "the content of policy and its impact on 
those affected may be substantially modified, elaborated or 
even negated during the implementation stage 0 (Anderson, 
1975 : 58). The possibility then exists that local 
authorities performing functions on a delegated basis on 
behalf of a higher tier of government have the ability to 
amend policy during the implementation stage. There is 
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therefore a need to move away from the top-down perspective 
which sees the autonomy of local government in terms of the 
powers and duties laid down by central government (Harn and 
Hill, 1984 167) • 
Drawing on a synthesis of.the classical model's 
structuralist/process problem approach and the integration-
ist model's behaviouralist approach, one can identify a 
number of obstacles (which are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive) during the implementation phase.which may 
severely jeopardise the success of a given policy:. 
1} Insufficient financial and human resources are devoted 
to the programme. 
2} Policy-makers lack the time and interest to legislate 
in minute detail. Legislation is often framed in a 
broad fashion allowing implementers plenty of scope to 
influence the content of policy. This means bureau-
crats can sometimes subvert the content of policies 
with which they do not agree. This can be done 
through, for example, the substitution of the bureau-
crat's view for policy, selected acceptance of 
instructions and obeying the spirit rather than the 
letter of policy. 
3) Policy goals are often multiple, conflicting and vague, 
which leads to ineffective implementation. 
4} There is often faulty communication between policy-
makers and bureaucrats. If bureaucrats do not know 
precisely what they are supposed to do, this will also 
lead to ineffective implementation. 
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5) Ineffective implementation can be due to poorly framed 
policies rather than implementation per se. Policies 
adopted are sometimes bad choices based on faulty 
premises. 
6) Inadequate time is devoted to the programme. 
7) If implementation depends on the cooperation of other 
implementing agencies, it is likely to hinder the 
successful execution of policy. 
8) Circumstances external to the implementing agency can 
provide crippling constraints, e.g. policy is un-
acceptable to some interests which have the power to 
veto them {Hogwood and Gunn, 1984 : 198-206; Garcia-
Zamor, 1988 : 2; Bain, 1986 38-44; Ham and Hill, 
1984 : 96-101) . 
Finally, Smith (1985B 135-137) argues that 
implementation is more of a major impediment to the success 
of public policies in the Third World than in developed 
nations. There are a number of reasons for this, including 
lack of resources, poorly framed policies, target group 
opposition, and underdeveloped, inefficient bureaucracies 
which are unable to formulate and implement plans properly 
{also see Garcia-Zamor, 1988 : 2). Smith {1985B: 135-136) 
also offers another rather interesting explanation for 
policy subversion during the implementation stage in the 
Third World. Interest groups and individuals are often 
excluded from the policy formulation in many Third World 
countries, where genuine representative democracy does not 
exist. It is during the implementation stage that these 
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excluded groups or individuals can articulate their 
interests. This can take a number of forms including 
bribery, and this leads to the modification of policy. 
2. 11. 3 Elasticity of control 
68 
It has been advanced that in developed countries such as the 
United Kingdom and the USA, the intergovernmental 
relationspips are characterised by "ela,sticity of control". 
This means that central interference of a disciplinary or 
compulsory nature is theoretically possible but in reality 
rare. Various forms of supervision and guidance tend to 
characterise this relationship (Werlin, 1970 : 192-193). 
Conversely, in many underdeveloped countries in Africa, 
the relationship tends to be relatively inelastic. Due to 
a lack of cooperation in such societies generally, control 
tends to be authoritarian, ineffectual or a sporadic 
oscillation between the two. The centre tends to use 
coercive or corruptive forms of power, rather than subtle 
persuasion (Werlin, 1970 : 193). 
The premise of this concept is that as a country 
develops politically, there is a gradual shift from coercive 
to persuasive control. The more illegitimate the 
legislation and administration in underdeveloped countries, 
the more likely that coercion and patronage will occur. As 
legitimacy develops, subtler ways for inducing compliance 
can be utilised (Werlin, 1970: 195-196). 
2.12 DECENTRALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.12.1 Need for Decentralisation 
Besides the general values of local government that have 
been discussed, there are more specific reasons used to 
argue the need for decentralisation in meeting developmental 
objectives in the Third World. 15 The most important of 
these are: 
1. Decentralisation is a mechanism of overcoming the 
problems of the highly ineffective centrally controlled 
planning that has been used in many developing nations 
since independence. Government officials in the field 
can obtain better information about local problems and 
needs and adopt national plans t.o local conditions if 
they are in close contact with the local population. 
2. Decentralisation can reduce congestion at the centre. 
It can cut through the red tape and the highly 
structured hierarchy of central planning in developing 
nations due largely to the over~concentration of power, 
authority and resources at the national capital of the 
country; and could lead to the speedy completion of 
projects by giving local agents greater decision-making 
powers. 
3. Decentralisation can allow greater political and 
administrative penetration of national government 
policies into remote areas where central government 
plans are often ignored by or unknown to the local 
elite and where support for national development plans 
is often weak. 
\ 
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4. The aim of many decentralisation programmes is to 
improve the living standards of the poor; viz. the 
amelioration of poverty, inequality and material 
deprivation. To succeed, such programmes must involve 
the participation by its clientele group in the 
planning and implementation thereof. 
5. Decentralisation can lead to the development of greater 
expertise amongst local governments and thus expand 
their capacities to take over functions that are best 
suited to local level. 
6. Decentralisation can offset the influence or control 
over development activities by conservative local 
elites who are lukewarm about national development 
policies and insensitive to the needs of the less 
privileged (Rondenelli, 1981 : 135-136; Rondinelli, 
Nellis and Cheema, 1984 : 5-9; · Conyers, 1983 : 98-101; 
Smith, 1985 : 186-188; Maddick, 1963 : 44-74). 16 
2.12.2 History of Decentralisation 
According to Mawhood (1989B: 4), the history of decentral-
isation to local authorities in Anglophone Africa can be 
viewed in terms of a pendulum model. Four distinct phases 
can be identified. Firstly, there was the colonial rule 
phase. A decision was made by the Colonial Office in 1947 
to establish autonomous local authorities along the lines of 
the English model. In the latter days of colonial rule, 
there were thriving local authorities. One reason for its 
introduction was to defuse po~er, thus diverting the 
attention of the educated elite away from strategic policy 
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issues at central level. The other reason was the use of 
decentralisation as a tool to achieve developmental 
objectives (also see Kasfir, 1983 : 27). 
The second phase in the immediate post-independent era 
in the 1960s saw a rapid loss of decentralised local 
government powers. Kasfir (1983 : 33-37) cites four main. 
reasons why decentralised government was abolished with 
great rapidity. Firstly, there was tension between 
imported and indigenous institutions; ·viz. the contradition 
created by the imposition of the colonial legacy on 
traditional social practices. This dilemma between 
traditional moral beliefs in which channelling resources to 
one's kin was regarded as one's political duty and the 
rational model of Administration imported from the First 
World which resolved itself into what in the West was 
regarded as massive corruption. There was little 
commitment by national and local officials/councillors to 
the ethos of local government and little obligation to make 
the system work. Accordingly, the performance of many 
local authorities was ineffective and inefficient (also see 
Riggs, 1964). 
Another legacy from the colonial era was its author-
itarianism. Many African leaders ~ere conditioned by the 
Hobbesian view of laws under colonial rule: viz. they are 
obeyed only because of the threat of force. This 
bequeathed the notion that authoritarianism wqs the most 
expedient method of government. It is not surprising, 
then, that decentralised local government, with its concept 
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of 'dual mandate' (viz. the notion that elected local 
government could articulate alternative policies to those of 
central government) was rejected. (Also see Diamond, 1988 : 
7) • 
Secondly, there was the problem of the fundamental 
poverty of Africa. There have always been inadequate 
revenue resources available to local governments to allow 
them to implement tasks allocated to them. Central 
governments had access to most of the limited available 
resources. Inadequate resource bases have often led to 
central authorities taking over functions from lower tier 
authorities because of the latters' financial inability to 
perform such services adequately. Another consequence of 
poverty was the low levels of trained manpower. This 
further undermined decentralised local government. The 
better educated ended up in the employ of central govern-
ment, leaving the less-trained to work for local government. 
This led to problems of administrative inefficiency and 
corruption (also see Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984 
63-69; Mawhood and Davey, 1980 : 407-409; Maddick, 1963 : 
28-29) • 
Thirdly, there was the belief amongst both liberal and 
Marxist economists that rapid economic development needed 
centralised planning. This led to the centralised 
decision-making of the 1960s with a concomitant loss of 
local government powers. There was the belief that the 
limited funds should be utilised in terms of an integrated 






















reason for centralisation was the need to reduce individual 
and regional inequalities through centrally-based 
redistributive policies~ There was the belief that 
decentralisation of such programmes would enhance rather 
than reduce social inequalities (Olowu, 1988 : 14-15) (also 
see 2.10.4 Equality/Territorial Justice). 
Finally, and most importantly, the desire to stay in 
power was the fundamental reason why central authorities 
eroded local government autonomy. Coups d'etat, ethnic 
civil wars and class revolution soon became the order of the 
day in Africa. The stability of states was often extremely 
tenuous and they assumed huge powers not because they were 
strong but because they sought to compensate for weakness. 
Diamond (1988 : 20-21) points out that in Africa the state 
commands vast resources but cannot achieve its objectives. 
Furthermore, the norms that legitimise local government 
institutions had not been sufficiently developed to prevent 
attacks on them by central leaders who, in an insecure 
environment, often regarded autonomous local structures as 
potential fifth columnists (see 2.9 National Unity). 
The third phase involved limited moves back towards 
decentralisation in the 1970s. Perhaps the main reason for 
this was the spectacular failure of centralised planning and 
control. In countries such as Tanzania central decision-
making proved itself to be wasteful, ineffective and 
unresponsive to local conditions. There was a greater 
realisation that citizens had to be won over to develop-
mental objectives and that there should be some form of 
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local input into the decision-making process. Further, it 
·was yet to be proved that the short-comings of decentralised 
government could be averted in a centralised system. 
Corruption and inefficiency appeared endemic in larger 
bureaucracies (Mawhood, 1983 : 6-7; Diamond, 1988 : 22). 
This shift back towards decentralisation initially took 
the form of what was termed mixed models, which were intro-
duced in countries such as Ghana, Sudan and Tanzania. 17 
Such councils consisted of unofficial local representatives, 
government officials_ and party politicians. However, these 
councils tended to be rather short-lived. The problem was 
that these councils operated as a form of central 
representation. The shortcomings of centralised models 
still remained (Mawhood, 1989B: 246). 
The final phase has been a swing in the direction of 
the English-type local government model. The failure of the 
mixed model was one reason for this~ The problems of the 
centralised model had remained largely unsolved. Another 
reason was the wave of anti-central state ideology in the 
1980s which was inspired by the policies of the Reagan and 
Thatcher administrations. There was a general loss of 
confidence in the ability of the central state to solve 
societal problems. Many states (on both sides of the ideo-
logical spectrum) attempted to reduce the scope of the 
public sector in order to strengthen private sector 
initiatives. However, the private sector was underdeveloped 
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authorities was one of the alternative ~solutions that were 
adopted (Olowu, 1990 : 3-4). 
There was also a greater emphasis by multi-lateral 
organisations and donor agencies, such.as the World Bank, on 
local government involvement in service provision. In 
certain cases implementation through municipal government 
became a condition for aid (Olowu, 1990 : 3-4). 
Has the wheel then turned full circle? The answer is 
no. It has not quite been a return to the fully-fledged 
English model which existed in the 1950s. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, the tenuous position of many 
Third World governments ensures that there are still many 
central controls over the activities of local authorities. 
Secondly, the lack of financial and human resources in many 
local authorities ensures that central control is needed to 
guide development until the former structures' capabilities 
improve to the extent w.here they are competent enough to 
assume greater decision-making powers (also see 3.2 
Personnel). According to the United Nations (1962 27): 
The availability of controls facilitates 
devolution, particularly of responsibility for 
technical services. As individual local author-
ities prove their abilities, controls can be 
relaxed on a selective basis. Local authorities 
differ in their capabilities and require different 
treatment by.the central government. 
However, despite these impediments, these trends show that 




There are different forms of decentralisation; viz. 
devolution, delegation and deconcentration. Each of these 
different forms will reflect a ·different set bf central-
local relationships. The three values which local 
government is supposed to promote are liberty/democracy, 
participation and responsiveness. The claim for the 
liberal/democracy value is that it helps prevent the 
development of central tyrannies, but this is no guarantee 
against the development of local tyrannies. The partici-
pation value as an expression of community government is 
still valid to an limited degree, although not perhaps to 
the extent that some of its 19th century promoters 
advocated. The responsiveness .value is still highly valid 
because local government is a more preferable service 
providing body in comparison with a deconcentrated 
administration. 
Whether a state has a federal or unitary constitution 
does not seem significantly to affect the degree of 
decentralisation within it. There are three different types 
of local government administrative systems, viz. 
prefectorial, functional and communist. Certain factors · 
which facilitate the development of decentralised systems 
were identified. These included, inter alia, the age of the 
nation, size of GNP and level of industrialisation. The 
general trend in virtually all nation states has been 
increased growth of central government powers at the expense 
of subordinate tiers of government. The viewpoint that 
there is a trade-off between efficiency and democracy when 
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it comes to consolidation of local units is not necessarily 
valid. Governments with a' narrow base of legitimacy will 
normally be reluctant to devolve powers to sub-national 
units. However, decentralisation is sometimes used to 
improve political stability by giving minority groups the 
ability to participate in decision-making at sub-national 
level. 
The relationship between grants and autonomy is rather 
problematic. There is no simple equation between central 
government subsidisation of local authorities and the degree 
of autonomy. The justifications f~r macro-economic control 
over local authorities are not universally accepted. 
Auditing and budgetary review are also used to ensure 
central control. Central government subsidisation is often 
needed to ensure territorial justice because a highly 
decentralised taxing system will lead to geographical 
inequality. 
Although there are a number of formal mechanisms 
through which central government can administratively 
control local authorities, this relationship between 
government intervention and control is quite complex. There 
is no simple correlation between government. intentions and 
actual outcome. Policy continues to be made through the 
implementation stage by local authorities. 
' 
Decentralisation has often been used to meet 
development objectives in the Third World. There were 
thriving local governments in the colonial era. Autonomous 
local authorities were dismantled in many newly independent 
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states. There were a variety of reasons. for this, the most 
·important being the need to neutralise any possible 
oppositional base that could be used to undermine the 
central government. Top-down models, whether the 
centralised or mixed variety, have failed; they have been 
highly unresponsive to local needs. There have accordingly 





MEASUREMENT OF DECENTRALISATION AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the framework o{ analysis which is used to 
determine the degree of decentralisation that has occurred 
in South Africa in the 1980s is discussed. It must be said 
from the outset that this quest to measure decentralisation 
is fraught with methodological difficulties. Firstly, 
power is a complex phenomenon and its distribution is 
difficult to measure. One cannot make simple conclusions 
about power relationships (Fesler, 1965: 537). Secondly, 
there is difficulty in differentiating degrees of 
decentralisation within a given country at a given time. 
Different sub-national units are treated differently and the 
tendency to generalise often leads analysts to treat variety 
in decentralisations as minor deviations from the norm 
(Fesler, 1965 : 337). Power is not necessarily zero-sum; 
the addition of power at one level of the hierarchy does not 
automatically mean the withdrawal of power at another 
(Fesler, 1965 337; Stewart, 1983 : 68). 
Rabinowitz (cited 1n Aiken, 1973 : 446-7) has pointed 
out certain methodological problems that urban researchers 
conducting cross-national research may face, e.g. 
standardisation of data, lack of international conformity on 
what constitutes an urban unit, changes in principal 
boundaries over time and the quality of data. Other 
problems entail the variety in local government structures 
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and different voting systems (Aiken, 1973 : 441-2). Aiken 
· (1973 : 442) suggests that because of factors such as these, 
researchers should concentrate on intranational rather than 
cross-national research. 
Further, one cannot compile a definitive index because 
of the different dimensions found in decentralisation. It 
is suggested that the explanation for differences in 
. " 
decentralisation is unlikely to be found in one broad 
general theory. These different dimensions raise different 
issues which can probably only be explained in terms of 
different bodies of theory (Page and Goldsmith, 1985 : 198). 
It can be said from the outset that there is no 
universal theory of decentralisation. In 1961 MacKenzie (5) 
asseI'."ted that: "There is no normative theory from which we 
can deduce what local government ought to be; there is no 
positive general theory from which we. can derive testable 
hypotheses about what it is." About three decades later 
there has been little progress in this direction. Mawhood 
wrote in 1987 (20) that there is .not "any general normative 
model or body of testable hypotheses which apply 
universally" (to politically decentralised structures) . 
. Grand theory is accordingly rejected. There is no coherent 
body of theory which can satisfactorily explain different 
degrees of decentralisation within and between nations. 
Accordingly, this chapter does not attempt to make any new 
major theoretical contribution to the field. What this 
framework att~mpts to do is more modest. Its level of 

















Certain indices which can measure decentralisation are 
identified and examined. These indices are personnel, 
access, functions, party politics, finances, hierarchical 
.relations and size. As will be shown, even this middle-
range approach has certain limitations. 
3.2 PERSONNEL 
It is generally recognised as axiomatic that the more the 
centre controls the selection and deployment of local 
personnel, the less decentralised the organisation is · 
(Smith, 1979 : 221). A distinction can be made between 
three different types of local government personnel systems 
(although in practice some countries have a mixture of these 
models) • 
3.2.1 The separate system 
The separate model occurs when each local authority acts as 
a completely autonomous employer. Personnel are not 
transferrable to other jurisdictions by a central. body. It 
is not uncommon for the central government to provide the 
main impetus for sound local government practices under the 
separate system through, for example, the setting of maximum 
salaries, pensions, standards of local civil service systems 
and qualifications of certain technical personnel. 
The separate model is conducive to devolution of power. 
Permanently based local officials are likely to know local 
conditions better and develop more interest in community 
affairs than would employees recruited elsewhere. The 
problem with this system is that less affluent, smaller and 













competent personnel. Also, nepotism and corruption seem to 
abound under certain separate systems, in particular those 
where there is no central impetus for ensuring sound 
personnel practices, such as Brazil in the 1960s. 
The separate system is mainly found in developed 
countries with a tradition of_ strong local government, such 
as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France and New Zealand 
(United Nations, 1962 : 48-51; 1966 : 7-25; Mawhood, 
1983 : 18-20; Wallis, 1989 : 131-132; World Bank, 1989 : 
119-120). 
3.2~2 Integrated system 
An integrated personnel system is sai.d to exist when local 
authorities' staff are employed locally but are organised 
nationwide in a single service. They are civil servants and 
can be transferred, both to other local authorities and to 
other government departments, by the .bodies responsible for 
the civil service as a whole. 
Some of the advantages of the integrated system are 
that it permits the most extensive area base for the 
recruitment to the service; it makes quality staff available 
to all local authorities; it facilitates the optimal use of 
trained personnel; the presence of trained staff allows 
central government to devolve more functions to local 
authorities; and it minimises local corruption and nepotism 
(there is, however, no guarantee against central corruption 
and nepotism). The problem with this system is that it is 
highly centralist, because career loyalty of officials is to 























ambitious local authority offi.cer is likely to defend the 
council's interest where this is in conflict with the 
·viewpoint of a Minister or the civil service. 
Countries which use the integrated system tend to have 
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centralised governments with no strong tradition of 
decentralised local authorities. A sample of some 20 
African countries in the mid-19·80s showed that 12 of them, 
including Ghana and Sudan, had adopted the integrated system 
(United Nations, 1962 : 48-51; 1966 : 40-53; Mawhood, 1983 
: 18-20; Wallis, 1989 : 131-132; world Bank, 1989 : 119-
120) . 
3.2.3 Unified system 
The unified system exists when the local authority's staff 
are employed locally but are organised nationwide by the 
central government _in a single civil service parallel to the 
central civil service. The responsibilities of such a 
parallel civil service include the establishment of a 
national grading scheme, procedures for the recruitment of 
senior officials and control of the promotion and discipline 
of these officials. In certain unified systems the central 
body has the power to transfer staff to local authorities. 
Where a unified model exists, it is often in respect of 
senior local government employees only. 
The advantages of this system are that it can help 
smaller local authorities attract more qualified staff than 
would be the case under a separate system; it can facilitate 
the creation of nation or state-wide career services founded 
on merit principles, and it can reduce corruption and 
-· --
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officials, which in turn are more decentralised than those 
performed by deconcentrated field administrators. It can 
also be suggested that having directly elected members, as 
opposed to indirectly elected councillors, is more conducive 
to decentralisation. 
Another index is to look at the total distribution of 
administrative personnel between the different levels of 
government. The proportion '6f total public servants 
employed on relevant government functions, viz. those 
handled at local level in either a decentralised or 
deconcentrated fashion, needs to be calculated. The greater 
the proportion of people employed at local level on these · 
relevant functions, the greater is the degree of 
decentralisation (Stephens, 1974 : 61-64; Smith, 1979 
221) • 
3.3 ACCESS 
Page and Goldsmith (1985 : 181) define access as "the nature 
of contacts between central and local government actors". 
A more comprehensive definition.is that of Rhodes (1980 : 
577), who defines access as the ability of local government 
to penetrate national politicans and to influence policy-
mpking affecting local authorities. There are two issues 
that have to receive attention: 
1. How frequent and important are direct forms of access 
between individual and central actors involving 
bilateral direct.relationships between individual local 
authority actors and central actors, in contrast to 
indirect forms of access by which local actors have 
their views and interests represented to central actors 
through the mediation of national associations or 
interest groups of local officials and politicians or 
through party networks? (Page and Goldsmith, 1985 : 
181) . National associations of local authorities are 
an important issue here. How effectively do they 
represent their members' wishes? Or, alternatively, 
do they represent central government's view to local 
governments? (Rhodes, 1981: 31). 
2. Do these patterns of access give local government 
actors privileged access to central government 
decision-making processes? (Page and Goldsmith, 1985 
181) . 
In France the cumulation of offices gives local 
government actors who accumulate them considerable leverage 
and greater access to central decision-making. Mayors can 
also be elected to parliament and then use this conduit to 
bring benefits for their commune. In contrast, in the 
United Kingdom central-local relations are normally 
conducted between central government departments and 
national associations of local authorities which have tended 
to be rather weak def enders of local government interests 
(Page and Goldsmith, 1985 : 181). 
The role of technocrats and topocrats also has to be 
assessed when looking at this issue of access. Technocrats 
are professional specialists; they have the ability to 
exercise influence on behalf of their employing local 




.the centre and as members of professional associations they 
can lobby central government about improving professional 
standards. Another factor affecting the degre~ of 
decentralisation, is the extent to which professions are 
locally, rather than nationally, organised (Rhodes, 1980 
573 and 1981 : 33). 
Topocrats, on the other hand, derive their authority 
from place and they can p'romote or defend the interests of a 
particular geographical area. · It is suggested that 
topocrats have emerged as a countervailing power to 
technocrats (Rhodes, 1981 85-6, 89, 90). 
Other factors relating to access are central 
government's policy of secrecy or openness in consulting 
local government on matters af·fecting them, whether there is 
a directly elected mayor or not (he is often a powerful 
power-broker), and whether local political leaders are also 
represented in national political structures (Rowat, 1980 : 
602; Rhodes, 1980 : 373). 
3.4 FUNCTIONS 
. It has been argued that the range of local government 
functions is an index of decentralisation. Stephens (1974 
: 59-61) developed a service index to measure the 
state/local distribution of services based on the proportion 
of total expenditure on a public service allocated to state 
and local governments in the U.S.A. The formula was based 
on th~ proportion of total expenditure on a public service 
allocated to state and local governments. A service is 
classified as 'state' where the state spends 60-100%; as 
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local if the state spends 0-39%, and joint if the state 
accounts for 40-59%. 
It is therefore proposed that the more relevant 
functions (those that can be performed in either a devolved 
or deconcentrated/delegated fashion) that are handled by 
devolved methods, the greater the extent of decentralisation 
to local government {Smith, 1979: 216; 1985 : 86). 
There are certain methodological problems involved in 
drawing up a list of relevant functions. Each function has 
a number of detailed activities and to quantify each of 
these minute sub-activities would be highly time-consuming. 
This makes the practical application of this index rather 
problematic (Page and Goldsmith, 1985 : 178). A more 
limited and feasible approach is, however, to look at a 
single major function in detail. This approach was adopted 
in each of the case studies. 
Another relevant issue is to examine historically why 
certain relevant functions ended up at local level and 
others at central level (Page and Goldsmith, 1981 : 177). 
For example, as Carroll and Carroll (1980: 297-8) point' 
out, some functions are deemed primarily local because of 
different demands from different communities; there is thus 
minimal spillover and the service may be administered 
efficiently within a small community. Other functions are 
assigned to a higher tier of government because of the 
importance of administrative or financial economies of scale 
or because of the likelihood of spillover effects. 
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Finally, another complex issue is the distinction 
between the number of functions decentralised and the 
overall scope of a state's activities. For example, in 
Country A, local authorities could have a broad range of 
responsibilities, which nevertheless constitute a smaller 
proportion of the state's whole set of functions than a 
small range of functions p~rformed by the local authorities 
of Country B, in which local governments perform most public 
functions (Smith, 1979 : 216). Self-evidently, free-market 
orientated goverments will favour limited public sector 
provision of services, while social democratic and socialist 
governments will prefer a more active role for government. 
3.5 Party Politics 
The effect of party politics on decentralisation is 
another issue worth considering. The wishes and directives 
of national parties may substantially curtail the autonomy 
of their representatives at local level (Smith, 1985 : 89 -
90). Elazar (1968 : 379) argues that the existence of the 
non-centralised party system is perhaps the most important 
element of non-centralisation in federalism. Non-
centralised parties initially develop because of the 
institutional arrangements and political dynamics of 
federalism, but once they come into existence they tend to 
be self-perpetuating and to function as decentralising 
forces in their own right. In both Switzerland and the 
USA, cantonal and state parties, respectively, have strong 
powers at subordinate level. However, the process can flow 
in the other direction as well. Ideas, information, 
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experience and demands from grassroots can influence 
·national policies (Gyford, cited in Smith, 1985 : 90). 
3.6 Finance and Autonomy 
The relationship between finance and autonomy can be divided 
into three different categories: 
(a) nature of revenue base; 
(b) elasticity of sources of revenue; 
(c) amount of financial discretion in the use of revenue 
sources. 
3.6.l Revenue Base 
Mawhood (1983 : 14 - 15) has devised a scale on the systems 
of local financing, ranging from the 'most autonomous' to 
the 'least autonomous': 
i) Own revenues occurs when the council has wide 
discretion to vary the rate of the tax collected. This 
means that the taxation level can be adjusted to 
balance with expected expenditure needs. 
ii) General grants are unconditional grants. They are 
often based on a formula calculating the resources and 
needs for each local area. 
iii) Assigned revenues are prescribed and collected by 
central government and then handed over to local 
government. They tend ~o be less favourable to local 
discretion than (ii) because they do not embody any 
calculation of resources and needs. 
iv) Incentive grants cover a stated proportion of the cost 























centrally induced incentive to persuade local 
authorities to adopt some central policy. 
v) Specific grants occur when the local authority has 
virtually no say as to when and how money for a 
particular programme is to be spent. This is a form of 
delegation. 
vi) ,i;>eficiency grants are paid by the government simply to 
offset the difference between a local authority's 
expenditure and revenues. There is no inducement to 
encourage local responsibility in collecting and 
spending, and the local authority is often treated as a 
subordinate government agency. 
However, it is necessary to qualify this continuum. As 
pointed out (in 2.9.1 Intergovernmental Grants) the 
relationship between grants and autonomy.is rather problem-
atic. A good example of this is a situation where a local 
authority raises most of its revenue but is still controlled 
by other means. 
3.6.2 Elasticity of Tax Base 
The elasticity of the financial resources available to 
local governments is another important issue, in so far as 
they need revenue sources that can expand beyond the rate of 
inflation. Davey (1971 : 147) argues that elasticity is 
best attained "where the taxable. base expands of its own 
accord in keeping with the growth of the economy, the rate 
of inflation and demands of expenditure." 
Countries that have inherited the British system of 
local government financing (most of its erstwhile colonies) 
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have often experienced a shortage of income at local level . 
. Rates/property tax i_s extremely inelastic and tends to lag 
behind the inflation rate (Hepworth, 1984 : 15). In many 
Third World cities, which rely on rates as a major source of 
income, large population growth and rapid urbanisation make 
balancing the budget even more difficult. Local income 
taxes are more buoyant than rates. Countries which rely on 
local income taxes, such as the Scandinavian states, suffer 
less .from a resource squeeze (being caught between a 
declining revenue base and an increas~d demand for goods and 
services) than those countries whose major source of income 
is rates (Smith, 1985 : 102) . 
3.6.3 Financial Discretion over Expenditure 
Davey (1983 : 120 - 121) argues that local authority 
financial discretion in respec~ of expenditure has two 
elements: 
(a) scale: · the amount of money they are allowed to 
spend; 
(b) purpose: the objects on which they are allowed to 
spend their revenue. 
Using both these dimensions Davey has derived a continuum in 
descending order of discretion: 
(1) Local authorities have complete freedom to spend as 
much as they like on what they like. 
(2) They can spend as much as they like, but only on a 
prescribed range of services. 
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(3) They may allocate money between different services 
(unlimited or prescribed) but with a fixed ceiling on 
expenditure. 
(4) They may allocate money between services providing they 
spend a mandatory minimum on certain functions. This 
mandatory minimum may be laid down by statute or be a 
condition of a higher tier government grant or loan. 
(5) They are free to allocate money, but only within total 
amounts prescribed for individual functions by higher 
tier government. 
(6) A higher tier of government prescribes levels of 
sectoral expenditure and details allocations within 
these. Local authorities only execute centrally 
prescribed budgets and exercise choice only over the 
lowest level of detail. 
These restrictions can apply to all levels of local 
authority expenditure, or alternatively certain parts of it; 
viz. 
i) capital expenditure only; 
ii) current expendi'ture only; 
iii) expenditure on certain functions only; 
iv) certain types of expenditure, e.g. personnel 
costs; 
v) amounts received from central government 
allocations; 
vi) a fixed percentage of total expenditure; 
vii) expenditure up to a certain basic level. 
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Another control over expenditure is statutory 
requirements obliging local authorities to set aside fixed 
sums or percentages for specific purposes. A common 
requirement is that a certain percentage of revenue must be 
set aside for capital development purposes (Davey, 1983 : 
156). 
3.6.4 Local.Expenditure as.Percentage of Total 
Central Expenditure 
Another indicator of decentralisation is the level of local 
expenditure as a proportion of total public expenditure. 
The greater the percentage of. local government expenditure, 
the greater the extent of decentralisation (Smith, 1979 : 
219; Page and Goldsmith, 1985: 177). However, this is 
less useful. This was the formula that Vieira used and, as 
already pointed out, this variable cannot distinguish 
between different types of decentralisation. Different 
components of the same function, e.g. policy-making, 
financing and execution, may reside at different levels of 
government. To exa~ine only the financing of a function 
does not tell us who has control over the critical policy-
making element thereof; it does not tell us the difference 
between delegation and devolution. Furthermore, as Smith 
(1979 : 219) points out, for this index to be analytically 
useful, one has to subtract expenditure which could never be 
devolved, e.g. defence and foreign affairs, from the total 
expenditure. It needs to concentrate on relevant functions 
which could be the responsibility of either central or local 
government. 
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3.7 Hierarchical Relations 
There are certain formal administrative mechanisms 
through which higher tier control over local authorities' 
powers can be maintained. They are: 
i) Approval of decisions - decisions can only come into 
effect after approval by the higher authority. 
ii) Directives/instructions - ordering local authorities to 
do or refrain from doing some act. 
iii) The power of suspension - higher tier authority has the 
power to suspend the activities of local authorities. 
iv) ·The power.~f annulment - decisions of the local 
authority can be overturned. 
· v) The power of reformation - decisions of the local 
authority can be modified. 
vi) The power of substitution - the higher authority can 
act in place of a lower one (De Forges, 1975 : 127). 
In addition to the controls mentioned in the financial 
section, there are other administrative mechanisms which can 
be used to ensure higher tier control, e.g. circulars laying 
down policy, inspectors, and the requirement of reports on 
progress in specific services. 
There are other issues affecting this extent of 
control. The first factor is the legal framework of 109al 
government - whether the local government services are 
decided locally or whether they are explicitly granted by 
central government, for example through the ultra vires 
doctrine (see 2.4 Federalism vs. Unitarism). The second 
issue is whether the general supervisory powers are vested 
in a higher tier government official such as the Prefect in 
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France before 1982. The third issue is whether services are 
mandatory (whether local authorities are legally obliged to 
offer services) or permissive (whether local authorities by 
virtue of a special grant or powers or a constitutional 
provision of general competence, have the freedom to offer 
services). Finally, the extent to which central government 
attempts to issue nonstatutory advice. to local government 
also affects the degree of decentralisation (Pag~ and 
Goldsmith, 1985 : 178 180). 
However, not all of these arguments are black and white 
when it comes to the issue of autonomy. For example, the 
conventional argument that the ultra vires doctrine is by 
definition more centralised than the general competence 
doctrine has been questioned (see 2.4 Federalism vs. 
Unitarism). Furthermore, merely because local authorities' 
activities are mandated does not mean that they have little 
discretion. In many cases the legislation granting duties 
"· 
on local authorities does not specify the level of activity 
or the way.the activity should be carried out (Stewart, 1983 
14 7) • 
It must also be repeated that central intentions are 
not always uncritically translated into policy outcomes at 
local level (see 2.11.1 Intervention or Control). 
Extensive central supervision notwithstanding, local 
authorities can retain a certain amount of discretion. 
Another issue is that of different forms of supervisory 
patterns. Griffith (1966 : 515-528) distinguishes between 





patterns over the activities of local authorities, viz. 
laissez-faire, +eguiatory and promotional. Laissez-faire 
entails minimum intervention within the necessary fulfilment 
of departmental duties. Regulatory control is somewhere 
between laissez-faire and promotion of local authority, viz. 
the middle way.' One of the major concerns is to see that 
statutory regulations a:r;e upheld. Otherwise the supervisory 
tier of government does not interfere excessively.in local 
authorities' affairs. Promotional supervision often implies 
local authorities executing functions under the close 
control and direction of a government department. Griffith 
suggests that the more politically important the functions 
are for central government, the greater the likelihood that 
this form of supervision will be promotional. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the more levels 
there are in an areal division of power, the more difficult 
it is for central government .to ensure that its policy is 
enforced at local level (Smith, 1979 : 220) . It has 
already been mentioned that delegation leads to discretion 
and therefore it can be argued that the more levels there 
are, the greater the delegation and discretion. 
Conversely, it can be argued that a multi-tiered system 
means that some decisions are taken by a remote higher-tier 
au.thori ty which does not necessarily represent the interests 
of the local community. Decisions would invariably reflect 
a compromise between the interests of the different 
communities, or even reflect the interests of one community 
ahead of another. A system would accordingly be more 
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decentralised if a local authority's jurisdiction 
corresponded exactly to a particular community's 
jurisdiction (Smith, 1979 : 220). 
As Smith (1979 : 220) 
puts it, "what might apply to levels within a bureaucratic 
hierarchy might not be_ applicable to the geographical 
hierarchy of the state." 
3.8 size 
It is argued that many problems associated with the 
sheer demographic borders in larger countries are resolved 
by decentralising powers to sub-national tiers of government 
in developed countries. 
This factor is still more relevent 
reduced the extent to which size inhibits decentralisation 
(Clark, 1974 : 29). 
Modern systems of communication have 
in less developed countries· (Smith, 1985 : 48), but as 
pointed out (in 2.6 Factors Favouring Decentralised 
systems), Vieira~s investigation showed there was no 
correlation between the physical size of the country and 
devolution. 
It is generally held that larger local authorities are 
, 
expected to be more autonomous on the grounds that they have 
strong revenue bases, more professional organisations, 
greater political power when dealing with central government 
and greater expertise at performing f~nctions. 
Smith (1979 
: 222) suggests there are two problems with this 
proposition: 
1. Research has not verified the hypothesis that smaller 
local authorities are more likely to submit and conform 
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2. The larger the units of decentralised government, the 
fewer units there are for central government to control 
(Smith, 1979 : 222). 
There is also, of course, no guarantee that larger local 
authorities will not be tightly controlled by central 
authorities. 
Size, then, is perhaps a rather uncertain index of 
decentralisation and needs to be subjected to greater 
empirical scrutiny. 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion has, hopefully, illustrated that 
the identification of indices which c~n illuminate. the 
degree of decentralisation in a given society is a rather 
complex task. The proposed framework for analysis is 
limited in its applicability; at best it can provide a 
partial explanation. 
The South African government's political decentral-
isation programme in the 1980s was implemented in a highly 
contradictory fashion. Government spokesmen claimed that 
extensive devolution of powers to sub-national units was 
occurring, while a number of commentators retorted that the 
local government reform programme was implemented in a way 
that led to greater centralisation. It is contended that 
this theoretical framework of analysis, however limited its 
applicability may be, can make greater conceptual sense of 














The model developed here is the fully-fledged framework. 
for analysis. In the case studies a more limited variant 
will be applied, in which only certain indices will be 
examined. The reasons for.this are, firstly: not all the 
information needed for the fully-fledged model is available. 
The strong proclivity of the South African public sector 
towards secretiveness is a major impediment in this regard 
(see 1.5 Methodology). Secondly, certain indice~ are 
inappropriate to certain of the case studies. Thirdly, 
space constraints are another impediment to the application 
of the fully-fledged model. The application o~ the limited 
variant has already led to fairly detailed case studies. 
The utilisation of the fully-fledged model would have led to 
these case studies being too long and cumbersome. 
Finally, while these indices are largely geared towards 
middle-range analyses, aspects of some of them are also of 
relevance when looking at macro-level. Reference will 
accordingly be made to such indices in the chapters looking 
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SECTION 2 
CHAPTER IV 
, HISTORY OF WHITE, COLOURED AND INDIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT : 
1910-1979 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide a brief history of the central-
local relationship in South Africa from 1910 unti~ 1979, 1 an 
era which has generally been recognised by most local 
government commentators as one of increased diminution of 
local authorities' powers and functions as a result of 
centralisation by both central and provincial governm~nt. 
It will' examine the constitutional framework of South 
Africa, the structure, functioning and financing of both 
provincial authorities (the supervisory body of local 
authorities) and local government. Reasons for 
centralisation will be analysed, as will both central and 
provincial manifestations of this trend. Finally, it will 
look at the development of different local government 
structures for different race groups, a process that was 
accelerated after the NP was elected in 1948 on the 
apartheid manifesto. 
4.2 CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Slabbert and Welsh (1979 : 86) posit that "the possibility 
of a highly centralised system was inherent in the South 
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African constitution from its inception." An examination of 
the intergovernmental aspects of the 1910 and 1961 
constitutions seems to corroborate this claim. 
The South Africa Act of 1909 established the Union of 
South Africa, which consisted of the four self-governing 
'.:. 
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British Colonies, viz .. cape Province, Transvaal, Natal and 
the orange Free state. These colonies.surrendered most of 
their powers and functions to central government and .became 
provinces in the Union of south Africa, which was 
established in 1910. They did, however, retain their pre-
Union borders (J. Cloete, 1988 : 226). 
The south Africa Act created a three~tier system. 
Firstly there was a parliament based on the British 
Westminster system in terms of structure, procedure and 
practice. The constitutional form of government that was 
adopted was unitary, viz. a centralised legislative 
authority was considered sovereign over all forms of 
subordinate legislatures. A bicameral system was created 
which consisted of the House of Assembly and the Senate. 
only whites could be elected to parliament, although limited 
voting rights existed for 'non-whites' in the Cape and 
Natal. 2 Further, certain powers were vested in the 
Governor-General as representative of the British crown 
(Olivier and van Wyk, 1978 : 2; Slabbert and Welsh, 1979 
77-80). 
The second tier of government was the provincial 
system. The viewpoint amongst most delegates to the 
National Convention was that south Africa was too large for 
a governmental structure only consisting of the central 
authority and local authorities (De Wet, 1984 : 227). 
The 







Orange Free State 
Transvaal 
644 060 km2 
91 740 km2 
125 930 km2 
265 470 km2 
(RSA, Bureau of Information, 1989 : 1) 
Although the provincial system was sometimes regarded as a 
compromise between those who wanted a federal state and 
those who wanted a unitary state, Vosloo and Schrire's 
claim (1978 : 17) that "in its powers and functions the 
(provincial) system was clearly a victory for those 
delegates who favoured a strongly centralised system" seems 
a more accurate observation. Acts of parliament promulgated 
what powers Provincial Councils had. Such councils were 
very much subordinate legislatures: all draft ordinances 
had to be approved by the Governor-General before they 
became law. If inconsistent with national legislation, such 
ordinances were vetoed. Central government also had the 
authority to make regulations binding upon them and to 
revoke their powers and functions (J. Cloete, 1988: 17; 
Meyer, 1978 : 90-91; Vosloo and Schrire, 1978 : 77-79). 
The third tier of government was that of local 
authorities. At the time of Union, all four colonies 
already had well-developed forms of local government. The 
four colonies had been colonised by the Dutch and the 
British in turn, and both countries had introduced local 
government institutions based on their respective indigenous 
systems. However the British re-colonisation of 1806 had 
led to the virtually total anglicisation of structures which 
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was reflected in the system of local government that existed 
just prior to Union (Vosloo, 1974 : 20-21). 
Because of South Africa's large size it was considered 
practical to have the provincial authorities supervising 
these local authorities (Freed, 1~36 .: 69). The alternative 
to the provincial system had involved either minimum or 
maximum devolution of powers, both systems having political 
and administrative problems. Provincial ordinances created 
local authorities and defined the scope of their local 
jurisdiction •.. The regulation and control of municipal 
affairs occurred through such provincial ordinances, 
although parliament was also a competent body to create 
local authorities. Local authorities could only make by-
laws within the parameters of this legislation. The 
Republic of south Africa Act of 1961, whereby the country 
became a Republic, did not change this intergovernmental 
relationship. The only constitutional change worth 
mentioning was that the Governor-General's prerogatives were 
now vested in the State President, in theory elected by 
parliament, but in practice, given the size of the NP's 
majority, a political nominee of the ruling party in the 
House of Assembly (Meyer, 1978 
25-26: Cloete, 1988 : 35). 
43, 90-91: Vosloo, 1974 
Unlike certain countries such as West Germany, where 
the rights of local government are enshrined in the 
constitution, the South African system of local government 
has never had any form of constitutional safeguards. 
Neither the constitution of 1909 nor that of 1961 made 
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reference to the right of local government to exist. There 
was nothing in the statute which made it mandatory for 
provincial councils to create local authorities. Their 
powers and functions could be revoked by provincial 
authorities. No court of law was competent to pass judgment 
on the nature of powers that were devolved down to local 
authorities. This applied equally to Acts of parliament arid 
provincial ordinances. The doctrine of ultra vires applied, 
viz. that local authorities could only perform a statute if 
it was specifically authorised by a higher tier of 
government (Craythorne, 1979. : 11; 1982 128; J. Cloete, 
1988 : 266; Meyer, 1978 : 91). 
4.3 STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONING AND FINANCING OF 
THE PROVINCIAL SYSTEM 
One of the major manifestations of the centralisation that 
occurred under the Westminster system has been the 
subordination of the provincial system to central government 
dictates. This, as will be shown, had adverse implications 
for local government autonomy. 
The provincial system differed from both central 
parliament and local authorities in that power was not 
vested exclusively in the elected legislative body. Such 
power was shared between a centrally appointed Administrator 
and the elected provincial council. The Administrator was 
appointed by the State President (before 1961 the Governor-
General) on the advice of the cabinet. He was invariably a 
supporter and off ice-bearer of the ruling party in the House 










he was the representative of central government at local' 
level. He had to assist in the execution of central 
government policies and keep. in touch with other government 
departments so that his policies could conform to central 
functional policy, e.g. education! He exercised widespread 
powers of control over certain aspects of local government 
and administration and was statutorily empowered to act on 
his own in this capacity. 
The Administrator was also the Chief Executive of the 
provincial council. He summoned and prorogued provincial 
councils, took part in council proceedings, introduced all 
financial and appropriation draft ordinances and promulgated 
ordinances after the State President had given his assent. 
The councils had no power to dismiss their Administrators; 
that coulq only be done by the State President. However, 
councils could refuse to authorise the Administrator's 
budget and could adopt a motion of no confidence in him. 
The other majo~ component of the provincial system was 
the elected provincial council. The Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act as amended by the Constitution and 
Elections Amendment Act (1973) provided that when a province 
had less than 20 representatives in the House of Assembly, 
its provincial council had twice as many members as the 
province had members in_the House of Assembly. Otherwise 
the number of members in the two bodies was the same. 3 
Members of provincial councils were elected for five-year 
terms on a voters' roll which was the same as the 
parliamentary voters' roll. 
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Up to 1962 party divisions in the provincial council 
were proportionately reflected in the composition of the 
executive committee. An amendment to the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act in that year required members of the 
Executive Committee (cited hereafter as EXCO) to be elected 
by majority vote. Each committee was in charge of a 
particular portfolio, one being local government~ The 
Administrator was chairman of EXCO, having both a 
deliberative and casting vote. He had to abide by major 
decisions, except for matters where the State President 
could overrule EXCO (Vosloo, 1974 : 24-26; Vosloo and 
Schrire, 1978 : 78-80; Roux, 1971 : 110-113; J. Cloete, 
1982 : 215-223; RSA, President's Council, 1982B : 7-11). 
The chief administrative official was the Provincial 
Secretary who headed the corps of full-time bureaucrats. 
This was largely an integrated staff system; most 
provincial employees were members of the central Public 
Service and could be transferred to and from State 
departments. As pointed out (in 3.2 Personnel) this system 
is not conducive to decentralisation. However, some 
provincial employees such as teachers and nurses were 
provincial employees and their service conditions were set 
by provincial councils (J. Cloete, 1982 : 229). 
Elements of centralisation were then built into the 
provincial system from its inception. This system was a 
mixture of deconcentration and devolution, weighted in 
favour of the former. This dual role of the Administrator 
as well as the centralised constitutional framework meant 
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that "South African provincial authorities have (had) very 
little scope for decision-making independent of central 
government 11 (Roux, 1971 : 111) . 
This has been further exacerbated by the steady erosion 
of provincial powers and functions down the years.. White 
primary and secondary education, hospital services and 
provincial roads were their most important functions, along 
with supervision of White, Coloured and Indian local 
authorities. Other functions included fish and game 
matters, licensing and control of trade and recreation and 
cultural amenities. However, provinces lost Black education 
(1953), Coloured education (1965) and Indian education 
(1963) to central government departments. The centre also 
took over policy-making in respect of White education and 
certain aspects of hospital services in order to ensure 
uniformity of policy (Vosloo and Schrire, 1978 : 78-80; 
Roux, 1971 : 112-113; Vosloo, 1974 : 23-24; RSA, 
President's Council, 1982B : 9). 
Similarly, in the field of financing there was a loss 
of powers. The provincial powers to levy income and 
... 
personal tax were transferred to central government in 1972 
and replaced by central subsidies, albeit in the form of 
unhypothecated (untied) grants. The subsidies were 
calculated according to a formula based on the needs and 
financial abilities of the different provinces. The 
difference between the two would form the subsidy. 
Approximately 82% of provincial revenue now came from 
central subsidies (as opposed to 50% previously). The only 
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major sources of revenue the provinces were left with were 
motor vehicle licences and totalisator and related taxes 
(Vosloo and Schrire, 1978 : 28-29; Roux, 1971 : 114-115; 
Vosloo, 1974 : 24-25; RSA, President's Council, 1982B : 11; 
J. Cloete, 1982 : 233-236). 
This steady whittling away of provincial powers was 
exacerbated by the fact that from the 1950s onwards, the NP 
{the ruling central governing party from 1948 without 
interruption} controlled all the provincial councils except 
Natal. Such provincial councils offered little resistance 
to this process of centralisation (Slabbert and Welsh, 1979 
: 79}. The decline in provincial status, power and 
influence continued·right through this Westminster period so 
that by 1978 Vosloo and Schrire (1978 : 3) could quite 
uncontroversially state that "provinces are now essentially 
implementers of national policy rather than formulators of 
essentially provincial policies". Boulle (1985 : l} and J. 
Cloete (1983 : 140-141) came to similar conclusions. 
4.4 STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONING AND FINANCING OF 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
South African local authorities in the Westminster era were 
characterised by differentiation in almost every conceivable 
aspect, e.g. size, organisation, powers, functions, source 
of revenue and electoral qualifications. One reason for 
this was that there was no prior consultation between the 
various provinces at the time of Union. Accordingly, names 
and types of local authorities differed from province to 











different local government structures for different race 
groups (Van Rooyen, 1987 : 1-2; Roux, 1971 : 116; Vosloo, 
1974 : 26). 
4.4.1 White Local Authorities 
White local authorities were single-tier, multi-purpose 
institutions with both legislative and executive powers. No 
metropolitan form of government existe·d. There was a 
bewildering array of official designations for urban local 
authorities in the various provinces. These ranged from 
Village Management Boards, Village Councils and Health 
Committees, with limited powers and functions for smaller 
local authorities, through to Town Councils, Municipalities 
and Boroughs for larger areas with wider powers and 
functions, and to City Councils for large cities. The 
latter designation applied to larger town councils/boroughs 
(Roux, 1971 : 121; Vosloo and Schrire, 1978 : 82; Vosloo, 
1974 : 26). 
4.4.2. Urban Local Authorities 
Urban local authorities consisted of elected councils, 
normally based on a ward system. A mayor with largely 
ceremonial powers was indirectly elected by councillors. 
The two main forms of internal organisation were the 
multiple committee and management committee systems. Under 
the former system the councils were divided into a number of 
committees, each committee being responsible for supervision 
within.a specific functional area. Under this system, 
officials reported directly to the relevant committee, 
although general control rested with the council as a whole. 
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. This system existed in the Cape (with the exception of Cape 
Town) and Natal. The Management Committee, on the other 
hand, made provision for a cabinet-type system. Authority 
was concentrated in a single controlling executive, rather 
than the council as a whole. Such a system existed in the 
Transvaal, Orange Free State, and the city of Cape Town. 
The town clerk was the senior administrative/executive 
official of local authorities, heading a corps of permanent 
officials. Under the Management Committee system his 
position was strerigthened considerably, being the only 
channel of communication between the officials of the 
councils and the former committee (Roux, 1971 : 122; Vosloo 
and Schrire, 1978 : 82-83; Vosloo, 1974 28; Craythorne, 
1980 : 84-91; J. Cloete, 1988 : 255-257; RSA, President's 
Council, 1982B: 14~15). 
Local authorities provided a wide range of services to 
the public. Their functions included the construction and 
maintenance of roads and streets, the supply of water and 
electricity, control of tiaf~ic, provision of housing, 
refuse collection, health services, public library services, 
museums, public transport, building control, city and town 
planning, parks and recreation facilities, abbatoir 
services, fire-fighting services, the licensing of motor 
vehicles and of certain businesses, sewerage, cemeteries and 
crematoria, ambulance services and stormwater drainage. 
Police protection (except for traffic), education and social 










government functions (J. Cloete, 1986 45-46; Vosloo, 1974 
26-27). 
The services provided by local authorities could be 
divided into two categories in respect of decentralisation. 
Firstly, there were permissive functions which were services 
undertaken voluntarily by local authqrities. It was the 
prerogative of the local authority concerned to decide 
. . •" 
whether it wanted to offer such a service and it depended on 
factors such as the needs of the community and available 
finance and staff. Devolution of power existed here subject 
to certain indirect controls. Secondly, there were 
mandatory functions which local-authorities were- obliged by 
law to perform. These functions were often undertaken by 
local authorities on behalf of central government on an 
agency basis. For example, it was obligatory for local 
authorities to perform certain health functions such as the 
prevention of infectious diseases and the provision of 
health inspection and family planning services (RSA, Browne 
Committee, 1980, Annexure D: 27). 
4.4.3. Rural Local Authorities 
There were also different provincial institutions for rural 
local government. The only truly representative form of 
rural local government was in the Cape where the elected 
Divisional Council system existed. _Their raison d'etre was 
mainly the construction and maintenance of roads. However, 
they gradually acquired more-functions so that in terms of 
services offered they became .virtually indistinguishable 
from urban local authorities. In the Transvaal the Board 
113 
for Development of Peri-Urban Areas, in Natal the 
Development and Services Board, and in the Orange Free State 
the Small Areas Control Board, provided rural services. 
These tended to be appointed forms of government which were 
advised by local areas committees without executive powers. 
They, too, tended to offer a wide range of services. In 
these three provinces the provincial administrations 
sometimes supplied services directly to rural areas. 
Finally, provision was made in the Cape for local area 
committees in peri-urban areas, viz. developing areas, with 
advisory powers. However, executive powers still resided 
with the elected Divisional Councils (J. Cloete, 1988 : 261-
263; Roux, 1971 : 117-119; Vosloo, 1974 : 29-31; Vosloo 
and Schrire, 1978 : 83: RSA, President's Council, 1982B : 
13-14). 
Finally, in addition to multi-purpose urban and rural 
local authorities, single-purpose local authorities existed 
on a rather small scale as, for example, water boards and 
irrigation boards (J. Cloete, 1988 : 268-269). 
4.4.4. 
4.4.4.l 
The Financing of Local Authorities 
Classification of Local Authorities' Functions 
into Financial Categories 
The various functions of local authorities can be divided 
into three financial categories: 
i. Functions of local importance which have to be financed 
from local funds, e.g. administration, fire,. personnel 
and stormwater drainage. 
1 
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il. Functions of regional importance which have to be 
financed from municipal and state funds, e.g. township 
development, industrial zoning and provision of 
freeways and through roads. 
iii. Functions of national importance where the local 
authority acts as the agent of provincial or central 
authorities and is financed by the authority concerned, 
e.g. health services, environmental pollution, national 
freeways and vehicle licensing (RSA, Browne Committee, 
1980 : 6) • 
4.4.4.2 Sources of Income 
The South African local government system operated largely 
on the basis of self-sufficiency. Most of the revenue was 
self-generated, although the provinces determined the 
sources of revenue. The major sources of revenue were, 
• rates on fixed property5 (the power of rating goes back 
to pre-Union days); 
• income derived from trading services such as 
electricity, water and gas supply services; 
• service charges for certain amenities rendered by local 
authorities, e.g. fees for swimming pools, rent for 
municipal halls; 
• subsidies from central and provincial government, often 
in the form of specific grants; 
• loans which could be raised under prescribed conditions 
and for specific purposes (see 4.5.3.1 Financial 








Craythorne, 1980 205-209; RSA, Browne Committee, 
1980 : 28}. 
An examination of'l978 financial statistics show that 
rates (16,3%) and trading (55,9%) provided the lion's share 
of current revenue (Solomon, 1983 : 23). Service charges 
hardly covered the cost of rendering services. Grants 
provided only 4,2% of current and capital expenditure 
compared to Canada (46,5%) and the' United Kingdom (49%). A 
major reason for this was that education, social welfare and 
police functions which are heavily subsidised by higher tier 
authorities in these countries, are not local government 
functions in South Africa. What grants there were came from 
provincial administrations for services such as libraries, 
museums and separate beaches, as well as central government 
for services such as health and transport (RSA, President's 
Council, 1982B: 64-65). 
As a result of constant complaints by local authorities 
that their sources of income were insufficient to fund their 
growing responsibilities, 6 the government appointed the 
Borckenhagen Commission to examine intergovernmental 
financial relations. However, the Commission rejected local 
authorities' claims for additional sources of revenue, 
finding that income from property tax had not reached its 
limit (RSA, Borckenhagen, 1960 Part I : 30, 38, 40, 42-43). 
4.5 CONTROL OVER LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
4.5.1. Reasons for centralisation 
The Westminster era .has generally been recognised, even by 
government spokesmen, as a period of increased central-
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isation of ~local authorities' powers and functions (Heunis, 
1988 : 209). Four main rea~ons can be identified. Firstly, 
the trend can be ascribed partly to the tendency of central 
authorities in both unitary and federal states to centralise 
decision-making powers. This was exacerbated by the lack of 
restraints on the centre's ability to accumulate more powe.r. 
As pointed out (in 4.2 Constitutional Framework) local 
authorities had no entrenched rights. The ultra vires 
doctrine existed and their powers and functions could be, 
and were, revoked by higher tiers of government. 
Another reason for this centralisation was the 
ineffective division of powers between the three tiers of 
government. When provincial councils were introduced at the 
time of Union no new national allocation of functions was 
made between the provinces and local authorities. As a 
result, centralisation of policy-making occurred in 
functions such as health due to local authorities having 
inadequate financial bases to perform necessary functions 
and to employ trained staff. This unsatisfactory 
intergovernmental relationship was the subject of a number 
of government investigations. However, no rational re-
allocation of functions resulted from these investigations 
(Floyd, 1952 : 107; Roux, 1971 : 155; Hattingh, 1986 : 
17) . 
Macro-economic objectives provided a third reason for 
centralisation. There was a belief that only the central 
government could ensure macro-economic objectives such as 





authorities' financial affairs (see 2.10.2 Macro-Economic 
Objectives). 
The fourth reason was the need to ensure the 
implementation of apartheid. The NP was elected to power in 
1948 on its apartheid (separate development) manifesto. 
Apartheid meant large-scale social engineering in all 
spheres of life, including local authorities' functional 
activities. The NP initially expected white local 
authorities to be agents in the implementation of apartheid 
laws. However, in certain major cities the government 
believed that municipalities controlled by the United Party 
(cited hereafter as UP) 7 were deliberately obstructing the 
impiementation of strict segregation (see 5.5. 
Administration Boards for more detail). More direct state 
control was needed to ensure the successful introduction of 
apartheid. A number of important apartheid Acts which 
curtailed local government autonomy were introduced, such as 
the Separate Amenities Act and the Group Areas Act (see 
4.5.2 Central State controls). Further, the differentiation 
of structures according to race was accentuated with 
separate structures being introduc~d for Blacks, Coloureds 
and Indians. such structures were introduced under close 
central state control. The heyday of apartheid was 
associated with the brutal crushing of all 'non-white' 
opposition to the system; accordingly the state had no 
intention of giving such groupings platforms which they 
could use against the central government (Floyd, 1952 : 107, 
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143-144; Roux, 1971 : 155~ Hattingh, 1986 
and Welsh, 1979 87; Welsh, 1979 : 149). 
4.5.2. Central state Controls 
17; Slabbert 
The Group Areas Act of 1950 provided for the demarcation of 
suburbs and districts into different areas of residence and 
ownership. The Group Areas Bo~rd was appointed to report to 
the responsible minister on the allocation of various Group 
Areas for members of different racial groups. Disqualified 
people had to move out of such areas. The Board was 
attached to the State Department of Planning and local 
authorities were consulted only on such decisions. In a 
number of cases, such as that of Cape Town, local 
authorities were opposed to the racial demarcation of their 
areas and made unsuccessful representations in this regard 
to the Group Areas Board. The Separate Amenities Act of 
1953 provided for separate amenities in all governmental and 
private premises and vehicles, including schools, hospitals, 
parks, beaches, hotels, theatres, restaurants, buses, taxis 
and places of entertainment. The Act was an enabling one. 
The various provinces introduced ordinances empowering the 
Administrators to direct local authorities to segregate 
public facilities. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 
provided for the reservation of certain occupations for 
Whites only. These included local government vocations (see 
4.5.3.2 Personnel Control for more detail). 
The Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act 
of 1967, as amended in 1975, made provision for central 
government control over the zoning and sub-division of land 
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for industrial purposes. Major planning policies were drawn 
up at national level. More detailed guide plans were 
formulated at regional level by government planning 
committees. Local authorities' industrial planning had to 
be within the framework of such plans. Further, land ~6uld 
not be zoned for industrial use without state approval. 
These measures centralised policy in respect of industrial 
zoning. The reason for such control was largely apartheid-
based. For example, the draft guide plan for Cape Town was 
wedded to the Group Areas Act and the acceptance of Atlantis 
as an industrial decentralisation point. 8 
In order to accelerate the separate development policy, 
control of administration of Blacks in urban areas was 
removed from the control of White local authorities and 
placed under the jurisdiction of newly created Adminis-
tration Boards (see 5.5. Administration Boards). Finally, 
the government also abolished the Cape's (albeit limited) 
non-racial municipal franchise and replaced it with 
segregated structures (see 4.6 Coloured Local Government for 
more detail) (Slabbert and Welsh, 1979 : 87; RSA, 
President's Council, 1987 8-12, 41-50; RSA, Browne 
Committee, 1980, Annexure D : 27; RSA, President's Council, 
1982B : 42-44, 80-90; Vosloo, 1974 : 36; Urban Problems 
Research Unit (cited hereafter as UPRU), 1986 : 75-79; 
Rees, 1979 : 5; Welsh~ 1979 : 149). 
All these apartheid measures have severely eroded local 





The need for coordinated policy-making in 
South Africa's special circumstances has resulted 
in relatively less functions being provided at 
local government level than ·in most western 
countries. 
There were also a number of Acts which, while not 
directly related to apartheid policies, placed certain 
obligations upon local government. Some of the more 
important of these will be discussed. The Health Act of 
1977 made it obligatory for local authorities to perform 
certain health functions, such as the prevention of 
infectious diseases and the provision of health inspection 
and family planning services. The Housing Act of 1966 made 
provision fo! the establishment of the National Housing 
Commission (cited hereafter as NHC) and National Housing 
Fund (cited hereafter as NHF). All housing schemes proposed 
by local authorities had to be approved by the NHC, which 
also regulated the provision and standard of housing, e.g. 
size, materials and building regulations. The NHF was used 
to grant housing loans to local authorities. Detailed 
provisions controlled the advance of such loans and the 
recovery of interest and capital. 
In terms of the Electricity Act of 1958, electricity 
rates were subject to approval by the Electricity Control 
Board, as was the extension of a local authority's rated 
general capacity by more than 10% a year. Control was also 
exercised over the supply by local authorities to areas 
beyond their boundaries. In terms of the Civil Defence Act 
of 1977, local authorities were obliged to participate in 
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certain aspects of civil defence. There were direct 
financial obligations imposed on local authorities by the 
state, e.g. import duty, excise duties on essential 
commodities such as diesel fuel, fuel tax and General Sales 
Tax (cited hereafter as GST). Another constraint on 
autonomy was the Community Development Act of 1966 which 
provided for the development of certain areas by the 
Community Development Board. This board had wide powers 
over local authorities, e.g. in respect of the acquisition 
and disposal of property and the supply of services for 
uevelopment purposes. Areas developed by the Board were 
exempt from rating and were not subject to local by-laws 
(RSA, Browne Committee, 1980, Annexure D : 26-27; 
Craythorne, 1982 : 171-173; Labour Research Commission, 
1982 : 74-75; Venter, 1984 : 403). 
4.5.3 Provincial Controls9 
Since 1910 the provincial authorities gradually but 
increasingly assumed the role of watchdog over the 
activities of local authorities. As early as 1936 it was 
remarked that the achievement of provincial administrations 
in respect of local government 
had been positively negative - not only have 
they not encouraged local government, but they 
have actually gone so far in the opposite 
direction as to encroach on powers of certain 
local institutions and to destroy the 







This trend continued until the_provinces ended up con-
trolling and interfering in many facets of local 
authorities' activities (Meyer, 1978 : 79}. 
How was this control exercised? Each province 
promulgated a general ordinance laying down the functions 
and powers of local government and the procedures they were 
to follow. These were supplemented with other ordinances 
dealing with various functional areas, e.g. town planning, 
electoral qualifications, etc. A Directorate of Local 
· Government was established in each province with 
responsibility, inter alia, for enforcing local authority 
ordinances, issuing circulars explaining policy and 
detailing administrative instructions (Meyer, 1978 : 80). 
Gildenhuys (cited in De Wet, 1984 : 280) pointed out that 
power was often delegated within Provincial Administrations 
so that low-ranking provincial officials were able to 
dictate, and in some cases interpret, policy to local 
authorities. No differentiation was made between the powers 
granted to the smallest local areas and the larger cities. 
There was a uniform policy in respect of control measures 
which did not take cognisance of the varying capacities of 
local authorities {Meyer, 1978 : 179). 
Although the elected provincial Member of the Executive 
Committee (cited hereafter as MEC) for Local Government was 
the nominal head of these Departments of Local Government, 
most powers in respect of the control of local authorities 
were vested in central government-appointed Administrators. 
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• the establishment of local authorities; 
• all by-laws had to be approved by him and he could 
modify or veto such by-laws; 
• he could force a council to pass by-laws against its 
wishes and if a council refused to do so he could 
authorise another body to perform the function and 
claim the costs from the local authority concerned; 
• he could overturn local authorities' town planning 
decisions if affected citizens appealed to him to 
reconsider such a decision; 
• he controlled the monthly allowances· of councillors; 
• he could empower local authorities to segregate 
facilities; 
• he could appoint commissions of inquiry to investigate 
• 
allegations of misconduct against local authorities and 
if misconduct was found by such a commission, he could 
take disciplinary steps against the council/councillors 
concerned; 
He could limit the type of organisations to which 
councils could make grants-in-aid. 
It was pointed out (in 3.7 Hierarchical Relations) that 
six forms of administrative control exist over local 
authorities, viz. approval of decisions; directives/ 
instructions; the powers of suspension, annulment, 
reformation and substitution. The Administrator had all 
these powers at his disposal. 
There were also major financial and personnel controls, 





















sections (Craythorne, 1980 : 258-260 and 1982 : 123-125; 
Vosloo, 1974 : 25-26; -Roux, 1971 : 125-126; Vosloo and 
Schrire, 1978 : 84; RSA, Browne Committee, 1980, Annexure D 
: 25) . 
4.5.3.1 Financial controls 
There was a plethora of financial controls over the 
activities of local authorities. Most of these powers were 
vested in the respective Admini~trators. Local authorities 
were obliged to keep a detailed record of all assets, 
liabilities and financial transactions. They had to prepare 
estimates of income and. expenditure in respect of both 
capital and operating current accounts. The Administrator 
placed limits on the rates which local authorities were 
allowed to levy. There were also limits on the valuation of 
property. Provincial ordinances circumscribed the powers 
and duties of valuers, the composition of the valuation roll 
and the basis of valuation courts. 10 Local authorities were 
not allowed to budget for deficits on the operating account 
and if the budget showed a deficit the Administrator had the 
power to force the local authority to levy an extraordinary 
rate. Local authorities could not exceed the estimated 
expenditure without approval of the Administrator. All 
capital expenditure over a certain amount had to be approved 
by the Department of Finance. Since the mid-1970s this had 
entailed an annual growth percentage determined by the 
Minister of Finance. 
The Administrator also had controls over local 
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borrowed for prescribed purposes and there were ceilings on 
the amount that could be borrowed. Local authorities could 
borrow money from the Public Debt Commissioners. Detailed 
financial provisions governed the terms and conditions of 
such loans. As part of its control over the capital 
expenditure of local authorities, the Department of Finance 
required approval of capital borrowing of local qUthorities 
that exceeded Rlm in a financial year. 
Local authorities were also required by ordinan~e to 
keep Capital Development Funds (cited hereafter as CDFJ, 
which were sources of internal financing. A certain 
percentage of current income had to be paid into a CDF along 
with, inter alia, surpluses on the sale of assets and 
unanticipated surpluses on operating accounts. Advances 
could only be made from these funds by way of repayable 
loans which were subject to various regulations. The 
Administrator also placed restrictions on institutions where 
local authorities could invest funds. Local authorities 
were obliged by ordinance to call for tenders for contracts 
for the execution of work and supply of goods which exceeded 
a certain limit. A strict procedure had to be adopted 
regarding the opening of tenders. The Administrator also 
placed a ceiling on the amount of revenue that could be used 
by local authorities for grants-in-aid. 
All local authorities' books had to be audit~d by 
Provincial Auditors or private professional accountants 
working under the supervision of Provincial Auditors. The 


















were mentioned to the municipal councils. Provincial 
Auditors had wide powers of disallowance and surcharge: any 
ultra vires expenditure was disallowed. When Johannesburg 
City Council started a social welfare department, the 
provincial auditors ruled that expenditure on this function 
' 
was ultra vires. The department accordingly had to be 
dismantled (RSA,, Browne Committee, 1980, Annexure D 
35; Craythorne, 1980 : 192-221; Vosloo, 1974 : 29). 
4.5.3.2 Personnel control 
24-27, 
South Africa inherited the separate British personnel 
system whereby each local authority acts as a completely 
independent employer. Local authorities could employ their 
own staff under the respective conditions of employment 
which were approved.by the Administrator of a particular 
province in terms of its relevant ordinance. 11 These were 
usually only general guidelines, e.g. local authorities 
could only employ workers on the basis of merit, viz. 
qualifications and fitness for the particular type of work 
involved. However, certain key appointments had to be 
approved by the Administrator or functional Ministers. All 
local authorities had to obey the provisions of the 
Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act of 1941, the 
Shops and Off ices Act of 1964 and the Labour Relations Act 
of 1956. The former two Acts provided for central protecti~n 
of the worker. The Factories, Machinery and Building Work 
Act laid down regulations for safety at the work place. The 
Shops and Off ices Act laid down certain work procedures such 
as reviewing weekly working hours, overtime, termination of 
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contract, annual. and sick leave. The Labour Relations Act, 
on the other hand, provided for compulsory arbitration in 
disputes which officials and their employing local 
authorities could not settle (J. Cloete, 1986 : 75-76, 85; 
Craythorne, 1990: 210-227). 
There were controls over the service conditions of town 
clerks. Up to the 1950s, local government could.set its 
levels of remuneration, subject to the normal process of 
bargaining with trade unions. Beginning in the Transvaal 
and spreading to other provinces, control over town clerks' 
remuneration and service benefits conditions was removed 
from the ambit of the Industrial Conciliation Act and placed 
under control of the respective Administrators. The 
objective behind this was to strengthen the organisational 
structure of town clerks by making them more responsible for 
overall leadership, co-ordination and general management. 
The town clerks were removed from the ambit of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act so that they could be unaffected 
in staff negotiations and disputes between their councils 
and council employees. However, the respective 
Administrators down the years assumed more control over town 
clerks through provincial ordinances, which imposed 
stringent conditions of service, including maximum salaries 
for these officials. 
This system led to divided loyalties. Arbitrary 
dismissal of town clerks occurred. Local government 
autonomy was undermined by the fact that it was the province 






















was responsible for the conditions of service and the 
continued employment of town clerks (Craythorne, 1982 : 373-
374; Evans, 1985 : 1-4). This increased provincial control 
over town clerks also indicated a shift towards the unified 
staff system for this group of employees. As pointed out 
(in 3.2 Personnel), one of the main features of this system 
is that a higher tier of .government sets comprehensive 
national service conditions for senior local government 
employees. 
Apartheid affected local government personnel practices 
in that certain vocations, such as ambulancemen, firemen and 
traffic police, were reserved for whites only in terms of 
central government legislation in the 1950s. This led to 
severe shortages of staff in these vocations in certain 
local authorities (Labour Research Commission, 1982 : 62; 
Cape Times, 20/2/1982; Roux, 1971 : 125-126). 
4.5.4 Local Choice 
This extensive range of control may give the impression that 
local authorities were nothing more than local adminis-
trative agents of central government. However, while a 
great deal of centralisation has occurred, local authorities 
still had a certain degree of local choice. There had been 
greater control in respect of finance and personnel 
generally, along with a trend towards the centre laying down 
general standards for certain services and determining 
policy for certain functions. However, local authorities 
still had a certain amount of autonomy in respect of raising 
different levels of revenue (within limits), setting 
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priorities across services, deciding ho~ much to spend on 
different services, setting policy for certain functions, 
and the method of service provision. 
Furthermore, the fact that councillors were,directly 
elected and not appointed was in itself conducive to 
devolution of power (see 3.2.4. Other Personnel Indices). 
4.6 RACIAL DIVISION OF POWERS 
It was pointed out (in 2Al Introduction) that the division 
of powers and functions amongst the various tiers of 
government is known as the areal division of powers. 
However, south Africa developed what can be termed a racial 
division of powers during the Westminster era. This has co~ 
existed, and in some areas dovetailed, with an areal 
division of powers. In the case of Black local authorities 
this system existed from soon after Union (see 5.3 Black 
Advisory Boards) , while in the case of Indian and Coloured 
local authorities this process was only developed after the 
election of the NP to power in 1948. The latter system will 
now be examined. 
4.7 COLOURED AND 'INDIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
When the NP was elected to power in 1948, the municipal 
voting qualifications for Coloureds and Indians in the 
various provinces were: 
• In the Transvaal and Orange Free State only Whites were 
• 
able to vote and stand for election at municipal 
level. 12 
In the Cape, Coloureds and Indians had technically been 
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the same voters' roll as Whites and had to fulfil the 
same voting qualifications. 
In Natal, both Coloureds and Indians were on the 
voters' roll and could stand for election. However, 
the system of electoral representation was property 
ownership of a certain value. This effectively 
debarred the majority of Coloureds and Indians from 
eligibility to vote4 There were further restrictions 
affecting the ability of Indians to vote in Nata1. 13 
(RSA, President's Council, 1982B: 18-23). 
Racially integrated local authorities were contrary to 
NP policy of having separate political structures for 
different racial groups. The genesis of separate local 
government structures was the Group Areas Act of 1950, which 
made provision for separate residential areas and for the 
eventual introduction of separate local government 
structures in Coloured and Indian areas. However, no active 
steps were taken to introduce separate local government 
structures until i961 when the Niemand Committee of 
Investigation was appointed to investigate the development 
of local government for Coloureds in urban areas. As a 
result of its recommendations, the Group Areas Amendment Act 
of 1962 was introduced which made provision for three phases 
in the development of Coloured and Indian local government. 
The three phases were: 
1) Consultative Committees which consisted of nominated 
members having advisory powers only and functioning 
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under close official guidance of the local authority 
where they were geographically situated. 
2) Management Committees, which were partly elected and 
partly nominated, also having advisory powers but in 
addition certain powers could be delegated to them by 
their 'mother' White local authorities. 
3) Fully-fledged municipal status equivalent to White 
local authorities. Before this happened, investigation 
was needed by a special committee which recommended 
whether a Management Committee should become a local 
authority. Certain essential prequisites, such as 
sufficient revenue, trained staff, minimum area size, 
and the capability of being geographically 
consolidated, had to be fulfilled before a local 
authority could take this step. 
In Natal, a two-stage evolutionary process was estab-
lished, Local Affairs Committees (cited hereafter as LACs) 
existing in place of both Consultative and Management 
committees. LACs had more power than Management Committees. 
They were corporate bodies which were able to sue and to be 
sued, and greater executive powers could be delegated to 
them by their mother White local authorities. 
Although the Minister of Community Development14 was 
ultimately responsible for the development of Coloured and 
India~ local government, its practical application was the 
responsibility of different provinces~ each of which adopted 

















The consultative stage was soon dropped and Management 
Committees/LACs were created for most Coloured and Indian 
communities under the tutelage of their 'mother' White local 
authorities from 1964 onwards •. Management Committees/LACs 
administrative staff are employed by their 'mother' White 
local authority (Evans, 1969 : 97-99; Vosloo~ 1974 46-49; 
RSA, President's Council, 1982B : 19-25; van Rooyen, 1987 : 
3-4 and J. Cloete, 1988 : 44-48). 
This new form of Coloured representation co-existed 
with direct representation on White local authorities in the 
Cape until 1971 when a provincial ordinance changed the 
voting requirements so that only those who were registered 
as parliamentary voters (i.e. Whites) could now register as 
municipal voters15 (CCC, 1982 : 314 and craythorne, 1982 
46) . 
Only four Indian LACs (Verulam, Isipingo, Marburg and 
Umzinto North) in the whole country have evolved into 
independent local authorities. No Coloured Management 
Committee/LAC has evolved into an independent local 
authority. 16 Various commissions on Coloured local 
government highlighted the reasons for this lack of 
evolution. The Roussouw Report of 1960 found that no 
Coloured area in Greater Cape Town was in a position to 
become an independent local government. The most important 
reasons for this were their lack of viability - most 
Coloured and Indian areas a.re characterised by little or no 
rate-generating commercial and industrial areas as well as 








staff, lack of suitable candidates and the fact that for 
town planning reasons local authorities treated Coloured 
areas as an integral part.of their jurisdiction. The Botha 
Report of 1971 came to.the same conclusion. 
. ( 
Indian local 
areas were subject to similar constraints (Craythorne, 1982 
: 35, 60). 
The mandate of the Theron Commission was to investigate 
all facets of Coloured life, including local government. 
The Commission found that Management Committees as a system 
had largely been a failure. The main reasons for this were: 
• Lack of executive powers. This meant that such bodies 
were toothless and, as a result, ineffective. 
• Especially in the more educated urban areas, Coloureds 
were opposed to apartheid structures and wanted direct 
representation on White local authorities. 
• There were jurisdictional and structural problems such 
as geographical fragmentation of Coloured areas that 
were impediments to such bodies becoming viable 
entities.· 
• There was often a lack of mutual goodwill between White 
• 
local authorities and their Management Committees. 
The fact that the Coloured Persons' Representative 
Council (cited hereafter as CPRC) 17 and Provincial 
Administrations had concurrent jurisdiction led to 
ineffective coordination of the system (RSA, Theron 
Commission, 1976 : 440-443). 
The Schlebusch Commission was appointed by the Cape 
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to investigate the functioning of the.Management Committee 
system in the Cape Province, with a view to delegating extra 
powers to these bodies. This was a response to complaints 
by the Association of Management Committees (cited hereafter 
as ASSOMAC) 1S that local authorities were ignoring their 
legitimate requests. Coloured members of this Commission 
argued that the system had been imposed upon them and that 
it lacked effective powers. The Commission also found that 
the system was being used for political purposes, which 
hindered its proper functioning, and that members of such 
bodies were inadequately trained (RSA, President's Council, 
1982A : 33-41). 
Finally, another reason for this lack of progress was 
that Management Committees/LACs, through their various 
provincial representative bodies as well as major Coloured 
and Indian political parties who control most of these 
bodies, have always rejected separate representation. They 
argue that participation in these structures is a short-term 
strategy in order to achieve their ultimate goal, viz. non-
racial representation on currently. White city councils (see 
House of Representative Debates (cited hereafter as HRD], 
17/6/1987 : Cols. 986-9 for the policy of the Labour Party 
(cited hereafter as LP], the ruling party in the CPRC from 
1975 until this body's dissolution in 1979, in this regard). 
It can briefly be mentioned that in terms of the Rural 
Coloured Areas Act of 1963, provision wa~ made for two 
different forms of local government institutions in Coloured 
rural areas. Firstly, there were advisory boards, which 
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could advise the Minister of Community Development in 
matters affecting their areas. The second form was a Board 
of Management into which these advisory boards evolved. 
These Boards had certain defined local government powers and 
were competent to render a number of municipal functions 
(Vosloo, 1974 : 49-50; J. Cloete, 1988 : 247). 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
. 
The 1910 constitution created a unitary centralised state in 
South Africa. Both provincial and local government were 
subordinate legislatures having no inherent powers. Local 
government had no constitutional rights. Its powers and 
functions could be revoked by higher tiers of government. 
The ultra vires doctrine existed. Local.authorities could 
only make by-laws within the parameters of both national and 
provincial legislation. The provincial government system 
contained elements of both devolution and deconcentration. 
However, down the years, the provincial government lost both 
powers and functions to central government. The 
Administrator, a central government appointee, was the 
Executive-in-Chief of provincial government. He had a great 
number of supervisory powers over local authorities. 
The South African local government system was 
characterised by differentiation in almost every conceivable 
aspect. White local authorities were multi-purpose 
institutions providing a wide range of services to the 
public. They lost functions and powers to both central and 
provincial government after Union. The major reasons for 





































division of powers between the three tiers of government, 
central macro-economic objectives, and 'the fact that the 
implementation of apartheid· required central control. 
various manifestations of both central and provincial 
control were discussed. However, despite increased 
-
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centralisation, local authorities still retained a certain 
amount of local choice. Finally, segregated structures were 
introduced for Coloured and Indian race groups. These 




HISTORY OF BLACK LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1910-1979 
5. 1 INTROD.UCTION 
This chapter traces the history of Black local government
1 
which, during the Westminster era, constitutionally and 
politically took a different route from that of White, 
Coloured· and Indian local government. It will show how 
Black local representation was linked with White 
requirements for Black labour. Various forms of Black local 
structures that existed in this period - Advisory Boards, 
Urban Bantu Councils (cited hereafter as UBCs} and Community 
Councils - will be examined, as will ·Administration Boards 
which were forms of deconcentrated administration. The 
financing of Black local authorities will also be examined. 
5.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND BLACK LABOUR 
The history of Black local government representation in 
South Africa is inextricably linked with White requirements 
for Black labour. As Stadler (1987 : 102) puts it: 
a clear distinction cannot be made between 
control and allocation of labour on the one hand 
and the administration of amenities ·and services 
on the other in a situation in which Africans were 
entitled to be in urban areas only in order to 
perform labour services. 
The genesis of this policy pre-dates the era of 
industrial capitalism. Welsh (1971 : 196-197) points out 
that various forms of pass laws regulating Black entry into 




















it was only in the early 20th century that this policy was 
systematically applied. The Native Land Act of 1913 set 
aside about 7% of the country as Black reserves. Blacks 
were no longer allowed property in the other 93% of the 
country which was designated as 'White' South Africa. The 
Stallard Commission of 1922 enunciated the modern basis of 
this urban policy, which was to endure for over 60 years, by 
arguing that Blacks should be allowed into White areas for 
labour purposes only. The commission stated that "it should 
be a recognized principle of government that natives - men, 
women and children - should only be permitted within 
municipalities insofar and for so long.as their presence is 
determined by the wants of white population" {cited in 
Welsh, 1979 : 132). 
This principle was embodied in the Native {Urban Areas) 
Act of 1923. It gave White local authorities the power to 
impose influx control on Black migrants entering White 
cities and towns. Blacks who were deemed 'surplus labour 
requirements' were denied permission to settle in white 
areas (Kane-Berman, 1979 : 23). 
I 
The Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 as 
amended in 1952 tightened influx control. Section 9 of the 
Act segregated Blacks into separate residential areas. 
Section 10 prevented a Black person from staying in White 
urban areas for more than 72 hours unless there was proof 
that: 









( 2·) he had 10 years continuous service for one employer or 
15 years continuous employment with more than one 
employer and resident in a prescribed area; 
(3) he/she was a dependent of those who qualified under (1) 
and ( 2) ; 
(4) he/she had permission from a labour bureau to be there. 
{Welsh, 1982 : 93-94). 
This was controlled through pass laws. All Blacks had to 
have identification papers consolidated into a single 
reference book. This was extended to Black women in 1952 
and enforced as from 1960 (Welsh, 1982 : 94). 
The NP was elected to power in 1948 on its apartheid 
policy. Regulating the uncontrolled flow of Blacks into 
urban areas formed a major component of this apartheid 
manifesto. Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, Prime Minister from 1958 
until 1966, gave this reserve policy pseudo-scientific 
status by claiming that South African Blacks consisted of 
different ethnic groups who would be given their own 
'homelands' with the view to ultimate independence. This 
was known as the separate development policy and was 
embodied in the Promotion of Self-Government Act of 1959. 
Black political aspirations were now to be channelled into 
evolving homeland political structures (Schrire, 1982). 
5.3 BLACK ADVISORY BOARDS 
If Blacks were only 'temporary sojourners', it followed 
quite logically that they were to be denied political rights 
in White South Africa. No Blacks have ever been represented 
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local government structure remotely resembled the English 
devolved model (see 2.2 Terminology). 
In terms of the South Africa Act of 1909 and the Native 
(Urban Areas) Act of 1923, the administrative responsibility 
for urban Blacks was divided between central and local 
government on a partnership basis. An attempt was made to 
strike a balance between local autonomy .on the one hand and 
the requirements of central government policy towards Blacks 
on the other (Welsh, 1979 141-142). From 1910 until 1923 
there tended to be a lack of uniformity and direction from 
the Department of Native Affairs (Riekert, 1983 : 145-146). 
The Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 retained this system, 
but created a single uniform legislative framework for the 
country as a whole. Local authorities were obliged to 
provide segregated residential areas for Blacks and to set 
up advisory boards. They were also required to provide 
housing and welfare amenities for Blacks (Welsh, 1971 : 232; 
Vosloo, 1974 : 40). Officials responsible for enforcing the 
laws and regulation of the Act had to be licensed by the 
central government's.Department.of Native Affairs (Welsh, 
1979 : 137-138). 2 
This Act was further consolidated by the Bl.ack (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 which required White 
municipalities to establish a Black advisory board for every 
Black location within its area of j~risdiction. Advisory 
boards could be either elected or nominated (Vosloo, 1974 
42-43). The powers of these boards were (as the 
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-designation indicates) purely advisory. Their functions 
were to consider and report on: 
i) any regulation which the local authority proposed to 
make affecting Black people in the location; 
ii) any matter referred to it by the Minister of Native 
Affairs or the local authority; 
iii) any matter specifically affecting the interests of the 
Black in the urban area, upon which the Board may 
consider it useful or desirable to report. (Evans, 
1969: 105-106). 
The board could also recommend to its 'mother' local 
authority the making or adoption of any regulation which it 
consider~d necessary or desirable in the interests of the 
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Black in the urban area (Evans, 1969 : 106). However, this 
form of representation proved to be inadequate. Many local 
authorities did not establish advisory boards and others did 
' 
so at a rather late stage. Furthermore, local authorities 
tended to ignore the recommendations of advisory boards 
where they were in fact established. 3 (Prinsloo, 1979 : 44; 
RSA, President's Council, 1982A : 19-31; Maylam, 1990 : 
66) . 
There was also control over local authorities in 
respect of administration of townships in this period. The 
Department of Native Affairs, inter alia, vetoed local 
authorities' developmental projects for Blacks and reduced 
loan funding for housing as an influx control measure (Bloch 




















5.4 URBAN BANTU COUNCILS 
Th~ Urban Bantu Councils Act (:1961) made provision for Black 
representative councils with executive as well as advisory 
powers. The intention was for White local .authorities to 
delegate additional powers to UBCs. These councils 
initially consisted of elected and nominated members, but by 
1970 they consisted entirely of representative members. 
The various powers and functions that were delegated were 
subject to the approval of the Minister of Native Affairs 
(Vosloo, 1974 : 43-45). Potential functions included the 
erection and use of dwellings, allotment of sites for church 
and school purposes, influx control and the layout of Bantu 
residential areas (Evans, 1969 : 111-112). 
Because the onus was on local authori~ies to delegate 
powers to UBCs, it tended to be a rather uneven process. 
However, in most cases extensive executive powers were not 
conferred upon UBCs (Vosloo, 1974 : 45). There was the 
feeling even amongst more liberal councils that Blacks were 
not competent enough to govern themselves efficiently 
(Evans, 1969 : 114). 
Like their predecesso~s, advisory boards, UBCs failed. 
Firstly, they were powerless due to the reluctance of White 
local authorities to transfer powers to them. Secondly, 
UBCs were more explicitly rejected for political reasons. 
Many Blacks saw UBCs, being based on racial grounds, as 
collaborators in the implementation of apartheid (Welsh, 
1982 : 152). 
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5.5 ADMINISTRATION BOARDS 
The Black Affairs Administration Act of 1971 divested White 
local authorities of their responsibility for the 
administration of urban Black areas. Control of this 
function was vested in the newly created .Administration 
Boards. Two major reasons for this policy change can be 
identified. Firstly, White local authorities were blamed 
for the failure of UBCs through their reluctance to delegate 
executive powers to these bodies (President's Council, 1982A 
31) • 
Secondly, since the election of the NP to office in 
1948, there had been conflict between it and the UP-
controlled municipalities (which controlled most major 
metropolitan local authorities) in respect of a number of 
issues; viz. housing policy, influx control, financial 
matters and the degree of discretion in the administration 
of policy. A number of municipalities (in particular 
Johannesburg) did not share the government's view that the 
urban Black was a transient dweller and were accordingly 
lukewarm in implementing influx control. Since the 1950s 
local authorities had had their autonomy steadily undermined 
by the Department of Native Affairs in respect of regulating 
the presence of Blacks in urban areas. The government had 
carried out forced removals of Black communities in local 
authorities (such as Johannesburg) against the latters' 
wishes (Bekker and Humphries, 1985 : 2-10; Kane-Berman, 
1979 64). 
In 1956 Dr Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, 


































Blacks. The partnership role between central and local 
governments which underpinned the 1923 Native {Urban Areas) 
Act was no longer considered to be in effect. Rather, "the 
task of urban authorities is to carry the policy of the 
country into effecti not to create basic policy for 
themselves or for the country" {Verwoerd, 1956 : 126). 
Despite the fact that local authorities' autonomy in 
respect of urban Blacks had been largely eroded, the 
government was not even satisfied with the former bodies 
performing this function on an agency basis, hence the 
introduction of Administration Boards • 
.. The main objectives of the Black. Affairs Administration 
Act, 1971 were, inter alia, to bringabout a more effective 
and efficient administration over larger areas and to 
achieve greater mobility in Black labour. For these 
purposes, 22 Administration Boards were established country-
wide (Riekert, 1979 : 64). They were vested with all the 
rights, functions and duties of local authorities in terms 
of all legislation and provincial ordinances relating to 
Black affairs (Vosloo, 1974 : 42). 
However, the Administration Boards did not have policy-
making powers nor powers to make regulations. This resided 
in the Minister of the Department of Cooperation and 
Development (cited hereafter as DCD and previously known as 
Native Affairs) . Each Administration Board consisted of an 
Administration Board (viz. a governing body without any 
executive powers) and municipal personnel. This 
Administration Board consisted of a Chief Executive and 
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other members nominated by the Minister, which included 
public servants, experts in agriculture, commerce and 
industry and representatives of local authorities in the 
Board 1 s area of jurisdiction. The terms of conditions of 
the Board 1 s personnel were determined by the Minister. A 
large number of staff who were attached to the Black Affairs 
Administration departments of White local authorities were 
transferred to these new bodies (RSA, Riekert, 1979 : 64-67; 
Vosloo, 1974 : 42). 
The main functions of these boards were in the fields 
of labour, influx control, trading services, housing and 
recreational facilities. Two of these functions, viz. 
labour and trade (for sorghum beer production) were not 
undertaken by White local authorities. White municipal-
ities continued to deliver certain services on an agency 
basis for Black areas, in particular health and transport 
(Bekker and Humphries, 1985 : 18-29). 
The Minister of DCD retained overall responsibility for 
urban Black affairs. These boards were subject to the same 
statutory controls as White local authorities. However, it 
has been cogently illustrated that the introduction of these 
Boards led to greater centralisation of powers. The 
Minister of DCD had far greater control over general policy 
towards urban Blacks. As Bekker and Humphries (1985 : 18) 
point out: "Ministerial appointment, staff recruitment and 
DCD control ensured that,the spirit and the letter of 
government policy were effectively im~lemented. 114 For 




policy would become chairmen of the board (Kane-Berman, 1979 
·: 64). Unlike White local authorities, who were at least 
democratically elected (by Whites), the Administration 
Boards were directly accountable to the Minister of DCD. 
This contributed to Administration Boards generally proving 
to be more unbending to deal with than White local 
authorities (Grest and Hughes, 1984 : 4), and also being 
less receptive to the wishes of UBCs (Kane-Berman, 1979 : 
147 
The Administration Boards, unlike some of these major 
White local authorities, were enthusiastic supporters of the 
NP, in particular implementing· influx control with great 
51-52). 
vigour. Welsh (1982 : 100) argued in 1982, at a time when 
the NP was moving into a post-Verwoerdian era, that the 
Board and the DCD "are entrenched bastions of conservatism, 




1976 saw the massive uprising in urban Black areas against 
apartheid rule (Kane-Berman, 1979). The Cillie Report into 
this urban insurrection commented that the Administration 
Boards were generally unresponsive to Black demands. 
Evidence submitted to the commission painted a poor picture 
of the high-handed and racist attitudes of many Board 
officials. However, because the Administration Boards had 
control over so many aspects of the lives of Blacks, they 
were forced to deal with these Boards almost on a daily 









Although never officially acknowledged, the decision to 
establish Community Councils a year after the 1976 riots was 
a tacit admission on the part of the government that UBCs 
had failed as representative bodies (Bekker and Humphries, 
1985: 99). It also seemed to indicate that the arrangement 
whereby Administration Boards acted as central government 
agents was not satisfactory either. Community councils with 
meaningful powers were seen by the State as a channel 
through which the demands of urban Blacks could be peace-
fully articulated and defused (Bloch, 1982 : 146). 
Besides the introduction of Community Councils, there 
was also a change in policy in that facilities and services 
in urban Black areas were now to be upgraded (Stadler, 1987 
: 114). Because Blacks were only regarded as 'temporary 
sojourners 1 in White areas, community facilities in Black 
townships had hitherto been deliberately neglected (Welsh, 
1982 : 101). Further, provision was made in 1978 for house-
ownership under the 99-year leasehold system for urban 
Blacks who qualify for Section 10 rights (Welsh, 1982 : 
105). This development of urban Black areas gradually began 
to undermine the 1922 Stallardist principle. 
The Community councils were elected representative 
bodies vested with executive powers in respect of a number 
of issues. It was claimed that "these councils constitute 
the first proper form of local self-government to be 
introduced into Black urban communities in the Republic of 
South Africa outside the national states" (Riekert, 1983 : 


















the allocation and administration of the letting of 
accommodation to single persons as if they were single; 
ii) the allocation and administration of the lettings of 
dwellings and buildings and other structures; 
iii) the prevention and combating of the unlawful occupation 
of land and buildings; 
iv) the allocation and administration of sites for church, 
school or teaching purposes; 
v) the approval of building plans of private dwellings and 
the removal or demolition of unauthorised or abandoned 
buildings or structures (Bloch, 1982 : 48-49). 
control of influx control and labour remained with 
56-57). community 
Administration Boards (Bloch, 1982' 
councils also lacked certain typical White local government 
functions such as health, traffic and transport (Prinsloo, 
1979 : 50) . The Mini~ter of DCD had the power to establish 
Community councils. Where established, they replaced UBCs. 
They were intended to function and develop alongside 
Administration Boards (RSA, Riekert, 1979 : 74-75). 
Only registered inhabitants of urban areas could vote 
for community councils; viz. those with section 10 
qualifications (Bloch, 1982 : 48). 
community councils had greater powers than UBCs in 
certain ways. Firstly, unlike their predecessors, they were 
constitutionally and legally separate from both central and 
other local government structures. secondly, powers could 
devolve to councils to the exclusion of the Administration 
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having a jurisdiction in respect of matters assigned to 
UBCs. Thirdly, Community Councils could gradually evolve 
into fully-fledged local authorities, which was a further 
undermining of the 1922 Stallardi:st principle (Atkinson, 
1984 : 2). Another advancement was that Community Councils 
had the right to appoint their own staff. However, this was 
tempered by the fact that these powers had to be exercised 
in concurrence with the Administration Board and subject to 
any condition the Minister may determine (Section 5{i) of 
the Act). 
There were, however, a number of centralising measures 
prevalent in the Act. The Minister had the power to 
establish and dissolve councils. He ·could decide what 
functions and powers to vest in them, no powers and 
functions being conferred automatically. After consultation 
with the respective Administration Boards he would decide 
what functions would be vested in Community Councils. The 
conferment of functions depended on the preparedness of the 
individual council. The Minister had the authority to 
remove powers from the councils on the basis of annual 
performance, and the power to make regulations affecting a 
wide range of council activities (Bekker and Humphries, 1985 
: 99; Bloch, 1982 : 51; Prinsloo, 1979 : 47 and Atkinson, 
1984 3-4). 
Community Council elections for the various townships 
were held between 1977 and 1980. By 1980, 224 Community 
Councils had been established (Bloch, 1982 : 45). The polls 
were generally rather low. The most celebrated failure was 
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Soweto (the largest urban Black township in the country), 
where there was a 5,6% poll and the mayor, David Thebahali, 
was elected in a 97-vote mandate (Bloch, 1982,: 52). 
Various case studies have shown that, in practice, 
Community Councils did not enjoy a great deal of municipal 
autonomy. For example, a study of the Eastern cape 
Administration Board showed that 50 out of 54 Community 
Councils only had limited powers to pass resolutions, with 
provision of services remaining the preserve of the Boards. 
Only four councils had more extensive powers (RSA, 
President's Council, 1982B: 19-34). Bekker and Humphries 
(1985 : 109) have shown that Boards still played an 
important role in decision-making and implementation of 
council decisions. ·Very few councils had qualified staff 
and Administration Boards ended up performing functions on 
their behalf. Marais (1989 : 248) points out that by 1980 
only 15 of the 228 Community Councils had an approved civil 
' 
establishment, i.e. a structured personnel establishment of 
which the majority of employees were blacks. Grest and 
Hughes (1983 : 124) claim that in certain cases Community 
Councils, despite their formal powers, were overruled by 
Administration Boards. 
Besides the extent of ministerial control and the lack 
of human resources, there was another reason for the minimal 
transfer of powers to Community Councils. Administration 
Boards had to be consulted by the Minister before any 
functions could be delegated to councils, and accordingly 
had a great deal of say in this process. In many areas, 
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·officials acted as a brake on this transfer of power, 
fearing they would become redundant if they divested 
themselves of functions (Atkinson, 1984 : 16). Despite the 
introduction of local self-government in urban South Africa, 
Blacks were still supposed to exercise their 'natural' 
political rights in their respective homelands. 
Finally, the United Councils Association of South 
Africa (cited hereafter as UCASA) was formed in 1978 as a 
representative body for Community Councils. Its aim was to 
bring all Black councillors together for the purpose of 
considering and dealing with matters of common interest in 
the field of local government. However, this body had 
little significance prior to the 1980s. UCASA's request for 
recognition was turned down by DCD on the grounds that its 
representativeness could not be gauged (Atkinson, 1978 : 1, 
7 I 31-32) • 
5.7 THE FINANCING OF BLACK AREAS 
The Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, as consolidated by the 
1945 Act, introduced the principle of self-sufficiency for 
Black townships. Local authorities were required to keep 
special accounts called the Native (later Black) Revenue 
Account for Black affairs (Vosloo, 1974 : 40; Evans, 1969 : 
19). The estimates of expenditure had to be passed by the 
local authority and approved by the Minister of Native 
Affairs (Evans, 1969 : 112-113). 
The major sources of revenue for this Native Revenue 
Account from 1923 to 1971 were sorghum beer production and 









employers of Black labour in certain areas (from 1952 
onwards) and the payment by township residents to local 
autho~ities for various services rendered, mainly rentals 
and fees (Bekker and Humphries, ·19s5 : 119; Kane-Berman, 
1979 62-65; Evans, 1969 : 112-113; Bloch and Wilkinson, 
1982 25-26).). 
Only services rendered by.local authorities in Black 
locations could be charged to this Native R~venue.~ccount. 
Repayment of housing loans, services and maintenance, 
welfare, recreational and other amenities were all expected 
to be financed from these revenue sources (Welsh, 1979 : 
144) • 
· The amount of finance these sources of revenue raised 
was minimal. A fundamental problem was the 'dormitory town' 
status of Black urban areas. Because of a lack of freehold, 
there could consequently be no tax on property. Further, 
most of the rented housing was low-income due to the 
fundamental problem of poverty among Black people. There 
were also minimal rate-generating industrial and commercial 
activities in Black areas. This was a deliberate policy. 
There were restrictions regulating the ability of Black 
businesses to trade in Black urban areas. The government's 
policy was that Black entrepreneurs with sufficient capital 
to establish large businesses should move to homelands 6 
(Welsh, 1971 : 195). 
. 
These limited financial sources of revenue managed to 
sustain urban Black townships when they were kept in a 
deliberate state of underdevelopment. By 1971 only 21 of 
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the approximately 400 White local authorities (which were 
mainly major metro~olitan authorities) had been subsidising 
their Black Revenue Account directli (Welsh, 1979 : 144). 
However, such limited sources of revenue were insufficient 
when the government decided to develop townships in the 
highly inflationary times of the late 1970s. (The reasons 
for this change of policy are discussed in 6.2 Total 
Strategy.) 
The Administration Boards were also required to be 
self-financing. They inherited the existing sources of 
revenue from white local authorities' Black Revenue 
Accounts along with any surplus or deficit that may have 
existed for the account (Bekker and Humphries, 1985 : 130). 
However, although self-financing, they did not have the 
powers to set their own levels of taxation. The Minister of 
DCD, upon receipt of a report from.the relevant Adminis-
tration Board, had the power to raise rental and service 
charges (RSA; Riekert, 1979 : 72). The rent portion 
includes site and house rent for state housing, while 
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service charges include the cost of township development and 
the provision of services. (Chaskalson et al., 1987 : 53) 
state that rental and service charges are in practice 
indistinguishable to township residents as they are billed 
and paid together.) Community Councils, once established, 
were financed through the Administration Boards from the 
same reven~e base (Bloch, 1982 : 49). However, provision 










draw up their own budgets and establish their own treasury 
(Bloch, 1982 : 55). 
The Administration Boards inherited healthy surpluses 
from most White local authorities. By the end of the 1970s 
these inherited surpluses of Administration Boards had 
turned into considerable deficits. The estimated aggregate 
surplus of the Boards was R482 841 in 1973/74, as opposed to 
the R7 889 079 aggregate deficit in 1980/81 (Bekker and 
Humphries, 1985 : 132). What were the reasons for this? 
Firstly, there was a d~cline in the consumption of 
sorghum beer from R90M in 1979 to R70M in 1981. The 
significance of this decline must be seen in the light that 
approximately 50 percent of total revenue was raised from 
this source. The second and major reason for this decline 
was that the income accrued from township housing and the 
provision of services did not match rapid increases in 
expenditures in the 1970s. These increases in expenditure 
were due to increased inflation, increased capital 
expenditure in Black areas after the 1976 uprising and the 
fact that Black townships were no longer subsidised by White 
municipalities directly or indirectly (e.g. not debiting 
Black Revenue Accounts with the full costs of providing 
services) (Bekker and Humphries, 1985 : 133-146) • 
Administration Boards attempted to raise rental and 
service charges to meet these increased deficits, but were 
hindered by community councils (who had to be consulted 
before these charges could be increased). After the 1976 





increases, fearing it could lead to further unrest (Bekker 
and Humphries, 1985 :. 147). Certain increases were 
bulldozed through by Administration Boards, but they were 
not sufficient to arrest these increasing deficits (Bloch, 
1982 : 59-60). 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
During the apartheid era Blacks were steadily deprived of 
such citizenship rights as they had once possessed. 
Measures were introduced to restrict their entry into White 
areas. They were accordingly not granted meaningful 
representation at any level of government. Black Advisory 
Boards and UBCs were both advisory forms of local 
government. They were also both powerless and rejected by 
those they were intended to serve. 
The most advanced form of local government was the 
Community Council system which theoretically made provision 
for a certain amount of devolutiop. 7 However, in practice, 
they did not have remotely the same degree of municipal 
autonomy as their White counterparts and nor could they hope 
to attain a comparable finance base. White local 
authorities were responsible for the administration of urban 
Black areas. Although they initially had a certain amount 
of discretion to determine policy in this regard, these 
powers were gradually whittled away down the years by the 
central government. 
Administration Boards assumed control of Black 
townships in 1971. These structures were under much closer 
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were introduced because of the viewpoint within the 
government that some White local authorities had been less 
than enthusiastic in enforcing government policy in respect 
of urban Blacks and therefore more pli~nt structures were 
needed in their stead. 
Black local structures have never had sufficient 
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sources of revenue to balance their budgets. At the end of 
the 1970s, Administration Boards, which were responsible for 











THE POLICY PROCESS OF. LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING 
IN THE 1980S 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the policy process of .local government 
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restructuring in the 1980s will be examined. The chapter is 
primarily concerned with examining how policy proposals were 
formulated to deal with particular problems and how specific 
prop6sals were cho~en for adoption; viz. the policy 
formulation and adoption stages. It is not directly 
concerned with the content of legislation or the 
implementation of policy. 1 This chapter will accordingly 
concentrate on examining the various factors, commissions, 
institutions and actors which.have influenced these 
constitutional changes. It will attempt to give a broad 
overview of how local government policy has changed in the 
1980s, with particular emphasis on this central theme of 
devolution. It will also discuss the state's aims and 
objectives for local government and will show how these 
third tier bodies were intended to fit into its overall 
constitutional scheme for the country. 
Although this thesis is primarily a study of inter-
governmental relations, the focus of this chapter, being on 
central level constitutional changes, is slightly different.· 
For this reason it was deemed useful to employ certain 
publi~ policy concepts. In particuiar, attention was 
focused on theoretical models of policy-making. It is 
contended that certain aspects of the elite model can help 
illuminate this local government ~olicy in the 1980s. 
Classical elitists such as Mosca and Pareto argued that 
in all societies there is always a class that rules and a 
class that is ruled. They argued that government by a small 
elite over the rest of society is inevitable. Most modern 
f 
elitists would, however, argue that elite rule is due to 
political and/or economic power (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987 
136-139). 
A seminal work on elitism was that of Wright Mills 
(1956) who, drawing on Mosca and Pareto, argued that the 
American political system in the 1950s was dominated by a 
power elite occupying key ~ositions in business, 
corporations and in the military. The overlap and 
connection between the leaders of these institutions helped 
create a relatively coherent power elite. There was a whole 
spate of studies of local politics in the USA in the 1950s 
which concluded that policy was.made in an elitist fashion. 
All these studies took issue with pluralist theories of 
decision-making which argue that power in Western 
industrialised societies is widely distributed among various 
interest groups (Ham and Hill, 1984 29-32) . 
Elitists would argue. that: 
(1) Public policy consists of the preferences and values of 
a governing elite. The elites shape mass opinion on 
policy questions more than masses shape the opinion of 
elites. Policy therefore does not arise from mass 
demands {this type of argument is also present in 
Schumpeter's classical 1944 work on democracy). 
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(2) Elites share a fundamental consensus in the values and 
preservation of the social system. 
(3) Because of this general status guo orientation of 
elites, changes in public policy will be incremental 
rather than revolutionary. (Dye, 1975 : 24-26). 
A modern-day variant of the elite theory is 
Nordlinger's autonomous state model. He argues that the 
'society centred' viewpoint of most contemporary political 
theories, namely that social forces of different kinds can 
always control the state in a democracy, is flawed. 
The preferences of the state·are at least as important 
as those of civil society when it comes to policy. There 
are three possible forms of state autonomy: 
• The weakest form occurs when state officials act on 
their own preferences in situations where society's 
preferences do not diverge from theirs. 
• The medium form of state autonomy occurs when state 
actors take effective action to alter society's 
preferences to persuade a majority of social groups to 
want what governing elites want before they commit 
policy in line with the latter's preferences. 
161 
• The strongest form of state autonomy occurs when state 
officials act on their own preferences in contexts 
where governing elites' favoured options clearly 
diverge from.society's preferences (Nordlinger, 1981). 
It will be argued that in the case of South African 
local government reform in ~he 1980s, the medium form of 
state autonomy is the model which is perhaps of the most 
relevance. Much of this policy was formulated in a top-
down, secretive, manner by a small influential group of 
civilian reformers. 2 Only when policy was at a relatively 
advanced stage were there attempts td sell it to various 
groups. 3 There were two reasons for this. Firstly, these 
reformers realised that the present system was untenable and 
that there had to be both political and economic reform to 
ensure greater stability in the country. However, such 
reformers intended retaining careful control of the reform 
process. The principle of power-sharing without losing 
control was to apply at all levels of government. 
Commitment to reform was never intended to lead to NP 
abdication of power in favour of so-called revolutionary 
Black organisations. This consideration led to the decision 
to formulate policy in such an elitist fashion. 
Secondly, these reformers also real1sed that there 
would be strong conservative opposition in the NP, public 
service and among the White voting public to such reform. 
The way to neutralise such opposition would also be through 
secretive, top-down policy-making. 4 
When evaluating the main features of new local 
government legislation (see 7.22 Evaluation of State 
Strategy), it will be shown that there was a contradiction 
between the decision to formulate policy in an elitist 
fashion on the one hand, and a commitment to devolution of 
power on the other. The determination of reformers to 
retain control of the reform process had as a corollary a 
reluctance to devolve extensive powers down to local 
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authorities because of the fear that such bodies could be 
captured by groups hostile to the central state. 
6.2 TOTAL STRATEGY 
The notion of 'Total Strategy' was undoubtedly one of the 
most important factors which influenced the environment in 
which policy-making generally occurred in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
'Total Strategy' was drawn up by the Department of 
Defence in 1977 when P.W. Botha was its Minister, but it was 
only when he became Prime Minister in 1978 that it was 
adopted in earnest. The motivation was basically strategic; 
the decolonization of Mozambique and Angola, the 1976 urban 
riots in both Black and Coloured areas, the development of 
an increasingly aggressive Black trade .union movement, and 
unprecedented international hostility to Pretoria's 
policies, with the threat of sanctions, boycotts and 
disinvestment, led to Pretoria's becoming increasingly 
threatened, and were the main factors which gave rise to 
'Total Strategy' (RSA, Department of Defence, 1977 : 7-8; 
Saul and Gelb, 1981; Giliomee, 1982 and O'Meara, 1982) . 
. 'Total Strategy' was described as: 
the comprehensive plan to utilise all the 
means available to a state according to an 
integrated pattern in order to achieve the 
national aims within the framework of the specific 
policies. A total national strategy is therefore 
not confined to a particuiar sphere, but is 
applicable at all levels and to all functions of 
the state structure (RSA, Department of Defence, 
1977 : 5) . 
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The Defence White Paper added further.that this 'Total 
/ 
Strategy' was not only the responsibility of government 
departments, but also that of the entire population, nation 
and every population group (RSA, Department of Defence, 1977 
4-5) • 
This need to counter the preceived communist-inspired 
'Total Onslaught' through a 'Total Strategy' became a 
central ideological and political theme of P.W. Botha's 
administration (Schrire, 1988A: 13). Indeed, it was a 
major feature of Botha's world view (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 
1985 : 39). 
Tts aim was to manage the four power bases of South 
Africa - viz. the basis of ~olitics/diplomacy, security~ 
economics, society/psychology - in an integrated fashion, a 
brief that was wide-ranging, encompassing military and civil 
administration (RSA, Department of Defence, 1977 : 5). 
However, 'Total Strategy' was never a detailed blueprint 
determining all aspects of civil society. It was not 
'total' in the sense of being a rational comprehensive plan. 
Rather, it was a broad ideological framework within which 
reformist policies (which were sometimes contradictory) were 
drawn up by different government departments on a number of 
fronts in response to the increased threat to which the 
state was being subjected. It was also generally taken more 
seriously by the 'Law and Order' departments than their 
civilian counterparts. 
'Total Strategy' was, however, centralist in tone. As 





Onslaught is the language of centralisation." As will be 
,shown, the garnering_of all available state resources to 
counter this 'Total Onslaught' was to make for a high degree 
of centralisation and was not conducive to devolution of 
power (Bekker and Jeffery, 1989 : 13). 
The broad thrust of 'Total strategy' was the creation 
of a multi-racial alliance of forces wedded to the values of 
private enterprise. Its intention was to wean a' certain 
segment of the disenfranchised away from Marxist doctrines 
by giving them a stake in the system worth defending (Moss, 
1980; NUSAS, 1982; Pottinger, 1988 : 75). 
'Total Strategy' had both domestic and foreign5 policy 
implications (Geldenhuys 1984 : 37-38). The main domestic 
spheres of concern were industrial relations, 6 Black 
urbanisation (including the introduction 'at BLAs7 ), the 
internal reorganisation of Pretoria's public service, and a 
new constitutional deal for Coloureds and Indians at both 
central and local level. 
Rationalisation of state departments was intended, 
firstly, to reduce the costs of running the public sector. 
The number of state departments was reduced from 39 to 22. 8 
The second aim of rationalisation was, as pointed out, to 
coordinate all government departments to counter the 'Total 
Onslaught' against the country (Marais, 1989 : 22). The 
laissez-faire attitude of John Vorster, Prime Minister from 
1966 until 1978, to the activities of the public service had 
led to duplication, lack of coordination and bureaucratic 
rivalry (Grundy, 1988 : 35; Geldenhuys, 1984 : 74; 
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Schrire, 1988B : 28; O'Meara, 1982 : 11; Pottinger, 1988 
35-40). This.state of affairs was hardly conducive to a 
unified strategy and accordingly the machinery of government 
was completely restructured by P.W. Botha. 
An Office of the Prime Minister (later the State 
President) and a Cabinet Secretariat were established. 
There was the creation of five Cabinet Committees in the 
. 
Prime Minister's Office, consisting of certain c~binet 
members, businessmen and key members of the security forces, 
to coordinate policy formation and adoption. These five 
committees were those of Economic Affairs, Internal (later 
Constitutional) Affairs, Social Affairs, Finance and the 
State Security Council (cited hereaf~er as SSC) (Schrire, 
1988B : 29; Grundy, 1988 : 35} (also see 6.12 The NSMS}. 
This coordination of the bureaucracy almost inevitably led 
to greater centralisation of policy-making (Schrire, 1988A 
27; Grundy, 1988 : 39). 
The other aim of rationalisation was to neutralise 
Verwoerdian elements in the bureaucracy which opposed the 
government's reformist policies. This became imperative 
when conservative elements in the DCD sabotaged government 
attempts to reform the pass laws (see 8.2 Riekert 
commission) . The NP created 18 new posts of Director~ 
General with an elevated status and higher salary than 
existing heads of departments, with the intention of by-
passing Verwoerdian diehards in top public service posts9 · 
(The Argus, 22/2/1980). 
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Probably the major showpiece of this 'Total strategy' 
era was the Republic of·south Africa Constitution Act of 
1983 which replaced the Westmi.nster system with the 
Tricameral parliament. It was premised on the need to 
incorporate significant elements of the Coloured population 
(and to a lesser extent the Indians) into the ruling 
fortress and, in so doing, wean them away from future 
alliances with Blacks. 10 The aim was to strengthen the 
powers of the White minority government by drawing in 
Coloureds and, to a lesser extent, Indians to serve as 
buffers between the Whites and the Blacks11 (Giliomee, 1984 
11-12, ·16; Pottingeri.1988 : 49). 
The new constitution made provision for limited power-
sharing for Coloureds and Indians. Blacks were excluded 
from the new constitution. Attempts were made to appease 
urban Blacks by giving Black local authorities more 
extensive powers (see 8.3 BLA Act of 1982). Separate 
parliamentary chambers were created for Whites, Coloureds 
and Indians, viz. the Houses of Assembly, Representatives 
and Delegates, respectively. White, Coloured and Indian 
chambers were to decide exclusively on 'own affairs' and all 
three chambers would decide jointly on 'general affairs'. 
The voting representation of the three houses was such that 
the dominant party in the White chamber retains overall 
control of 'general affairs', which included all the 
strategic functions such as macro-economic policy, defence, 
justice, labour and foreign affairs. If one of the chambers 
rejects a general bill the State President has the power to 
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refer it to the_NP-dominated President's Council which can 
decide whether or not the measure should be enacted12 (RSA, 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 of 1983). 
The racial chambers had carte blanche to decide on all. 
functions designated 'own af~airs 113 subject to the 
existence of any general policy or general law. Functions 
such as housing, education, culture, health and local 
government were deemed 'own affairs'. In each chamber a 
Minister's Council was created, consisting of the Ministers 
of the respective 'own affairs' portfolios. However, these 
functions were not entrenched by constitution. The State 
President, subject to the guidelines of 14(1) and 14(2) of 
the Constitution, 14 had power to change the status of an 
'own affair' function to a 'general affair' one (RSA, 
Republic pf South Africa Constitution Act No. 110 of 1983). 
The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act affected 
local government in that this field technically became the 
responsibility of central government. In each chamber a 
Department of Local Government was created for the 
constitutional control of these ethnic local authorities15 
(see Annexure A for a diagram of the new constitutional 
system at central, provincial and local levels). 
Theoretically this meant that independent Coloured and 
Indian local auth.ori ties should be created throughout the 
country. There was, however, a caveat. one of the 
guidelines that underpinned the Constitution Act of 1983 was 
that "separate local authorities be constituted for the 
various population groups wherever possible, but subject to 
168 
the requirement that effective financial arrangements should 
be made to ensure the viability of these authorities" (RSA, 
Constitutional Guidelines, 1982 9). This was to ensure 
that unviable Coloured and Indian areas did not become 
·independent local authorities. Furthermore, as will be 
shown (in 7.19 Own Affairs Administrations), only the White 
Department of Local Government assumed these supervisory 
powers. The Coloured and Indian houses did not want such 
powers. 
One of the fundamental features of the constitution was 
the large amount of executive- power vested_ in the State 
President. Besides the powers already mentioned, he also 
had, inter alia, exclusive prerogative to refer deadlocked 
bills to the President's Council, power to appoint and 
dismiss cabinet members, their deputies and President 1 s 
council members, the power to assent to bills and the power 
to dissolve all three houses. He was also chairman of the 
cabinet (RSA, Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 
110 of 1983). In addition to his executive powers, the 
State President also had a number of powers over the 
functioning of the legislature. As party leader he retained 
overall control over the activities of the NP, the dominant 
party in the most powerful chamber of parliament. His power 
was subject to very few legislative checks and balances. 
The granting of vast executive powers to the State 
President merely continued the trend towards centralisation 
of policy-making. What was fundamental to this consti-
tutional system was that attempts made to extend the power 
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base of the Whites were designed in such a way that the 
hegemony of the ruling NP was not threatened. Moreover, the 
constitution, by making provision for ethnic ·chambers based 
on separate voters' rolls, was in fact a form of neo-
apartheid. The Population Registration Act and the Group 
Areas Act were indispensable conditions for the operation of 
the system. In many ways, this new constitution was the 
'institutionalisation' of apartheid. The August 1984 
elections for Coloured and Indian houses were characterised 
by low polls, indicating a low level of legitimacy for those 
parties which chose to participate. ·However, this did not 
deter the goverrtment, and the new constitution came into 
effect in September 1984. It was going to have a 
significant effect upon the operation of local government. 
6.3 DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 
The role of the Department of Finance has been somewhat 
underplayed in the literature dealing with local government 
reform. It is contended that the Department in fact played 
a major role in the formulation of new local government 
policy. One of the reasons for this was that the Department 
was already beginning to look at the field of inter-
governmental fiscal relations in the late 1970s. A special 
Constellation Committee was set up to look at the financial 
implications of P.W. Botha's 'Constellation of States' 
concept and this included two men, Dr Jan Lombard and 
Gerhard Croeser, who were to play influential roles in the 
formation of new local government policy (Interview with 







headstart when the government began examining constitutional 
options for local government in the 1980s. 
The writings of Lombard were influential in the late 
1970s. He was not formally attached to· the Department, 
being a professor in Economics at Pretoria University. 
However, he had often been employed as a policy consultant 
by the government. He was one-time Economic Adviser to the 
Prime Minister and had also ,been a member of a number of 
government committees on Finance. His writings were to 
influence the Department of Finance's thinking: 
significantly. 
He argued that a distinction needed to be drawn between 
welfare and order functions. Welfare functions needed to be 
decentralised while other functions needed to be 
centralised. Welfare functions were the processes of income 
production and distribution. They included functions such 
as Education, Health and Social Welfare. Order functions of 
the state over the economy included fields such as Defence, 
Law and Order, and Justice. This decentralisation was 
necessary in order to enhance democracy and to. protect 
minorities in South Africa (Lombard, 1978 : 132-142; 1979 
51) • 
Underpinning this strategy was the need to depoliticise 
the central state. The argument was that, because of its 
racist nature, the central state had been involved in too 
many facets of the creation and distribution of wealth, 
employment and welfare. Overt state intervention had 
politicised a number of areas of life, including the urban 
-----~ ------------
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environment. The central state was a·ccordingly blamed for 
all wrongs in society and it needed to be extricated from 
this site of conflict. The way to achieve this was through 
depoliticisation of the central state'~ role in society. At 
a political level it would entail devolution of powers to 
local authorities and at an economic level it would involve 
privatisation (Lombard and Ou Pisani, 1985; Glaser, 1984). 
This distinction between welfare and order functions 
was not adopted strictly by the government. The 1983 
constitution, which divided functions between the various 
ethnic chambers on the basis of the 'general'/'own' affairs 
distinction, effectively pre.:.:.empted ·.the strict application 
of this welfare/order dichotomy. Nevertheless, the need to 
decentralise, although not exactly along the lines suggested 
by Lombard, became an important component of the new local 
government system. In particular, the need to depoliticise 
the central state through devolution of powers became a 
constant policy line of the Department (and eventually the 
government) in the 1980s. The most forceful exponent of 
this position within the Department was Croeser, then Deputy 
Director-General of Finance. 16 
As will be shown (in 7.20 Department of Finance Macro-
Control), there were, however, contradictions in the 
Department's attitude to devolution. Although the Depart-
ment was committed to the devolution of functions to local 
government level, it was still determined, for macro-
economic reasons, to maintain tight control over the 
financial operations of local authorities. 
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6.3.l. Browne committee 
The Department of Finance only really became influential on 
local government policy after the release of the Browne 
Committee's Report. The Borckenhagen Commission (1960 30, 
38, 40, 42-43) had already rejected local authorities' 
claims for aqdi tional sources of revenue in 1971. However, 
by the late 1970s, caught between the inelasticity of 
property rates as a source of revenue and increasing demand 
for goods and services, local authorities were once again 
clamouring for extra sources of revenue. 
As a result the Browne Committee was appointed by the 
government. Its mandate was, inter alia, to. investigate the 
adequacy of existing sources of local government revenue, 
with special emphasis on the problem of financing coloured 
and Indian areas. It recommended, firstly, that local 
authorities' requests for additional revenue be rejected. 
Secondly, local authorities' request'that the state pay 
rates on state property was rejected, as was their plea for 
exemption from GST and Customs and Excise duties. The 
·committee suggested that if local authorities operated on 
more efficient lines, they would not have these financial 
problems (RSA, Browne Committee, 1980 : 90-92). Thirdly, it 
found that Rl48,3 million would be needed to establish 
viable Coloured and Indian local authorities. To expedite 
this process with a view to creating separate racial local 
governments, the Browne Committee recommended that a system 
of transfer payments from White to Coloured and Indian local 
authorities be introduced. It also recommended the 
introduction of a Joint Services Commissiori17 as a means of 
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solving the financial and manpower problems of creating 
separate racial local authorities. This would be integrated 
with the system of transfer payments (RSA, Browne Committee, 
1980 : 64, 83-84). 
There was a massive backlash from White local authori-
ties who, through their representative association, the 
United Mun1cipal Executive (cited hereafter as UME), 
rejected the viewpoint that local authorities were awash 
with funds that could be used to subsidise Coloured and 
Indian local authorities. Many local authorities were 
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struggling to balance their budgets and it was felt that the 
implementation of Browne's recommendations could lead to the . 
bankruptcy of some existing local authorities. The UME in 
fact lodged objections against the findings of this 
Committee (Hattingh, 1986 : 18). 
6.3.2. croeser working Group 
The vitriolic reaction of the UME, who in the past had 
accepted unsympathetic government commissions with a measure 
of resignation, clearly worried the government. This led to 
the Minister of Finance appointing a working group under the 
chairmanship of Croeser to assess all the recommendations of 
the Browne Committee. 
The Croeser Working Group (cited hereafter as CWG) must 
be considered the most influential Department of Finance 
input into local government policy. It had a decisive 
impact on state strategy. It consisted of members of the 
Department of Finance, representatives from the provincial 









alia, to evaluate each of Browne's recommendations in the 
light of the government's guidelines on the rationalisation 
of the public sector as well as changes in the consti-
tutional framework (RSA, Croeser, 1982 : 3). However, the 
reform-orientated technocrats within the Department took 
advantage of this 'window of opportunity' and interpreted 
its brief more broadly by examining the whole gamut of 
intergovernmental relations (Interview with senior Finance 
official, 1989). 
Although .the cabinet accepted most (about 95%) of the 
recommendations of the CWG in 1981, its report was only made 
available to the public in 1983. Am~ngst the more sig-
nificant deviations from the Browne Committee's Report that 
the government accepted were: 
i) The rejection of the idea of transfer payments 
(described as "politically untenable"). It proposed a 
three component revenue source in lieu of this, based 
on turnover, salaries/wages and investments. These 
taxes were to be levied on the business sector. This 
introduced the important principle of fiscal federal-
ism; viz. to decentralise taxing power down to the 
lowest possible level of government. This was a 
corollary of the Department's commitment to depoliti-
cisation and devolution, which was intended to remove 
the central state from the site of conflict over 
resources. With decision-making responsibility came 
the power to tax. 
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ii) There was acceptance.of mutual tax liability between 
different tiers of government. The government 
subsequently agreed to pay full taxes (less 20% rebate) 
to local authorities. In return, local authorities had 
to pay GST. 
iii) Finally, its recommendation that the UME be recognised 
as the central local authority association of White 
local authorities was accepted. (RSA, Croeser, 1982 
7, 94-99, 343-345; Cape Times, 19/5/1981). 
The CWG concurred with the Browne Committee's recom-
mendations that bulk services should be provided on a 
regional basis (RSA, Croeser, 1982 : 99-100). It 
recommended further that there should be overall financial 
control over both the capital and operating expenditure of 
local authorities in the interests of macro-economic 
objectives (RSA, Croeser, i982 : 99-100). 
Finally, Croeser's recommendations suggested that the 
CWG be upgraded into a standing liaison committee to discuss 
matters of local government finance with the central 
government and the provinces. This was accepted and the CWG 
was upgraded into the Permanent Finance Liaison Committee 
(cited hereafter as PFLC). Its main function was to 
investigate and make recommendations to the government on 
matters with financial and allied implications for all tiers 
of government (RSA, Croeser, 1982 : 100-103). However, the 
PFLC was only a small caretaker body. The major groundwork 
into intergovernmental financial relations had been done by 
I 
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its predecessor (Interview with senior Finance official, 
1989) . 
The President's Council report on local and regional 
government was heavily influenced by the submission of 
Croeser in his official capacity. Research undertaken by 
the CWG formed the basis of his submission. Many of the key. 
principles that had been expounded by the CWG were embodied 
in the President's council's report. This will be taken up 
in the next section. 
6.4 THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL'S REPORT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The Report into local and regional management systems was a 
Joint Report of the Committee for Economic Affairs and the 
Constitutional Committee of the President's Council. Its 
brief was to look at local government policy options for 
Whites, Coloureds and Indians (RSA, President's council, 
1982A : 4-9). 
The Report accepted the principles of maximum devolu-
tion of authority and decentralisation of administration and 
recommended that provision be made for autonomy and 
necessary legislative capacity at local government level 
(RSA, President's Council, 1982A : 49, 51, 105). It did not 
suggest what types of powers should be devolved. This 
proposal must be seen in conjunction with the recommendation 
that local government functions be split into 'hard' and 
'soft' functions. The former were functions that were 
usually provided on a regional basis, such as bulk water, 
bulk electricity and town planning. These were matters of 
common concern to all race groups. Racially-based local 
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authorities would retain control over what were termed 
'soft' functions; viz. culturally sensitive functions such 
as swimming pools, parks, houses and beaches. These would 
be functions where local authorities would have 'the local 
option' to integrate or segregate (RSA, President's Council, 
1982A : 42-43). Devolution, in this sense, is a combination 
of racial and geographic division of powers. It is a means 
whereby racial groups could have self-determination.over 
culturally sensitive functions. 
Here lies one of the major contradictions of 'Total 
Strategy'. As erstwhile PFP leader F. van Zyl Slabbert 
noted at the time of the release of the report: 
Whereas the recommendations for central 
government concentrate on the increased central-
isation of power, recommendations for local and 
metropolitan government on the other hand focus on 
the increasing decentralisation of power. How 
these two tendencies are going to be resolved in a 
final constitutional package is not clear (The 
Argus, 13/5/1982). 
As has been argued (in 6.2 Total Strategy), and as will 
be shown in the next chapter, this contradiction resolved 
itself in favour of centralised government at both central 
and local level. 
The Committee also accepted that there was a need for a 
metropolitan body of some form to solve the uncoordinated 
planning caused by fragmentation on racial lines. This 
fragmentation had led to the unnecessary duplication of 




body would also facilitate multi-racial decision-making 
(RSA, President's Council, 1982A: 59-60). 
There were also certain recommendations that went 
beyond the bounds of government policy. It suggested that 
ethnicity should not be enforced at local government level. 
It also reasoned that under certain circumstances, there 
should be racially separate wards, particularly when it 
would not be cost-effective to establish a separate local 
authority of small pockets of Coloureds/Indians in White 
municipal areas (RSA, President's Council, 1982A : 49, 59, 
102-103, 106-109). 
The President's Council's financial proposals were 
largely influenced by the CWG's report. It acknowledged the 
limited potential for extending the tax base of existing 
local governments and recommended the introduction of a 
neutral fund which could be used to fund the system of 
metropolitan bodies. This income should be allocated in a 
way that redressed the existing maladministration of rates 
income whereby most commercial and industrial areas were 
located in the jurisdictions of white local authorities. It 
recommended that the levels of taxation and nature of 
redistribution should be decided at local level and 
suggested that the achievement of greater parity of services 
would facilitate the depoliticisation of local authority 
functions (RSA, President's Council, 1982A : 96-99, 115-
116) . 
These proposals must have been seen by Croeser as a 
personal triumph. Important principles that his Department 
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had been forwarding, such as the acceptance of the 
devolution of power, the need to promote depoliticisation, 
the need for metropolitan structures and the acceptance of 
new local taxes, were adopted by the Report. 
Finally, although the President's Council rejected the 
Browne Committee's recommendation of transfer payments, its 
proposal of neutral income would in effect amount to the 
same thing; viz. redistribution of income from White to 
Coloured/Indian areas. As a result of the NP's acceptance 
of proposals for power-sharing at all levels of government, 
17 of its MPs left the party in February 1982 and formed the 
Conservative Party (cited hereafter as CP) in March 1982 
(South African Institute of Race Relations [cited hereafter 
as SAIRR] 1 198.2 : 8) . Al though the President's Council's 
proposals were probably finalised before this break-away, it 
is certain that the right-wing elements were entrenched in a 
number of local authorities, in particular in the country's 
most populous province, the Transvaal. Direct subsidisation 
as proposed by Browne would have led to much resistance 
amongst right-wing supporters of the NP. Indirect sub-
sidisation was an attempt by government reformers to 
minimise right-wing resistance by redistributing wealth in a 
far less visible way. 
6.5 GOVERNMENT REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL'S REPORT 
The NP called a Federal Congress in July 1982 to announce 
its new constitutional plans for Coloureds and Indians. At 
this congress the go~ernment announced its guidelines and 






i) It accepted the principle of maximum devolution of 
power and decentralisation of administration at local 
government level and of minimum administrative control 
over local authorities. 
ii) It proposed that separate local authorities be 
constituted for the various population groups where 
possible, but subject to the requirement that effective 
financial arrangements should be made to ensure the 
viability of such authorities. 
iii) Services would probably have to be provided jointly on 
a metropolitan or regional basis. However, before 
metropolitan struc~ures were introduced, further 
technical investigations would have to be undertaken. 
iv) A recommendation that local authorities give certain 
attention to improving relations with Coloured and 
Indian Management Committees was accepted and various 
interim proposals were receiving consideration. 
v) The government accepted that ther~ was a need for 
effective coordination of the development of local 
government at central government level. This function 
should be the responsibility of the DCDP. (RSA, 
Constitutional Guidelines, 1982 : 8-11) • 
However, the government veered away from some of the 
President's Council's more liberal recommendations, such as 
that ethnicity should not be.enforced, and that mixed racial 
local authorities should be permitted. Its broad principles 
for constitutional development at both central and local 
level were self-determination for each group over its own 
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affairs and co-responsibility for matters of common 
interest, with no one population group dominating another. 
Why did the government not· support ~hese more flexible 
proposals? The most powerful of the provincial municipal 
associations, the Transvaal Municipal Administration (cited 
hereafter as TMA), came out in unequivocal rejection of the 
report. The TMA was still largely embedded ii) Verwoerdian 
ideals of strict segregation and were against even limited 
integration. They rejected the concepts of both neutral 
income and metropolitanisation, cal1ing the proposed system 
a socialist 11 integrationist11 approach (Rand Daily Mail, 
13/10/1982). 
Although the government did not agree to all the TMA's 
demands, it did reject these liberal proposals of the 
President's Council. As already pointed out, a section of 
the NP's right wing had broken away to form the CP as a 
result of the government's acceptance of the President's 
council's proposal for limited power sh~ring. The 
government, at this stage, was highly sensitive to right-
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wing criticism, fearing that too bold initiatives would lead 
to further erosion of its support. 
6.6 THE RISE AND TIMES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING 
While many of the principles underpinning local government 
reform were established by the Department of Finance, it was 
the DCDP which embodied these principles through the 
formulation of new local government legislation. It was 
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RSCs, a much more explicit political orientation than the 
Department of Finance had initially envisaged (Humphries, 
1988A: 110-111). It generally became known as the 
Department at the cutting edge of reform .. · 
The DCDP had its origins in P.W. Botha's rational-
isation policy of 1979. The five planning branches, viz. 
economic, physical, social, constitutional, and scientific 
planning, were established in the Office of the Prime 
Minister in 1980. ~he DCDP came into being in August 1982 
when all the planning divisions of the Prime Minister's 
Office were transferred to it (F. Cloete, 1988B: 22-23). 
Senior Cabinet member Chris Heunis became the Minister in 
charge of the Department. 
There were two Chief Directorates in the Constitutional 
Development branch of the Department, which dealt with local 
government. One Chief Directorate was that of Consti-
tutional Planning; within it were two Directorates -
Directorate: Central Government Planning, and Directorate: 
Subsystem Planning, local government issues being dealt with 
in the latter structure. The aim of this Chief Directorate 
was to develop constitutional models. 
The second Chief Directorate was that of Constitutional 
Promotion. This in turn was divided into two Directorates: 
Regional and Local Government Promotion, and Self-Governing 
Territories. This Chief Directorate's aim was to promote 
the reform process through liaison with other government 
departments and the provinces. It was more of a 'nuts and 
bolts' section, in that it was concerned with the imple-
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mentation of new constitutional initiatives (RSA, DCDP, 
1987). 
Fanie Cloete (1988B) outlines four distinct phases in 
the evolution of the Department. The first phase (1980~82) 
was that of macro-planning branches without executive powers 
in the office of the Prime Minister. Phase two (from the 
DCDP's inception in 1982 until .1985) was the coordinated 
macro-planning of reform at all levels of society. In this 
stage local government developments in which the 
Directorate: Constitutional Planning was involved included 
the drawing up of an urbanisation strategy, the.restruc-
turing of government functions under the guidance of the 
Commission for Administration (the central personnel 
institution of the public service), the drawing up of the 
Regional Services Council Act of 1985 (which was the lynch-
pin of local government reform), and the restructuring of 
certain aspects of local government for the purposes of 
Coordinating Council investigations (see 6.7 Coordinating 
Council for Local Government Affairs) (F. Cloete, 1988B : 
24) • 
The Directorate: ·constitutional Promotion was involved 
in the formulation and execution of the Promotion of Local 
Government Affairs Act of 1983 (which established the 
Coordinating Council); it provided the secretariat and was 
involved in the investigation of the Coordinating council's 
six committees into various aspects of local government. It 
provided the secretariat of the Training Board and was 














Remuneration of Town Clerks and Training Acts (F. Cloete, 
1988B : 25). 
The third phase, 1985-86, saw the Department acquiring 
executive functions. This involved acquiring responsibility 
for Group Areas legislation and ~egulations from the 
Department of Communications and Public Works. Furthermore, 
all aspects of the Black communities outside the self-
governing states, mostly falling under the control of .the 
DCD, were transferred to the DCDP. To dismember the once 
omnipotent DCD .and to acquire control of urban Black affairs 
·was undoubtedly a major coup for the department (also see 
8.7 The 1984-1986 Urban Uprising Against BLAs). 
At this stage the influence of the Department was 
probably at its zenith. In the 1985-86 budget it was 
allocated funds of almost R5,5 billion (an amount exceeded, 
marginally, only by the Department of Finance) (Cape Times 
19/3/1985) . The DCDP had at that time no less than 27 
directorates under its control. It had responsibility for, 
inter alia, ~onstitutional planning, Primary Local 
Authorities (cited hereafter as PLAs) of all race groups 
(i.e. existing racially-based local authorities), RSCs, 
Development Boards, urbanisation and squatter control, 
provincial government, constitutional development of the 
national states, Regional Development Advisory Committees 
(cited hereafter as RDACs) 18 and Group Areas (The Argus, 
13/5/1986). This massive concentration of power in the 
Department gave it great leverage in the reform process. 
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Before we look at the decline of the DCDP in the fourth 
.phase, it is necessary to look at the nature of the policy 
process. Three issues need to be examined in this regard: 
i) the bureaucratic culture of the Department; 
ii) both P.W. Botha's personality and the structural 
influence of the Office of the State President (cited 
hereafter as OSP) ; 
iii) the personal characteristics of Minister Heunis. 
An examination of these factors will explain why in 
fact the DCDP became the most influential government 
Department within the state, and how its influence was based 
on rather precarious conditions which in turn led to its 
demise. 
6.6.1. The Bureaucratic Culture of the Department of 
Constitutional Development and Planning 
One of the problems the government faced when it embarked on 
reform was that it was saddled with a public service still 
very much wedded to Verwoerdian ideals. Because the NP had 
been in power so long, a number of bureaucrats no longer saw 
themselves as politically neutral civil servants; rather 
they began to adopt the government's way of thinking. This 
no doubt served the NP at one stage, but it was perceived to 
be a problem when the government embarked on reform. It was 
decided to politicise the top level of the bureaucracy and 
in so doing to bypass conservative elements within it. 19 
This politicisation was achieved, inter alia, through 
contract appointments of up to five years and the large-
scale appointment of staff outside the public service. This 
186 
;; ' 
allowed Ministers to bring in their 'own men' (Marais, 1988 
· : 295 - 297; Marais, 1989). 
The DCDP was the most striking example of this new 
strategy. Most of the Department's senior staff {viz. 'the 
movers and the shakers'>" were recruited from outside the 
public service, and its recruitment policy was specifically 
reform-orientated (Interview with senior DCDP official, 
1989). Minister Heunis (1988 : 100) quite candidly said, 
"In this department there is no place for officials who are 
not reform-orientated". 
Reform-orientated professionals and technocrats were 
brought into the public service from the universities and 
the private sector and were utilised in separate full-time 
planning units not involved in routine administration. This 
gave the DCDP enormous power. No line department could 
match its well-researched, technically sound policy. This 
'think tank' resource base underpinned .Heunis's power. 
Comprehensive research into various policy options was 
undertaken (Swilling and Phillips, 1989 : 29-30; interview 
with ex-DCDP official, 1991). 
6.6.2. The state President: Personal and Structural Power 
It has already been pointed out that part of the 
rationalisation process involved the creation of the Office 
of the Prime Minister {from 1985 the OSP). Previously the 
Prime Minister had functioned within the government as an 
individual. He lacked a department and personal advisors. 
He did not play a major role in coordinating policies or 
ensuring that policies were implemented. The creation of 
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the OSP changed all that: it institutionalised and extended 
·his power (Schrire, 1988B 29-30). 
The OSP consisted of a number of committees, advisors, 
secretarlats and Ministers dealing witn public adminis-
tration, public expenditure priorities, constitutional 
affairs, economic policy, socib-economic development and 
national security (Swilling and Phillips, 1989 : 10). 
It is fair to say that this structural power gave the 
OSP bureaucrats who formulated policy and controlled the 
flow of information to the State President a certain amount 
of influence over state policy. However, the argument that 
"theOSP is the nerve centre that presides over a tightly 
centralised state form" (Swilling and Phillips, 1989 : 2) is 
based on rather loose theoretical premises, seeming to 
sugg~st that if one understands the structure, functioning 
and objectives of the OSP, then policy flows in accordance 
with a deductive logic. The. major problem with this is that 
the.causal relationships between the various components are 
not adequately spelled out. 
This thesis contends that the key to understanding 
state policy in the 1980s lay in the personality of State 
President P.W. Botha. While his personal power and the 
structural power of the OSP complemented each other to a 
certain extent, in the final analysis it was the personal 
characteristics of P.W. Botha that were the most important 
factor. The rationalisation process and the tricameral 
system placed enormous powe.r in the hands of the State 
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the incumbent was of crucial importance in explaining how 
policy was made. More specifically, it is argued that the 
idiosyncracies of P.W. Botha were perhaps the most important 
variable which influenced the direction of local government 
reform. 
State President Botha had an authoritarian personality, 
and this influenced the reform process significantly. No-
one in the cabinet had the courage to challenge him on a 
major policy issue once he had reached a decision, 20 lest 
they fall foul of his notoriously explosive temper or, worse 
still, end up in political oblivion .. (P.W. Botha had in 
fact ruined the political careers of certain of his 
colleagues who had dared to cross him.} The route to power, 
therefore, lay in getting his backing for policy proposals. 
This process will be discussed in the next section (Swilling 
and Phillips, 1989 30; interviews with senior DCDP 
official, 1989 and with ex-senior DCDP official, 1991; 
Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1985~ Pottinger, 1988 : 352-367). 
6.6.3. Minister Heunis 1 s personality 
Minister Heunis was an important actor in the local 
government reform process. His influence was not only due 
to the resources of his Department. F. Cloete (1988 : 26) 
suggests that Heunis's status and influence in cabinet, his 
reform strategy and energy, were all important factors. 
Firstly, he was a senior cabinet member, and.from 1986 
onwards Cape leader of the NP. This in itself gave him a 
certain amount of influence and relatively frequent access 
to P.W. Botha. 
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His reform strategy involved getting P.W. Botha's 
backing for policy proposals. This he did by taking new 
proposals to P.W. Botha in an informal way before formally 
presenting them to SSC and the cabinet. This informal 
access ensured that if· Heunis presented proposals at cabinet 
level, they had been cleared with P.W. Botha, the state 
President's formal consent to the proposals then ensuring 
that their passage through cabinet was merely a formality. 
After cabinet approval, policy proposals were referred to 
the NP caucus and then (after the introduction of the 
tricameral system) to the standing Committee for 
Constitutional Affairs where consensus between the different 
Houses was reached· (see 6. 8 RS Cs, for more inf.ormation about 
the operation of Standing Committees) (Swilling and 
Phillips, 1989 : 30; interview with senior DCDP official, 
1989) . 
The crucial variable, as swiliing and Phillips (1989 : 
31) correctly point out, was that "the personal relationship 
between Heunis and the President was the thread on which the 
. . 
DCDP hung the whole reformist project ..• this fragile 
relationship acted as the conduit for reformist policy 
between the DCDP and P.W. Botha"~ 
The third factor was Heunis's energy in pursuing the 
government's reformist goals, his being renowned as a 
'workaholic'. He was known as the arch reformer of the 
cabinet. He was the architect of the tricameral system and 
is credited with having persuaded. the Coloured and Indian 








1985 : 39). After H~unis's resignation, ex-PFP leader Colin 
Eglin said, "His most important contribution was not in 
constitution building but in trying to educate his own party 
from within, in moving away from the sterile policies of the 
past to something better11 · (The Argus 23/5/1989). Heunis was 
known to have been extremely forceful in influencing 
colleagues about the need for the redistribution of wealth 
through RSCs in order to ensure stability. 
There was also a very close relationship between Heunis 
and senior DCDP officials. A former top official, K. 
Jordaan, said that within the DCDP there was ''net grootste 
lof vir die Minister se ondubbelsinnige verbintenis tot die 
Regering se beleid van hervorming en sy bewese vermoe om die 
Regering se beleidsinligting in die praktyk deur te voer" 
(Rapport, .30/10/1989). 
Although a man of considerable intellect, Heunis was 
often incomprehensible to the man in the street. He never 
enjoyed much public support in the stakes for P.W. Botha's 
successor. The incoherence and vagueness of many of his 
constitutional proposals were known ~s 'Heunis-speak121 
(South, 18-24/5/1989;. The Argus, 13/5/1989; Sunday Star, 
24/5/1989). 
There were negative aspects to his personality that 
ultimately contributed to the downfall of both Heunis and 
his Department. P.W. Botha, Heunis's predecessor as Cape 
leader of the NP, was his political mentor. Some of P.W. 
Botha's less pleasant attributes had rubbed off on Minister 
Heunis. He tended to be authoritarian, antagonistic and 
aggressive. 
. . 
As Schrire (1988B : 93) argues, Heunis was 
unpopular in the NP caucus 11 because-· he suffers fools 
ungraciously and tends to be vain, arrogant and rude to his 
colleagues." Allied to this was -tlie fact that the 
securocrat faction of the NP was decidedly lukewarm about 
some of his reformist policies~ T,his caused him to make a 
' number of enemies within the cabine~. As will be shown in 
the next section, when Heunis lost his ~rivileged channel of 
access to P.W. Botha, his unpopular'ity within the NP made 
his position precarious. 
The fourth phase in. the evolution of the DCDP reflects 
its decline. O~e component of this final stage involved the 
transfer of executive powe'rs from the DCDP to line 
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departments from .1986. In particular, the administration of· 
Black affairs in urban areas was transferred to the 
provinces. The Department reverted to its predominant role 
of macro-planning. and development. Its staff complement was 
accordingly cut from 1700 to 327. It was ·still in a broad 
sense responsible for overali policy-making and coordination 
in respect of functions.devolved to provinces as well as for 
control of provinces, themselves (South African Digest, 
10/10/1986; F. Cloete, 1988B 28-29). 
Late 1985/early 1986 was a period when senior DCDP 
officials were moving beyond the parameters of 'Total 
Strategy' (Swilling, 1988A : 15-17). Prospects for major 
reform actually looked quite promising at the beginning of 
this period. There was talk of moving in a federalist 











KwaZulu-Natal Indaba proposals, which attempted to integrate 
KwaZulu with Natal, and non-racial city initiatives, and 
certain DCDP officials were being actively obstructionist in 
the extension of 'own affairs' powers, which they saw as an 
extension of apartheid (also see 7.19 Own Affairs 
Administration) . It looked foreseeable that there could be 
some move towards integrated local authorities. Also, 
Heunis was reputed at this time to have been P.W~ Botha's 
preferred successor. This state of affairs soon changed. 
The most prominent feature of the final stage of the 
DCDP was that of the slow demise of both of both Department 
and Heunis from early 1986 onwards. -what were the reasons 
for this? 
Firstly, the declaration of the State of Emergency in 
June 1986 led to the waning of the influence of the 
reformists vis-a-vis the securocrats within the state. The 
cabinet, and P.W. Botha in particular, developed a 'laager' 
mentality which was not conducive to further reformist 
measures. 
Secondly, the increasingly recalcitrant attitude 
adopted by the LP, the ruling party in the House of 
Representatives, meant that the NP could no longer have its 
own way in parliament. In particular, -the LP used the 
standing committees to reject certain new bills. P.W. 
Botha blamed Heunis, as the father of the tricameral system, 
for this. Heunis had, in fact, persuaded Botha that the 
Coloured and Indian parties could be controlled (Interview 
with senior DCDP official, 1989). 
Thirdly, a rift developed.between Botha and the DCDP 
over the question.of city states. This concept had been 
rejected by the government in the early 1980s, but P.W. 
Botha revived. the idea in early 1986 (see 8. 7 The 1984 Urban 
Uprising Against BLAs for more detail). On the other hand, 
Heunis argued that the city state option pre-empted the new 
policy of including Blacks into higher levels of decision-
making via the negotiation process (Swilling and Phillips, 
1989 31; F. Cloete, 1989 : 26-27; interview with senior 
DCDP official, 1989 and former senior DCDP official, 1991). 
The 1987 general election effectively ended Heunis's 
political power .. His majority in the Helderberg 
constituency was cut from 2 942 to.just 39 by Dr Denis 
Worrall, ex-Ambassador to Britain and Independent liberal 
candidate. This was anomalous: in the rest of the country 
the NP made sweeping gains against the liberal opposition, 
.. 
the Progressive Federal Party (cited hereafter as PFP). 
Importantly, after the election, Heunis lost his 
privileged channel of access to P.W. Botha. This meant that 
he no longer had the State President's automatic support 
when he presented proposals to the cabinet. Further, a 
number of colleagues who had been on the receiving end of 
Heunis's sharp tongue and were envious of the high powered 
resources within his Department, took advantage of these 
changed circumstances by publicly opposing his proposals in 
cabinet. This factor, as well as securocrat resistance, 
meant there was increased opposition to DCDP reformist 







diminish (Swilling and Phillips, 1989 : 32; interviews with 
senior DCDP official, 1989 and former DCDP official, 1991). 
The most visible manifestation of this decline of 
influence was the withdrawal, by the National Intelligence 
Service (cited hereafter as NIS), of the security clearances 
of two top DCDP officials, for allegedly promoting dis-
cussions with 'revolutionaFY' organisations. This was done 
without Heunis's approval. The two officials were known as 
reformists who were moving beyond the bounds of 'Total 
Strategy'. This was a clear attempt by the securocrats to 
neutralise Heunis {whom they regarded as too reformist in 
the power struggle for the State Presidency) and his 
Department {Rapport, 30/10/1989; The Argus 3/11/1989; 
Sunday star, 6/11/1989). 
This decline in influence continued through the rest of 
the 1980s, culminating in. Minister Heunis's resignation from 
cabinet in 1989. After t_he 1989 general electi'!n, the new 
F.W. de Klerk administration dealt the Department its death 
knell by splitting it in two, with some of its functions 
going to the Department of constitutional Development and 
others going to the Department of Planning and Provincial 
Affairs. 
6.7 COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 
The next three sections will look in more detail at this 
policy process and some of the policy ini~iatives of the 
DCDP during its halcyon days, beginning with the 
Coordinating Council for Local Government Affairs. It will 
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attempt to show how policy was made in an elitist, top-down 
fashion. 
In response to the government's acceptance of the 
President's Council proposal that local authorities should 
give attention to improving relations with Coloured and 
Indian Management Committees, a National Interim Liaison 
Committee as well as a Regional Liaison committee for each 
province were established. This National Inte~im Liaison 
Committee was intended to serve as an interim body for local 
government until the new constitutional plans were 
implemented. It was establ-ished under the chairmanship of 
Minister Heunis and consisted of representatives of govern-
ment departments, provincial administrations, local 
authorities, Management Committees, LACs and Administration 
Boards (Heunis, 1983 : 21; SAIRR, 1984 : 28). 
The Promotion of Local Government Affairs Act of 1983 
created the Council for the Coordination of the Affairs of 
Local Authorities which must be seen as the statutory 
. 
formalisation of the National Interim Liaison Committee. The 
chairmanship of the co-ordinating Council was vested in the 
Minister of DCDP. Provision was also made, inter alia, for 
representation by the Provincial Administrators, the MECs in 
charge in local government, UME, the National Ad Hoc 
committee of the Association of Coloured and Indian 
Consultative Local Affairs and Management Committees, the 
Own Affairs Ministers of Local Government (from 1985), and 
local government professional organisations. No provision 




of Local Government Act, No. 91 of 1983 and OCOP, 1983). 
However, when Blacks were brought into mainstream 
constitutional developments in early 1985~ provision was 
made for UCASA representation on the Coordinating council 
(RSA, DCDP, 1985). 
The primary function of the council was to advise the 
government on the coordination of local authority functions 
of general interest (RSA, coordinating Council 1986: 1). 
It had no executive powers. It was not intended to replace 
the UME as the mouthpiece for White local authorities. 
Rather, it was intended to be a forum where representatives 
of various population groups 9ould discuss local matters 
that· were 'general affairs'·. The· racially-defined 
associations such as UME were to remain the bodies which 
would bring to the attention of the government issues of 
'own affairs' nature. 
At the first Coordinating Council meeting in January 
1984, six committees of inquiry were appointed to report on 
specific local government matters. The fields that were 
investigated were uniform municipal franchise qualifica-
tions, the demarcation of areas of jurisdiction of local 
authorities, criteria for the demarcation of viable local 
authorities, the· joint provision of services, the provision 
of personnel for local authorities, the control over local 
authority institutions, and additional sources of revenue 
(the last committee being in conjunction with the Department 
of Finance and under the chairmanship of Deputy Oirector-
General Croeser (Makda, 1987). 
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As a result of these investigations, a whole host of 
legislation was passed by the government in the 1984-5 
period, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Since then, the Coordinating Council has undertaken a 
number of investigations-which have resulted in legislative 
changes including greater remuneration for councillors~ 
delegation of powers to Management Committees and LACs, 
devolution of powers to local authorities, coordination of 
fire services, the future of Transvaal Peri-Urban Boards and 
Divisional Councils, Rural Councils, Local Councils, prior 
votes for municipal elections and deregulation and 
privatisation of local government activities in South 
Africa. At the end of the 1980s it was still investigating 
a uniform law for local government (RSA, Coordinating 
Council, ~986, 1987 and 1988). 
All local government issues requiring legislative 
changes were first referred to the Coordinating Council for 
recommendations (Heunis, 1988 : 66). The Coordinating 
Council did not need to vote in the first five years of its 
existence, up to the end of 1988. Almost 400 resolutions 
had been passed on a consensual basis (Interview with 
Secretary: Coordinating Council, 1989). On the face of it, 
the Coordinating Council looked like an example of pluralist 
decision-making where policy outcomes were due to horse-
trading and compromise among various groups. 
However, a closer examination of the policy process of 
the council reveals a different picture. Most issues 





by the Coordinating Council's sub-committees. DCDP 
officials acted as technical advisers and drew up the terms 
of reference which the committees used as guidelines 
(F. Cloete, 1989 : 14). These terms of reference were NP 
policy; viz. self-determination for each group over its own 
affairs and co-responsibility formatters of common concern. 
Also, the expertise of the DCDP officials gave them a 
certain a~ount of influenc~ over the direction of policy. 
The Action Committee was the Executive of the Co-
ordinating Council. It consisted of Minister Heunis, the 
Minister of Finance, the three Own Aifairs Ministers of 
Local Government, one of the Provincial Administrators, one 
senior DCDP official, one senior. Finance official and one 
representative from the other six local government 
associations represented on the wider .council. It met 
approximately four or five times a year. It reviewed 
reports of the Coordinating Council and perhaps amended 
them. It then sent its report with recommendations to the 
full Coordinating Council, which met about twice a year. 
The full council could either 
• approve the report and refer it to the cabinet for 
approval; 
• refer it back to the relevant sub-committee; or 
• reject it entirely. 
Most reports were approved and ref erred to the cabinet for 
further action. Major policy changes, such as the 
introduction of RSCs, would have to go through the route 
described in the previous section. On a couple of 
199 
occasions, the report was referred back to the relevant sub-
committee for further action. There was never an instance 
in the 1980s where a report was rejected in toto (Interview 
with Secretary: Coordinating Council, 1989). 
At a formal level this looked like a democratic way of 
achieving consensus. However, an important consideration 
was the authoritarian chairmanship of Minister Heunis. 
Several interviewees pointed.out that the Minister "totally 
dominates them" (the council) through managing "consensus" 
by rushing the meetings and by concluding debate prematurely 
(Atkinson and Heymans, 1988 : 50). ,There was also a feeling 
that the Coordinating Council's meetings had largely become 
a rubber stamp for decisions carried out at Action Committee 
level. This was partly due to the fact that the full 
council was too large and unwieldy to reach speedy decisions 
(Atkinson and Heymans,· 1988 : 48). 
The government's claim that all local government 
legislation had the support· of organised local government 
thus seems questionable. It is true that the council was 
the first direct link between central and local government, 
that it made central government more aware of the needs and 
problems of local authorities and that it was a forum for 
co-operation between representatives of ethnically-based 
local authorities. However, the government has responded to 
these needs and problems in a way that fitted in with its 
own agenda, and not that of local government. 
What was the reason for this? UME was dominated by the 
numerically superior TMA which, as already pointed out, was 
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a rather conservative body. 22 Important reformist 
principles such as power-sharing,. redistribution of wealth 
and greater status for Management Committees ,and LACs may 
have run into more serious opposition if. there was too much 
democratic input into the council's policy process. I • This 
seems to be confirmed by one.conservative interviewee who in 
1989 complained that 
Heunis ran roughshod over Minister Amie 
.Venter (the White Minister of Local Government) . 
He favoured Coloureds and Indians at the expense 
of White local government. The council did not 
address the problems of White local government • 
. It is also interesting to note that the council has not 
only confined itself to matters of 'general affairs'. A 
number of its investigations have been in areas which are 
'own affairs' functions in term·s of the cons ti tut ion. This 
seems a means of further undermining.UME. 
It is also interesting to note that more than one 
interviewee thought the government had been over-
accommodating to the demands of the Coloured and Indian 
representatives. Issues such as prior votes and increased 
remuneration for councillors originated from these 
representatives. This can be explained by the fact that the 
promotion of the status of Coloured and Indian 
representatives was one of the most important objectives of 
Heunis and senior.DCDP planning officials (see 10.3 The 
Tricameral System: Greater Access for Management 
Committees). 
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6.8 REGIONAL SERVICE COUNCILS 
Undoubtedly the main component of the new local government 
legislation and one of the major manifestations of this 
policy of devolution of power was the Regional Services 
Council Act of 1985. Its objectives as announced by 
Minister Heunis when he presented the bill in parliament 
were: 
i) to provide certain bulk services in a more cost-
effective and efficient manner; 
ii) to provide extra sources of revenue to alleviate the 
limited growth potential of property rates; 
iii) to promote multi-racial decision-making at local 
government level _(House of Assembly Debates {cited 
hereafter as HAD), 1985 : Cols. 7750-7759). 
As already pointed out, the policy process began with 
the Browne Committee's recommendation that Joint Service 
Commissions.be introduced. This was-supported by the CWG. 
The President's Council's report accepted that there was a 
need for a metropolitan body to solve the uncoordinated 
planning caused by fragmentation, which led to the 
unnecessary duplication of functions, infrastructural 
services and manpower. There was also need for such a body 
to facilitate multi-racial decision-making. Further, the 
President's Council's report recommended that a committee of 
experts be set up to investigate the establishment of 
metropolitan authorities in major urban areas. 
The government, in its response to the Report, acknow-
ledged that services would have to be provided jointly on a 
metropolitan or regional basis. However, before such 
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structures were introduced, further technical investigations 
·would have to be undertaken. This was achieved through the 
Coordinating Council's report into the Joint Provision of 
Services which was undertaken between January and April 
1984. The chairman of the committee was Eugene Lauw, then 
Administrator of the Cape. The report, which fleshed out 
the detail of joint provision of services and recommended 
that RSCs should be introduced for the provision of general 
or regional services (RSA, Coordinating Council, 1984A), was 
approved by the Coordinating Council and then forwarded to 
the.cabinet for approval, almost.certainly after Minister 
Heunis had first informally lobbied the State President. 
The Bill was originally presented to parliament in July 
1984, but was referred to the Select Committee on the 
constitution after vociferous protests from a number of 
disparate quarters, including UME and organised Commerce and 
Industry, because of its lack of both detail and knowledge 
of local government workings. This system of select 
committees, .appointed by parliament to investigate and 
report on specific matters, was a feature of the Westminster 
system (J. Cloete, 1982 : 105). This particular select 
committee consisted of members of all the political parties 
represented in the three Houses. It could hear evidence 
from all interested parties. The government has not 
revealed which bodies gave evidence to this committee on 
RSCs. 
By the time the revised Bill was introduced to 
parliament in 1985, two major developments had occurred. 
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Firstly, violent opposition to BLAs in a number of townships 
from 1984 onwards had led to,the collapse of several of 
these councils. The original Bill had only encompassed 
White, Coloured and· Indian local authorities. Blacks were 
included in the 1985 Bill. RSCs were a vehicle for the 
redistribution of wealth, and it was obvious that the 
greates~ need for upgrading was in Black areas. The 
government hoped that the upgrading of facilities in Black 
areas would lead to greater stability (Interview with 
Minister Heunis, 1989). 
-The second major development was the introduction. o.f 
the tricameral system in September 19S4. The tricameral 
system was intended by the government to work on a 
consensual basis. such consensus was to operate through the 
joint committee system. For 'general affairs' matters, each 
House appointed a standing select committee for the duration 
of a House. A standing committee consisted of three 
standing select committees and was appointed for the 
duration of a Parliament (Marais, 1989 : 262-263). The most 
important standing committee was that of constitutional 
Affairs. All new major constitutional and draft legislation 
was dealt with by this committee. It was also a heavyweight 
committee, consisting of, inter alia, Minister Heunis, 
chairmen of the Minister's Councils.in the Houses of 
Representatives (Allan Hendrickse) and Delegates (then 
Amichand Rajbansi) , and the Minister of Local Government in 
the House of Representatives, David curry. 
,. 
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In May 1985, the Regional Services Council Bill, as was 
.required in terms of the new constitution, was referred to 
this committee. Here a number of concessions were wrung 
from the government by the Coloured and Indian repre~ 
sentatives. For example, Central Business Districts (cited 
hereafter as CBDs) and industrial areas were excluded for 
the purposes of calculating voting strength. The voting 
strength of individual local authorities depends on the 
amount of RSC services consumed by them.. Most CBDs and 
virtually all industrial areas fall within White local 
authority areas. This exclusion therefore bolstered 
Management Committees/LACS and Black local bodies' strength 
at the expense of White local authorities. An Appeal Board 
was created as a result of an amendment that came out of the 
standing committee. It existed to hear appeals against RSC 
decisions and consisted of, inter alia, the three Own 
Affairs Ministers of Local Government (also see 7.2.3. 
Voting Representation) . Coloured and Indian representatives 
saw it as a safeguard against being dictated to by richer 
and larger White local authorities (RSA, Regional Services 
Council Act, No: 109 of 1985; interviews with senior DCDP 
officials, 1989). 
Although these ch~nges gave the appearance of ad hoc 
incrementalist measures, they were in the sphere of content, 
not principle. These concessions were within the 
government's local government. reform parameters, which had 
been determined before the tricameral system became 
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operational, i.e. the need to share power and redistribute 
wealth without losing control. 
The 1985 Bill, unlike its 1984 predecessor, made 
provision for extra sources of revenue. This was a result 
of the Coordinating Council's investigation into such 
sources. While the CWG had proposed a three-component 
revenue source (see 6.3.2 CWG), the Coordinating Council 
recommended a two-component revenue source; viz. an 
employment tax and a turnover tax. The other tax, that of 
the investment levy, was referred by the government to the 
Margo Commiss-ion for investigation (Croeser, 1985 : 20). 
The Bill was presented to and passed by all three 
Houses in July 1985. RSCs were originally intended to be 
implemented from January 1986. However, they were only 
introduced in July 1987. The government had underestimated 
the lead time involved· in setting up the RSCs. Some of the 
dynamics involved in establishing the RSCs will be discussed 
in the chapter on the WCRSC· (see 11.2 Formation of the 
WCRSC). 
The creation of RSCs are an excellent example of how 
policy was made in a top-down, elitist fashion which did not 
reflect public demands. Only once the Regional Services 
Council Bill was at a relatively advanced stage were there 
attempts to sell it to various groupings. The policy was 
formulated by a small group of reformists. The NP's rank 
and flle supporters made little input into this process. 
Its traditional sources of influence, the party caucus and 











(F. Cloete, 1989 15; interview with ex-senior DCDP 
official, 1991). 
There was little initial enthusiasm for RSCs. The 
official opposition in the House of Assembly, the lib.eral 
PFP, and the extra~parliamentary opposition rejected the 
Bill because it was premised on separate racial local 
authorities. The CP rejected it because it introduced the 
principle of power-sharing and redistribution at local 
level. Organised commerce and industry opposed it because 
of the extra taxes they would have to pay to organised local 
government. The UME complained that it had not been 
consulted when the Bill was rushed through (Natal was the 
only provincial municipal association that had recommended 
to the President's Council that Joint Services Bodies be 
introduced). A number of non-NP-controlled local 
authorities opposed it because they feared losing powers and 
functions to RSCs. A number of Divisional Councils opposed 
the Bill because they saw their existence threatened by the 
proposed new councils .. There is also evidence to suggest 
that the government had to do a great deal of explaining and 
cajoling to get certain NP-orientated municipalities to 
support RSCs (Cameron, 1988A; Humphries, 1988A: 110-111). 
6.9 DEVOLUTION OF POWER : THE POLICY PROCESS 
It has been pointed out that the government accepted 
the President's Council's recommendations that maximum 
devolution of powers to local authorities be accepted as 
policy. One of the Coordinating Council's initial 




question of loosening control over local authority 
institutions. However, the Council had to operate within 
the framework of the Republic -of South Africa Constitution 
Act, which meant an adherence to the racially based 
'general'/'own' affairs philosophy (RSA, Coordinating 
Council, 1984B: 5-6). 
The committee made a number of recommendations, some of ... 
the most important being that 
i) Voters' control over the activities of their local 
authorities should be promoted (8-12). 
ii) Macro-control should be exercised by the Department of 
Finance over the spending of local authorities in order 
to establish a coordinated expenditure pattern in the 
public sector (21). 
iii) There should be differentiatiori regarding the nature 
and scope of control, provided that any devolution of 
power be withdrawn -should it be found that the local 
authority concerned is not governed effectively (19). 
iv) Any control should be exercised as close as possible to 
the local authority so that the lines of communication 
can be as short as possible to avoid any delays 
resulting from indirect control (19). 
v) Due to the large number of central acts, regulations 
and proclamations affecting the activities of local 
authorities, it was not possible for the committee to 
check all the legal stipulations and make recommend-
ations as to which central government control measures 





suggested that all government departments inquire which 
control measures that are exercised in terms of legis-
lation can be adopted in line with the government's 
accepted guidelines (25/26). 
vi) It suggested that certain provincial powers and 
functions be devolved down to local authorities. A 
list of control measures compiled from the various 
provincial ordinances served as a useful guideline to 
indicate which provincial powers could not be devolved 
and which should be subject to control (26). 
In May 1985 the guidelines and provisions in respect of 
devolution of power were endorsed and further developed in a 
decision taken by the cabinet. This implied that: 
i) government functions should as far as possible be 
carried out at the lowest possible level of government; 
ii) central government and.its departments should be vested 
primarily with general policy and monitoring functions: 
iii} this accepted the principle of continued existence and 
monitoring power of Central Treasury (Botha, 1988 : 2-
3) • 
This 1985 decision, unlike that of 1982, made provision 
for devolution of power to provincial authorities. A number 
of pre-conditions determined the extent to which the 
government would be prepared to devolve power: 
i) It should be.determined what functions can be trans-
ferred to local authorities to ensure cost-effective 
services to the inhabitants of a particular 
municipality. 
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ii) Arrangements should be made to ensure that national 
goals are adhered to by local authorities. 
iii) Changing needs of communities need to be met. 
(Thornhill, 1985 : 1). 
As the Coordinating: council pointed out, further 
technical investigations were needed to explore what 
functions could be delegated. A Project Committee headed by 
the Commission for Administration was appointed to compile a 
report on the devolution of powers to local authorities. 
The Committee also consisted .of the Directors of Local 
Government of the four provinces and the three own Affairs 
Administrations, DCDP planners and Department of Finance 
officials23 (RSA, Coordinating Council, 1985 : 11-12). 
There were three phases in this devolutionary exercise: 
i) identification and.transfer of 'own affairs' at central 
government level; 
ii) identification and transfer of 'own affairs' at 
provincial level to various Ministers' Councils and 
devolution of general functions from central to 
provincial level; 
iii) identification and transfer of functions and powers 
from central and provincial level to local government 
level. (Business Day, 8/10/1986). 
Phases (1) and (2) involved.the horizontal extension of 
powers in terms of sections 14 and 16 of the constitution, 
and entailed the transfer of powers to the various 
Ministers' Councils. These phases were completed and 
various powers were transferred to these bodies in April 







1989. Phase (3) involved the devolution of powers to local 
authorities and by October 1989 it was still in progress. 
The Macro .organisation directorate of the Commission was 
responsible for this process, in conjunction with the 
Organisation and Workstudy Departments of the various 
provinces. This entailed identification of functions at a 
minute.micro-level, which was a.highly time-consuming 
process. This explains why even after some years this task 
had not yet been completed (Interview with senior official, 
Commission for Administration, 1989). 
Of particular interest were the principles within which 
the Commission operated. This meant that policy-making 
resided at national level, while local authorities were 
responsible for the execution component of the function 
(Intervie~ with senior official: Commission for Admin-
istration, 1989). Minister Heunis confirmed this 
interpretation of affairs during a personal interview in 
1989. While the adherence of local authorities to national 
goals is compatible with devolution, the notion.that local 
authorities are responsible for the administration and 
execution of policy is in fact delegation and not 
devolution. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
embodiment of this principle in legislation led to 
accusations that the new local government deal was in fact 
characterised by greater central government control. 
Devolution of power was accepted as government policy 
in 1982, a year before the DCDP local government directorate 






after the 1985 cabinet decision re-affirming this commitment 
to devolution that this policy was adopted in earnest. From 
1983 until 1985, DCDP officials were the most forceful 
lobbyists within the government for the need to give greater 
power to this devolutionary· process (F. Cloete, 1989). The 
issue of why devolution of power was seen as being important 
will now be examined. 
6.10 OBJECTIVES OF DEVOLUTION 
A major objective of devolution was to embody the basis 
of self-determination. Devolution was a mechanism through 
which group rights could be protected (Botha, 1988 : 10-11). 
This objective was to b~ achieved through the creation and 
strengthening of different racial local authorities, viz. 
vertical decentralisation, and the transfer of powers· to the 
various Ministers' Councils, viz. horizontal decentral-
• isation. There seems little doubt that this racial division 
of powers was more important than the geographic division of 
powers. As P.W. Botha stated: "devolution of authority to 
the local government institution of various population 
groups was a constitutional mechanism which would protect 
the interests of minority groups within a heterogeneous 
society" (Cape Times, 27/3/1984). 
The second main objective of devolution, and it is 
. ' 
closely related to the first, was that of a conflict-
defusing mechanism; viz. to depoliticise highly contentious 
issues. The RSCs are the most prominent.manifestation of 
this attempt to introduce technocratic structures removed 
from the realm of public contestation to incorporate and 
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defuse conflict. As Minister Heunis contended: "I hold 
that as a philosophy we have to reduce the conflict areas on 
a central level and bring them down to local level" (HAD, 
1983 : Col. 10117). Part of this strategy also entailed the 
central government ridding itself of local development 
I ' 
problems by transferring them to local government units, 
with RSCs also being an example thereof. 
The third main objective was an administrative one. 
Centralised rule had proved to be inefficient and was 
unresponsive to local needs. It was hoped that devolution 
would expedite communication and decision-making and lead to 
decisions being adapted to local conditions; It was felt 
that it was easier to obtain reliable information if you are 
operating closer to the people· who are to be affected by the 
decisions. This in turn would lead to more cost effective 
and efficient service provision (Heunis, 1988 : 209; F. 
Cloete, 1988A : 22). 
The first two reasons can be classified as political 
and the third as administrative. These first two objectives 
had strategic purposes. They had explicit political 
objectives in that they were part of the government's 
strategy to bring about greater stability in the country. 
However, as pointed out (in 2.9 National Unity), states 
whose very existence is threatened do not devolve power 
lightly. In this case the beleaguered South African 
government was determined to keep control over the reform 
process for security reasons. As will be shown in the next 
chapter, this attempt to closely control this devolution of 
213 
power policy explains, to··a large extent, why the govern-
·ment's parameters for this policy involved a great deal of 
central control. 
6.11 THE NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
It has been argued by a number of academics that the 
military was the hidden power during P.W. Botha's tenure, 
first as Prime Minister and then as State President 
(Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983; Grundy, 1988; Swilling and 
Phillips, 1989). The evidence for this view is uncon-
vincing; while the military undoubtedly played a major role 
in the formulation of a counter-revolutionary strategy to 
neutralise the activities of extra-parliamentary groups, it 
made little input in the formulation of both national and 
local constitutional proposals. It is true that the 
military,, through the National Security Management System 
(cited hereafter as NSMS), became involved in the activities 
of certain BLAs, but this was in the field of the formu-
lation and implementation of local policy and not in the 
formulation of central policy. This issue of NSMS' 
influence in local government policy will now be examined. 
The military-dominated SSC was constantly accused of 
playing a dominant role in policy-making at national level 
during the 1980s (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983; Grundy, 1988 
: 49-57). However the SSC, albeit the most important 
.. 
component, was only one aspect of the NSMS. Although the 
NSMS had been created as part of P.W. Botha's rational-
isation process in 1979, it was only activated in 1986 with 









'Total Strategy' reforms had not had the desired effect. 
There was mass resistance to the tricameral.system, 
apartheid education and in particular to BI.As where popular 
resistance caused the collapse of certain councils. A 
selective State of Emergency in 1985 had failed to quell the 
violence so in June 1986 the government declared a nation-
wide State of Emergency. The Minister of Law and Order, 
Adriaan Vlok, subsequently announced that the state was 
operating according to a three-phase counter-revolutionary 
programme: 
l. The restoration of law and order was the important 
priority. 
2. Socio-economic upliftment would then occur. 
3. Only then would constitutional development proceed 
(Leadership, 1987 : 28). 
The NSMS was responsible for the management of the 
emergency and the embodiment of this programme. As pointed 
out (in 6.6.3 Minister Heunis's Personality) this 
revolutionary climate was not conducive to the reform 
process and the DCDP began losing influence vis-a-vis the 
securocrats within the state. While the DCDP reformists 
believed that political and economic reform had to go hand-
in-hand, the securocrats as encapsulated in the infamous 
statement by General Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence, 
believed that the stability of the middle grouping of Blacks 
could only be bought through the satisfying of material 
needs (Die Suid-Afrikaan, 1986 : 13). 
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The apogee of the NSMS was the SSC. It has been argued 
that the SSC was the most important cabinet committee and. 
highly influential on policy-making because: 
1. It was the only committee that was instituted 
statutorily. 
2. It was the only committee that had the State President 
(previously the Prime Minister) as chairman. 
3. It was concerned with a broader range of activities 
than other committees including foreign policy, 
constitutional and economic affairs. 
4. The support network was more comprehensive than the 









own secretariat which was dominated by military i · 
personnel (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983 : 39-40; Grundy, 
1988 : 49). 
The SSC had a wide-ranging brief, viz. to advise the 
government on the formulation ahd- implementation of national 
policy and strategy in relation to the security of the 
Republic (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983 : 39-40). The 
permanent members of the SSC were the State President 
(formerly the Prime Minister), the.Ministers of Defence, 
Foreign Affairs, Justice and Law and Order, the most senior 
cabinet members, heads of the South African Police (cited 
hereafter as SAP), South African Defence Force (cited 
hereafter as SADF) and the NIS, as well as other top 
officials. Additional ministers and officials could be co-
opted on certain issues. The SSC secretariat was dominated 
by senior security force officers (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 
1983 : 39-40; Grundy, 1988 ; 51-57). 
Next in line came the National Joint Management Centre 
(cited hereafter as NJMC) which was responsible for the 
functional management of the State of Emergency. It was 
chaired by the Deputy Minister of Law and Order (first Roelf 
Meyer and then Leon Wessels). It was responsible for the 
coordination of both security and wel£are functions 
(Swilling and Phillips, 1989 : 18, 22; Seegers, 19888, 29-
3 0) • 
Beneath the NJMC were the Joint Management Centres 
(cited hereafter as JMCs) which, as one observer put it, 
"are at the cutting edge of government policy as it is 
deployed on the ground" (Selfe, 1987 : 9). It was an 
attempt to decentralise the operation of the sscs to the 
regional and local levels. At regional level there were 11 
JMCs which divided the country into management regions 
corresponding to SADF area commands and the nine ecqnomic 
development regions. , They were normally chaired by senior 
SADF and SAP officers. Beneath them at metropolitan level 
were about 60 sub-JMCs, with some having borders that 
approximated those of the RSCs. Thirdly, at local level 
there were between 250 and 500 mini-JMCs and Local 
Management Centres (cited hereafter as LMCs) which 
coordinated state action in virtually every established 
urban area in the country. All these committees only had 
advisory powers and did not have separate budgets (Selfe, 
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1987 : 9-11;, Seegers, 1988A 132-135; swilling and 
Phillips, 1989 : 23-26). 
The NJMC, sub-JMCs, mini-JMCs and LMCs were all divided 
into four committees (Seegers, 1988B, 30). One of them is· 
important for the purposes of this thesis, namely the 
welfare committee. This committee was responsible for the 
coordination of functions of civil administration. Its 
membership consisted of officials of the various.non-
security state departments. Its major functions were "to 
practise development projects, cut red tape, unblock 
bottlenecks and generally ensure that things get done". At 
JMC level and below it was primarily concerned with the 
identification and coordination of local upgrade programmes 
(Seegers, 1988B : 30-31; Swilling and Phillips, 1989 : 24). 
Thirty-four areas which were deemed major security risks 
-
were identified for upgrading. (They were mostly Black 
local authorities, but at least one Coloured area was 
involved). Millions of Rands were pumped into these areas 
(Swilling and Phillips, 1989 : 21). 
LMCs were responsible to mini-JMCs; those in turn to 
sub-JMCs, those to the JMCs; the JMCs to the NJMC and 
finally the NJMC to the SSC (Seegers, 1988B : 29, 31). All 
government institutions were required by law to participate 
in the NSMS. The development of the system was an attempt 
both to coordinate executive functions and to give the SSC 
the capacity to act at sub-national level (Seegers, 1988A 
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The problem' with much of the literature on the NSMS is 
that it presumes that policy derives in an a priori fashion 
from the structure, functioning and objectives of the 
system. The causal relationships between the major 
components are not spelled out. It is contended that the 
influence of the SSC (like that of the OSP) was due to 
personal and not structural reasons. Its strength was due 
to the fact that the state President was its chairman ahd 
had the ability to determine the agendas and decisions of 
both the.cabinet and the SSC (F. Cloet~, 1989: 9-10). All 
.leaders bring in with them trusted advisers into office. 
Quitelogically P.W. Botha, being.Minister of Defence prior 
to becoming Prime Minister, brought in military officials as 
advisers. This does not mean there were any structural 
changes in policy. As previously pointed out, P.W. Botha 
had a highly forceful personality and was rarely challenged 
on any major issue at cabinet .level. There is no reason to 
think things operated any differently at SSC level. While 
issues that were approved by the SSC tended to be rubber 
stamped by the cabinet, this was because·P.W. Botha as 
chairman of the former body had already consented to such 
matters, and not because the military were de facto running 
the country. As Schrire (1988A : 25) points out: "While he 
(Botha] devised many of the perceptions of the military, he 
did not become a captive of his own department. Botha was 
alway~ clearly in charge." 
The SSC had no say in the formulation of new central 
policy in respect of local government. Major policy change 
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proposals would·have been submitted to the SSC for comment, 
but by this time they had, due to Minister Heunis's informal 
lobbying, been consented to by the State President. This 
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would have ensured their safe passage through the SSC. What· 
also tends to be down-played is that there is a large 
overlapping membership between the SSC and cabinet, which to 
a certain extent blurs the differences between the two 
bodies (Selfe, 1987 : 6) . 
The activities of JMCs at local government level, 
however, were more complicated. The government's stated 
position was that th.e JMCs were merely a coordinating 
mechanism and that they did not have any executive powers. 
They had to convince line departments and local authorities 
to take their advice. JMCs were prevented in writing from 
giving orders to other government departments (General Malan 
quoted in The Argus, 16/9/1987). 
There were certain cases where the military was 
involved in functional activities, but this was as an agent 
of other departments. This was because in crisis situations 
the military could have acted more quickly than line 
departments. It was able to call on manpower resources 
(professionally qualified conscripts) and financial 
resources (through secret funds) (Seegers, 1988A : 134 and 
interview with. senior DCDP official, 1989). 
The evidence, however, suggests considerable variation 
amongst different areas. Case studies have suggested that 
the JMCs had a major say in the formulation of local 
government policy in certain townships. Further, even where 
the JMCs were only advisory bodies, it seems that their 
advice was invariably accepted by local authorities, 
particularly ·when such structures consisted of unsophisti-
cated councillors (Boraine, 1988 : 21~22). The fact that 
upgrading occurred in areas which wer~ identified as 
security risks (viz. the 34 so:.:..called 'oilspots 1 ) 24 seems to 
suggest that policy at local level in certain instances was 
largely determined by recommendations of JMCs. The crucial 
factor is that the JMCs had access to upgrading funds. Even 
if the JMCs were only advisory bodies, the lure of funds for 
upgrading was a powerful incentive for local authorities to 
accept their recommendations (see 8.8 1986-1989: The 
Reassertion of State Control and the Reign of JMCs for an 
account of the activities of JMCs in certain Black 
township~). 
Notwithstanding, the broad principles and parameters 
underpinning local government had already been accepted by 
cabinet by the time the NSMS.had been activated.· The NSMS 
was responsible for the coordination of welfare policies. 
It did not make centrgl policy in respect of local 
government. Its actions have generally been within the 
parameters of policy drawn up by the DCDP and accepted by 
cabinet. Indeed, the raison d'etre of JMCs can be partly 
explained by the.delay in g~tting the RSCs off the ground. 
The NSMS was involved in the formulation and 
implementation of policy at local level. In certain 
instances the structures of this system have undermined the 
powers of existing local authorities. However, the fact 
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that SSC, through the various welfare committees, seemed in 
certain cases to determine what development should occur at 
regional and local level, is a case of undemocratic 
centralisation of powers and not the formulation of new 
. . 
central poli9y (Bekker and Jeffery, 1989 : 15). 
In conclusion, while the militarists gained increased 
influence on the implementation of policy through the NSMS 
in the 1980s, this did not indicate a structural shift of 
power. As indicated previously, these developments were 
indicative of the fact that there had been a centralisation 
of power, resources and authority in the presidency by the 
new constitution. The NSMS in the last instance was 
accountable to the OSP. As Schrire (1988B : 28) remarked: 
"If there has been a takeover, it has been an 'executive 
coup', not a military one." 
6.13 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the formation and adoption stages of 
the local government policy process in the 1980s. 'Total 
Strategy' was a broad ideological framework which influenced 
the environment in which policy was made·. The tricameral 
system with its 'general affairs'/'own affairs' dichotomy 
determined the parameters within which local government 
policy changes were going to occur. 
The Department of Finance was the first state 
institution to stress the need to depoliticise and devolve 
in order to reduce the conflict level at central level. The 
CWG was the most important Department of Finance input into 





many of the CWG's proposals, such as the necessity to 
qepoliticise and devolve powers and the need for new local 
government structures and taxes. 
The government accepted most of the President's 
Council's recommendations and the reformist-orientated DCDP 
was given the responsibility for the drawing up of new local 
government legislation. The DCDP acquired a great deal of 
power and functions and had great leverage over the reform 
process. The main influence of the DCDP was due to the 
reformist strategy of Minister Heunis in informally 
canvassing, and getting the support of, the State President 
before formally presenting policy proposals to cabinet. 
This was because the tricameral system· had vested enormous 
powers in the State President. The incumbent, P.W. Botha, 
had an authoritarian personality. No-one in the cabinet had 
the courage to challenge him on a major policy issue once he 
had reached a decision .. 
There is evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
local government policy process was made in an elitist, top-
down· fashion by a small group of reformists. The 
Coordinating Council, which made recommendations on all 
local government issues requiring legislative changes, was 
dominated by Minister Heunis and was not an instrument for 
consensus. RSCs, which introduced n~w metropolitan 
structures, were another example of policy being conducted 
in an elitist, top-down fashion. There was little popular 
. enthusiasm for RSCs. · Devolution of power was another policy 
change which was largely engineered by a group of reformists 
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within the state. The.main objectives of devolution of 
power were: 
(a) to embody the central policy principle of self-
determination for each group; 
(b) to defuse conflict from central to local level; 
(c) to ensure that services were provided in a more cost-
efficient and effective way. 
The NSMS played a negligible role in the formulation 
and adoption of stages of local government policy. The 
I 
regional/local extension of the NSMS, i.e. JMCs, were 
however involved in the implementation of policy in certain 
Black areas. This usurped the powers and functions of 
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THE POLICY CONTENT OF NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
While the previous chapter dealt with the mechanics of 
policy-making and the aims and objectives of local 
government reform, this chapte~ will concentrate primarily 
on the analysis of the policy content of this new local 
' 
government legislation in the 1980s. 1 Particular attention 
will be given to the central issue of whether the main 
features of this new local government legislation embody 
devolution of power or not. 
An analysis is also made of the hew provincial and Own 
Affairs structures and the Department of Finance control 
procedure over local authorities. An examination is also 
undertaken of the manifestations of one of the principles 
underpinning the devolution of power, viz. voters' control. 
Finally, an evaluation of the state's strategy in respect of 
this devolutionary issue is undertaken. 
7.2 REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL ACT OF 1985 
It was pointed out (in 6.1 Introduction) that state 
reformers realised that there had to be both political and 
economic reform to ensure greater stability in the country. 
However, although committed to power-sharing, the NP had no 
intention of losing control of the reform process. Both 
these objectives were encapsulated in the Regional Services 
Council Act of 1985, which introduced new multi-racial 
local government structures, RSCs. This Act was the 
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kingpin of new local government legislation. Minister 
Heunis of DCDP said that this Act was the best example of 
the new policy of devolution of power (Network, 27/10/1988). 
Its objectives, as announced by him in parliament when 
presenting the Bill, were: 
1. To provide certain bulk services in a more cost-
2. 
efficient and effective manner. Uncoordinated region-
alisation had led to the duplication of services .with 
poorer areas failing to attain even a minimum standard 
of services. 
To provide extra sources of revenue to alleviate the 
limited growth potential of property rates. 
3. To facilitate multi-racial decision-making at local 
government level .. The Act created a forum where 
matters of joint concern could be discussed {HAD, 
17/6/1985 : Cols. 7750-7759) . 
• 
Functions 
The Act made provision for 21 functions to be performed by 
RSCs. Most of these functions were to be transferred from 
PLAs to these new bodies. RSC services are obligatory for 
all its constituent local authorities, unless specifically 
granted exceptions. The 21 functions are: bulk supply of 
water, bulk supply of electricity, sewerage purification 
works and main sewerage disposal guidelines, land usage and 
transport planning, roads and stormwater drainage, passenger 
transport services, traffic matters, abattoirs, fresh 
produce markets, refuse dumps, cemeteries and crematoriums, 













airports, civil defence, libraries, museums, recreational 
facilities, environmental conservation, promotion of tourism 
and the establishment, improvement and maintenance of other 
infrastructural services and facilities. Provision is also 
made for any other regional functions to b~ transferred to 
RSCs (RSA, Regional services Council Act No. 109 of 1985 : 
Section 3). 
It was originally intended for for RSC functions to be 
matters of 'general affairs', while matters of 'own affairs' 
were to be controlled by racially-based local authorities 
(see 6.2 Total Strategy for more information about this 
'general affairs'/'own affairs' dichotomy). However, an 
amendment to the Act in 1986 made provision for RSCs to 
perform both 'general' and 'own' affairs functions. This 
was because Cape RSCs, unlike those of the Transvaal and 
orange Free state, 2 were not newly created bodies. They 
took over the infrastructure and functions of Divisional 
councils which included both 'general' and 'own' affairs 
(See 4.4.3 Rural Local Authorities for an overview 
matters. 
of the functioning of Divisional councils.) 
7.2.2 Establishment 
The power- to establish or abolish RSCs or alter their 
boundaries rests with the Administrators of the respective 
provinces. Before an Administrator does this he has to 
consider a report from the Demarcation Board (see 7.11.l 
Demarcation Board) and has to exercise the powers in 
concurrence with the Minister of DCDP (both in this capacity 
and that of Minister in charge of Black local government) ,
3 
the Minister of Finance, and the three Own Affairs Ministers 
of Local Government. He is also obliged to consult with 
local bodies involved. Finally, he has to take cognisance 
of the criteria mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Act, viz. 
community of interests among the residents, the economic 
interdependency between residents in respect of where they 
live, work, commute and relax and spend most of their 
income, financial self-sufficiency with regard to the 
rendering of services, the nature of the services rendered, 
cost-effectiveness and efficiency in rendering of services, 
existing administrative' boundaries and development 
potential. Once this procedure is completed he demarcates 
the RSC boundary for the region, determines which local 
bodies will be represented on the Council and which 
functions the RSC will undertake, decides which CBDs and 
industrial areas are to be excluded, and then creates the 
RSC {Section 2). There is no possibility of appeal against 
any of his decisions. 
7.2.3 Voting representation 
RSCs consist of representatives of White local authorities, 
Coloured and Indian Management Committees/LACs, BLAs, or any 
representative appointed by the Administratqr of a body 
established outside the area of jurisdiction of these 
authorities. The members are nominated by constituent local 
authorities, and are thus indirectly elected. The voting 
power of a constituent local authority is in direct 
proportion to the amount of RSC services consumed by it, 















part thereof of services consumed. However, no local 
authority can have more than 50% of the vote. All· decisions 
require a two-thirds majority (Section 9). Furthermore, 
CBDs and industrial areas are excluded for the purposes of 
calculating voting strength (see 6.8 RSCs). 
Provision is also made for an Appeal Board. The Appeal 
Board consists of the Administrator (or the Minister of 
Finance in respect of financial matters) , the Minister of 
DCDP in his capacity as Minister in charge of Black local 
government, and the three Own Affairs Ministers of Local 
Government. A local body which is aggrieved by a RSC 
decision can ask the Council to debate the matter again. If 
it is still dissatisfied after a second hearing, it can 
appeal to the Appeal Board. A successful appeal needs the 
consent of all the Board members. An appeal can be lodged 
in respect of five items, viz. the failure of a council to 
provide a regional function; the inadequate performance by 
the council of a regional function; any decision or 
proposal of the council of a priority in connection with the 
appropriation of funds; any determination by the council of 
a priority in connection with the appropriation of funds; 
and the refusal by the council of any application for 
exemption to make use of a RSC service (Section 11) . 
Voting requirements such as a two-thirds majority for 
decisions, limits on larger local authorities' represent-
ation· and the process that aggrieved local bodies had to 
comply with if they were dissatisfied with a decision, were 
designed to encourage consensus politics (DCDP, 1988 : 17). 
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The Regional Services Council Amendment Act of 1988, \ 
however, changed the voting arrangements on RSCs. In terms 
of this legislation, the Administrator has the power to 
change the voting composition of the local authorities in 
order to achieve a result which in his opinion is fair to 
all parties concerned. Furthermore, if a majority cannot be 
obtained on any matter, the chairman is compelled to refer 
the matter to the Administrator for a final decision, 
effectively overriding the entire appeal mechanism (RSA, 
Regional Services Council Amendment Act, No. 49 of 1988). 
Finance 
The Act embodied two of the CWG's recommendations, provision 
being made for a regional services and a regional 
establishment levy. The former is a tax on wages and 
salaries of all employers in a RSC region. The latter is a 
levy calculated on total sales recorded by businesses. The 
rate of these levies is determined by the Minister of 
Finance after consultation with th~ Administrator. These 
taxes replaced black transport and labour levies, which were 
direct government subsidies, as well as local authority 
license fees. The RSCs did not have the power to levy 
property rates. This remained the preserve of PLAs. 
The Act made it obligatory for RSCs to spend their 
funds exclusively in RSC regions and on the following: 
(a) costs incurred in the execution of its functions; 
(b) the payment or part thereof of costs incurred in a 
region by a local body in the performance of its 
functions; ,. 
' 
- :7 ~· 
(c) expenses in connection with the collection of levies. 
(d) payment or part thereof· of regional transport infra-
structure expenses; 
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(e) training of personnel. It is obligatory for RSCs to 
pay one-twentieth of a year's revenue to the training 
fund established in terms of the Local Government 
Training Act (see 7.10 Local Government Training Act of 
1985) ; 
(f) any other purpose approved by the Minister of Finance 
after consultation with the Administrator (RSA, 
Regional Services· Council Act, 1985: Section 12). 
Priority was to be given to the establishment, 
improvement and maintenance of infra~tructural services, and 
infrastructural facilities where the greatest need exists 
(Section 12[6)). 
It was stated in parliament by Minister Heunis that it 
was hoped these additional sources of revenue would enable 
local ~uthorities to become more financially self-
sufficiertt, thus reducing the need for government subsidies 
in metropolitan areas. Among·the financial principles the 
.Act was based on was, firstly, devolution of power. Local 
voters would have control over the nature and level of 
services. Secondly, it was based on the principle of user-
charges, viz. that services should be paid for as much as 
possible by the actual consumer (HAD., 17/6/1985 : Col. 
7758). 
·7.3 EVALUATION OF THE REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL ACT 
7.3.l Metropolitanisation 
The issue of consolidation of local units has already been 
discussed (in 2.8 Consolidation of Local Units). It was 
pointed out, firstly, that a metropolitan form of government 
is the natural consequence of growing urban centres where 
there is both duplication of services and disparities in the 
costs of providing such services among constituent local 
authorities. Secondly, international and local evidence has 
shown that local authorities rarely organise effective 
cooperative action voluntarily. Local political and 
economic interest groups' apprehension that their interests 
would be subsumed in a metropolitan body ensures that 
cooperation generally occurs in technical areas only. For a 
metropolitan body to work effectively, participation must be 
mandatory. In terms of these criteria, the government had 
strong grounds for introducing these new structures. RSCs 
were intended to rationalise the use of scarce resources 
such as skilled manpower, infrastructure and land. In 
particular, they were seen as a solution to the problem that 
had bedevilled poorer and smaller local authorities: that 
of finding trained staff. The intention was to pool the 
services of professional· staff of a region so that they 
could be utilised by the smaller and poorer local author-
ities (DCDP, 1988 : 198) . 
. Less persuasive is the government's claim that metro-
politanisation leads to a more effective provision of 
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Units) the economies of scale of metropolitanisation have 
never been satisfactorily proved anywhere. Metropolitan 
bodies can, however, be justified on the basis of equity. 
Such structures are potentially progressive in that, under 
certain conditions they can ensure the redistribution of 
wealth from richer local authorities/areas to poorer local 
authorities/areas of a metropolitan region. 
The redistributive intention behind the RSCs was seen 
in Section 12(6) which is an attempt by the state to defuse 
township unrest by uplifting the quality of life in such 
under-developed areas. It was rushed through just before 
parliament was prorogued in 1985. The reason for this haste 
was that the government saw the RSCs as an immediate panacea 
for such unrest. As Deputy Director-General of Constitu-
tional Development C. F. Scheepers rem.arked, "RSCs have a 
vital role in the total strategy of upliftment and 
\ 
stabilisation of non-white communities" (South African 
Broadcasting Corporation [cited hereafter as SABC] News 
Bulletin, 29/11/1985). 
However, although the Act makes provision for funds to 
be redistributed to where the need is greatest, the voting 
mechanism appeared to militate against this happening. 
W.hi tes are greater consumers of services, and in many RSCs 
White local authorities collectively had in excess of the 
two-thirds threshold voting level. The view of White local 
authorities as expressed through the UME has consistently 
been that they do not consider their function to subsidise 
local authorities of other race groups. 4 At the time of the 
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promulgation of the Act it was suggested that in order to 
ensure compliance with Section 12(6), the Appeal Board could 
find itself in a position of having to reverse the 
allocation of funds to White areas in the direction of 
underdeveloped Black townships. This could lead to strong 
resistance by White local authorities and give right-wing 
parties a strong mobilising issue (Cameron, 1986A : 73; 
19888 54) • 5 
7.3.2 Devolution of power 
Does the Regional Services Council Act embody the govern-
ment's stated principles of devolution of power and minimum 
administrative control? The government argues that RSCs are 
an extension of local authorities and that it is the 
representatives of such local bodies who will make RSCs' 
decisions.. However the Administrator, a government 
appointee, plays a major role in the functioning of the 
RSCs. He has the power, inter alia3 to establish a RSC 
(after considering a report from the Demarcation Board which 
he can reject), amend its region, abolish the RSC, decide 
which local authorities/bodies are going to participate in 
it, appoint and dismiss the chairman of any RSC, transfer or 
second to it any civil or municipal servant, decide which 
functions or parts of functions the RSC may perform, change 
the voting composition of local authorities on RSCs, make a 
final decision if a majority vote is not reached on any 
matter, relieve any local body or any function identified as 
a regional function without compensation, identify which 






make regulations he deems necessary for the effective 
execution of the Act. These key powers are a form of 
deconcentration and not devolution. . 
It has been argued that these powers of Administrators 
mainly relate to getting the RSCs off the ground. It was 
suggested that once functional, RSCs would probably be 
controlled from the bottom up because constituent local 
authorities have the right to participate, the right to vote 
in meetings and the right to.appeal (Breytenbach, 1987 : 46-
47). However, the Regional Services Council Amendment Act 
of 1988 gave the Administrator potent~al power to.override 
local authorities' decisions and appeals. 6 The Adminis-
trators were given the power to perform the duties of a 
local authority where it refused to carry out any regional 
function, and to charge the costs incurred to the local body 
concerned (RSA, Regional Services Council Amendment Act, No. 
49 of 1988). 
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It has been argued by the government that devolution of · 
power has occurred in respect of finance. Provision is made 
in the Act for two regional taxes raised from and allocated 
to local jurisdiction by local representatives. However, 
the levels of these taxes are set by the Minister of Finance 
(after consultation with the Administrator) . RSCs are 
subject to more central financial control than PLAs. The 
latter bodies are subject to indirect financial controls in 
that once they have determined their rate levies, these have 
to be approved by the Administrator. However, the rates of 
RSCs are determined" directly by the Minister of Finance. 
While these regional levies have embodied the principle of 
fiscal federalism, it is in a rather neutered form (see 
6.3.2 CWG for more information about fiscal federalism). 
These levies are delegated and not devolved taxes, with the 
rate being set by the Minister of Finance. Although the 
rate for all RSCs was initially set at 0,1% for the turnover 
tax and 0,25% for the payroll tax, there is no limit on the 
amount to which the rates of these taxes can be raised in 
the future. By the end of the 1980s a number of RSCs, with 
the approval of the Minist~r of Finance, had already 
increased the. rate of their turnover taxes. Further, RSCs 
budgets must be approved by the Minister of Finance and he 
can introduce regulations which he deems necessary for the 
execution of this Act. A 1986 Amendment gave the Minister 
of Finance additional powers to determine how the levies 
will be calculated and by whom (RSA, Regional. Services 
Council Amendment Act, No. 78 of 1986). 
A further undemocratic feature of the Act is the 
provisions pertaining to the Appeal Board. Although an 
appeal can only be lodged in respect of five items, the 
criteria for these items are extremely wide, covering most 
matters of probable contestation. Thus, collective 
decisions of local·authorities can be overturned by 
government ministers. Although this is undemocratic, it has 
been mooted that this is a form of 'enlightened autocracy', 
because it can ensure redistribution of wealth to poorer 
. 
black areas. The 1988 Amendment centralises matters even 
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refer any decision where there is a deadlock to the 
A~ministrato~ for a final decision. 
RSC functions represent most of the important functions 
of major PLAs. Although in terms of the Act, PLAs could 
operate these services on an agency basis for the RSCs, they 
will have no primary policy-making powers in this regard. 
If all these 21 potential regional functions are transferred 
to the RSCs, the type of functions that PLAs will be left 
with will be dramatically diminished. 7 In view of the large 
range of central controls, the government 1 s justification 
for this - that RSCs are an extension of local authorities -
seems dubious. Further, such bodies are indirectly elected, 
hence not directly account.able to local ratepayers. 
7.3.3 Regional Services councils' Finance 
One of the major financial principles underpinning this new 
legislation was the need for the state ~o disengage itself 
from expenditure. This was to be achieved through the 
introduction of these self-financing metropolitan bodies. 
The intention was gradually to phase out all central 
government subsidies in respect of RSC functions, such as 
transport. Self-financing RSCs were an important component 
of the government's strategy to depoliticise the central 
state (the state's strategy of depoliticisation is discussed 
in more detail in 6.3 Department of Finance and 6.4 The 
President's Council's Report on Local Government). It is at 
metropolitan and not central level that provision is made 
for the redistribution of resources to poorer local 
authorities. Finance Minister Barend du Plessis, responding 
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to a question as to why the. new sources of revenue cannot be 
raised and redistributed at central government level, 
asserted: 
Raising taxes at central level and redis-
tributing them to regional level, will merely 
further politicise an issue which is essentially 
for the benefit of people in an economically 
contiguous area (HAD., 19/6/1985: Col. 7859). 
The government's plan was that conflict over resources 
would be articulated at indirectly elected RSCs, which were 
intended to be depoliticised bodies removed from the realm 
of public contestation. 
7.3.4 Regional services councils.and Ethnicity 
Although the government claims that the RSCs are not racial 
bodies in law, they are nonetheless premised on racially-
defined local authorities, which are in turn based on 
separate Group Areas. It is these racial representatives 
who are represented on RSCs. This factor caused the system 
of RSCs to be opposed by the PFP, liberal city councils and 
extra-parliamentary Black organisations. However, it has 
been argued by the state that although group-based, RSCs are 
the first fully multi-racial decision-making bodies at local 
level. The symbolic impact of representatives of all the 
statutorily prescribed groups discussing issues of common 
concern should not be underestimated (DCDP, 1988 : 203). 
7.4 PROMOTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 
AMENDMENT ACT OF 1984 
As a result of the Coordinating Council reports into 
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criteria for viable local authorities, the Promotion of 
Local Government Af.fairs Amendment Act of 1984 was 
promulgated (RSA, Coordinating Council, l984C and 19840). 
In terms of this Act, the powers of Administrators to 
establish, dissolve or to combine to local authorities, to 
determine or alter the area of jurisdiction of a local 
authority or to classify local authorities according to 
grades, have to be exercised in terms of general.directives 
setting out uniform criteria, standards and norms for all 
local authorities. These directives were to be laid down by 
the Minister of DCDP after consultation with the 
Coordinating Council. Local authorities were to be graded 
on their ability to perform functions and exercise powers 
effectively on the basis of these directives. In May 1985, 
17 directives were announced. They ranged from technical 
issues such as an adequate supply of water and electricity 
to concepts such as 11 a fairly homogenous community" which, 
because they are so nebulous, are wide-ranging in 
implication (see RSA, Promotion of Local Government Affairs 
Amendment Act, No. 116 of 1984~ and RSA, Directives Issued 
in terms of Section 17A of the Promotion of Local Government 
Affairs Act 1983, Government Gazette No. 9571 of 24 May 
1985) . 
This Act reflects both centralisation and devolution 
simultaneously. on the one hand, the Minister of ·ocoP now 
has considerable say in the establishment of local 
authorities, while on the other, the grading system is an 
important component of the devolution policy. It was now 
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possible to identify on a scientific basis the different 
financial and administrative capabilities of individual 
local authorities. Power could be devolved to local 
authorities on the basis of these capabilities. This was 
achieved with the Remuneration of Town Clerks Act. 
7.5 REMUNERATION OF TOWN CLERKS ACT OF 1984 
Town clerks were the only group of local government 
employees that remained outside of the provision of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. As pointed out (in 4.5.3.2 
Personnel Control) they were subject to the virtually 
unlimited control of provincial administrations. This meant 
they had very little job protection and were occasionally 
fired arbitrarily. Further, control of their remuneration 
was such that departmental heads who, although subordinate 
to them, often earned more than they did. The town clerks, 
through their professional body, the Institute of Town 
Clerks, and their union, ·the Association of Chief 
Administrative Officers of Local Authorities, made repeated 
representations to the government to be removed from the 
control of the Administrators and to be made subject to the 
provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act. This was 
achieved in 1984 but not in the way in which they had asked. 
Although they were included in the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act, the successor of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act, there was one notable exception: their remuneration 
(Evans, 1985: 1-4). 
The Remuneration of Town Clerks Act was originally 
applicable to government institutions for Whites, Coloureds 
. ' .. 1 .. , 
.and Indians. Blacks were brought into the ambit of the Act 
in 1985. The power to set the remuneration and other 
service benefits of town clerks (defined as the Chief 
Executive of a local authority irrespective of the 
designation of the post), such as housing schemes and 
travelling allowances, was removed from the Administrator 
and vested in the Minister of DCDP. Local authorities were 
divided into 15 different grades in terms of the Local 
Government Affairs Amendment Act of 1984. The grades were 
determined on a statistical formula based on 13 factors 
which were weighted differently. The Income of Local 
Authorities {25%) was the most important factor. Erven 
(15%), Electricity Meters {12%), Water Meters (10%) and 
Sewerage Points {10%) within local authorities' boundaries 
were the other important factors. Town clerks were to be 
remunerated in proportion to the grading of their local 
authority. Furthermore, no employee's remuneration, 
including allowances, could exceed 92,5% of that of their 
town clerk (RSA, Remuneration of Town Clerks Act, No. 115 of 
1984 and Classification of Local Authorities According to 
Grades, Government Gazette No. 9462 of 19 October 1984). 
By controlling the remuneration of town clerks, the 
Minister de facto controlled the remuneration of senior 
municipal officials in all local authorities in the country. 
While this legislation led to greater centralisation of 
powers, it is also fair to say that central personnel 
control is not incompatible with devolution. It is not 
uncommon, even under the separate personnel system, for 
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aspects such as minimum salaries, disciplinary procedures, 
labour relations, .qualifications of certain technical 
personnel and standards of local staff systems to be 
controlled by central government (see 3.2.1 Separate 
system). The United Nations (1966 : 24) suggests ·that there 
is a 
clear correlation between the extent to which 
certain basic elements of local government 
personnel systems are prescribed nationally and 
the extent to which the prerequisites of a sound 
personnel system are generally fulfilled. 
The government, however, went beyond this prescription 
of certain procedures and norms, and introduced further 
measures of central control. It was pointed out that 
provincial control over town clerks had already led to a 
shift from the separate to the more centralised unified 
model. The various provinces had imposed stringent service 
conditions, including maximum salaries, for this group of 
employees (see 4.5.3.2 Personnel Control). The government 
now introduced elements of the even more centralised 
integrated model (see 3.2.2. Integrated System). The 
remuneration packages of senior local authority staff were. 
now linked to those of public servants, and were indirectly 
controlled by central government. It means, as craythorne 
points out (1990 : 327), that local authorities cannot 
improve their own staff conditions; they have to wait until 
the Commission for Administration improves public service 
conditions before they can do so. 
···~ 
This Act had a great effect on the remuneration package 
of smaller local authorities in particular. Many of them 
had to pay relatively high salaries to attract professional 
staff. This legislation cut the remuneration package of a 
number of senior officials in certain local authorities and 
caused a great deal of bitterness (Financial Mail, 
21/12/1984). 
This local authority discontent contributed· to The 
Remuneration of Town Clerks·Amendment Act of 1987, which 
changed the content of the original Act by introducing an 
Advisory Board on Remuneration and Service Benefits of Town 
Clerks. The Board consists of local government represent-
atives from employer and employee organisations. It is able 
to determine the service benefits of town clerks subject to 
certain conditions. The Board now had the function to 
classify local authorities in grades. The grading system 
was also changed. Now no senior official could earn a 
higher remuneration than an amount equal to the remuneration 
payable to a town clerk of a local authority, which is one 
rank lower in accordance with the general determination 
binding on the latter local authority (RSA, Remuneration of 
Town Clerks Amendment Act, No. 106 of 1987). 
These changes meant a shift in the direction of 
devolution in certain respects. Town clerks 1 salaries were 
under statutory control since 1956. The Minister of DCDP 
was divested of the power that he held in terms of the 
original Act to determine the remuneration benefits of town 
clerks. Now their remuneration was to be set by local 
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government representatives. However, the Board's powers to 
determine salaries were limited. According to section 9 of 
the Act the highest remuneration, including service 
benefits, that can be paid to a town clerk is that payable 
to a Deputy Director-General of the public service. The 
amended Act also led to ~reater centralisation, in that it. 
brought leave benefits within its ambit. 
244-
Finally, individual local authorities still.did not 
have the power to set the salaries of their respective town 
clerks. one of the principles underlying this Act was that 
town clerks were part of the. public sector and decisions on 
service benefits for town clerks should be within prescribed 
maximum limits. This view had been expressed in the Browne 
committee's Report (1980 : 7), which pointed out that local 
authorities' employees are paid by taxpayers and increases 
in salaries paid by municipalities result in higher local 
authority taxes. The need to control local government 
expenditure became government policy and was reflected in 
the Act. 
This principle was also evident in another Act 
affecting local government, viz. the Pension Benefits for 
councillors of Local Authorities whereby the Minister of 
DCDP determined the conditions under which the local 
authorities operate pension funds and the rate of 
contributions of local authorities (RSA, Pension Benefits 
for councillors of Local Authorities Act, No. 125 of 1987). 
The importance of town clerks in this local government 
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of Town Clerks Act, which elevated town clerks to 
.professional status. The justification for this Act was 
that town clerks were playing a key role in this maximum 
devolution of power policy, ~hich demands greater responsi-
bility and insight, hence the need for professionalism 
{HAD., 6/6/1989 : Cols. 12982-83 and RSA, Profession of Town 
Clerks Act, No. 75 of 1988). 
It is also worth mentioning briefly under. this broad 
discussion of personnel that the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act of 1983 replaced the Shops and Off ices Act 
and lays down certain minimum service conditions that have 
to be adhered to by employers, including local authorities. 
Similarly, the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act of 1983 
replaced the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and lays 
down worker safety conditions that have to be followed by 
employers, including local authorities (Craythorne, 1990 : 
217 - 228; also see 4.5.3.2. Personnel Control). 
7.6 THE COMMISSION FOR ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1984 
The Commission for Administration Act of 1984, although not 
specifically applying to local authorities had one ominous 
provision pertaining to them. Although couched in rather 
vague terms, Section 7 of the Act can be interpreted in a 
way that gives the Minister of Horne Affairs, through the 
Commission of Administration, vast powers over the 
appointment, remuneration and service conditions of local 
authorities. In particular, it gave the Minister the power 
to appoint senior local government officials {RSA, 
Commission for Administration Act, No. 116 of 1984). This 
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measure was not, however, used against local authorities in 
the 1980s. 
7.7 LOCAL AUTHORITY LOANS FUND ACT OF 1984 
In terms of this Act, the management of Local Authority 
Loans Funds were transferreq from the Public Investment 
Commissioners to a Board under the chairmanship of the 
Minister of Finance or his nominee (RSA, Local Authority 
Loans Fund Act, No. 67 of 1984). This fund was originally 
for smaller local authorities exclusively. It was only made 
available to larger local authorities in 1987. However, 
larger local authorities have generally moved towards 
internal financing, and in any event their creditworthiness 
is such that they can obtain loans in the open market. It 
is mostly smaller White local authorities and BLAs that are 
utilising the Fund. 
This Act makes provision for smaller local authorities 
to gain access to funds which they otherwise would have 
trouble raising. However, there is now direct government 
allocation of funds, as opposed to the previous indirect 
control. 
7.8 GROUP AREAS AMENDMENT ACT OF 1984 
The Group Areas Amendment Act of 1984 made provision for the 
opening of CBDs to all races for trading purposes. Requests 
for the opening of CBDs would be considered by the Group 
Areas Board, who would then send recommendations to the 
Minister of Community Development (from 1985 the Minister of 
DCDP. Group Areas was transferred to DCDP in that year}. 



























authorities had to be consulted, but their explicit consent 
was not needed for the opening of such areas. This meant 
that right-wing municipalities could not obstruct the de-
segregation of CBDs (RSA., Group Areas Amendment Act, No. 101 
of 1984). 
7.9 THE RATING OF STATE PROPERTY ACT OF 1984 
As a result of the recommendations of the CWG (see 6.3.2. 
CWG), The Rating of State Property Act of 1984 was 
promulgated. This Act repealed the State Property (Immunity 
from Rating) Act of 1931 and the Rating of Railway Property 
Act of 1959. In terms of the Act local authorities could 
~ 
now levy rates on state property. The Minister of DCDP 
could exempt certain state property providing he had 
consulted the respective Administrators and obtained the 
concurrence of the Minister of Finance (RSA, The Rating of 
state Property Act, No. 79 of 1984; and Craythorne, 1990 : 
373-374) . 
7.10 LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRAINING ACT OF 1985 
The Local Government Training Act made provision for the 
establishment of a national coordinated local government 
Training Board, whose objective was to train local govern-
ment officials and provide guidance to councillors. The 
legislation was a result of the Coordinating Council's 
report on training, which recommended the introduction of 
such a Board (RSA, Coordinating Council, 1984E). In 
addition, the Browne Committee had expressed concern about 
the inadequate training facilities for local government 
employees, and the President's Council had mentioned the 
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need for trained local government personnel and capable 
councillors. The seven members of the Board are appointed 
and hold off ice at the pleasure of the Minister of DCDP. 
The Training Board makes policy on advice from the National 
Coordinated Training Committee, a sub-committee of the 
Coordinating Council. Regional Training Committees have 
been created for each province. Beneath these bodies are 
sub-regional training committees. Municipal associations 
have representation on these committees, which determine 
training needs within regional/ sub-regional contexts. They 
draw up budgets and programmes for training action and 
arrange for courses to be presented. 
How are the Training Board's activities funded? 
Between 1985 and 1989, R16 650 000 was allocated by 
parliament to this body. One twentieth of RSC funds go to 
I 
the training fund annually. In addition there is a training 
levy of R2,50 (orignally Rl,50) per employee on local 
authorities (RSA, Local Government Training Act, No. 41 of 
1985; RSA, Training Board, 1987, 1988 and 1989). 
The lack of _suitably trained personnel has been one of 
the main obstacles to both the establishment and operation 
of 'non-white' local authorities. This has been a problem 
in smaller White local authorities too. such bodies do not 
have the funds to run their own training programmes. Local 
authorities that provide training, in accordance with 
courses approved by the Training Board, to the staff of 
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to claim for the defrayed costs of training local government 
.personnel. 
The government claims that the Training Act is a 
devolutionary act which transfers the responsibility and the 
execution of training programmes to local authorities 
(through the regional and sub-regional committees). The aim 
of the training strategy is to improve th'e level of services 
and the level of local government and administration. This 
will make local authorities more competent to meet local 
demands and will enhance the prospects for further 
devolution (RSA, Training Board, 1987; Thornhill, 1985 
10) • 
How does this affect the training programme of existing 
local authorities? A number of larger (White) local 
authorities have run their own training programmes for 
years. When the Act was enacted, the government was at 
pains to point out that the autonomy of local authorities 
would not be interfered with. It regarded the role of the 
Training Board as being to supplement rather than to replace 
existing training programmes of local authorities. A senior 
DCDP official stated that the Training Board would not 
prescribe courses but only react to proposals put forward by 
the various training bodies. The aim was to establish broad 
guidelines according to fixed standards (Thornhill, 1985 
10) • 
The content of these courses is evaluated by an 
Evaluation Committee consisting of professionals in the 
field of personnel. This is to ensure that training 
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programmes are evaluated in terms of scientific criteria 
(RSA, Training Board, 1987). While this is likely to 
improve the quality of training programmes in the long term, 
this Act has, to a certain extent, led to the centralisation 
of authority for training. Local authorities that. wish to 
have costs defrayed for existing or new programmes (and in 
view of the resource squeeze in which many local authorities 
find themselves, it makes sense to do so) have to conform 
with the Training Board's standards. The money for the 
Training Fund can be utilised only for the provision of 
training courses that have been approved by the Training 
Board. 
At the time that the Act was enacted, it was feared 
that such training standards could be underpinned by NP 
policy, viz. self-determination for ethnic groups (Cameron, 
1986A : 75-76). In practice, much emphasis has been placed 
on training in management skills for middle and top 
management in local authorities (RSA, Training Board, 1989). 
As far as can be ascertained, these courses do not have any 
apartheid underpinnings. However, the CPA did oppose the 
CCC becoming the regional training centre of the Western 
cape because of the council's liberal policies. Training is 
undertaken by Western Cape-based training officers 
accountable to the Training Board, but for payrol_l purposes 
on the books of t.he CPA (also see 9. 7. 3 Effect of Training 
Board's Activities on CCC). This seems to suggest that the ,. 
NP is not prepared to relinquish too much control over the 
determination of training policy at local government level. 
' . 
· The motivation behind the guidelines to councillors was 
that a number of mainly Black and a few Indian councillors 
had been involved in serious problems of misconduct such as 
corruption, inefficiency and illegal interference in the 
activities of administrative staff. A number of less 
sophisticqted councillors did not know what their defined 
responsibilities were. There was accordingly a need to 
explain to such councillors precisely what their duties 
entailed. Furthermore, greater devolution of powers 
requires greater expertise on the part of councillors to 
handle greater powers and responsibilities~ Self-study 
manuals were drawn up and sent to councillors by the 
Training Board for this purpose (RSA, Training Board, 1989). 
There are also certain Management Development 
programmes which are offered jointly to officials and 
councillors. The reasons why management courses are also 
offered to councillors are, firstly, that it is intended to 
provide them with the background knowledge as to how local 
authorities should be run efficiently and effectively. 
Secondly, such cou~ses are intended to facilitate better 
working relationships between officials and councillors 
(Interview with Western Cape Sub-Regional Committee Training 
Officer, 1991). 
It has been argued that councillors are supposed to be 
lay people with general knowledge of local authority 
administration. Accordingly, provisions to tr~in 
councillors to be specialists must be seen as an attempt by 
the government to impose its ideological stamp on the course 
251 
content of training programmes (Cameron, 1986A : 75-76). 
While this argument is probably overstated in that there was 
a crucial need to provide councillors with background 
knowledge about the workings of local authorities, it is not 
without substanc~ either. An interviewee said in 1990 that 
a training video for Biack councillors could most certainly 
be construed as being supportive of the apartheid-based 
system of separate local government structures for different 
groups. 
7.11 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AMENDMENT ACT OF 1985 
7.11.1 The Demarcation Board 
The Local Government Affairs Amendment Act made provision 
for a multi-racial Demarcation Board. This was in line with 
the recommendations of both the President's Council and the 
Coordinating Council. This is a permanent body. It has a 
maximum of seven members who have a five-year term of 
office. All its members are appointed by the Minister of 
DCDP. Its main function is to advise the Administrator on 
the demarcation of the area of jurisdiction of both RSCs and 
PLAs; it has no executive powers. It has to undertake 
these functions in terms of the directives laid down by both 
the RSC Act for the establishment of RSCs and the Promotion 
of Local Government Affairs Act of 1983 for the creation of 
PLAs {RSA, Promotion of Local Government Affairs Amendment 
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7. 11. 2 Final Decision-Makinq Powers £or 
Management committees/LACs 
This Act also made provision for Management Committees/LACS 
to acquire final decision-making powers. 8 To understand the 
reason for this it is necessary to trace the evolution of 
government policy towards these bodies in the 1980s. 
After years of Management Conunittees'/LACs' frustration 
due to their lack of executive powers (see 4.7 Coloured and 
Indian Local Government) , the government introduced measures 
to give these bodies greate_r say in policy affecting their 
areas. Directives issued in terms of the Promotion of Local 
Government Affairs Act of 1983 made provision for interim 
regulations to improve communications between White councils 
and Management Committees/LACs and to allow the latter 
bodies greater participation in their own areas (RSA, 
Regulations for the Improvement of Communication between 
Local Authorities and Coloured and Indian Consultative Local 
Affairs and Management Committees, Government Gazette No. 
9490 of 9 November, 1984). However,.this Act did not confer 
final decision-making powers on the committees; it listed 
seven regulations, at least one of which had to be adopted 
by White councils. 
However, a number of White local authorities were tardy 
about adopting these regulations (see 10.5 ADMC/CCC 
Relations: 1984-1989). As a resulF, the Local Government 
Affairs Amendment Act also made provision for Management 
Committees/LACS to- acquire final decision-making powers. 
This was not a conferment of separate municipal status. It 
in no way nullified existing provincial legislation which 
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gave the respective Administrators power to set up 
Management Committees/LACs. It was only an interim measure 
until the impediments to setting up Coloured and Indian 
local authorities had been addressed. Nor were these powers 
granted automatically. If a Management Committee/LAC wanted 
these powers it had to petition the respective Adminis-
trator, who in turn had to conduct an investigation to 
determine the feasibility of such a request (RSA, Promotion 
of Local Government Affairs Amendment Act, No. 110 of 1985). 
A number of Management Committees/LACs requested final 
decision-making powers. There were, however, problems 
involved in the take-over of these functions. These 
problems were, firstly, that decisions of Management 
Committees/LACs could have financial and legal consequences 
which could involve their mother local authorities; and 
secondly, there was concern about the effect this fragment-
ation would have on the rendering of municipal services. 
The matter was investigated by a special Action Committee of 
the Coordinating Council and as a result 106 functions which 
could be delegated to Management Committees/LACs were listed 
in the Government Gazette in May 1988. These 106 functions 
are a comprehensive set of functions which, if delegated to 
Management Committees/LACs, would give them powers almost 
comparable to White local authorities without being divorced 
in toto from the municipality. such powers include the 
allocation of new houses and eviction of tenants, appoint-
ment of Coloured and Indian staff, powers to make grants-in-
aid, to approve building plans, to levy tariffs for 
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municipal services and property rates, etc.. These powers 
are not delegated automatically •. They·depend on the 
willingness and capability of the respective Management 
Committees/LACS to perform such functions (RSA, Delegation 
of Powers to Coloured and Indian Management and Local 
Affairs Committees by Local Authorities, Government Gazette 
No. 11298 of 31 May, 1988). 
At the end of the 1980s the Coordinating council was 
still investigating: 
(a) the question of financial resources required for the 
proper functioning of all bodies, including Management 
Committees/LACs; 
(b) a formula for division of services between local 
authorities; 
(c) the allocation of resources generated in CBDs and 
industrial areas. 
Because of these issues, the comprehensive takeover of 
functions and powers could not, in most cases, take place 
(RSA, House of Representatives, 1987 : 47; Debates of 
Parliament, 27/2/1989 : Col. 1772). (Also see 10.5 ADMC/CCC 
Relations: 1984-1989.) 
7.12 TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS 
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ACT OF 1986 
In terms of this Act, the State President can either suspend 
or grant exemption from laws that he deems excessive 
barriers to tne economic progress of persons engaged in 
industry, trade or occupation, or competition in these 
spheres, or the creation of job opportunities. The impli-
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cation for local authorities is that the State President now 
had the power to suspend any local authority's legislation 
in this regard for a period of three years, by means of a 
proclamation without consulting and considering the local 
authority concerned (RSA, Temporary Removal of Restrictions 
on Economic Activities Act, No. 87 of 1986). 
The former Administrator of the Cape, Eugene Louw, 
encapsulated the objective of this Act when he remarked 
that, 
Deregulation is so vital to the creation of 
jobs that local authorities could not be allowed 
to frustrate the process. Devolution of power 
could, if not carefully carried out, enable local 
authorities to·use new-found powers in such as way 
as to neutralise the goal of deregulation 
completely (Cape Times, 21/5/1987). 
This Act was used against local authorities for the 
first time in February 1988, when the state President 
exempted a site in the industrial area of Kew in 
Johannesburg from certain licensing and municipal by-laws. 
The zone was exempted from, inter alia, the Labour Relations 
Act of 1956, Wage Act of 1957, The Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act of 1983, The Machinery and Occupational 
Safety Act of 1983 and the Factory, Machinery and Building 
Works Act of 1941 (SAIRR, 1987/88 : 624-625; and 1988/89 : 
353-354). It was announced in September 1989 that the State 
President intended deproclaiming a further 22 industrial 








suspended the most restrictive licensing provisions in the 
four provincial licensing ordinances (SAIRR, 1989/90 
These developments seemed to suggest that the 
government regarded deregulation as a more important 
priority than devolution. 
7.13 CAPE MUNICIPAL AMENDMENT ORDINANCE NO. 3 OF 1986 
587) • 
An amendment to the Cape Municipal Ordinance in 1986 gave 
the Administrator of the Cape power to remove from office 
councillors or even entire councils who, in his opinion, are 
responsible for or have contributed to the failure of a 
council to enforce or carry out the provisions of any 
ordinance, by-law, etc. and nominate a person of his choice 
as a replacement. He also has the power to withhold 
councillors' allowances (CPA, Cape Municipal Amendment 
Ordinance, No. 3 of 1986). The legislation was introduced 
to give the Administrator more powers to counter both 
liberal and conservative intransigence towards the 
Management Committee system. Although this is a Cape 
provincial ordinance and not a parliamentary Act, it is one 
of the most centralist pieces of legislation affecting local 
government in the 1980s. 9 The Administrator now has 
unfettered discretion to fire democratically elected 
representatives. 
7.14 LOCAL COUNCILS ACT, 1987 
The Local Councils Act of 1987 {House of Assembly) was 
instituted for the benefit of the peri-urban areas that were 
left without representation after the dissolution of bodies 
such as the Divisional Councils and the Board for the 
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Development of Peri-Urban Areas. The Act made provision for 
the creation of Local Councils in White areas only. These 
councils are not equivalent to local authorities. They do 
not have the power to levy rates, make by-laws or to render 
services. These powers all reside with the Minister of 
Local Government, House of Assembly. The Minister ha$ the 
power to assign the administration of a law to Local 
councils. He also has powers on a wide range of local 
matters: he can establish Local Councils, decide on the 
election or appointment of councillors, the number of 
councillors, promulgate regulations in respect of aspects 
concerning such.councils, etc .. Such Local Councils also 
have representation on RSCs. These Local Councils, like 
local areas, were seen as developing bodies that should 
ultimately become independent local authorities. A number 
of Local councils such as Constantia and Melkbos have 
subsequently been established (RSA, Local Councils Act, No. 
94 of 1987). 
While Local Councils are an improvement on the 
situation whereby jurisdictions such as ex-Divisional 
councils local areas had no representation whatsoever, they 
are merely advisory bodies, similar in status to Management 
committees. The extensive powers vested in the Minister 
mean that the autonomy of these bodies is highly 
constrained. 
7.15 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS COUNCIL ACT, 1989 
The government claims that.to give effect to its policy of 
devolution of power, it was necessary to establish a _Local 
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Government Affairs Council (House of Assembly) for the 
-performance of functions previously undertaken by peri-urban 
bodies such as the Board for the Development of Peri-Urban 
Areas and the Divisional Councils in respect of White areas. 
This new body is based in Pretoria. Its members are 
appointed by the Minister of Local Government, House of 
Assembly, who also sets their service conditions. This 
council has the power to levy property rates, make by-laws, 
raise loans, enter into contracts and set service charges 
for such areas. The aim of such legislation was to 
coordinate Local Councils. A number of power? that were 
vested in the Minister were transferred to this umbrella 
body for local areas. However, despite government claims to 
the contrary, it is clear that this legislation is highly 
centralist in tone. An appointed body in Pretoria has the 
power to decide policy for local areas throughout the 
country (RSA, Local Government Affairs Council Act, No. 84 
of 1989). 
7.16 RURAL COUNCILS 
The Regional Services Council Amendment Act of 1988 made 
provision for the establishment of Rural Councils outside 
the area of jurisdiction of local authorities. These Rural 
' ' 
Councils were created on ethnic lines, such councils being 
established for each group in each region (with the 
exception of Blacks - the bill did not make provision for 
Black Rural Councils) . The respective Own Affairs Depar-
tment of Local Government Ministers had the responsibility 
for the establishment of these bodies. 
; ; 
Rural Councils can be vested and entrusted with the 
powers and duties which the Minister may from time to time 
identify. However, the Rural Councils do not have the power 
to make by-laws, render services or levy taxes (RSA, 
Regional Services Council Amendment Act, No. 49 of 1988). 
It appears that the autonomy of Rural Councils is 
limited. Their primary objective.seems to be to give rural 
(mainly farming) areas representation on RSCs, 10 rather than 
to enhance democratic representation. 
7.17 FREE SETTLEMENT AREAS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 
IN FREE SETTLEMENT AREAS ACTS OF 1988 
These Acts arose as a result of the President's Council's 
constitutional committee report on Group Areas in 1987, and 
was the government's response to the de facto 'greying', 
(i.e. when a large number of people who are not statutorily 
defined as White move into White group areas) of suburbs 
such as Hillbrow. The Free Settlement Areas Act provides 
for the ownership and occupation of property by all ethnic 
groups in certain areas. This Act establishes the principle 
of open residential areas. A Free Settlement Board was 
established and advises ·an which areas should be opened. 
Its members are appointed by the various state departments. 
The State President, the Own Affairs Ministers of Local 
Government, Administrators and local authorities can request 
an investigation into the opening of an area. The State 
President has the ultimate power to proclaim these areas, 
although the Minister's Councils have the right to veto any 











-· ~ ~ 
.. t 
~~· 








areas. Any decision to open an·area must be taken in 
consultation with the local authority affected {RSA, Free 
Settlement Areas Act, No. 152 of 1988). 
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What is of interest to this thesis is the centralist 
thrust of this piece of legislation when compared to the 
President's Council's recommendatioris. The latter body had 
recommended that decision-making in respect of free 
settlements should be taken by the municipality concerned in 
line with the policy of devolution of powers. The right of 
appeal to the Administrators should exist. Further, only 
White, Coloured and Indian local authorities and local 
residents. could initiate an application to open an area 
{RSA, President's Council, 1987 .: 114-118). However, the 
Act vested final decision-making powers with the various 
Ministers' Councils. and made provision for central 
government representatives to initiate such applications. 
What were the reasons for this? 
As pointed qut previously, there had been the strong 
growth of CP-orientated local authorities. The government 
was determined not to allow such local authorities to 
undermine its reform policies. To give too much say to 
local authorities in this process.could have led to the 
objectives of this Act being thwarted. by conservative local 
bodies. Although local authorities still have to be 
consulted, the Ministers' councils do not need the former 
bodies' explicit consent to open areas. 
The Local Government Affairs in Free Settlement Areas 
Act establishes multi-racial bodies to represent residents 
in free settlement areas. Such residents will be able to 
choose whether they want to participate in local authorities 
they previously voted in or in these newly created bodies 
which are also called Management Committees. They are 
identical in status and powers to Coloured and Indian 
Management Committees except that they are non-racial in 
nature. They only have advisory powers and can be 
overridden by their 'mother' White local authorities. They 
can, however, receive primary powers to make policy in their 
areas if these functions are delegated by the Provincial 
Administrator. The Administrator has the power to establish 
a joint committee consisting of an equal number of members 
of the local authority and management body which will 
discuss matters of common concern (RSA, Local Government 
Affairs in Free Settlement Areas Act, No. 103 of 1988). 
It can also be seen that these new representative 
bodies were also rather circµmscribed in autonomy. The 
reason for this control is to limit the pressure of the left 
(as opposed to problems on the right which led to the 
centralist clauses of the main Act). For the government, 
joint voters rolls were a giant step into the dark, hence 
the need for careful control of this new policy. 
By the end of the 1980s, the Free Settlement Board was 
just beginning its investigations. In November 1989 parts 
of District Six in Cape Town, Country View in Midrand, 
Windmill Park in Boksburg and the Warwick Avenue triangle in 






Africa (The Argus, 25/11/1989). No multi-racial Management 
. committees had, however, been created. 
7.18 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1986 
At the 1982 Federal Congress of the NP, P.W. Botha noted 
that to give effect to self-determination in matters of both 
own and joint concern~ the provincial system, it need be, 
would have to be adapted. Although it was announced in 
parliament during the second reading of the Republic of 
South Africa Constitutional Bill that its provisions in no 
way affected the role of provincial administrations (HAD., 
16/5/1983 : Col. 7063), it was str6ngly evident that the 
provincial system was incompatible with the tricameral way 
of things which made provision for self-determination by 
three of South Africa's statutorily prescribed ethnic groups 
(White, Coloured and Indian). Only Whites could stand for 
and be elected to provincial councils. However, 
investigations showed that the costs of duplicating the 
bulky tricameral system in each province would be 
astronomical and hence unaffordable (Sunday Star, 
18/5/1986). The other option, which involved retaining the. 
present structure and integrating Coloureds and Indians into 
a common decision-makiI).g body, was taboo because it did not 
reflect ethnic differentiation, one of the cornerstones of 
the new system. 
Hence, in 1985 it was announced in parliament by 
Minister Heunis that the provincial councils as elected 
bodies would be abolished in 1986 and would be replaced by 






headed by the Administrators. Instead of being accountable l 
to an elected provincial council, these EXCOs would now be 
directly answerable to parliament. Their terms of office 
would be linked to those of central government (HAD., 
6/5/1985 : Cols. 4902-4909 and 12/5/1986 : Cols. 5346-5350). 
Accordingly, the Provincial Government Act of 1986 made 
provision for this new provincial system which came into 
effect in July 1986. Under the new format the Adminis-
trators are vested with extensive executive powers. 
Although they are obliged to consult their EXCOs, they are 
not- bound. to heed_ their recommendations. The Administrator 
has the authority to amend an existing ordinance by means of 
a proclamation, provided such a proclamation has been 
approved by a parliamentary standing committee. Any new 
provincial legislation must in future be approved by 
parliament. The same applies to provincial budgets (CPA, 
1987A : 2; ·RSA, Provincial Government Act, No. 69 of 1986). 
Provincial councils are now responsible for the 
supervision of 'general affairs' which include control of 
the RSCs, provincial' roads, horse racing, Group Areas 
permits and the Prevention of Squatting Act. Further, 
Development Boards, Transvaal Peri-Urban Boards and 
Divisional councils have been (or, in the case of some of 
the latter structures, are to be) abolished in terms of the 
Abolition of Development Boards Act (also see 8.7 The 1984-
1986 Urban Uprising Against BLAs) and their directorates 
placed under the functional control of the respective 
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administrations took over the functions of Development 
Boards, it became possible for the government to transfer a 
large portion of the administration and developme~t of 
Blacks, which is a 'general affair', to the second tier of 
government. The DCDP still had overall responsibility for 
provincial policy; 86% of the provincial budgets came 
through the DCDP. The Minister of DCDP still met regularly 
with the four Administrators so that policy affect~ng 
provincial administrations could be formulated. The 
provincial secretaries also met regularly with senior DCDP 
officials (RSA, DCDP, 1987A: 5, 7; HAD., 6/5/1985 : Col. 
4903) • 
The scrapping of the elected provincial councils and 
their replacement with nominated executive committees must 
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be considered a highly centralist measure. The government 
claimed that these changes are the broadening of democracy 
because Blacks, Coloureds and Indians now have represent-
ation on provincial government. This is in one sense 
correct, but an elected body is inherently more democratic 
than a nominated one. Although the pre-1986 elected 
provincial councils were rather circumscribed in powers, 
there were at least some checks and balances between the 
powers of the elected councils and those of the appointed 
Administrators. The Administrator' now has far more 
unfettered deconcentrated powers. At the time it was argued 
that the parliamentary standing committees would not be an 
effective check because of their lack of meticulous 
knowledge of provincial affairs. This seems to be the case 
in practice. A Democratic Party (cited hereafter as DP) MP 
of the Cape Provincial Standing Committee called this system 
ineffective because of the lack of debating time set aside 
for provincial affairs. He termed the new provincial 
structures "a bureaucratic management organisation" 
(Interview, 1991). 
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Furthermore, as Heymans and Atkinson (1988 : 6-7) point 
out, provincial bodies are instruments for territory-
orientated decentralisation rather than vehicles for 
ethnically-based devolution. This means that 'general 
,-
affairs' bodies such as RScs- -a:re being supervised by pro-
vincial bodies, while 'own affairs' bodies PLAs are 
constitutionally the domain of the respective Own Affairs 
-
Administrations. In mitigation it can be argued that, as 
with RSCs, provincial executives were an important beach-
head in that for the first time at provincial level, 
symbolic multi-racial decision-makin·g was occurring. 
7.19 OWN AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATIONS 
As pointed out, the Commission for Administration investi-
gated what powers could be devolved horizontally to the 
respective Minister's Councils and on April 1, 1989 certain 
powers, that had been determined by the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution of 1983 as being 'own affairs', were 
transferred to the Department of Local Government, House of 
Assembly (Department of Local Government, House of Assembly, 
1989) . 
There is also evidence suggesting that reformist-
orientated DCDP officials on the project team which 
investigated the issue of devolution managed to dilute the 
horizontal transfer of powers, because they saw this process 
as an extension of, rather than a move away from, apartheid 
structures. The formula that was worked out by the 
committee hinged on a single/multi-tier authority dichotomy. 
Single-tier authorities are W~ites~only local authorities, 
while multi-tier authorities are local authorities which 
consist of representatives of different groups; viz. 
Whites, Coloureds and Iridians. With single-tier author-
ities, all powers can be transferred to the White Department 
of Local Government Ministry, while with multi-tier 
authorities, a large number of functions still reside within 
the provinces because they are 'general affairs' functions 
affecting all the groups (RSA, House of Assembly, 1988; 
Debates ~f Parliament, 2-0/3/1989 : Cols. 3323-3324). Seeing 
that most local authorities, in particular the larger 
metropolitan bodies, are multi-tier bodies, this formula 
ensured that a great many functions still resided with the 
provinces. The dilution of the transfer of powers left 
right-wing elements within the government, parliamentary 
opposition and bureaucracy, fuming because they regarded the 
extension of 'own affairs' as a mechanism whereby group 
rights could be protected (Interviews with DCDP, CPA and Own 
Affairs: House of Assembly officials, 1990). 
The House of Representatives and the House of Delegates 
refused to assent to the transfer of these horizontal powers 
to their administrations, seeing this arrangement as an 
extension of 'own affairs' and apartheid. Such supervisory 
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functions in respect of Coloured and Indian local bodies are 
still vested in the respective Provincial Administrators, 
although all measures still have to be carried out in 
consultation with the refevant own Affairs Ministers 
(Debates of Parliament, 20/3/1989 : Cols. 3323-3325). 
This means that the Department of Local Governments in 
the Houses of Representatives and Delegates do not concern 
themselves with the supervisory side of Coloured and Indian 
local government respectively. As will be shown in the case 
study in Chapter X, the Department of Local Government in 
the House of Representatives .focused primarily on housing 
and infrastructure development. If ~ Coloured Management 
Committee is in dispute with its 'mother' White local 
authority about a certain issue, the Administrator, after 
consultation with the Minister of Local Government in the 
House of Representatives, will make a binding decision in 
this regard. 
Another feature of the Own Affairs Administrations was 
the appointment of ~inisterial Representatives in the 
respective Houses by the State President in March, 1987. 
These representatives were appointed in different 
geographical regions. The objective was to provide for the 
administration and management of 'own affairs' on a 
decentralised basis. A number of decision-making powers 
were delegated to these representatives by the respective 
Mihiste~'s Councils (The Argus, 17/2/1987; Cape Times, 
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19/2/1987; Citizen, 13/6/1987). These representatives must 
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at the second~tier level of government. They are, however, 
.. 
subject to the same criticism as Administrators: that they 
are centrally appointed and not accountable to the 
electorate . 
7.19.1 . service Delivery 
How have things changed consiitutionally in respect of 
service delivery under the tricameral system? Housing is 
now controlled constitutionally by the Houses of 
Representatives and Delegates for Coloureds and Indi~ns 
respectively. This function was previously controlled by 
the now defunct community Development Department, which was 
divided into the various Local Government, Housing and 
Agriculture ministries. 
Further, instead of one NHC providing funds and laying 
down standards for Whites, Coloureds and Indians, as was the 
case under the Westminster system, each House has its own 
commission carrying out these functions and also assisting 
with self-help schemes. The House of Representatives' 
commission is called the Housing Board and all local 
authorities that receive funds for Coloured housing have to 
go through this body. Functional control of housing is 
carried out by local authorities on an agency basis for the 
Department. 
7.20 DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE MACRO-CONTROL 
In June 1981, as a result of one of the recommendations of 
the Browne committee, the cabinet gave instructions that the 
Department of Finance should assume overall control over 
local authority expenditure. This was introduced in 1982 
(Croeser, 1988 : 1 [see 6.3.2. CWG]). 
What was the position prior to 1982? capital 
expenditure had been controlled by the Minister of Finance,. 
who determined an annual growth percentage with allowances 
for special circumstances (RSA, Browne Committee, 1980 : 
142). Control over operating expenditure was exercised by 
the respective provinces. Although there was no growth 
percentage level, local authorities could not exceed a 
maximum levy in the Rand without the Administrator's 
approval (Craythorne, 1990 : 356-357). 
To give effect to this new policy the Department of 
Finance set a letter to all local authorities in the 
country, in which it announced: 
i. The Department had to exercise overall financial 
control over the total expenditure of local authorities 
with the view to bringing about better coordination of 
public sector spending in the national interest. 
ii. In addition to existing controls over capital budgets 
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., 
of local authorities, operating accounts also had to be f 
t 
sent to the Director of Public Finance before the start 
of each financial year for overall consideration and 
approval. 
iii. The purpose was not to create a complicated new control 
structure, .but in the interests of discipline in 
overall public sector spending it was necessary to 
ensure that all local authorities, in particular the 
. -
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larger units, kept their patterns of expenditure within 
set norms. 
The funds obtained from the Department of Community 
Development (later divided into the three own Affairs 
Administrations after the introduction of the tricameral 
system) for housfng were not included in the limit, since 
the Department of Finance already exercised control over the 
allocation of funds to the former Department (Department of 
Finance, 1982). 
The Public Finance Branch of the Department of Finance 
assumed overall responsibility for macro-economic control 
over local authorities' budgets. However, specific control 
was exercised by the Chief Directorate: Intergovernmental 
Relations and its sub-unit, the Directorate: Local 
Government Relations (Interview with Gerhard Croeser, 
1989) . 11 
7.20.1 Determination of Limits 
How are limits determined? In the 1982 circular much 
emphasis was laid on the need to control public sector 
spending in order to curb· inflation and to prevent balance 
of p~yments problems (Department of Finance, 1982). In a 
1986 article, Deputy Director-General of Finance Gerhard 
croeser argued further that in the formulation of fiscal 
policy, expenditure and income of all tiers of government 
had to be taken into account to ensure that the general 
government's share in the economy did not increase to the 
detriment of a usually more productive private sector which 
supplied the tax base. On the expenditure side, the 
specific nature of spending is examined within the framework 
of government's priorities when drawing up controls 
(Croeser, 1986 : 4). Such controls are often used as a tool 
to pursue certain national objective~~ For example, in 1984 
it was a major macro-economic objective to fight 
unemployment. Accordingly,· local authorities could exceed 
the Department's capital limits if' such projects were 
creating job opportunities (Cape Times, 13/4/1984). 
On the income side, attention was paid to the total tax 
burden in the economy, which means that the burden imposed 
by local taxes must be taken into. account when drawing up 
limits. Consideration was also paid to the monetary policy 
function of the Department to ensure that the total demand 
of the capital market by.borrowers in the public sector does 
not put unnecessary pressure on the interest rates and that 
loans for long-term projects are satisfied by means of 
capital market sources. This. objective is achieved by 
ordering and arranging borrowers from the public sector, 
including local authorities, access to the capital market 
and by approving the conditions upon which these loans may 
be raised. Furthermore, an attempt is made to ensure that 
current expenditure is not financed by means of loans. This 
aspect also includes supervision of the raising of loans 
overseas by the public sector (Croeser, 1986 : 4). 
7.20.2 Financial Control Procedure 








The Department of Finance sends a circular to each local 
authority before 1 July (the beginning of the book-year) in 
which: 
i) an exposition is given of current economic 
circumstances; 
ii) the prescribed limit is laid down; 
iii) a request is made for the submission of budgets; 
iv) criteria for ad hoc applications and possible 
contraventions of the limits are listed. 
A copy of the letters is sent to the respective pro-
vincial Depa-rtments- of Local Government, with an instruction 
to impose financial discipline on local authorities and to 
watch out for unhealthy practices such as-when operating 
expenditures exceed available revenue; tariffs and rates 
increase excessively and where interest and interest 
redemption in respect of loans are too high. One senior 
Public Finance official described the provinces as "the eyes 
and ears" of the Department of Finance. 
When it comes to operating expenditure, six or seven 
items are controlled by the Directorate, of which salaries 
and wages (which should be approximately 30%) , capital 
redemption and interest payment (which should be about 25%) 
and electricity receive major consideration. If satisfied 
with the operating and capital estimates, the Department 
will approve the budget. If not, the local authority will 
have 'to make certain revisions to its budget (Interview with 
senior Department of Finance official, 1989). 
Emergency capital development is dealt with on an ad 
hoc basis. The exceeding of operating limits is considered 
when local authorities are faced with extraordinary capital 
developments. Local authorities must show that this is not 
going to lead to drastic tariff or rate increases (Croeser, 
1988 : 4-5). 
Upon completion of the book-year an evaluation is taken 
of the actual results.of such controls .. Explanations of 
over and under-expenditure are requested if there is a 
deviation of more than three percent or R500 000 from the 
original estimates. The Auditor-Genera112 is also involved 
in this process ln that he must check out discrepancies 
. . 
between approved and actual estimates. He will bring any 
irregularities to the attention of the province and the 
local authority concerned (Croeser, 1988 : 4-5). 
In Chapter IX an analysis will be made of how these 
financial controls have affected the autonomy of the CCC. 
7.21 VOTERS' CONTROL 
As pointed out (in 6.9 Devolution of Power: The Policy 
Process) voters' control was an important principle 
underpinning the devolution policy. Minister Heunis said 
that "devolution of decision-making authority can only 
become real once communities take part in the decision-
making processes that affect their interests, also at local 
level'' (Debate~ of Parliament, 1988 : Col. 15148) and that 
only once there was sufficient voters' control of 
councillors and councils could there be less administrative 
control by higher authorities (Network, 27/10/1988). 
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There were a number of manifestations of this policy. 
Measures such as pension schemes, greater remuneration for 
councillors and the training guidelines for councillors were 
intended to create. a better calibre of councillors. Another 
prong of this policy was to create a better-informed 
electorate. A campaign to inform people about the 
functioning of local authorities coincided with the 1988 
municipal elections. The Bureau of Information embarked on 
a R4,7 m advertising campaign in order to inform the 
electorate ·(the Black, Coloured and Indian communities in 
particular) about the activities of local authorities and to 
persuade peopie to vote. Voters' control had traditionally 
been rather problematic among Blacks, Coloureds and Indians 
because of rejection of apartheid structures in these 
communities. Although .there were slightly improved polls in 
198813 it is doubtful whether they were high enough to say 
that voters' control exists effectively. In any event, as 
pointed out (in 2.3.3. Responsiveness/Efficiency) the whole 
principle of voters' control generally is rather suspect, 
given large-scale ignorance and apathy about local 
government and the tendency for local elections to be 
decided often by national issues. 
7.22 EVALUATION OF STATE STRATEGY 
One of the reasons for the fact that the new local 
government legislation contained a great many measures· which 
reflect centralisation, deconcentration and delegation 
rather than devolution is that the~e appeared to be a 
certain amount of misunderstanding amongst policy-makers 
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about what exactly devolution entails. NP politicians some-
times called any transfer of power away from the centre 
"devolution''· {Minister Heunis has said this on more than 
one occasion, see HAD., 12/5/1986 : Col. 5349 and Interview, 
1989). As pointed out (in 6.10 Objectives of Devolution) 
one of the principles underlying this devolution policy was 
that central government and its departments should be vested 
primarily with general policy and monitoring functions, 
while government functions should as far as possible be 
carried out, at the lowest level of government. This is in 
fact delegation and deconcentration of the administration 
and execution of functions to local level. 
This control is sometimes justified on the grounds that 
in a unitary state central government is responsible for 
final legislative authority (Thornhill, 1985 : 18). 
However, as pointed out (in 2.4 Federalism vs. Unitarism) 
extensive devolution of power is not inconsistent with a 
unitary constitution. This misunderstanding goes some way 
towards explaining why legislation such as the Regional 
Services Council Act, Remuneration of Town Clerks Act and 
Free Settlement Areas Act, contain measures which ensure 
that central government retains a great deal of say over 
local authorities' activities. 
A related question is why exactly does central 
government wish to have a great deal of say over local 
government activities? One major reason is strategic. As 
pointed out (in 2.9 National Unity) a number of observers 










legitimacy will be reluctant to devolve powers to local 
·authorities because of the fear that they may be building up 
centres of opposition to their own rule. 
Accordingly, one of the major features of the NP's 
limited reform programme of the 1980s was to ensure careful 
control of these evolutionary measures. Minister Heunis 
said that he "considered government reforms to be managed 
change which must be controlled and orderly" (South African 
Television channel 2 (cited hereafter as SATV2] interview, 
16/7/1987). As pointed out (in 6.1 Introduction) the need 
to keep control was motivated by concerns to out-manoeuvre 
both left and right-wing groupings opposed to NP policy. On 
the left, the concern was the growth of the extra-
parliamentary movement, and in particular the formation of 
the United Democratic Front (cited hereafter as UDF) in the 
early 1980s. The establishment of RSCs and the creation of 
new BLAs meant there was going to be a proliferation of new 
structures at regional and local level. The government had 
no intention of allowing such bodies to be captured by 
groupings who would use these local structures to undermine 
central state structures or to propagate social welfare 
policies that would impede capitalist accumulation {Cameron, 
1986A: 78-79; 1988B: 60). 
Another concern on the left was the resistance of 
certain White liberal local authorities (the CCC in 
particular), which were opposed to apartheid fragmentation 
at local level. For example, the CCC had refused to promote 
Management Committees in the way the state had wished, 
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because it regarded them as apartheid bodies that had been 
imposed on the council (see 10.4 ADMC/CCC Relations: 1980-
1984). Some of the centralising tendencies can also be 
ascribed to the government's attempts to overcome this 
intransigence and to ensure the successful implementation of 
its new local government policy. 
Regarding the right, the concern was to neutralise 
right-~ing opposition to limited power-sharing. This became 
of crucial importance after the growth. in ~umbers of CP-
controlled local municipalities· which were. attempting to re-
introduce petty apartheid and in so doing were undermining 
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the government's reform programme. This was unacceptable to. 
the NP. Heunis said that "the government would not tolerate 
the sabotaging of its policies by town councils. Through 
their defiant actions the CP town councils can prejudice the 
transfer.of more authority to local authorities" (The Argus, 
1/12/1988) . The Free Settlement Areas Act is a good example 
of policy that was framed in a way to neutralise the 
activities of right-wing municipalities. 
It has been suggested that the government was pursuing 
contradictory policy objectives. Either it could allow 
devolution of power and face the prospect of independent 
political groupings promulgating alternative policies at 
local government level, or there could be an attempt to 
retain strong control over local authorities, ensuring a 
uniformity of policies and compliance with government 
wishes. The attempt to do both had inherent limitations 
(Cameron, 1986A : 78-79). 
, . 
. '~ 
Another motivation for centralised legislation was th~ 
-viewpoint based on the United Nations argument (see 2.12.2 
History of Decentralisation) that this developmental process 
has to be carefully steered. As ex-Chief Director of DCDP, 
F. Cloete (1984 : 44), argued: 
In developing societies full devolution of 
powers is normally counter-productive because of a 
lack of sufficient skills, experience and finances 
on the lower levels. of government. In these 
situations strong initiatives from the central 
government level are norrnally·still required to 
maximise the developmental goal. 
This concern was reflected in a number of Acts. For 
example, the Remuneration of Town Clerks Act and the 
Training Act gave central government a great deal of say in 
the development of human resources at local government 
level. 
It was suggested by the government that this 
centralisation for purposes of developmental objectives is 
only transient. The argument was that it may be necessary 
to centralise power in the interim in order to lay the 
institutional and organisational basis for the creation of 
more decentralised powers in the future. This was necessary 
for the sake of uniformity among racia~ groups, which was an 
important premise underpinning local government reform. It 
was also deemed necessary to· consolidate local government -
powers so that the DCDP could actively promote the 
developmental process in the way they wished. This entailed 
breaking up local fiefdoms which could have resisted 
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development changes. Development cannot be steered in a 
decentralised way. The grading system makes it possible to 
devolve powers to local authorities on the basis of 
capabilities in the future (Heymans and Atkinson, 1988 9; 
Natal Mercury, 10/4/1985). 
The Remuneration of Town Clerks Amendment Act is held 
up as an example of this process. The powers in respect of 
town clerks service benefits were originally centralised in 
the person of the Minister of DCDP. Once the institutional 
foundation for the orderly control of this function had been 
laid, it was possible to transfer powers to a Board 
1. 
consisting of local government representatives. However, as 
pointed out, the Board can only set service conditions 
within certain parameters laid down by central government. 
Also, So.uth Africa has a long way to go before there are 
sufficient skills, experience and finance in poorer Black, 
Coloured and Indian areas to permit extensive devolution of 
powers to these local authorities. In any event, in the 
last instance, strategic ~easons remained a brake on this 
development-inspired devolution in the 1980s. 
Another reason for control was macro-economic 
objectives (which was discussed in 7.20 Department of 
Finance Macro-Control). As Croeser (1986 : 6) pointed out: 
Since local governments play such an 
extremely important role in the total economy, it 
is essential that the economic and financial 
decisions taken at local government level must be 
in line with the agreed economic strategy and 








The view of the Department of Finance is that local 
government expenditure, if left unchecked, can lead to 
excessive inflation and may break the back of the South 
African economy. Part of the motivation for this viewpoint 
is that local authorities are inefficient, an argument which 
was forcefully expressed by the Browne Committee. This 
determination to monitor local government expenditure 
closely is reflected in the financing of RS.Cs, whereby the 
levies are set by the Minister of Finance and not these 
local bodies themselves: 
7.23 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the main features of local government 
legislation in the 1980s. It was argued'that despite the 
government's commitment to devolution of power, a great deal 
of this legislation reflected elements of centralisation, 
deconcentration and delegation. There appears to be a 
certain amount of confusion among policy-makers as to what 
devolution actually entails. The major reasons for this 
attempted continued control of local authorities were: 
• governments under threat are reluctant to devolve 
powers to local authorities because of the fear that 
they may be building up centres of opposition to their 
own rule; 
• there was the belief that the developmental process had 
to be carefully steered from the top; 
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• there was the viewpoint that in a unitary state there 
had to be a reasonable degree of higher tier control i 





BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE 19805 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter traces developments in Black local government 
in the 1980s. It concentrates primarily on the recommend-
ations of commissions and the content of legislation in the 
1980s, and how this affected the functioning of BLAs on the 
ground. The state's objectives, in respect of new local 
government policy initiatives have already been discussed 
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(see 6.2 Total Strategy) and will not be repeated in detail 
in this chapter. It looks at the Riekert Report's 
recommendations that certain Blacks be given permanent urban 
rights and how the government's acceptance of this had as a 
corollary the upgrading of Community councils into BLAs with 
more extensive powers. Another consequence of this policy 
shift was the conversion,of Administration Boards into 
Development Boards whose aim was to develop Black areas 
until they could function as autonomous BLAs. 
The chapter goes on to examine the failure of BLAs and 
violent resistance to these structures in the period 1984-
86. Other manifestations of this insurrection weie rent 
boycotts and peoples' power, which are also analysed. The 
state's response to this uprising included reformist 
measures such as the bringing of Blacks into mainstream 
local government development, ihcluding RSCs; the abolition 
of influx control and the scrapping of Development Boards. 
It also involved repressive measures such as the state 0£ 
_,,.,; T 
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Emergency, the smashing of opposition to BLAs, and security 
force influence through JMCs on policy of certain of these 
local structures. These developments, too, will be 
assessed. 
The chapter also analyses .the 1988 municipal elections 
and the implic~tions thereof and concludes by looking at 
further attempts to devolve powers to the BLAs in the late . 
1980s. 
8.2 RIEKERT COMMISSION 
The Report of the Riekert Commission was released 
simultaneously with the government's White Paper in 1979. 
Riekert's recommendations were to have far-reaching 
implications for Black local government in the 1980s.
1 
Riekert's brief was to investigate the extent to which 
labour markets were regulated and controlled by the state. 
Influx control had proved an impediment to the creation of a 
skilled and stable work force and had accordingly led to a 
severe shortage of skilled labour. It has also proved 
ineffective as a means of keeping Blacks out of so-called 
White areas. The report, along with.Wiehahn's investi-
gations into industrial relations, must be considered as the 
most sophisticated elements of 'Total Strategy' with respect 
to Blacks (see 6.2 Total strategy). Riekert recommended 
that the Black.holders of lO(l)a-c rights would qualify as 
permanent urban dwellers, while tighter influx controls 
would be applied against the holders of lO(l)d rights (see 
5.2 Local Government and Black Labour). It was an attempt 









'outsiders'. It was estimated that these 'insiders' 
.comprised riot quite half of the urban Black labour force. 
'Insiders' could move from one White urban area to another, 
depending on the availability of housing and employment. It 
also recommended the dropping of the 72-hour restriction for 
qualified Blacks. From the state's perspective, 'insiders' 
would satisfy·employers' requirements for labour stability 
and by giving them a stake in the system (through, for 
example, home ownership), it was hoped that this privileged 
group would act as a buffer between Whites and disqualified 
Blacks (Saul and Gelb, 1981 : 63-68; Nusas, 1982; Welsh, 
1982 : 107-109; Bekker and Humphries, 1985 : 28-29; 
Stadler, 1987 : 96-100). 
Because Black labour was so inextricably linked with 
urbanisation, Riekert's brief included an analysis of local 
government structures operating in Black areas. The report 
was particularly scathing of Administration Boards. There 
was overwhelming evidence that.the labour service bureaus 
had not improved under Administration Board control. This 
had led to problems of labour stability. The report stated 
that officials were often "more concerned about (influx) 
control than the rendering of services to the employer and 
employee" (RSA, Riekert, 1979 198-199). 
The Report also pointed to the fact that three bodies, 
viz. Community Councils, the DCDP, and Administration 
Boards, were responsible for the administration of Blacks in 
urban areas. This was expensive and led to overlapping and 
confusion. It accordingly recommended that there was a need 
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for rationalisation of these structures 2 (RSA, Riekert, 1979 
: 203). It did not make any recommendations regarding the 
financing of urban Black structures because this was being 
done by the Browne Committee (see 6.3.1.Browne Committee) 
(RSA, Riekert, 1979 : 201). 
The government's White Paper accepted these major 
recomm.endations affecting influx control and. the 
administration of Black urban areas (although they did not 
accept the recommendation that the labour restriction for 
qualified Blacks be dropped [RSA, White Paper on Manpower, 
1979]) .. Despite acceptance of the permanence of urban 
Blacks, national political representation still had to be 
exercised through Homelands. However, the government now 
floated the concept of the 'Constellation of States', 
broadly based on the EEC, whereby separate political 
development was combined with economic cooperation (Saul and 
Gelb, 1981 : 46-58). 
Coinciding with this publication of Riekert and the 
White Paper, the number of Administration.Boards were 
rationalised from 22 to 14. The reasons for this were to 
improve the physical mobility of urban Black workers and to 
dovetail with the greater role Boards were going to play in 
the development of Homelands (Bekker and Humphries, .1985 
31) . 
The government's embodiment of Riekert's recommend-
ations came in the form of three bills introduced to 
Parliament by the Minister of DCD, Dr Piet Koornhof, in 
October 1980. These bills dealt with the upgrading of 
·~ 
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powers of Community Councils, rationalisation of 
Administration Boards and the ·modernising of influx control 
respectively. Despite being heralded as a 'New Deal' by Dr 
Koornhof, closer examination of the latter bill revealed 
that influx control was in fact being tightened. It was 
widely conjectured that conservative bureaucrats within 
Koornhof's Department who were still wedded to Verwoerdian 
ideals had deliberately sabotaged the reformist direction of 
that bill (Hudson and Lacey, 1983 : 104). 
There was massive protest against the bills. The UDF, 
a united front consisting of representatives from, inter 
alia, student and youth organisations, trade unions, ci vie· 
movements, political, religious and women's organisations, 
was specifically formed to oppose the Koornhof Bills (and 
the tricameral system) (Swilling, 1987 : 3). Big business, 
seeking a more stable urban labour force, also protested 
vociferously against the proposed new legislation. Dr 
Koornhof, realising that he had been deceived by his own 
officials, withdrew the bills and referred them to a 
commission headed by Judge Grosskopf, whose brief was to try 
and adapt .them to the content and spirit of the Riekert 
Report. The revised bill then went to the Select Committee 
on the Constitution where representations were made by 
interested parties. The Urban Foundation, which was formed 
by major capitalist interests in the wake of the 1976 
uprisings, to improve the quality of life in urban 
communities, gave substantial evidence to the Committee 
(HAD., 11/6/1982 : Cols. 9354-9356). These three bills re-
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emerged in 1982. While two of them resulted in legislation 
(which will be discussed later) the bill in respect of 
influx control again met with strong business and union 
pressure and was referred to another Select Committee. The 
reason for this resistance was that this bill showed the 
same draconian content and intention as its 1980 predecessor 
(Hudson and Lacey, 1983 : 106-108). 
By this time, according to Grest and Hughes (1983, 126-
129), Community Councils had all but collapsed due to their 
limited powers, lack of financial resources and low level of 
legitimacy (see 5.6 Community Councils). However, the 
already low legitimacy of councils plummeted even further 
when they raised rent and service charges, with civic 
associations mushrooming throughout the country to protest 
against these increases (Bloch, 1982 : 64) . 
One of the main cogs of 'Total Strategy' was to defuse 
conflict by removing the central government from the firing 
line in urban Black areas (see 6.2 Total Strategy). Com-
munity Councils were intended to be safety valves through 
which urban grievances could be articulated, but for the 
reasons outlined they failed to achieve this objective. The 
remedy lay in the introduction of Black local authorities 
with more extensive powers (Bekker and Humphries, 1985 : 
111-112). The obverse of this strategy would involve the 
phasing out of· unpopular Administration Boards. 
8.3 BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES ACT OF 1982 
The Black Local Authorities Act, No. 102 of 1982, introduced 
a municipal code mainly based on the principles of the 
288 
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Transvaal Local Government Ordinance. The Minister of DCD, 
Dr. Koornhof, said when he presented the bill in parliament 
that this piece of legislation was actually one of a trilogy 
of three bills which "actually complement each other and 
form a whole" (HAD., 11/6/1982 : Col. 9344). The other two 
were the Black·communities Devel6pment Bill, dealing with 
the upgrading of Administration Boards, and the Orderly 
Movement Settlement of Black Persons Bill, dealing with 
influx control. ~ct No: 102 made provision for two main 
categories of local authorities; viz. Village Councils and 
Town Councils. Village Councils were to have varying powers 
and responsibilities according to their ability to perform. 
their relevant functions. Town Councils (unlike Community 
Councils) ~ere automatically to have all the powers of the 
Act vested in them. Whether a Village or Town Council was 
to be established depended on the capabilities of the 
respective areas. Provision was also made for Town Councils 
to be upgraded into City Councils. Community Councils did 
not automatically become Town or Village Councils. Only 
.when a local authority was established for the area would it 
replace the existing Community Council. Accordingly, the 
community council Act would not be abolished until all 
Community Councils had been replaced by these new structures 
(RSA, Black Local Authorities Act, No. 102 of 1982; and 
HAD., 11/6/1982 : Cols. 9345-9346). 
The structure of Black local governments would approx-
imate those of White local authorities in that provision was 
made for a town clerk, mayor, executive committee and 
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secretary. BLAs wou19 have the ability to appoint their own 
staff, standing committees and to create their own 
departments. A Director of Local Government in the DCD was 
· to be responsible for the implementation of Black local 
government countrywide and would also exercise. indirect 
supervisory control over their activities (RSA, Black Local 
Authorities Act, No. ·102 of 1982). 
The Act gave Black Town Councils.powers an~ functions 
which were substantially more than Community Councils but 
not quite as comprehensive as White local authorities. 
Among their more important- functions were parks and public 
resorts, sports and recreational facilities, library 
services, museums and botanical gardens, the construction 
and maintenance of housing, regulation of street trading, 
health, ~ater, electricity, rubbish removal, sewerage 
disposal, cemeteries, the renting of council houses, 
prevention of illegal squatting, roads, welfare services, 
and the allocation of trading sites. Subject to the consent 
of the Minister of Law and Order, they could also appoint 
their own police force. 3 Bekker .and Humphries (1985 : 115) 
pointed out that BLAs assumed control of influx control 
insofar as permanent rights were related to availability of 
housing; e.g. only they could legally allocate housing to 
legal residents. 
There was the omission of certain traditional White 
local authority functions such as public transport, 
abbatoirs, aerodromes, fire services and ambulances, town-
ship planning, creches and nursery schools. However, 
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Section 24 of the Act made provision for the state President 
to add to the powers of a BLA by notice in the Government 
Gazette (RSA, Black Local Authorities Act, No. 102 of 1982). 
BLAs' powers included the setting of levies for service 
charges, the making of by-laws, issuing proclamations, the 
opening of their own treasuries, drawing up budgets, 
borrowing and investing of money, the making or accepting of 
donations, owning immovable property and enteririg into 
commercial transactions in respect of such property. 
What was the relationship between BLAs and Adminis-
tration Boards? Section 25(2) of the Act specifically 
provided that if a BLA is at any stage charged with a right, 
function, duty or obligation, the Administration Board shall 
be divested or relieved of that power, right, function or 
duty. This meant that the Boards' role in respect of Town 
Councils .would be limited to assistance in policy imple-
mentation (if so desired). In the case of Village Councils 
or Community Councils, the Boards would continue to perform 
those functions that the Minister had not yet transferred to 
these bodies. Boards would continue to ope~ate as local 
authorities in areas where advisory local committees were 
established (Bekker and Humphries, 1985 : 114). 
The Minister of DCD had control over a wide range of 
BLA activities. on the one hand, there were powers that 
were akin to traditional indirect provincial controls of 
local authorities, such as the approval of by-laws and 
budgets, the issuing of proclamations, the power to 
establish councils (upon request of the Community Council 
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concerned) and to determine their area of jurisdiction (RSA, 
Black Local Authorities Act, No. 102 of 1982). 
The Minister ~lso had more substantial powers of a 
direct nature. He could order local authorities to make by-
laws or take action in instance~ where he felt they had 
frustrated an objective of the Act by failing to exercise 
any functi6n assigned to them, or were guilty of mal-
. . 
administration. If a local authority failed to carry out 
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such an instruction the Minister might rectify the situation 
or order another person or organisation to do so. If, in 
his opinion, the need for them no longer existed, he had the 
power to sack councillors or even entire councils. Finally, 
he could intervene when he felt that the finances of a local 
government were unsound (for example, where a local 
government, in his opinion, failed to agree to adequate 
charges for municipal services) . If a local government 
failed to heed his instructions in this regard, he could 
disband it (RSA, Black Local Authorities Act, No. 102 of 
1982: Riekert, 1983 : 150-151). 
The Minister also had certain control over the 
conditions of service of BLA employees. The Chief Executive 
of a BLA could not be removed from his post or have his 
remuneration reduced without consent of the Minister (RSA, 
Black Local Authorities Act, No. 102 of 1982). 
Bekker and Humphries (1985 : 113-114) suggest that 










1. The lack of experience of both officials and 
councillors meant there was a need for promotional 
control; viz. close central direction and guidance 
(see 3.7 Hierarchical Relations). 
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2. There was the concern that local authorities would be 
used as instruments to attack the central state. This 
would run counter to the government's objective .. of 
defusing conflict to local government level. 
3. There was the need for control over financial resources 
to ensure efficient financial management. 
8.3.l Finance 
The Browne Committee had not recommended any major sources 
of new income for Administration Boards and Community 
councils. It had merely recommended that "appropriate 
measures of Black peoples' needs and ability to pay be 
calculated and kept under constant review" (RSA, Browne 
committee, 1980 : 106) and suggested certain measures such 
as the encouragement of·home ownership and recommended that 
20% of liquor prof its that were being paid to the DCD be 
retained by the Boards. With the whole report being 
referred to the CWG, these recommendations were not 
implemented. Yet even if they had been it would not have 
made much difference to the massive deficits.that 
Administration Boards were incurring. In the 1981/82 report 
the aggregated deficit of Administration Boards was 
R12 367 571 (Bekker and Humphries, 1985 : 132). 
It was therefore surprising that no extra sources of 
income were provided for the financing of these new Black 
•• 1Ntt ,.,.w.__.__., ... ,.,~ 
local governments, especially since the principle of 
financial self-sufficiency which applied for White local 
authorities was to apply equally to their Black counter-
parts. BLAs were to rely on rent and service charges as 
their primary sources of income. Sorghum beer/liquor and 
employees levies were to remain Administration Boards' 
sources of revenue, although they were intended to use some 
of this money to subsidise BLAs. The rationale for this 
omission, according to Dr Koornhof, was that the CWG was 
still reviewing the Browne Committee's recommendations 
(HAD., 11/6/1982 : Col. 9349). 
Despite the warnings of the then official opposition 
(the PFP) that Black local government could crumble because 
of the lack of adequate finances {HAD•, 11/6/1982 Col. 
9359), the government passed the bill without any additional 
financial resources. The reason for the urgency has already 
been pointed out. There was a need to de£use conflict at 
local level. Community councils with limited powers were 
patently inadequate for this purpose, hence the need for 
BLAs with more comprehensive powers. 4 Measures were, 
however, taken to ensure that BLAs had at least certain 
qualified staff. Provision was made for the secondment of 
Administration Board officials to BLAs, subject to the 
consent of the latter body. Provision was also made for the 
transfer of Board officials to BLAs subject to the approval 
of both latter body and the Minister (RSA, Black Local 







8.4 THE INTRODUCTION OF BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
The upgrading of Community Councils took place in three 
phases. The DCD conducted a comprehensive investigation to 
determine which Councils should be upgraded. Local 
authorities were graded in terms of certain criteria. 
Factors which were taken into consideration included 
financial viability, infrastructure, community amenities, 
the number of houses in-a township, population, the amount 
of trade and commerce in the township, availability of staff 
' ' 
for a local authority, extension plans for the township and 
whether the people in the township would accept these new 
local authorities. Townships which scored 70 points or more 
in terms of the DCD's formula qualified for the first round 
of the elections. The second phase for which the cut-off 
level was 50 points, incorporated 84 community councils and 
was due to start in 1984~ while the third phase was to begin 
two or three years later (Financial Mail, 21/10/1983). 
In November/December 1983 the first elections to create 
Town and Village Councils were held. Twenty~four Town 
councils and five Village Councils (mostly in the Transvaal) 
of the 232 Community Councils were initially earmarked for 
upgrading. Despite having more powers than their pre-
decessors, the average poll was 21% against the 27,&% in 
1978 and this despite the fact that the age limit had been 
lowered from 21 to 18 (Financial Mail, 16/12/1983; 
Totemeyer, 1984 : 62). 
What were the reasons for the low polls? There was a 
boycott by a number of_ extra-parliamentary organisations 
including the UDF, Inkatha and Azapo. There also appeared 
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to be mass apathy, lack of interest and ignorance. Further, 
the retention of Administration Boards, which were to exist 
in tandem with these new Black councils, meant that the new 
structures were tainted by association. Finally, there was 
this lack of an adequate tax base. Although the CWG's 
report recommending additional sources of revenue (see 6.3.2 
CWG) had been released, the government had not yet acted 
upon it. It seemed that a number of Blacks did not vote 
because they felt that the new. councils lacked the financial 
resources to 'deliver the goods' (Financial Mail, 9/12/l.983, 
16/12/1983; T6temeyer, 1984 : 62-63). 
This lack of finance was to prove an immediate problem. 
Already in January 1984 ,· the month in which BLAs were 
inaugurated, the mayors of Soweto and Alexandra claimed that 
their limited sources of revenue (mostly rents and service 
charges) were insufficient to make their administrations 
viable (Financial Mail, 20/1/1984). In April it was 
reported that all of these councils were running on large 
deficits, with Soweto's amounting to R2,3 million a month 
(Financial Mail, 27/4/1984). 
8.5 THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL'S REPORT 
Blacks were specifically excluded· from the President's 
Council's brief; viz. the investigation into a new 
constitutional dispensation at central, provincial and local 
level. 5 The Report on local and regional government never-
theless made some observations on Black local government in 
White areas. It pointed, inter alia, to the shortage of 
trained Black local government staff and recommended that 
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attention be given to the training of officials and 
information courses.for councillors (RSA, President's 
Council, 1982A : 99-100). 
Blacks were accordingly excluded from the Republic of 
South Africa Constitution Act of 1983. Section 93 of the 
Act did, however, state that the control and administration 
-Of Black affairs shall be vested in the state President. In 
terms of the new constitution, the administration of urban 
Blacks was deemed to be a 'general' affair. Although 
certain Blacks were now recognised as· permanent urban 
dwellers, the government had not yet moved to a position 
where it was prepared to give urban Blacks some form of 
central representation in White South Africa. The 
'Constellation of States' idea had been still-born because 
of opposition from neighbouring countries. There had been a 
shift towards the concept of a 'Confederation of States' in 
which south Africa along with independent and self-governing 
states would participate. The government envisaged that 
city states for some urban Black townships should join this 
confederation (Mar~, 1983 : 79-80). In addition, at the 
beginning of 1983, the government had appointed a. special 
' cabinet committee to investigate the rights of urban Blacks 
outside homelands (Grest and Hughes, 1984 46). 
8.6 BLACK COMMUNITIES DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1984 
The Black communities Development Bill was tabled in early 
1982. It was referred to the Standing committee on the 
constitution and did not re-emerge until 1984. The Act 
upgraded Administration Boards to Development Boards. In 
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line with Riekert's recommendations, their functions changed 
from being local authorities to state development agencies. 
As the Deputy Minister of the DCD, Dr George Morrison, put 
it, "the functions of a development board have been 
formulated in such a way that the emphasis is placed more on 
development than administration" (HAD., 6/2/1984 : Cols. 
415-416). Accordingly, one of ·their major functions was to 
oversee local authorities until they could function 
autonomously. 
These Development Boards had the power to carry out the 
functions of a local authority where no Village or Town 
Council had been established. Where such councils had been 
established these boards would cede their functions to them. 
They remained responsible for development functions, 
township and housing development. The remained subject to 
the external control and direction of the DCD. Boards did 
not have the power to make by-laws although the Minister had 
the power to promulgate regulations on their behalf. They 
had the power to delegate any of their powers or duties to a 
local authority in their area. Alternatively, boards could 
(subject to the consent of the Minister) perform functions 
on an agency basis for local authorities in their area. 
They could also act on an agency basis for any government 
department. Finally, the boards were to continue with the 
implementation of influx control (RSA, Black Communities 
Development Act, No. 4 of 1984). 
The Developmertt Boards took over all the assets and 







the light of Administration Boards' aggregated deficit of 
R27 477 550 at the end of the 1982/3 financial year (SAIRR, 
1984 : 165). The Act established a Black Communities 
Development and Revolving Fund.which was to be administered 
by the Director-General of DCD. The purpose of these funds 
were to make advances to Black persons, boards or local 
authorities for the better development of land occupied by 
Blacks and generally to assist and develop the wellbeing of 
Blacks (RSA, Black Communities Development Act, No. 4 of 
1984) . 
The Minister had_ extensive powers over the functioning 
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of the Act. He was empowered to notify boards to perform 
any act which in his opinion they had failed to perform, and 
in the event of failure, to assume the rights and powers to 
perform the functions of the boards. If the finances of the 
board became unsound, the Minister could take steps to 
improve them or he could dissolv~ the boards. He could 
withdraw any powers that he had originally granted to the 
boards. He also had powers over a number of aspects of 
township deveiopment generally (RSA, Black Communities 
Development Act, No. 4 of 1984). 
The gradual withdrawal of boards from local adminis- . 
tration and their shift of emphasis towards development was 
seen as a further step towards giving BLAs extensive powers 
over their own activities. 
/ 
8.7 THE 1984-86 URBAN. UPRISING 
AGAINST BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
The 1984-86 Black urban uprising occurred on a number of 
fronts including local government, education and labour. It 
was, however, the assault on Black local government which 
was the main thrust of this insurrection. The shortage of 
revenue of BLAs has already been pointed out (see 8.4 
Introduction of BLAs) . The state was not prepared to offset 
this by increasing the level of subsidisation. Thus, to 
finance township services BLAs were.forced to increase rent 
and service charges (in some cases up to 100%). This 
inf lamed residents already battling to make ends meet during 
the severe recession that was occurring. It was pointed out 
(in 6.2 Riekert Commission) that many civic organisations 
had been formed to fight rent increases by Community 
Councils. These civics mobilised around local political 
issues, in particular housing grievances, and mushroomed in 
the 1980s. Many of the campaigns against rent and service 
increases were organised by mass-based civics affiliated to 
the UDF (Swilling, 1987 : 13; Seekings, 1988 : 202~205). 
What precipitated the uprising was a rent increase 
announcement by the Lekoa Town Council, which encompassed 
five Vaal Triangle townships. Protests against these rent 
increases were led by local civics and this escalated into 
violence in a number of these townships. This pattern of 
unrepresentati v·e BLAs increasing rent and service cha·rges 
only to be met by civic-coordinated township resistance, 
which in turn often led to violence, repeated itself in many 








form of physical attacks on councillors. Popular resistance 
also led to the resignation of many councillors and the 
collapse of certain BLAs. 7 It was claimed in a press report 
in July 1985 that only five out of the 38 established BLAs 
were effectively functioning (Swilling, 1987 : 14-16; 
Seekings, 1988 211-216; Grest, 1988 : 105-106; 
Chaskalson and Seekings, 1988 : 29-37; SAIRR, 1985 : 89). 
Another manifestation of this urban rebellion was a 
boycott of rent and service charges, especially in Transvaal 
townships, which also had its origins in the townships of 
the Vaal Triangle. In 1986 the rent boycott had spread to 
54 townships involving about 500 000 households. As at 30 
November 1986 the official statistics for rent and service 
charge arrears were Rl77,6 million (The Star, 11/2/1987}. 
The reasons for the rent boycott were primarily economic -
the rampant unemployment and declining standard of living 
during the recession meant that many households were unable 
to pay higher rent and service charges - and to a lesser 
extent political - this weapon was used to protest against 
the lack of substantive political rights in general and the 
present inadequacy and illegitimacy of BLAs in particular 
(Swilling, 1987 : 18-19; Chaskalson et al, 1987 : 54-58) . 8 
This rent boycott severely affected the already parlous 
state of the BLAs finances. 9 Where BLAs were still 
functioning, 10 the government made grants (from July 1986 
through the various Provincial Administrations) to help 
these local authorities fund their activities. However, in 
line with the government's policy of self-financing local 
301 
. ' ' - , ~ , . ' ' , ... \ .. 
authorities, such subsidies were deemed bridging loans that 
had to be repaid. These loans rose from R25m in 1983/4 to 
R5lm in 1984/5 to R63m in 1985/6 (HAD., 18/8/1986 : Col. 
2402). 
This genera·l insurrection against civil government also 
affected Development Board finances. Profits from liquor 
outlets dropped dramatically because of the boycott of 
government-financed liquor trade (City Press, 23/2/1986) and 
because of physical attacks on beer-halls and bottle stores 
(Humphries and Shubane, 1989 91). In the year up to June 
1985, Development Board debt went up 25% to Rl94m (Financial 
Mail, 27/5/1986). 
In addition, the government. had already, in 1982, 
committed itself to the privatisation of Development Boards' 
sorghum liquor outlets. 11 After a storm of protest by BLAs, 
which argued that such a move.would deprive them of badly-
needed revenue, it was announced in 1984 that the industry 
was not to be privatised at this stage but rationalised into 
semi profit-oriented consortia run by the boards, and then 
privatised later. This process of privatisation would take 
three years so that alternative sources of revenue for BLAs 
could be investigated (SAIRR, 1984 : 165-166, 226-227; 
Poto, 1988 : 97-98). 
Furthermore, in certain of the townships which had 
chased out civil administration, forms of community 
government called 'people's power' were formed. These 
structures consisted of street and area committees. Each 









representatives to an area committee. They were established 
·mainly in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape. 'People's 
power' was a dual process. It was firstly aimed at denying 
official structures any legitimacy to the point of 
pressuring officials serving on them to resign and, 
secondly, aimed at taking over some of the functions per-
formed by local institutions. In certain townships such as 
Mamelodi, services such as refuse removal and the 
establishment of people's parks were undertaken by such 
committees. However,'people's power' structures existed in 
only a few townships, and addressed a limited range of 
issues (Swilling, 1988B : 7; Sunday Star, 21/9/1986; 
Chaskalson and·seekings, 1988 : 44;_ Humphries and Shubane, 
1989 : 93). 
What was the state's response to this? The Van der 
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Walt Commission into Education for Blacks in the Vaal 
Triangle found that local problems and local government were 
the root cause of the problem, with the rent increases being 
the final straw. The report recognised the problem of 
inadequate revenue by pointing out the urgent need for 
additional sources of funding (Van der Walt, 1985 : 33-34). 
The government, acknowledging the seriousness of the 
situation, reacted in December 1984 when·Minister Heunis 
announced that Blacks were to be included in RSCs, which 
would enable them to obtain funds for essential upgrading 
(The Argus, 19/12/1984). This was an important policy shift 
in that it ended the longstanding policy of financial self-
sufficiency for Blacks. It was also a clear attempt to 
boost the BLAs through urban upgrading. This new policy was 
given further impetus in August 1985 when P.W. Botha 
announced that Rl ooom would be set aside for the develop-
ment and upliftment of Black urban communities (RSA, Bureau 
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of Information, 1989 : 543). In addition, in many townships 
there was the unfreezing of development which had been put 
off for 20 years because they were within 50 Jan of Black 
homelands and were earmarked for incorporation (Sunday Star, 
12/5/1985). 
Furthermore, the Promotion of Local Government Affairs 
Amendment Act of 1985 brought Blacks into the mainstream of 
local government developments. The Act broadened the 
statutory definition of local authorities to include BLAs, 
Community Councils and Development Boards. At the same time 
UCASA (see 5.6 Community Councils for more detail about this 
body) was recognised as the official mouthpiece of BLAs and 
provision was made for its representation on the Co-
ordinating council (RSA, Promotion of Local Government 
Affairs Amendment Act, No. 45 of 1985; SAIRR, 1985 : 82). 
This bringing of BLAs into mainstream local government 
developments was given further impetus by a provision of the 
Local· Government Affairs Amendment Act of 1985, which 
empowered the Demarcation Board to demarcate the 
turisdiction of al1 ethnically-based local government bodies 
(RSA, Local Government Affairs Amendment Act, No. 110 of 
1985) and an amendment to the Black Communities Development 






Remuneration of Town Clerks Act (RSA, Black Communities 
Development Amendment Act, No. 52 of 1985). 
The more short-term goal was, however, to resurrect 
local government. The state declared a State of Emergency 
in 1985 in an attempt to re-establis.h control and smash 
rudimentary forms of people's power. Furthermore, in terms 
of the co-operation and Development Second Amendment Act, 
the Minister of DCD was vested with certain pow~rs to ensure 
the continuation of administration where BLAs had collapsed. 
In such a case any power, duty or fur:ictio_n of a BLA could be 
exercised by the Minister-designated authority or 
functionary12 (RSA, Laws on Cooperation and Development 
Second Amendment Act, No. 90 of 1985 ) • White Adminis-
trators, with full powers in terms of the Black Local 
Authorities Act, were appointed to run certain non-
functioning townships (Humphries, 1988A : 112; Sowetan, 
11/6/1985; Evening Post, 8/11/1985). 
Another problem was that of Development Boards. The 
Van der Walt Report had suggested that these institutions 
were still following the old Administration Boards' 
autocratic management style and were paying scant attention 
to development work. There was also the suspicion that such 
officials were drawing up budgets in areas where there were· 
unsophisticated councillors· and were therefore at least 
partially responsible for the rent increases which had 
precipitated violent unrest (RSA, Van der Walt, 1985 : 29-
35} • 
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On 1/7/1985, Development Boards were transferred to the 
control of the more reformist DCDP in terms of the Local 
Government Affairs Amendment Act of 1985, which destroyed 
the empire of the once omnipotent DCD (see 6.6 The Rise and 
Times of the DCDP). On 1/9/1985 the social development, 
housing and population functi6ns were transferred from the 
oco to the DCDP13 (SAIRR, 1985 : 82). Such a move was 
supported by BLAs who felt that the former department was 
irrevocably tainted and that residing under the reformist 
DCDP would help improve their legitimacy (Humphries, 1988A 
108). However, this arrangement was to prove short-lived. 
By 1986 'Total Strategy' was in tatters. The first 
state of Emergency had not restored control in the 
townships. By June 1986, 52 out of 235 Black local 
government structures were not functioning (Cape Times, 
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30/11/1986). The state's dream of a contented Black middle-
class seemed light years away. Furthermore, its attempts to 
keep 'outsider' Blacks out of urban areas had been a fail-
ure. The Orderly Movement and settlement of Black Persons 
Bill was eventually shelved due to widespread opposition 
from business and political qrganisations. 
Earlier, the President's Council's Report of 1985 on 
Urbanisation had acknowledged the failure of influx control 
and recognised the inevitability of Black urbanisation. 
This was accepted by the government in its White Paper on 
Urbanisation. It had now moved away from preventing Black 
urbanisation towards controlling it, the principle of 







\insider'/\outsider' dichotomy was formally scrapped and 
Blacks were now regarded as citizens· of South Africa. 14 The 
White Paper's recommendations were embodied in the Abolition 
of Influx Control Act of July 1986 (Sutcliffe, Todes arid 
Walker, 1990 : 90-92; Cobbett, 1986 : 112-119; RSA, DCDP, 
White Paper on Urbanisation, .1986 and Abolition of Influx 
contro·l Act, No. 68 of 1986) . 
The acceptance of Blac1cs as permanent citizens of South 
Africa, as opposed to citizens of the different homelands, 
was given greater credence by the passing of the Bla.ck 
Communities Development Amendment Act of 1986 which made 
provision for freehold property rights for Blacks (RSA, 
Black communities Development Amendment Act, No. 74 of 
1986) • 
The abolition of influx control removed the major 
raison d I etre of Development Boards. Accordingl"y I the 
Abolition of Development Boards Act formally abolished these 
structures and transferred their directorates, along with 
their liabilities and assets; to the functional control of 
the Provincial Administrators with effect from 1 July, 1986. 
overall policy-making in respect of urban Blacks still 
resided with the Minister of DCDP. In so far as their 
sources of revenue were concerned, liquor outlets were in 
the process of being privatised and labour levies were 
replaced by the new RSC levies {RSA, Abolition of 
Development Boards Act, No. 75 of 1986). 
The Black Local Authorities Amendment Act of 1986 was 
introduced at the behest of BLAs who wanted their local 
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·government legislation brought into line with other 
population groups in the country. It was felt that BLA 
structures were inferior to those of White local 
authorities. This Act accordingly made provision for all 
Community Councils to be converted into Town Councils and 
all Village Committees established in terms of the principal 
Act to be raised to Local Authority Committee status. These 
bodies were upgraded from advisory to authoritative bodies 
with powers to make by-laws. 
There were now five different forms of BLAs; viz. 
Greater city Councils, City Councils, Town Councils, Town 
Committees and Local Authority Committees (RSA, Black Local 
Authorities Amendment Act, No. 58 of 1986; HAD., 29/5/1986 
: Cols. 6837-6838). Another move that increased BLAs 1 
powers was the Black Communities Development Amendment Act 
of 1986 which made provision for property owned by Develop-
ment Boards to be transferred to these local structures 
(RSA, Black Communities Development Amendment Act, No. 74 of 
1986; HAD., 29/5/1986 : Cols. 6837-6840). 
1986 also saw the refurbishment of the concept of city 
states by the NP federal congress (Weekly Mail, 12/9-
18/9/1986). In the early 1980s it had been suggested that 
certain Black townships should become autonomous and be 
linked to the proposed 'Confederation of States' concept. 
This idea had, however, been scrapped. 15 Its revival, as 
pointed out (in 6.6.3 Minister Heunis 1 s Personality) had led 
to conflict between P.W. Botha, who was an enthusiastic 
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moving towards integrating Blacks into common structures. 
The 'Confederation of States' idea persisted throughout the 
late 1980s. P.W. Botha is on record as stating that "If a 
state such as Luxembourg can be independent - why can Black 
urban communities close to our metropolitan areas not 
receive full autonomy as city states?" (Botha, 1986 : 24), 
an observation which overlooked the vast discrepancies in 
financial capacity between the units in the respective 
countries. 
The idea of a 'Confederation of States', like its pre-
decessor the 'Constellation of States', was not realised~ 
The deliberations of the special cabinet committee {see 8.5 
The President's Council's Report) had, however, led to P.W. 
Botha announcing in January 1986 that he intended 
negotiating with African leaders for the establishment of a 
National Council under his chairmanship to meet on matters 
of common concern, prior to the establishment of a 
negotiated new dispensation16 {SAIRR, 1986 : 92-93). In the 
same year, Blacks were brought into the revamped provinciai 
system in the form of State President-nominated EXCO members 
{see 7.18 Provincial Government Act of 1986). 
8.8 1986-1989: THE REASSERTION OF STATE CONTROL 
AND THE REIGN OF JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES 
It has been pointed out that the first State of Emergency 
failed to restore state control in the townships. The 
Emergency was lifted briefly in March 1986 and re-introduced 
in a more stringent form in June 1986. 17 This second State 
of Emergency reimposed state control in the townships with a 
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vengeance. Turbulent townships were occupied by the 
military. This was followed by arrests and detentions and 
the forcing of many a~tivitists into hiding. All this 
decimated extra-parliamentary organisations (Grest, 1988 
106). Furthermore, municipal policemen along with hastily 
trained \kitskonstabels'. (special constables), soon feared 
because of their brutality, were introduced to protect 
councillors. Civic organisations were decimated by this 
offensive and the system of BLAs was gradually resurrected 
(Humphries, 1988B : 16-17; Mashabela, 1988 : 3-4; Catholic 
Institute for International Relations (cited hereafter as 
CIRR], 1988). 
This counter-revolutionary onslaught was orchestrated 
by the militarists through the NSMS system (see 6.2 The NSMS 
for a mo~e comprehensive account of the structuring and 
objectives of the NSMS). JMCs, Mini-JMCs and LMCs, 
regional/local structures of the NSMS; were responsible for 
the re-establishment of law and order. However, through the 
respective welfare committees, such structures were also 
responsible for material upliftment of Black living 
standards. Townships which were identified as major 
security risks (viz. the 34 \oilspots') were earmarked for 
upgrading. 
Although this is disputed by the government, many 
observers have noted that policy at local level was largely 
determined by recommendations of JMCs. Budlender (1990 : 
80) argues that major decisions about squatters and land 
allocation in the PWV region were processed largely through 
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the JMC ·system and points out that case studies by Swilling 
in Langa and Hendler in Tembisa arrive at similar 
conclusions. Jochelson (1988 : 14) has asserted that the 
Mini-JMCs' de facto controlled Alexandra. 
What the JMCs failed to do was to quell rent boycotts. 
In late 1986 it was reported that JMCs were attempting to 
break rent boycotts in Black areas (Weekly Mail, 1/8-
7/8/1986). That they were unsuccessful was illustrated by 
the fact that by March 1987 BLAs arrears had risen to R27lm 
(The Argus, 27/5/1987). A whole range of measures had been 
adopted to end the boycott, including the eviction of 
tenants, the cutting off of electricity, the selling of 
council housing stock (with rent and service arrears to be 
included in the sale price), and a Bureau of Information 
campaign to get Blacks to pay rent and service arrears. 
However, none of these measures managed to break the back of 
the campaign (Weekly Mail, 26/8-1/9/1988; SAIRR, 1988 : 58-
59 I 217) • 
A more systematic attempt to end the boycott had been a 
clause of the Black Local Authorities Amendment Bill of 1986 
which had attempted to ~urn employers into rent collectors. 
This had been referred to the Standing Committee on the 
constitution after a storm of protests by businesses and 
trade unions. It was, however, reintroduced in a colour-
blind fashion in 1987 in the form of the Promotion of Local 
Government Affairs Amendment Bill. This bill made provision 
for local authorities to file statements with magistrates in 
respect of debtors. Employers would then be obliged to 
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collect such debts from wages (Weekly Mail, 17/7-23/7/1987; 
Financial Mail, 19/6/1987). This bill was a systematic 
attempt to break the rent boycott in order to bolster the 
credibility of councils before the 1988 municipal elections. 
According to reports·, the State President personally took a 
direct interest in the combating of the rent boycott (New 
Nation, 11-17/2/1988). However, this bill too was dropped 
after further sustained opposition. 
8.9 1988 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
The 1988 municipal elections saw a comprehensive campaign by 
the state to resurrect BLAs. During the campaign, 
government spokesmen constantly emphasised that PLAs were. 
the building blocks of the new constitutional dispensation 
(see South African Digest, 13/5/1988). such councillors 
would not only have· certain discretionary powers over PLA 
functions but would also nominate representatives to sit on 
RSCs. Furthermore, a major .proportion of Black represent-
ation in the new proposed negotiating forum at central level 
would be drawn tram regional electoral colleges, which in 
turn consisted of representatives of BLAs (Humphries, 1988B 
: 14). This constitutional development was the third phase 
of the state's counter-revolutionary programme (see 6.12 The 
NSMS) . 
The intention, then, was then to ensure that the ethnic 
representatives who stood for election were perceived to be 
legitimate. This legitimacy was to be achieved through 
attaining reasonable percentage polls. The state, through 














campaign to promote.the elections and to persuade people to 
.vote. The Prior Votes for Election of Members of Local 
Government Bodies Act of 1988 made provision for a system of 
special votes whereby persons registered on the roll could 
vote for candidates in their constituency before elections 
I 
through a postal ~ate. The prior ~ate period was 10 days. 
It also increased incentives to participate by substantially 
increasing councillors' allowances and attempted to get the 
maximum number of eligible voters on the roll (RSA, Prior 
Votes for Election of Members of Local Government Bodies 
Act, No. 94 of 1988; Cameron, 1988C: 18). Another measure 
aimed at stimulating participation was an amendment to the 
Black Local Authoritie? Act which allowed shack dwellers 
living within the borders of local authorities to vote in 
municipal elections providing that they were 18 years old 
and had resided in the area for three months. Alter-
natively, a voter had to be the owner of immovable property 
(RSA, Black Local Authorities Amendment Act, No. 95 of 
1988). 
A second measure involved the neutralisation of extra-
parliamentary organisations which had rejected apartheid 
structures. The state, now under heavy SSC influence, was 
determined not to allow boycott campaigns to undermine its 
carefully orchestrated constitutional plans. Accordingly, 
such organisations had to be repressed. The State of 
Emerqency restrictions curtailed the ability of extra-
parliamentary groups to mobilise opposition to the 
elections. The promotion of election boycotts, except by 
registered political parties, was prohibited. stringent 
punishments were introduced for those found guilty of 
intimidation of voters (Cameron, 1988A : 18). However, 
despite this regulation many calls for boycotts were still 
made, especially by church leaders (Humphries and Shubane, 
1989 : 93; south, 8-14/7/1988)~ 
The Black Local Authorities Amendment Act of 1988 also 
gave the respective Administrators power to remove from 
office those elected who failed to take office or refused to 
participate in proceedings or functions. This pre-empted 
any prospect of the UDF adopting the IRA option, viz. 
winning seats and refusing to take them up. The Adminis-
trator could also appoint people to local government off ice 
for a period up to 12 months until an election was held. 
This was primarily to ensure that local authorities would 
continue functioning even if there was mass resignation of 
councillors. He was also given the power to appoint members 
in areas where no previous elections had been held (RSA, 
Black Local Authorities Amendment Act, No. 95 of 1988). 
Both the government and the anti-apartheid lobby 
claimed that the results of the elections were victories for 
their respective positions. The official poll was 25,2% 
which Minister Heunis claimed as a victory for democracy 
(Network, 1/11/1988). Opposition groups, on the other hand, 
claimed that only 5-10% of eligible Blacks had voted and in 
most townships no more people voted than in 1983. It was 
als'o claimed that voters were pressured or intimidated to 
vote, particularly during the prior vote period. Further-
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more, the fact that prior votes (about 70% of total votes 
cast) were not open to public inspection was conducive to 
electoral fraud (Phillips et al, 1988 : 35-36; Humphries 
and Shubane, 1989 : 96-98; Weekly Mail, 21/10-27/10/1988, 
28/10-3/11/1988; South, 1-7/9/1988; New Nation, 3-
9/11/1988) . 
However, the issues were not clear-cut as in previous 
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elections. Schlemmer (1988 : 209) suggests that the results 
were somewhere between these two positions. The polls were 
generally low in a number of politicised townships. In 
Soweto, the largest Black township- in the country, there was 
a mere 11,5% poll. However, in other areas - in particular 
small townships and shack settlements - they were relatively 
high. Khayelitsha in the Western Cape, encompassing a large 
shack settlement, recorded a 43,28% poll (Humphries and 
Shubane, 1989 : 98). 
Furthermore, in certain areas such as Koster (Western 
Transvaal), Harrismith (Orange Free state) and Leandra 
(Eastern Transvaal), councils were elected with some kind of 
mandate from mass-based residents' associations (Seekings, 
1990 : 124; Budlender, 1990: 77-78). 
Further obfuscating this participation vs. non-
participation issue was the fact that in certain townships 
some successful candidates were elected after having 
articulated the same demands as anti-participation lobbies. 
For example, the Sofasonke Party candidates in Soweto 
promised to reduce rents and not to evict rent boycotters. 
This party won most of the seats in Soweto (Phillips et al, 
1988 : 37). This suggests that certain voters voted on 
local matters rather than the participation issue. 
8.10 1988-1989 GREATER DEVOLUTION OF POWER 
TO BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
The last section of this period was characterised by 
attempts by the state to firmly establish BLAs as building 
blocks for future reform initiatives at higher tiers of 
government. This involved greater devolution of powers to 
BLAs. The Conversion.of Certain Rights Leasehold Act 
increased the powers of BLAs considerably. The main aim of 
the Act was to convert occupational rights into more 
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comprehensive tenure. Accordingly, old township regulations 
were terminated. However, none of the rights of the 
previous regulations were included in the Act. For example, 
under the previous system tenancy could only be terminated 
under certain conditions, and on the death of the permit 
holder the family often had a legal right to preference in 
the allocation of the house. Under the new Act it is the 
prerogative of the councils to make policy in respect of 
such issues. This increased their powers dramatically (RSA, 
Conversion of Certain Rights Leasehold Act, No. 81 of 1988; 
and Budlender, 1990 78-79). 
The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1988 granted 
unfettered powers to local authorities to demolish illegal 
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squatter dwellings (but not powers of summary eviction) . It ·· 
would no longer be necessary to obtain a court order first. 
PLAs generally and BLAs specifically have now become the 
main agents for the management of informal settlements in · 
urban areas. There was, &owever, provision for central 
government to override the authority of a BLA if it failed 
to perform a function and to charge the expenses incurred to 
the local structure concerned (RSA, Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act, No. 181 of 1988; O'Regan, 1990 : 162, 172-
173; Gill, 1990 65). 
During this period, certain powers in terms of the BLA 
Act were delegated to Black local governments by the various 
provinces (see 9.4 Delegation of Powers for a detailed 
account of how this process was carried out). 
Notwithstanding these measures, it has beerr suggested 
that devolution of powers is not such a major issue among 
BLAs as it is amongst White local authorities. There is a 
reluctance among BLAs to support devolution, since their 
lack of financial viability undermines the ability of such 
bodies to take proper advantage of it (Heymans, 1987B : 20-
21) . 
The re-establishment of BLAs continued in this period. 
By mid-1989, according to the government, 262 BLAs with 
varying degrees of autonomy, depending on the financial base 
of their constituencies, had been established. This in-
cluded 25 fully-fledged city councils and 22 town councils. 
The rest consisted of town committees and local authority 
committees (RSA, Bureau of Information, 1990 : 22). Only 10 
local authorities were still under direct control of White 
Administrators (Cape Times, 30/5/1989). 
What about the fundamental question of local government 
finance? After the elections a number of Transvaal councils 
317 
,, ., . ,, ' ~· 
announced substantial rises in the costs of services to 
residents. The channelling of RSC funds into Black 
townships failed to stop many BLAs slipping deep into debt 
(Weekly Mail, 20-26/1/1989). However, despite the increases 
and the JMC's machinations, the rent boycott persisted. In 
May 1989 it was reported that rent and service charges 
arrears had reached a staggering R555,1 million (Cape Times, 
20/5/1989). Later in the year it was reported by the 
Transvaal MEC for Local Government, Olaus van Zyl, that TPA 
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bridging loans to BLAs totalled nearly R890 million and that 
the state was running out of money to subsidise these uni~~ · 
(Weekly Mail, 3-9/11/1989). 
From the extra-parliamentary side, 1989 was character-
ised by calls in many cities for a single tax base. The 
most prominent of these campaigns was in Johannesburg, where 
the Soweto People's Delegation (cited hereafter as SPD) 
called for the reuniting of Johannesburg's and Soweto's 
finance and administration. In a superbly researched report 
for the SPD, Planact showed how Sowetans contributed to the 
growth of Johannesburg, both as workers and as consumers, 
while receiving very little financial benefit in return. It 
was concluded that 70% of Soweto's disposable income was 
spent in the Johannesburg CBD and that it was Black labour 
and consumption expenditure that were the foundations of the 
businesses which contribute no less than 74% of the 
Johannesburg city council's rates (Planact, 1989 : 76-79). 
At the very least, certain subsidisation from White 
















ensure the suspension of rent boycotts. ·The SPD entered 
·into negotiations with the TPA, 18 but as the Botha/Heunis 
era came to an end in 1989 no agreement had been reached. 
The impasse in Black local government seemed likely to (and 
in fact did) drag on into the 1990s. 
8.11 CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most ill-fated constitutional experiment that 
the apartheid state has yet embarked upon is the attempt to 
introduce fully-fledged Black local government structures in 
the 1980s. BLAs with fairly extensive powers were 
introduced and Administration Boards were replaced by 
Development Boards, whose aim was to develop local 
authorities until they could operate autonomously. However, 
the government made the cardinal error of establishing BLAs 
without a~equate sources of revenue. 
Lack of finance, then, proved to be the achilles heel 
of BLAs. In order to finance township development, councils 
were forced to introduce exhorbitant rent and service 
charges. This led to violent resistance culminating in the 
, 
collapse of many BLAs. Rent boycotts .and people / s power, an 
alternative form of local representation, were other 
manifestations of this boycott. These developments forced 
the state to subsidise BLAs heavily. -They also led to the 
bringing of Blacks into mainstream local constitutional 
developments. This enabled BLAs to get access to funds for 
. infrastructural development. Influx control was abolished 
in 1986, which in turn led to the abolition of Development 
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Boards which had failed to adjust to their new developmental 
role. 
In 1986 the securocrats won a power struggle within the 
state against the reformists and a state of Emergency was 
introduced to crush resistance to BLAs. This was largely 
successful. Security force-dominated JMCs and their sub-
structures began to exert considerable influence on BLA 
policy. The 1988 municipal elections saw a comprehensive 
campaign by the state to resurrect BLAs. While the results 
were still low in many large townships, elsewhere poll 
percentages were higher than in previous years. The late 
1980s saw further attempts to devolve powers to BLAs. 
However, the rent boycott persisted. Despite the intro-
duction of RSC funds, the fundamental problem of lack of 
finance remained. Finally, this chapter has shown the 
dismal failure of the state's strategy of co-opting Blacks 
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into neo-apartheid structures to act as bulwarks against the 
forces of radicalism (see 6.2 Total Strategy). 
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SECTION 4 
For the sake of conformity, the framework for analysis 
measuring decentralisation has been placed after the chapter 
on Normative Local Government in Section 2. This does, 
however, present a problem in that it has been necessary to 
look at national political developments in respect of local 
governments in Section 3 before this framework could be 
applied to the case studies. This means that by the time 
the reader reaches the case studies in Section 4, he/she 
will probably need the following brief recapitulation of the 
nature of this framework for analysis. 
The framework does not attempt to make any major new 
theoretical contribution to the field of decentralisation. 
Rather, certain indices which can measure decentralisation 
are examined. Because of a number of constraints (see 3.9 
Conclusion), a more limited variant of the fully-fledged 
framework will be used in the case studies. The following 
indices will be utilised: 
1. the classification of local authorities' personnel 
systems into three different categories, i.e. separate, 
.integrated and unified; 
2. whether local councillors were directly elected, 
indirectly elected or nominated; 
3. the nature of the channels of access between local and 
central local goverDment actors; 
4. whether local authorities' functions are handled in a 
devolved or delegated/deconcentrated way (for each case 












5. whether ideas, informatioD, experience and demands from 
local politicians can influence national politicians of 
the same party; 
6. the nature of the revenue base, some forms of local 
taxation being more autonomous than others; 
7. the elasticity of the sources of revenue of local 
authorities; 
8. the amount of discretion local authorities have over 
expenditure; 
9. the different administrative mechanisms through which 
higher tier control can.be.maintained over local 
authorities; 
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10. an examination of different types of higher tier 
government supervisory patterns over local authorities; 
11. an examination of how the ultra vires doctrine ~ffects 
local government autonomy. 
It must be pointed out that not every index is 
applicable to each case study. 
CHAPTER IX 
CASE STUDY 1 CAPE TOWN CITY COUNCIL 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Cape Town is the legislative capital of South Africa. It is 
situated at the foot of Table Mountain in the Western Cape. 
The CCC was established in 1840. It is the biggest local 
authority in the Cape Province. The CCC is a grade 15 local 
authority, i.e. the largest category of local authority in 
terms of the statistical formula introduced by the 
government (see 7.5 Remuneration of Town Clerks Act). In 
1981 it was two and a half times bigger than any other local 
authority in this province and it also contained one-third 
of the rateable value of the province within its boundaries 
(The Argus, 4/8/1981). In 1989 the CCC'·s municipal area was 
30 322 ha and its rateable value was RS 456 895 333 (South 
African Municipal Yearbook 1989, 1989 : 74). According to 
the 1985 census, the CCC had 44,25% of the population of the 
WCRSC area under its jurisdiction (863 508 in total). This 
can be sub-divided into 37,8% (206 949) of the White total; 
49,8% (549 213) of the Coloured total; 75,6% (13 917) of the 
Indian total and 33,1% (93 429) of the Black total1 (CCC, 
1988A : 10). It also has 45,5% of the WCRSC's population 
residential dwellings in its area (CCC, 1988A : 6) . Another 
indication of its size is the extent of its capital and 
operating expenditure which in 1989/90 amounted to R281,7m 
and R999,lm respectively (CCC, 1989B : 13) (see Annexure C 
for map) . 
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Unlike most White local authorities in the area, it is 
a predominantly English-speaking institution, which is 
reflected in the composition of its councillors and 
officials. The CCC is not run on party-political lines. In 
the 1980s there was a considerable liberal PFP (thereafter 
DP) contingent on the CCC,. which wielded a certain amount of 
power but was unable to impose its_ will unreservedly on the 
council (Cameron, 1986B: 36-44). The CCC prides itself on 
being the heir of the Cape liberal tradition. However, it 
is sometimes rather ambivalent about matching liberal 
rhetoric with its actual policies (Cameron, 1986B : 83-89). 
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In this chapter an examination will be undertaken of 
the extent to which higher tiers of gov.ernment have 
decentralised power to the CCC in the 1980s. As pointed out 
in Chapter III, selected aspects of the framework for 
analysis will be used to gauge the extent of decentral-
isation that has occurred. 2 
9.2 PROCEDURE FOR BY-LAWS 
In the Cape, all by-laws must·be approved by the Adminis-
trator. He may refuse to approve a by-law if he believes it 
is not in the public interest. He can amend or modify the 
proposed by-law if he deems it necessary. The Administrator 
can force a council to pass by-laws against its wishes and 
if a council refuses to do so he can authorise another body 
to perform the function and claim the costs from the local 
authority concerned. 
There are a number of requirements for valid by-laws. 
Some of the more important of these will be discussed. 
--------·--------------------------------
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Firstly, a by-law may not be ultra vires; there must be a 
specific authority in the ordinance for whatever the council 
does. A by-law must also not be repugnant to the general 
law of the land; viz. it must not be contrary to the laws 
of higher tiers of government. Finally, it must be 
reasonable.· This is quite a complex issue. Generally, it 
means that the by-law must not exceed the imposed limitation 
on the,exercise of that power (Craythorne, 1990 : 424-433; 
interview with senior CPA official, 1990). 
As pointed out (in 7.19 Own Affairs Administration), 
certain supervisory powers in respect of White local 
government were transferred to the Minister of Local 
Government: House of Assembly on 1/4/1989. These powers 
have now been delegated to the White Ministerial 
Representatives (who were appointed in March 1987 and took 
office in May 1987). The Ministerial Representative for the 
Western Cape between 1987 and 1989 was Mr Jimmy Otto. CCC 
by-laws affecting Whites only are 'own affairs' and must now 
go to the Minister's Representative for final approval; if 
the matter also affects Coloureds and Indians it is a 
'general affair' and still goes to the Administrator .. 
Certain 'own affairs' powers, particularly in respect of 
financial issues, are still handled on an agency basis by 
the Administrator (Department of Local Government, House of 
Assembly, 1989). 
This division is rather complex in practice. 'Lily-
white' local authorities' by-laws go to the Ministerial 
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White suburb of a mixed local authority consisting of Whites 
and Coloureds or Indians (e.g. Claremont) also goes to the 
Ministerial Repr~sentative, while a by-law affecting only a 
Coloured area in a such mixed local authority (e.g. Athlone) 
goes to the Administrator. However, in a mixed local 
authority such as Cape·Town, where a by-law will affect 
Whites as well as Coloureds and Indians, it has to be 
approved jointly by the Ministerial Representative and the 
Administrator (Department of Local Government, House of 
Assembly, 1989). As pointed out, this division along colour 
lines is both complex and impractical; even practitioners 
said in interviews that there were a number of areas which,· 
in terms of this formula, did not lend themselves easily to 
either 'general' or 'own' affairs. 
There is also a joint CPA/House of Assembly committee 
on local government legislation to ensure uniformity of 
policy when it comes to the introduction of new by-laws 9r 
amendments to existing by-laws (Interview with CPA and 
Department of Local Government: House of Assembly officials, 
1990) • 
9.3 CCC/CPA HIERARCHICAL RELATIONS 
Relations between the CCC and CPA have down the years tended 
to be rather acrimonious at times. The major reason for 
this is that the anti-apartheid CCC objected to racially-
based legislation imposed upon it by the NP-controlled 
Provincial Council (until its abolition in 1986) . During 
the 1960s the CCC refused to demarcate its beaches on racial 
grounds when ordered to do so by the Administrator in terms 
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of the Separate Amenities Act. The CPA put up the apartheid 
signs and charged the costs to the CCC (Cameron, 1986£ 
62). Prior to and up to the mid-19805 there had been 
various pieces of provincial legislation which eroded the 
autonomy of the CCC, often because the ·cPA wanted to ensure 
that the recalcitrant CCC adopted the NP's apartheid 
policies. 
In the 1980s, two distinct phases of hierarchical 
relations between CPA and CCC can be identified. The first 
phase, using Griffith's definition· (see 3.7 Hierarchical 
Relations), ·can be termed promotional, that is, local 
authorities executing functions under the close control and 
direction of a higher tier authority. This phase covered 
the early and, to a lesser extent, the mid-1980s and is 
strongly linked with the tenure of Hernus Kriel (1981-1984) 
as MEC for Local Government, which was particularly 
associated with legislation diminishing CCC autonomy. Soon 
after his appointment to the portfolio, Kriel discouraged 
local authorities from establishing their own little 
'monarchies' or 'republics', saying that he would ensure 
that NP policy was carried out at local government level and 
that the aim of local authorities was to "ensure that 
government policy is honoured" (Cape Times, 25/5/1981). In 
1982 he said that the CCC was a "radical of the left" 
council and was sabotaging government plans to restructure 
the local government system. He warned of government legal 
action, and even the cutting off of state funds, to ensure 
that local authorities supported and implemented its 
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constitutional plans (Cape Times, 26/10/1982; Cameron, 
1986B : 61-62; 1988D : 54-55). 
During this period Kriel introduced legislation which 
gave the Administrator the right to appoint the chairman of 
the Municipal Service Commission (cited hereafter as MSC), 
the CCC's personnel body. This gave the CPA a strong 
foothold in the appointment and promotion of staff in the 
CCC (see 9.7.1 The MSC ) . He also introduced legislation 
which gave the Administrator power to terminate a lease 
between the CCC and a sports body if it was felt that the 
latter body was unreasonably withholding local authority 
facilities from other persons or organisations. Legislation 
was also introduced which gave the Administrator power to 
change, by means of a directive, any street names of which 
he disapproved. This legislation was introduced to enable 
the CPA to reverse a decision by the Northern Areas 
Management Committee in Port Elizabeth to name two streets 
in its area of jurisdiction after Nelson Mandela and Steve 
Biko (Labour Research Commission, 1982 : 160; CPA, 
Municipal Amendment Ordinance, No. 23 of 1983; Cameron, 
1986B : 62-63; 1988D : 54-55). 
It was not only through ordinances that provincial 
controls were asserted over the CCC in this period prior to 
and up to the mid-1980s. Because of the narrow parameters 
of the ultra vires doctrine, circulars and letters issuing 
directives to local authorities were often used by the CPA's 
Department of Local Government. 3 Gildenhuys has asserted 
that the delegating power of the Administrator led to 
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functions being delegated to a relatively low level in the 
staff hierarchy, with low-r~nking provincial staff being 
able to dictate and, in some cases, .interpret policy to 
senior local authority staff (cited in De Wet, 1984 : 280). 
It has been pointed out that this tendency occurred in 
CCC/CPA relations (Cameron, 19868: 63-64). Even a senior 
DCDP official accused the CPA of having a "centra;J..ist 
bureaucratic culture" (Interview with senior DCDP official, 
1988) . 
The second phase began in the mid-1980s, yet was 
pronounced only in 1988-1989 when the CPA attempted to 
embody the government's devolution of power policy (see 9.4 
Delegation of Powers). There has been a move towards what 
Griffith terms regulatory control (see 3.7 Hierarchical 
Relations), an approach which concentrates on upholding 
statutory regulations while not intervening excessively in 
local affairs. ~ccording to a senior CPA official, there 
has been a conscious shift in policy when it comes to 
reviewing by-laws. The CPA checks mainly whether by-laws 
are legally correct and not incompatible with higher tier 
legislation. The new ethos of the institution is to 
prescribe as little .as possible to local authorities and to 
allow them maximum permissable autonomy. This new 
commitment to decentralising powers is reflected in a drop 
in the number of directive circulars sent to local 
authorities. With delegated powers, the need for directive 
circulars has diminished to a large extent. 
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Despite this change in attitude there are still, 
however, elements of the promotional approach evident in the 
CPA's attitude to intergovernmental relations. For example, 
the new Administrator Kobus Meiring turned down the city 
council's proposed by-law seeking a 50% ban on smoking in 
city restaurants, on the grounds of unreasonableness (The 
Argus, 13/12/1989). 
In the rest of the chapter other manifestations of this 
mix of regulatory and promotional approaches will be 
examined. 4 
9.4 DELEGATION OF POWERS 
Since 1988 the CPA has delegated certain powers down to 
local authorities. 5 There were two major and two minor 
rounds of delegation in 1988 and 1989. The one major form 
of delegation saw over 50 functions being transferred to 
local authorities. The other major delegation saw the 
enforcement of certain town planning regulations being 
delegated to local authorities. How did this process work? 
Although the Commission for Administration had ultimate 
' responsibility for this process, in the Cape at any rate, a 
provincial committee6 worked through the ordinance, 
examining every section and sub-section to see what powers 
could be delegated. A framework consisting of four 
variables was used in this process. These four variables 
were political, economic, social and security reasons for 
delegating powers to local authorities. Each of these 
variables was divided into four further dimensions: none, 
minor, serious and critical reasons for delegating powers. 
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Each sub-section of the ordinance was examined in terms of 
these criteria (CPA, AA050, 9/2/1990A). 
Delegated powers mean that such powers can be recalled 
at some stage. Why were powers not devolved? The CPA felt 
that there was still a need to retain control in order to 
review delegations. This had become more pressing since the 
1988 municipal elections, which saw a growth in the number 
of CF-controlled municipalities which were opposed to the 
government's reform policies. For example, the power to 
initiate legal proceedings for the recovery of arrear rates 
was delegated to local authorities and then recalled. This 
was because of the fear that CF-controlled bodies could use 
this function against Black defaulters in a way that could 
heighten racial conflict (Interview with senior CPA 
official, 1990). 
Why did the CPA not devolve the powers to approve by-
laws down to local authorities, as has been the case in 
certain other provinces? 7 The CPA's policy, based on legal 
opinion, is that in terms of the country's unitary 
constitution there should always be a higher approving 
authority. There was also the belief that there should be a 
certain amount of uniformity amongst local authorities' 
legislation, hence the need for some form of higher tier 
control. In this regard, provision is made for the making 
of standard by-laws by the Administrator (although it is not 
compulsory for local authorities to adopt them) . Another 
possible reason for continued control was that devolution to 
local authorities would have been a threat to the powers of 
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CPA bureaucrats, who were accordingly unenthusiastic about 
implementing this policy. 
Moreover, certain powers conferred upon the Adminis-
trator - enabling him to make by-laws for a council which 
needs them but has not made them, and by-laws for a council 
on certain matters beyond its powers, as well as powers 
authorising him to instruct another body to implement a by--
law if a council refused to do so after being so ordered, 
and to recover the costs from the local authority concerned 
- still remain on the statute book (Craythorne, 1990 : 424-
425; interview with senior CPA officials,· 1990). 
Furthermore, in terms of De Forges' six administrative 
mechanisms through which higher tier control over local 
authorities' powers can be maintained (see 4.5.3 Provincial 
Controls), there has been little change. ·All these 
provincial controls still exist over the functioning of the 
CCC although, as pointed out in the previous sub-section, 
some of these powers are now exercised by the Ministerial 
Representative in the Western Cape. 
The view was also expressed by certain CPA interviewees 
that unfettered devolution could lead to inefficiency and 
corruption, an opinion that was groun~ed in their personal 
experiences of dealing with local authorities. This 
ambivalence towards devolution is reflected in some of the 
functional areas to which this chapter will now turn. 
9.5 FINANCIAL CONTROL 
According to Mawhood's scale of systems of local financing, 
own revenues is the source of financing most conducive to 
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local government autonomy (see 3.6.1 Revenue Base). In the 
CCC's case, 95,2% of its finances come from its own sources 
(CCC, 1989B : vi). Despite this, the CCC is constrained by 
higher authorities in a number of ways when it comes to 
determining local financial priorities. This section will 
look at the Department of Finance's macro-control over the 
finances of the ccc. 
9.5.1 Efi:ects of Controls on 
cape Town city council's Revenue Base 
The Department of Finance does not consider its macro-
controls (described in 7.20 Department of Finance Macro-
Control) to be restrictive. Deputy Director-General of 
Finance Gerhard Croeser stated that the Department 
endeavoured to adopt a flexible approach and to consider 
special ~djustments and corrections in the expenditure 
programme of local authorities within the framework of 
overall policy and prevailing circumstances (Croeser, 1986 
7). There , however, a great difference between the 
Department's attitude to capital and operating expenditure 
in practice. 
The Directorate: Local Government Relations tends to be 
more flexible when it comes to exceeding controls on capital 
expenditure. Applications for ad hoc expenditure by the CCC 
are generally treated quite favourably. For example, when a 
water pipeline burst in Heideveld, a low-income Coloured 
area on the Cape Flats , an ad hoc application for an 
additional R8,8m capital expenditure to replace it was 
approved (CCC, 1987A : 12). Interestingly enough, the CCC 
334 








o~ten underspends its capital account because of procedural 
delays; e.g. tenders have not been sorted out, plans not 
ready, etc. (Interview with Town Clerk, CCC, 1990). 
It is, however, the Department's policy to exercise 
much tighter. control over operating expenditure. The CCC 
has had its budget cut by the Department in the past; for 
example, in 1984/85 the budget was cut by R4m (Cape Times 
9/8/1985). The CCC has complained that these operating 
controls are severely restrictive. New capital projects 
have led to an ever-increasing burden of capital charges, 
operational costs and maintenance that have to be met from 
the operating account (CCC, 1987A : 9) . A major inhibiting 
factor is that of salaries and wages of CCC employees. The 
CCC has over 15 000 employees and their remuneration is 
subject to Industrial Council ·hearings. Furthermore, 
housing subsidy levels are set by central government. Local 
authorities are very labour-intensive because they provide 
large-scale services to the public, and salaries and wages· 
accordingly accounted.for 39% (R398m) of operating 
expenditure in 1989. It was felt that the Directorate: 
Local Government Relations' estimated figure of 30% for 
salaries and wages was unrealistic and only applicable to 
clerical government departments which do not provide large-
scale services (Interview with City Treasurer, Cape Town, 
1990; CCC, 19898 : 21). 
A related issue is the question of how restrictive 
these controls are on the CCC's discretion to determine its 
own priorities. Croeser argues that it is a local 
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authority's prerogative to determine budgetary priorities. 
The task of the Department is to see that these overall 
limits are not exceeded. Complaints were expressed by the 
major cities in the early 1980s that macro-control had 
deg~nerated into.micro-control~ with the Department of 
Finance trying to limit expenditure on various sub-divisions 
of the budget (CCC, 1986H). However, in.the late 1980s the 
Department reverted to its macro-control function (Inter-
views with Gerhard Croeser, 1989 and Donald Geyer, CCC 
Treasurer, 1990). 
What is the relationship between these controls and the 
inflation rate? Table I compares the growth percentage 
limits of the Department of Finance from 1982 to 1989, with 
the inflation rate for the same period. 
TABLE I: COMPA~ISON OF DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE LIMITS ON CCC'S 
EXPENDITURE WITH ANNUAL INFLATION RATE 1982 - 1989 
Limits on Inflation 
Year Expenditure• Year Rate•• 
1982-83 13,5% 1982 14,7% 
1983-84 9 ,,75% 1983 12,3% 
1984-85 10,0% 1984 11,7% 
1985-86 12,5% capital 
10,0% operating 1985 16,2% 
1986-87 15,0% 1986 18,6% 
1987-88 15,0% 1987 16,1% 
1988-89 13,5% 1988 12,9% 
1989-1990 13,5% 1989 14,7% 
*(Croeser, 1988 : 5; CCC, 1988B : 6; 1989B 2) 
** (Department of statistics, 1989) . 
It can be seen that with the exception of 1988, the 
Department of Finance's controls have been below the 





















ability of the CCC (and all other local authorities too) to 
expand its revenue base. 
It was pointed out (in 2.12.2 History of Decentral-
isation) that in certain instances central government 
supervision is needed to promote efficiency at local level. 
In this regard, macro-economic·control has had certain 
positive spin-offs. Firstly, local government b1ldgets are 
drawn up more carefully and expenditure is generally limited 
to more realistic levels. Secondly, it forces local 
representatives to determine relative priorities of 
different services. These advantages can be compared to the 
days when certain capital projects were approved by 
provincial administrations and other government departments 
without seeing whether local authorities could afford them. 
In some cases government departments forced local 
authorities to carry out projects with high standards, with 
no regard to the issue of affordability (Croeser, 1986 : 6-
10} . 
on less solid ground is croeser's argument that 
Department of Finance control is justified on the grounds 
that the state, since it began paying subsidies in lieu of 
. rates (rates from 1988 onwards}, is the biggest payer of 
local income tax. (R98m was paid by the state during the 
1986-87 financial year - see 7.9 The Rating of State 
Property Act of 1984} (Croeser, 1988 : 1-2). The major 
reason is that the CCC'.s GST payment, estimated at Rl 7m per 
annum, was only slightly less than the amount received from 
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the state in payment of assessment rates (1988 figures). 
(CCC, 1988B : 17). 
9.5.2 status of Financial Controls 
What authority do the Finance Department controls carry? In 
terms of the six forms of hierarchical controls, (see 3.7 
Hierarchical Controls), it actually has few formal powers. 
There is no law which the Department can use to force local 
.authorities to follow its guidelines. It relies to a large 
extent on local authorities' informal cooperation. However, 
there are certain powers which the Department could use 
against persistent offenders: 
i) No local authority that wants to borrow an amount of 
Rlm on capital expenditure can enter the market without 
the Department's approval. Recalcitrant local 
authorities can duly be refused such entry. 
ii) The Department administers the Local Authorities' Loans 
Funds (see 7.7 Local Authorities Loans Fund Act of 
1984). Local authorities that exceed expenditure can 
be refused loans from this source. 
iii) The state initially paid subsidies in lieu of rates on 
property to local authorities. In terms of The Rating 
~ 
of State Property Act of 1984, the state was supposed 
to pay rates on property to local authorities (see 7.9 
The Rating of State Property Act of 1984). In 1988 the 
state begain paying rates. Such state funds could be 
withheld from persistent offenders (Croeser, 1988 : 
10) • 
338 
. ~ .... 
Punitive measures (i) and (ii) could not be applied 
against the CCC because it raises its loan' requirements from 
internal funds through the Consolidated C~pital Development 
and Loans Fund (cited hereafter as CCDLF) (with the ex-
ception of housing). This means that (iii) is the only 
potential control that could be used against the CCC if it 
decided to ignore these limits. However, there is the 
concern among City Treasurers of the five major cities8 that 
if these guidelines are deliberately ignored, the state may 
respond by introducing legislation to enforce tighter macro-
-economic. control. This was likely to be more inflexible 
than existing control measures. The CCC accordingly kept 
within the limits laid down by the Department of Finance 
(Interview with City Treasurer, CCC, 1990). 
9.5.3 Provincial Role in Macro-economic Control 
The Treasury plays the major role in controlling local 
authority expenditure but, as pointed out (in 7.20.2 
Financial Control Procedure), the provinces are still 
involved, albeit to a lesser extent, in this process. A few 
months before the beginning of each new financial year, the 
CPA sends a standard circular to all local authorities in 
the province in which the Director: Local Government 
requests a statement of estimated income and expenditure in 
respect of both capital and operating accounts. Upon 
receipt of these proposed budgets, the Departments of Local 
Government scrutinise these budgets for unnecessary 
expenditure and items which are likely to lead to a sub-
stantial increase in rates. The Department of Finance and 
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the local authority concerned are informed accordingly if 
the province is unhappy. with certain items on the budget. 
The approval of the Administrator is'also needed to increase 
the capital estimates between budgets (see CPA, LG/PB, 
15/1988A) . The financial relations between the CCC and CPA 
have been good, at least since Doriald Geyer took over as 
city Treasurer in 1986. There has not been a need to 
question items on the CCC's budget because of the sound 
financiaLmanagement employed by the local authority 
(Interviews with CCC and CPA financial officials, 1990). 
It was also necessary for local authorities to request 
the Administrator's permission to exceed the statutory limit· 
in the Cape Province of ·2c per Rand for the rate levy (CPA, 
LG/PB 15/1988A). However, because the CCC was operating on 
an outdated 1979 general valuation roll in the late 1980s, 
this tended to be merely a formality in its case. By 
1989/90 this levy had in fact reached 3,39c in the Rand 
(before rebates) (CCC, 1989B : 12). 
The CPA still controls the ability of local authorities 
to borrow money and also regulates the functioning of 
CCOLFs, local authorities' internal system of financing. 
The delegation of powers (see 9.5.7 Delegation of Powers) 
has changed the loan system in that there is a grading 
system for the approval of loans, ranging from a middle-
level administrative official to the Chief Directorate: 
Local Government, depending on the amount concerned. 
However, the principle that loans must be approved by the 
CPA has not been changed. As already pointed out, this does 
not affect the CCC because it relies on internal sources of 
finance. 
9.5.4 Provincial Subsidies 
It was pointed out (in 4.4.4. The Financing of Local 
Authorities) that less than five percent _of the total 
expenditure by local governments, was derived from subsidies, 
and thus was limited to specific functions. Local 
authorities are also entitled to reimbursements in respect 
of expenses for functions carried out by a local government 
acting as agent for higher tier governments, such as 
freeways and through roads (Solomon, 1988 : 188). 
Subsidies form a relatively small percentage of the 
city's revenue. They declined from 7,76% of revenue in 1980 
to 4,8% in 1989 (UPRU, 1986 : 59; CCC, 1989B : 16). The 
major reason for this was that the CCC was consistently 
under-funded by the CPA during the 1980s. The CCC pointed 
out that it was entitled to expect a subsidy equivalent to 
between 40 and 50% of operating costs incurred in fire, 
library and nature conservation services. However, it had 
never actually received a subsidy of such magnitude (CCC, 
1990B : 5). 
The reason for this under-funding is not the CPA's 
fault. It relies on the central Treasury for approximately 
80% of the revenue and during the 1980s the amount of funds 
allocated to the CPA by the central government was often 
inadequate in relation to its needs. For example, the 
central government subsidy to the CPA was cut by R74m in 
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1984/85 and by more than RlOOm in 1985/86 (Cape Times, 
21/4/1985). 
The CCC also claims it has been short-changed in 
respect of roads reimbursement. It claims that it is owed 
R6m in provincial subsidies for road building in Mitchell's 
Plain in the past decade (The Argus, 11/1/1989). 
9.5.5 Elasticity of cape Town city council's Tax Base 
It was pointed out (in 3.6.2 Elasticity of Tax Base) that 
the ela.sticity of the tax base is an important ingredient of 
devolution. It was also pointed out that rates are 
extremely inelastic and tend to lag behind the inflation 
rate. This is corroborated by the CCC's experience. At a 
general level, Croeser pointed out that a 10% increase in 
expenditure requires a 25% increasement in assessment rates 
in South Africa (Croeser, 1985: 18). 
At a more specific level, at the end of the 1980s the 
CCC was operating on valuation rolls supposedly based on 
market prices and building costs in January 1979. These 
rolls only became operative in 1984 (The Argus, 6/7/1984). 
These valuation rolls9 were further eroded as a result of· 
several substantial and successful appeals to the Valuation 
Court (CCC, 1986A 115) ~ The natural growth of rates per 
annum was between 1,5 and 2% in the 1980s and this can be 
compared with the double-digit inflation during this same 
period (see Table I on page 336) (Interview with City 
Treasurer, Cape Town, 1990; CCC, 1987A: 17). All these 
factors contributed to rates forming a relatively small 







23,48% of total revenue in 1980 and 24,9% in 198910 - UPRU, 
.1986 59; CCC, 1989B : vi) • 
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Furthermore, The Rating of State Property Act of .1984 
only came into effect in 1988 (see 7.9 The Rating of State 
Property Act of 1984). In the interim the state committed 
itself to paying a subsidy in lieu of rates. This was often . 
less than anticipated. For example, in 1985/86 the CCC was 
underpaid by an amount of R4m. The chairman of the CCC 
EXCO, Richard Friedlander-, said "the city could not continue-
using 1979 values in a 1990 context. The increasing demand 
for services is straining the city's resources to the limit" 
(The Argus. 23/5/1989). 
There is, however, a self-induced reason for the lack 
of growth of rate revenue. It was the CCC's policy through 
most of the 1980s to set rates increases at least two 
percent lower than the Cost Price Index (cited hereafter as 
CPI) (CCC 1987A: 4). This was due to local economic 
circumstances. CCC's rates are the highest of all the 
metropolitan areas in the country11 and it was feared that 
excessive rate increases would drive away possible investors 
or cause businesses to relocate elsewhere (Interview with 
City Treasurer, Cape Town, 1990). 
The major source of income is its trading services, 
electricity and water, in particular the .former service. In 
1980 it formed 55,49% of total revenue and in 1989 49,3% 
(UPRU, 1986 : 59 and CCC, 1989B vi). However, following a 
recommendation by the CWG, only a 10% maximum surplus can be 
made on these undertakings to subsidise rate accounts (CCC, 
1983 39) 12 . 
9.5.6 Financial Implications of 
New Local Government Deal 
One of UME's preconditions for accepting the new local 
government deal was that no local authority should be 
financially worse off than before. This has not happened in 
the case of the CCC. The city Treasurer stated unequivo-
cally that the city was in a worse financial situation than 
before. It has already been pointed out that GST paid by 
local authorities and assessment rates paid by the state 
have virtually cancelled each other out. The CCC sustained 
a loss of R2,5m for business licence fees, which fell away 
following the introduction of RSC levies .. It also received 
a reduction of income of R1,4m from commission on Cape 
Divisional Council (cited hereafter as CDC) rates collected 
and a contribution towards valuation expenses previously 
received from this body (CCC, 1988B: 13). 
Furthermore, the CCC also has to pay WCRSC establish-
ment and service levies. In the 1987/88 financial year, 
this amounted to R1,2m (CCC, 1987A: 17). This means that 
the city was R5,lm worse off than before when the RSCs were 
introduced. 
9.5.7 Delegation of Financial Powers 
A minimal amount of financial power has been delegated to 
the CCC. The CPA has delegated certain financial functions 
down to local authorities, such as implementation of 






limitations on raising loans, raising of loans to liquidate 
previous loans, utilisation of proceeds of sale of capital 
assets, utilisation of surplus loan funds (in respect of 
local authorities with a grading above Grade 6), exemption 
from rates on leased council and state property, granting of 
rebates .on rates where valuation is. reduced, raising of 
external loans, and the utilisation of CCDLF funds for 
specific purposes (CPA, LG/PB 13/1988B and LG/PB 4/1989A). 
However, the City Treasurer does not regard any of these 
delegations as being major functions. They have not 
significantly increased the city's financial autonomy. It 
was felt, despite the fact that certain delegations are 
applicable only to local authorities of Grade 6 and above, 
that the CPA did not distinguish adequately between larger 
and smaller local authorities when delegating powers. 
Cognisance was not taken of the fact that the city had the 
financial expertise to handle more powers (interview with 
City Treasurer, CCC, 1990). 
It was argued (in 7.22 Evaluation of State Strategy) 
that macro-economic objectives formed an important reason 
for centralist measures in new local government legislation. 
In practice, there are also tight macro-economic controls. 
Few important financial powers have been delegated to the 
ccc. Furthermore, there has been centralisation of powers 
in that the Department of Finance has.taken over from the 
CPA as the institution responsible for macro-economic 
control of local authorities' finances. 
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In terms of Mawhood's scale of systems of local 
financing (see 3.6.1 Revenue Base), the CCC has what is 
theoretically the most autonomous form, namely own revenue. 
However, there are limits on the CCC's ability to adjust its 
tax base. Provincial controls on the rate limits and the 
10% maximum surplus that can be made on these undertakings 
are the major restrictions in this regard. 
In terms of Davey's framework of financial discretion 
(see 3.6.3 Financial Discretion over Expenditure), due to 
macro-economic control by the Department of Finance the CCC 
is quite limited in terms of scale, that is the amount of 
money it is allowed to spend,. particularly in respect of 
operating expenditure. It does, however, have greater 
leeway in terms of purpose, namely the objects on which it 
is allowed to spend its money. 
In terms of Davey's six-point continuum in descending 
order of discretion, item 3 appears to be relevant to a 
certain extent, namely that the CCC may allocate money 
between different services, but with a fixed ceiling on 
expenditure. A case can also, however, be made for the 
applicability, to a certairi extent, of item 5: that the CCC 
can allocate money but only within total amounts prescribed 
for individual functions for higher tier governments. It 
was pointed out (in 9.5.2 Financial Control Procedure) that 
the macro-amounts of six or seven major items are controlled 
by the Department of Finance. If anything, with increased 
Department of Finance control in the 1980s, there has been a 
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shift from item 3 to item 5, indicating greater and not less 
£inan6ial control. 
9.6 TOWN PLANNING13 
In 1985 the Cape Provincial Council promulgated the Land Use 
Planning Ordinance (cited hereafter as LUPO) No. 15 of 1985 
which replaced the cumbersome and outdated Township 
Ordinance No. 33 of 1934, which was a highly centralising 
piece of legislation in which most plartning decisions had to 
be referred to the Administrator for final approval. LUPO 
took effect on 1/7/1986 and provided, among other things, 
i) for subjecting the land scheme of the eritire province 
to zoning schemes, whereby the permissible use of land 
is prescribed in scheme regulations, and th.at a change 
of use of land is subject to rezoning approval on a 
uniform basis; 
ii) for control over the subdivision of land; 
iii) for total flexibility in the application of zoning 
schemes by means of the approval of departures; 
iv) for the introduction of structure plans which have as 
their objectives the provision of guidelines for future 
development in a specific area, and the empowering of 
local authorities to deal with rezonings themselves 
within the constraints of such plans; 
v) for a right of appeal to the Administrator against the 
decisions of local authorities; 
vi) for a right of appeal to an appeal committee if a local 
authority and a developer cannot come to an agreement 
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with regard to the supply of services (CPA, 1987A 
27) • 
According to a senior CPA planner, LUPO had four main 
purposes: 
• The first objective was the promotion of forward 
planning in order to expedite township establishment. 
Accordingly, forward planning was to be embodied in 
structure plans. 
• The second objective was the reinforcement of free 
market principles in land use control. An attempt was 
made in LUPO to give free market principles greater 
recognition. 
• The third objective was rationalisation of procedures. 
• 
A major problem of the old ordinance was that it was 
difficult and cumbersome to administer. LUPO 
accordingly simplified and streamlined procedures. 
The fourth objective, the most important for the 
purposes of this thesis, was the promotion of 
devolution of power. Special mechanisms were written 
into the ordinance in order to give positive substance 
to this policy in respect of land use planning. The 
underlying principle was that the devolution of land 
use control could be achieved effectively by control 
over forward planning. The CPA felt that in terms of 
this approach, a fairly flexible system of devolution 
could be instituted. Provision was made for a fairly 
flexible system along a sliding scale in which levels 













was accordingly concentrated on structure plans, which 
were to be used to devolve zoning schemes and, through 
the zoning scheme, the power to subdivide land 
(Theunissen, 1985 : 2). 
LUPO provoked an immediate response from two planners 
situated in the CCC's Town Planning branch. Writing in 
t 
their personal capacities, they took issue with the claim 
that LUPO embodied devolution of powers. They pointed out 
that nearly all the major powers conferred in terms of LUPO 
were subject to review by the Administrator, including the 
approval of rezon-ings·, subdivisions, departures, deemed 
zoning and any decision or action of a council. Only a few 
minor powers were non-reviewable. This form of 
decentralisation was in fact a form of delegation rather 
than devolution. The power to review any decision or action 
was retained by the Administrator, who could direct the 
council to act, or could act for it as the case may be. 
There were also a number of powers which were not delegated. 
The Administrator's control over local authority planning 
and policy was extended through his powers to approve or 
reject structure plans. In respect of appeals, he had wide-
ranging powers to overturn local authorities' decisions. 
The authors argued that this power of interven~ion had 
the effect of nullifying the powers delegated to local 
authorities. There were also a number of planning functions 
retained by other government agencies. For example, even 
though local authorities now had responsibility for 
preparing a structure plan, they had to conform to the 
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DCDP's guide plans for the area (Ketelbey and Commins, 1985 
: 45-48). It is concluded that, apparently "delegation of 
powers to local authorities under the LUPO does not 
effectively grant them greater freedom to decide or to act" 
(Ketelbey and Commins, 1985: 47). This was also the 
official CCC response. An official CCC document concurred 
with this interpretation of events, pointing out that only a 
few development control powers had been delegated (CCC, 
1987B : 12). 
.. 
The succ·essful implementation of LUPO was predicated 
upon local authorities drawing up their own structure plans. 
However, a number of local authorities including the CCC 
had, by 1988, not yet done this. By this time the City had 
committed itself to public participation in future 
development. This would involve getting public input before 
producing structure plans for different areas. This would 
involve an extended period of consultation. The CPA was, 
however, anxious to delegate powers as soon as possible and 
was contemplating drawing up its own structure plan which 
would give the city new powers but would set the parameters 
for Cape Town's future development (CCC, 1986I : 2-3). 
Accordingly, in 1988, the MEC for Local Government, 
Pieter Schoeman, announced that an inquiry was to be made 
into giving local authorities greater powers regarding sub-
divisions of properties and departures from the zoning· 
scheme. It was announced that the intention was to ensure 
that the Administrator would retain the right only to 













applications had, in terms of LUPO, to be referred to him 
(Cape Times, 22/7/1988). This was a tacit admission on the 
part of the CPA that LUPO was not as decentralised as 
initiallr claimed. 
In terms of CPA circular Go'K/LDC 9/1988 (CPA, 1988C) , 
the Administrator approved a general structure plan for the 
Cape Province which authorised local authorities, with 
effect from 1/1/1989, to grant or refuse ·zoning applications 
with the exception of the following cases: 
a) any rezoning of which a state institution, including a 
Management Committee, is not in favour; 
b) any rezoning below the one-in-50-year floodline, unless 
an approved structure plan exists for the relevant 
area; 
c) any rezoning of a public open space where an 
appropriate structure plan has not.been approved by the 
Administrator; 
d) any rezoning of land within parameters of the high-
water mark for which a permit is required in terms of 
the Environmental Conservation Act; 
e) any rezoning which is inconsistent with another 
structure plan applicable to the area concerned, which 
has been approv.ed by. the Administrator; 
f) any rezoning permitting the development without flats 
and/or town-houses (groups of dwelling houses) in a low 
density single residential area . 
. In addition, the Administrator retained his right to 
adjudicate on appeals from applicants or objectors. 
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According to a senior CPA official, 90% of the 
Administrator's powers were delegated to local authorities 
in terms of this structure plan. However, it is important 
to note that the CPA's intention was to delegate all the 
powers that were not very important. Decisions in respect 
of important items and appeals were still handled by the 
Administrator. The CCC does not consider that it has 
received major powers in land use planning (Interviews with 
Clive Keegan, Chairman CCC Town Planning Committee and 
senior CCC planner, 1990). A senior CPA official agreed 
with this interpretation, explaining that the reason for 
these delegated powers was primarily administrative 
convenience. The planning section had assumed control of 
Black local government affairs in 1986 and it found itself 
with insufficient staff to perform its functions. The 1988 
structure plan must be seen very much in the context of 
trying to delegate certain minor powers in order to speed up 
the workflow at CPA's town planning branch (Interview with 
senior CPA planner, 1990). 
However, the CCC is also responsible to a certain 
extent for the fact that few substantive powers have been 
delegated to it. The fact that it had not drawn up a city-
wide structure plan meant that substantive powers could not 
be delegated. The CPA circular in this regard stated that 
local authorities should proceed with the preparation of 
structure plans because this might result in councils 
obtaining more powers (CPA, GDK/LDC 9/1988C). The CCC did 
















referred to the Administrator. This request was on the 
grounds that the city was a large local authority with 
extensive expertise in its town planning branch (with more 
than 40 planners it is the biggest local authority town 
planning branch in the country), which was more than 
equipped to handle these functions. However this request 
was turned down by the CPA. .Its viewpoint was that this 
structure plan was intended to be a uniform document 
applicable to all local authorities for an interim period of 
five years. It would be difficult to administer if there 
were exceptions. At the end of 1993 this structure plan 
would lapse. By that time the CCC should have drawn up its 
own structure plan which would have allowed it to receive 
more substantive delegations (Interview with senior CCC 
planners and senior CPA planner, 1991). 
9.6.1 Cape Town city council/Cape Provincial 
Administration· Intergovernmental Relations 
All appeals in respect of land use planning are handled in 
the following way: If there is an appeal, the CCC's 
documentation as well as the objections must be submitted to 
the Administrator. Senior planning staff of the physical 
planning branch go out to examine the erf concerned. In 
addition, all views of interested parties are thoroughly 
canvassed. The senior planning staff then ma~e recommend-
ations which are submitted to EXCO. The Administrator, 
after consultation with EXCO, then makes the final decision 
(Interviews with senior CPA and CCC officials, 1990). 
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How has the delegation of planning power affected the 
intergovernmental relations between the CCC and CPA? From 
1986 until 1988 there was little change in the centralised · 
way in which land use planning issues were handled. 1987 
saw a major land use controversy between the CCC and CPA. 
The CCC had turned down an application to rezone a 
residential property for business use for a service station 
in Kenilworth. However, on appeal by the applicant, the 
Administrator rezoned the site without any discussions with 
those affected, without consultation and without calling. for 
objections. This was despite the fact that there was large-
scale resident opposition to business intrusion into the 
area (The Argus, 1/5/1987; Southern Suburbs Tatler, 
24/4/1987). After vociferous resistance to this decision 
the CCC went to the Supreme Court and won an uncontested 
victory (by this time, however, ·the CPA had withdrawn its 
decision) . The applicant then relaunched its application, 
the CCC turned it down again and the CPA overruled its 
decision once more. This matter was eventually resolved 
when the Caltex Oil Co. bought the property and decided not 
to rezone (Southern Suburbs Tatler, 25/2/1988; Cape Times, 
4/12/1987 and 16/12/1987). There were also other occasions 
when the CCC was vetoed on zoning issues (Cape Times, 
2/6/1988). 
The Kenilworth garage incident can, however, be 
considered a. turning point in respect of appeals. It caused 
a great deal of rancour in ccc circles. The ccc and CPA 
subsequently decided that when there were appeals the MEC 
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,for Local Government, Pieter Schoeman, and the chairman of 
the CCC Town Planning Committee, Clive Keegan, would go on 
site visits together. These two politicians developed quite 
a good rapport with appeals matters also often being 
discussed informally between them over the telephone. After 
this relations improved and the CPA became more receptive to 
the CCC's views when it came to appeals. In line with this 
shift towards a regulatory approach, the CPA sided with the 
CCC on most of these appeals. If an appeal was upheld, ,full 
reasons for the decision were given to the CCC. Notwith-
standing this, it must be reiterated that the Administrator 
still retained most of the important final decision-making 
powers. 
9.6.2 The Transfer of Planning Powers 
to the House of Assembly 
On 1/4/1989 certain planning powers were transferred to the 
Local Government Department, House of Assembly, in terms of 
the 'general affairs'/'own affairs' formula. This formula 
affected the CCC's area of jurisdiction in the following 
way: 
i) All the Administrator's planning powers in respect of 
White residential areas were to be transferred to the 
House, of Assembly. 
ii) All planning powers in respect of Coloured and Indian 
residential areas were to be retained by the CPA. 
iii) All planning powers in respect of White CBDs and 
industrial areas were to be transferred to the House of 
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Assembly (CPA diagram, 1989B; Department of Local 
Government, House of Assembly, 1989). 
The transfer of CBDs in particular must be considered 
rather surprising because of the fact that the city is a. 
free-trading area where Blacks, Coloureds and Indians may 
trade. In addition, thousands of members of these groups 
commute and.work there. A similar argument, albeit to a 
lesser extent, can be made about industrial areas. In any 
event, approximately 80% of planning functions were 
transferred to this Own Affairs Department. 
This also means there are now two LUPO provincial 
ordinances; one for 'general affairs' and one for 'own 
affairs'. The White own Affairs Department soon amended 
their ordinance. While it was a procedural change to give 
the Department greater powers to introduce regulations in 
terms of appeals, it soon became apparent that this · 
duplication had the potential to become an administrative 
nightmare for everyone concerned. There is now a joint CPA/ 
Own Affairs liaison working committee on land use planning 
to ensure that changes to the.ordinance are done jointly 
(Interviews with senior officials CPA and Department of 
Local Government, House of Assembly, 1990). 
9.6.3 House of Assembly/Cape Town City council 
Intergovernmental Relations 
In practice, 90% of CCC appeals are now handled by this 
I 
White Minister's Council. It follows the same procedure as 
the CPA did for considering appeals, the only difference 
being that the Ministerial Representative and not the 
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Administrator has the final decision. Although this thesis 
only covers nine months of this new relationship, one can 
already suggest that this White Own Affairs Department's 
attitude to planning is different from the CPA's and is out 
of step with the government's supposed policy of devolution. 
The Department of Local Government's mode of supervision is 
promotional. Its attitude towards local authorities·is 
similar to the style of supervision used by the CPA up to 
the mid-1980s (s.ee 9. 3 CCC/CPA Hierarchical Relations). 
On what basis is this allegation made? This Department 
is constantly upholding appeals against local authorities' 
zoning decisions. This Department has however also aban-
doned the joint site-visit mechanism that the CCC and CPA 
used in respect of appeals. Its viewpoint is that such 
visits are a violation _of the audi alterem partem rule. It 
felt that it would be illegal to have a joint visit with 
only one of the parties concerned in an appeal (Interview 
with Department of Local Government: House of Assembly 
officials, 1990). 
Furthermore, no .reasons were furnished to the CCC for 
the upholding of appeals. According to a CCC official, one 
out of every two appeals is upheld by the Ministerial 
Representative, who has the final say in this regard. This 
has caused a great deal of disquiet among members of the 
CCC. Chairman of the CCC's Town Planning Committee, Clive 
Keegan has stated, in response to this spate of upheld 
appeals, that "we are obviously powerless to do anything and 
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have just become feeble, emasculated rubber·stamps" (The 
Argus, 25/10/90). 
Why is the Department adopting such a centralist 
attitude? Three possible reasons can be suggested. 
Firstly, because of its apartheid orientation, the Depart-
ment is more likely to have attracted staff of a 
conservative bent, who are steeped in the traditional 
bureaucratic centralist attitude to local authorities. 
However, there is no conclusive evidence to support this 
claim. Secondly, it is a muscle-flexing exercise. The 
Department is a new creation and it is attempting to assert 
its authority on local authorities through these centralist 
actions. This argument is plausible to a certain extent. 
It is much smaller than the CPA, and some of these actions 
can be attributed to attempts to elevate this 'own affairs' 
structure to the same level as its 'general affairs' 
counterparts. It is trying to show local authorities that 
it is a new force that must be reckoned with. 
The third argument suggests that the reason for this 
centralist approacfi has not to do with any ulterior motive, 
but relates to the lack of· competent planners to handle 
these functions.. It was mentioned by a number of inter-
viewees that although 80% of the CPA's land use planning 
functions were transferred to the own Affairs Department, 
this was not matched by a concomitant transfer of staff. 
The latter body only had two planners transferred to it, 
while the CPA retained more than 20 planners on its 













was senior staff. The position is that these planners are 
hopelessly overburdened with work; they have not got the 
time to review each appeal· properly. These centralist 
decisions must therefore be seen as being just as much due 
to this inadequacy as to a muscle-flexing exercise. 
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What were the reasons for.this? Firstly, these powers 
were transferred in great haste. There had not been suf-
ficient systematic investigation into which· functions should. 
be transferred. It was felt in government circles at the 
time, most forcefully by Minister Heunis, that these powers 
had to be trans.f.erred as soon as possible to embody the 'own 
affairs' component of the constitution. 14 Secondly, there 
was a great deal of opposition within the CPA to the trans-
fer of such powers for empire building reasons. 15 The 
structure of the South African public service is such that 
senior posts depend on the number of subordinate staff there 
are. If a substantial number of personnel were transferred 
this would have reduced the staff establishment and led to 
the abolition of certain senior posts and reduced the 
prospects for promotion generally. The investigation into 
which functions could not be transferred was also carried 
out internally by the CPA's Organisation and Workstudy 
Department (although it was subject to final approval by the 
Commission for Administration). It is then perhaps not 
surprising that insufficient staff were transferred. 
In conclusion, there has been a certain amount of 
decentralisation of planning powers to the CCC. However, 
these powers are neither major in content nor devolved in 
nature. It was pointed out (in 3.4 Functions) that the more 
relevant functions (those that can be performed in either a 
devolved or deconcentrated/delegated fashion) that are 
handled by devolved methods, the greater the extent of 
decentralisation. In the case of land use planning, what 
powers have been decentralised to local authorities have 
been of the delegated variety. Most of the important powers 
are still held by the Administrator, which is a form of 
deconcentration, the weakest form of decentralisation. 
Also, the Administrator and the White Ministerial 
Representative have the right to hear appeals against CCC 
planning decisions. The centralist attitude of the latter 
has, in particular, made a mockery of the government's much 
vaunted policy of devolution. 
9.6.4 other central Government Controls 
Guide plans control the extent of land use .which is poten-
tially available for development in respect of industrial 
activities, urban development and non-urban areas such as 
agriculture and environmental resource and amenity. They 
are binding on all private and public sector bodies (CCC, 
1989C: 12) .. It was pointed out (in 4.5.2 Central State 
Controls) that central government controlled local 
authorities' planning through the formulation of binding 
guide plans. No land could be rezoned for industrial use 
without state approval. To_rezone land for industrial areas 
the CCC had to get special permission from the Minister of 
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secondly, to rezone land. This was a highly time-consuming 
process with no guarantee of the rezoning being granted. 
It was also pointed out that the Cape Metropolitan Area 
Guideplan of 1977 in respect of the Cape Peninsula was 
wedded· to apartheid premises. This guide plan was amended 
in 1984, but not substantially changed. It was still 
underpinned by apartheid legislation such as Influx Control 
and the Group Areas Act. Its aim was still to force 
industrial decentralisation to Atlantis, a Coloured re-
settlement area in the Western Cape, by contr.olling the 
amount of industrial land available to local authorities in 
the area (RSA, DCDP, Draft Guideplan Cape Metropolitan Area, 
1984). 
The CCC objected to this and made recommendations to 
the Cape Metropolitan Guideplan Committee. In particular it 
objected to the Group Areas Act underpinning the guide plan. 
It also wanted devolution of powers to local authorities on 
all decisions affecting land use planning and implement-
ation. This request was turned down by Minister Heunis on 
the grounds that the Council's recommendations to the 
committee were based on "ideological reasons" {Cape Times, 
8/2/1985) . 
The Abolition of Influx Control Act of 1986 rendered 
certain of the Metropolitan Guideplan's provisions out of 
date. It was accordingly amended again in 1988. However, 
central control over industrial rezoning still remained. 
The report still laid a high emphasis on the development of 
Atlantis as an industrial area (CCC, 1989C). 
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There are also other important functions that affect 
land use planning and that are still controlled by central 
government, such as the power to set urbanisation policy and 
to establish legislation in this regard (CCC, 1987B: 12). 
9.6.5 western Cape Regional Services council 
Planning Powers 
The WCRSC has also assumed certain planning powers. It is . 
responsible for ensuring that any changes in the land use in 
the Cape Metropolitan Guide Plan are consistent with the 
guidelines laid down therein. All land use development of a 
regional nature must accordingly be considered by the WCRSC 
{CCC, 1989C: 5; WCRSC, 1990). The chairman of the CCC's 
Town Planning Committee, Clive Keegan, is concerned that 
these powers are going to erode the CCC's autonomy. Appli-
cations by the private sector for amendments to the guide 
plan now go directly to the WCRSC; consent is not needed by 
the CCC for such rezonings within its area of jurisdiction. 
There has already been one such case and the fear is that 
this type of application will increase and accordingly 
further circumscribe the CCC's autonomy {Interview with 
Clive Keegan, 1990). 
9 • 7 PERSONNEL 
9.7.1 The Municipal Service commission 
It was pointed out (in 7.5 Remuneration of Town Clerks Act) 
that the government had assumed.control of the remuneration 
packages of senior officials in local authorities to such an 
extent that the personnel system that now existed was a 










over and above these centralist measures, there was also a 
sui generis piece of legislation which further eroded the · 
CCC's autonomy in respect of its personnel practices. This 
will now.be examined. 
The Diemont Commission of Enquiry into the Adminis-
tration of the Town Planning Scheme of the CCC in 1963 found 
that thera were certain irregularities in the staffing 
practices of the municipality. This came about as a result 
of the blurring of executive and legislative functions under 
the Multiple Committee structure (see 4.4.2 Urban Local 
Authorities) whichw-as then utilised by the CCC. 
Councillors were involved in the actual running of staff 
affairs of the CCC, and it gave them much scope to influence 
staff appointments. The Commission recommended that an 
independent investigation be instituted with the view to 
arriving at the best form of local government for the city. 
This led to CPA appointing the Slater Commission to 
investigate the functioning of the CCC's organisational 
structure. Slater found that this system gave the council 
almost unfettered power over staff, a situation which 
allowed for some dubious staff practices and was the cause 
of much dissatisfaction amongst employees (CPA, de Klerk, 
1975 : 31-6). 
Many of Slater's recommendations pertaining to staff 
matters were embodied in the Cape Town Municipal Ordinance 
24 of 1965 (which replaced ·the Multiple Committee with the 
Management Committ'ee system - see 4.4.2 Urban Local 
Authorities). Provision was made for a three-person MSC, 
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with the Administrator appointing the members from a list 
submitted by the CCC (CPA,.de Klerk, 1975 : 7-8). However, 
the powers of the MSC were limited. Accordingly, a great 
deal of conflic.t c;>f functions developed between MSC on the 
one hand and councillors and officials on the other. There 
was a general non-acceptance of the system by the CCC. who 
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felt it had been imposed upon them. In addition, the system 
was rather cumbersome. The MSC was a part-time commission 
and this, along with the elaborate process that 
had to be 
followed, led to lengthy delays when appointing 
staff (CPA, 
de Klerk, 1975 . 22-25). . 
As a result of these problems, the de Klerk 
Commission 
was appointed by the CPA in 1975 to investigate the 
functioning of the MSC. The Commission made a number of 
recommend~tions, inter alia, that the MSC should be a full-
time body (to obviate time delays) , that a senior person of 
the CCC's staff should be appointed as chairman of the MSC 
(to give it more credibility), and that union represent-
atives should be members of the Commission (as a result of 
representations from the CCC unions, south African 
Association of Municipal Employees [cited hereafter as 
SAAME] and Cape Town Municipal Workers Association [cited 
hereafter as CTMWA]) (CPA, de Klerk, 1975 : 26-33}. 
It took the CPA six years to act on these recommend-
ations. When they eventually did in 1981, it was in a way 
that eroded CCC autonomy. The exclusive right to appoint 
and dismiss staff was removed from the CCC. Legislation was 









appointed chairman of the MSC. The MSC was vested with the 
powers to make appointments and promotions up to a certain 
salary level. Senior promotions were, however, decided by 
the EXCO and the Town Clerk was appointed by general 
council. Provision was also made for one representative of 
the CCC, one from SAAME and one from CTMWA on the MSC. 
These representatives were chosen·by the Administrator from 
a short list prepared by these organisations. If the 
Administrator was not satisfied with the names on the list 
he could forward his own nominees. Although the CCC was 
respons.ible for. the remuneration of this of.f.icial he/she 
could be dismissed only by the Administrator (CPA, Municipal 
Amendment Ordinance, No. 6 of 1981). 
Why was the MSC amended in this centralist manner? The 
reasons were outlined by the MEC for Local Government, 
Hernus Kriel, when he introduced this legislation in the 
Provincial Council. He accused the CCC of inefficient 
administration and of discriminating .against Afrikaans-
speaking people, pointing out that only 6,9% of the top 
posts in the CCC were filled by this group (Cape Provincial 
Debates, 13/8/1981 : Col. 1980). 
Besides these specific reasons there were also more 
general reasons. As pointed out (in 9.3 CCC/CPA 
Hierarchical Relations) Kriel's tenure as MEC for Local 
.Government was characterised by the diminution of CCC's 
autonomy. At that stage the CCC was regarded by the 
government as a danger~usly 'radical' local authority whose 
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wings had to be trimmed accordingly; the legislation must 
be seen in this light. 
The CCC protested vigorously against what they regarded 
as unsubstantiated allegations together with this new 
centralist legislation. However, this was to no avail and 
this new ordinance was pushed through. This made Cape Town 
unique in that it became the only local authority whose 
employer/ employee relationships are largely managed by an 
Administrator-appointed body16 (Craythorne, 1982 : 369). 
The first and only occupant 0£ the post was Dr L. Fick, 
an erstwhile colleague of the MEC at the conservative CDC~ 
Kriel had been chairman of the CDC before he. went into 
politics, while Fick was in charge of the personnel section 
(Cameron, 1986B: 69). 
The CCC, however, never accepted the legitimacy of this 
system. It was also not happy with certain aspects of the 
operation of the MSC. For example, the CCC felt that the 
MSC got involved in too many matters that could have been 
·left to line management (CCC EXCO Minutes, 1985A). Certain 
of the CCC's departments were also unhappy about the nature 
of appointments that had been made. The CCC had already 
made an abortive attempt to get rid of the MSC in 1985. 
As a result of further representations from the CCC in 
the late 1980s, the CPA set up the Hugo Commission of 
Inquiry in order to ascertain whether or not there was still 
justification for its continued existence. Its findings 
were, firstly, that comprehensive regulations in the field 











any policy considerations nor legal warrant for provincial 
legislation to cover the same field of employer/ employee 
relations. These developments in labour relations included 
the abolition of job reservation, the opening up of labour 
unions and the system of negotiation to all workers, the 
establishment of an Industrial Court and the adoption of the 
. ,. 
concept of "unfair labour practice" as a framework within 
which both workers and employers would be able to formulate 
their complaints (CCC, EXCO Minutes, S/8/1989A). 
The report also said that the operation of a service 
commission as an independent element 'in the municipal 
administration, owing no responsibility or accountability to 
the elected councillors or the rate-paying public for its 
operation in the staff field (which amounted to 40% of 
budgeted operating expenditure), was not sound in principle. 
This recommendation would be in line with the government's 
devolution of power· policy, the spirit of which was 
beginning to permeate down to the CPA at the time. It has 
already been pointed out that the CPA was shifting from a 
promotional towards a regulatory mode of control over local 
authorities. Another finding was that the service com-
mission had failed to achieve the objectives contemplated 
when it was first introduced. This implied that the MSC had 
not led to more efficient administration (CCC EXCO Minutes, 
8/8/1989A) . 
The report recommended that the CPA negotiate the 
establishment of an Industrial Council with staff 
associations. In the interim and with effect from 1/1/1990, 
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the Town Clerk was to,take over all the functions and powers 
of the MSC (CCC EXCO Minutes, 8/8/1989A). 
How can the MSC be evaluated? Its operation, as Donald 
Craythorne (1982 : 369) pointed out, 
in effect allows the provincial author-
ities to politicise the·cape Town municipal 
service, to give secret orders on the recruitment 
of sta£f to the commissioners, and to destroy the 
governing power of the city council. 
Did the MSC in practice, however, operate as a 'Trojan 
ho·rse-' undermining the autonomy of the CCC? The answer is 
inconclusive. It was pointed out that MSC control over 
certain senior appointments is limited. The chairman was 
also sometimes outvoted by the other three MSC represent-
atives. Nevertheless, being chairman of the MSC was a 
pivotal and rather influential position. Fick was the only 
full-time representative and had greater specialist know-
ledge of personnel practices than his MSC colleagues. He 
was partly responsible for the influx of Afrikaans-speakers 
into the CCC in the 1980s, particularly at management level. 
However, such appointments could have been made purely on 
merit. 
The chairman also met periodically with the Adminis-
trator. One does not know if any secret o~ders were given 
at these meetings (Cameron~ 1986B 69-75). However, 
according to a senior CPA official, these meetings no longer 
took place in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, despite how 
this system actually functioned in practice, its existence 
per se must be considered a serious brake on the CCC's 
autonomy in that the CCC had no say over Fick's appointment 
and continued employment, nor his ability to influence the 
staff composition of the council. 
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What about the United Nations argument that, in terms 
of a separate personnel model, central government inter-
vention is needed to ensure the efficient operation of local 
authorities' personnel systems? (see 7.5 Remuneration 0£ 
Town Clerks Act) . It is fair to say that the inefficient 
functioning of the CCC's personnel system was the initial 
precipitant for CPA control. It can also be cogently argued 
that this system has led to the elimination of the 
bottlenecks that used to occur at the MSC and that union 
representation has safeguarded the rights of the workers to 
a certain extent. 
It can, however, be argued that United Nations control 
was referring primarily to control of an indirect kind. The 
type of system that the CCC had in the 1980s was 
characterised by 'hands-on' provincial intervention. While 
some intervention was possibly justified to improve the 
CCC's personnel practices; th~ CPA's measures went far 
beyond the indirect setting of procedures and norms 
advocated by the United Nations. The introduction of the 
MSC must be considered as the imposition of aspects of the 
more centralised unified model on the CCC (see 3.2.3 Unified 
System) . 
9.7.2 Effect of Remuneration of Town Clerks Act 
on the cape Town city council 
How did the introduction of the Remuneration of Town Clerks 
Act, which introduced elements of the centralised integrated 
model, affect the CCC? (see 7.5 The Remuneration of Town 
Clerks Act). The 92,5% clause did not cause much changing 
of grading of senior offic~als as the CCC's salaries were 
roughly in accordance with what the Act proposed. The 
linking of remuneration and service benefits of the town 
clerk (and indirectly ot' senior local government officials) 
to those of Deputy Director-Generals in the public service 
has caused certain problems in that the public service 
{unlike CCC personnel regulations) does not make provision 
for paying out of leave on pension. Local authorities were 
entitled to pay out salaries in lieu of leave in terms of 
the Labour Relations Act. The CCC has in the interim worked 
its way around the Remuneration Act by paying out staff who 
were appointed before the introduction of this legislation. 
In the long term, however, the Act will cause local 
authorities to change this system (Interview with senior CCC 
official, 1990). 
9.7.3 Effect of Training Board Activities 
on the cape Town city council 
The Training Board's activities have been rather low profile 
in the region (see 7.10 Local Government Training Act for a 
description of the structure and functioning of the Training 
Board). One interviewee called it a "talking shop". A 
number of CCC representatives and officials were on the 
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Government, which identified training needs for the region. 
Dr Fick, chairman of the MSC 1 .was also chairman of the Sub-
Regional Training Committee. There was an attempt by the 
committee to establish regional training facilities for 
' 
local authorities; however, this never got off the ground. 
The CPA objected to this proposed.regional training facility 
because it was largely seen as a CCC initiative and the CCC 
was seen as "politically unacceptable to Afrikaa~s-speaking 
municipalities in the region 11 (Interview with senior CCC 
official, 1990). As a result the CCC has limited 
involvement in Training Board acti,vities.. It has a well-
established training section of its own where its personnel 
receive in-house training. · 
The Western Cape Sub-Regional Training Committee has 
five full-time training officers at its disposal and also 
employs consultants from the private sector. Training 
programmes are provided for local authorities which do not 
have their own training facilities, such as smaller White 
municipalities and BLAs.. The committee has, however, 
insufficient staff and finance at its disposal to run 
training programmes in a comprehensive fashion. 
The CCC (as a result of Dr Fick's instigation) has 
submitted some courses to the Training Board's Evaluation 
Committee for approval but most of them have not been 
accepted. Initially, all courses registered in terms of the 
Manpower Act were granted automatic approval. However, this 
was soon changed because it was felt that not all of these 
courses were appropriate to local government. The CCC now 
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had to submit all its courses to the Training Board if it 
wanted reimbursement. The reason that these courses fell 
foul of the Evaluation committee is that they did hot meet 
the strict procedural norms that were required for approval 
of courses (Interviews with senior CCC official, 1990 and 
Western Cape Sub-Regional Training Committee Training 
Officer, 1991). 
9.7.4 Elected councillors 
The fact that CCC councillors are directly elected, as 
opposed to being indirectly appointed by a higher tier of 
government, is in itself conducive to decentralisation (see 
3.4 Other Personnel Indices). Although the Administrator 
has the power to dismiss councillors who fail to carry out 
the provisions of lawful legislation or regulatio~s, this 
has not been used against the CCC (or any other local 
authority [see 7.13 Cape Municipal Amendment Ordinance, No. 
3 of 1986]) . 
9.8 THE CAPE TOWN CITY COUNCIL'S LOCAL OPTION 
During the formulation stage of local government policy the 
CCC submitted numerous recommendations to state departments 
and government commissions. The constant threads running 
through these submissions were, firstly, the rejection of 
statutory racial separation at local level. The CCC's 
policy was that all owners and occupiers of immovable 
property should be able to vote for and stand for council. 
It was also opposed to the fragmentation of its municipal 
area into ethnic local authorities (CCC, 1981A: 9-10). 
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Secondly, it rejected the RSC system primarily because 
it was based on apartheid structures, and because it was 
felt that its introduction would lead to an erosion of its 
powers and functions (Cameron, 1986B : 259-261) . It called 
for the establishment of structures.flexible enough to take 
cognisance of local conditions (Cameron, 1986B: 228). This 
section will briefly look at how CCC's attempts to be 
allowed to adopt more liberal policies in· the form of a 
local option fared-
The motivation for the CCC's local option was the 
pending introduction o.f RSCs. The first instalment -of 'own 
affairs' in late 1985, in the form of House of 
Representatives-administered education, saw school boycotts 
in protest against LP policy, which subsequently turned into 
insurrection in the streets. Tourism, the lifeblood of the 
Western Cape economy, suffered severely in the context of an 
already stagnating regional economy. For a number of CCC's 
councillors it became paramount to ensure that RSCs, 
underpinned by unrepresen~ative Black, Indian and Coloured 
local authorities, were not introduced in the region. They 
feared that its introduction would also lead to political 
unrest (Cameron, 1987 : 66). 
Attempts to organise a local option in the region had 
already been initiated in May 1985. At the annual CCC 
meeting, a motion·was proposed by Councillor Joan Kantey, 
calling on EXCO to consider approaching neighbouring local 
authorities and civic organisations for discussions about 
constitutional alternatives for the region. Kantey was 
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subsequently authorised by EXCO to examine the feasibility 
of setting up a broadly based commission on local government 
in the Cape Peninsula along the lines of the Buthelezi 
Commission in Natal (The Argus, 26/7/1985). 
Two months later at an informal meeting attended by 
certain councillors, academics and local businessmen, it was 
decided that such a commission should be established under 
the auspices of a public authority with credibility in the 
Black community, like the CCC. The group felt that all 
local organisations and groups with public standing should 
be represented on the commission and proposals should be 
directed towards the community of Cape Town rather than the 
government (CCC workshop, 20/7/1985). 
Violence then erupted on Cape Town's streets. The CCC 
then opened up a second initiative, embarking on a "call for 
dialogue". The mayor and chairman of EXCO were directed to 
invite civics and other organised community groups to submit 
their views on subjects ranging from the most appropriate 
system of local government for metropolitan Cape Town, the 
municipal franchise and the proposed RSC, to matters 
associated with the unrest (The Argus, 17/8/1985). 
The report was released in July 1986. It stated that 
there was "virtually unanimous" support among civic and 
other political associations for the council's stance on an 
apartheid-free local option for the city. Virtually every-
one who submitted evidence called for a common voters' roll 





















Meanwhile, as a result ·of Kantey's initiative and in an 
attempt to halt the "escalating violence and the alarming 
deterioration of race relations" in the region, the CCC's 
constitutional committee (an ad hoc sub-committee) was 
requested to convene a Cape Metropolitan Peace Conference 
"that would draw up a manifesto for non-racial democratic 
local government" (The Argus, 31/10/1985 and 11/11/1985). A 
motion was passed to invite all sections of the community to 
meet with the council and find solutions to the crisis. The 
constitutional committee was given approval to establish a 
secretariat for the peace initiative, expand its membership 
for appointing councils, co-opt special advisers and. 
investigate ways of raising funds to finance the initiative 
(The Argus,. 3/12/1985). 
The former leader of the PFP, Dr Frederik van Zyl 
Slabbert, was offered and accepted the position of 
facilitator to promote the aims of the conference. His role 
was to attempt to get as many leaders as possible from all 
disparate groups in the region (Cape Town Bulletin, 
September 1986 : 2). At the end of 1986 Slabbert submitted 
an interim report in which he stated that he had made 
exploratory contact with a number of community organisations 
(Interview, 1986). 
In January 1987, however, Slabbert advised the CCC to 
place the initiative in cold storage. The major reason was. 
that the State of Emergency had decimated community 
organisations. Such leaders were either detained or in 
hiding. Secondly, given the tight higher-tier control, 
l 
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there was the feeling that the CCC did not have the 
capability to deliver a non-racial local government system 
(Hendricks, 1987 : 6). The initiative was then temporarily 
shelved by the CCC and it did not surface again during the 
rest of the 1980s. 
Part of this local option strategy involved lobbying 
the central government. The CCC opposed provisions of the 
Promotion of Local Government Affairs Amendment Bill of 1983 
because it involved centralisation of power and entrenchment 
of ethnicity. It sent a delegation to the Minister of DCDP 
to discuss the provisions of this bill and to ask whether it 
could be allowed to adopt its policy. They were strongly 
rebuked by the Minister, being told their policy of non-
racial representation could not be considered as this was· 
contrary to government policy. Such requests should have 
been conveyed through the correct channels, viz. Cape 
Provincial Municipal Association (cited hereafter as CPMA) 
and UME, which had already accepted this legislation (CCC 
EXCO Minutes, 28/6/1983). 
Four years later the CCC approached the Minister again 
for another meeting, this time with a delegation consisting 
of CCC representatives, local businessmen and academics, to 
discuss delaying the introduction of the RSC and to talk 
about a local option for the Western Cape. Minister Heunis 
turned down the request flat, saying that the RSC Act had 
been preceded by "many years of investigations and consult-
ations with all the parties concerned" and that the Western 









The CCC also attempted to lobby the Administrator. It 
wrote to him requesting a meeting to discuss the possibility 
of a local option. He responded by saying such a request 
was fut\le because it was contrary to government policy and 
\ 
that RSCs were fait accompli (CCC EXCO Minutes, 15/l/1986B). 
The CCC had not fared much better through the conduit 
of CPMA. At the CPMA congress in 198-4, it tried to raise 
its objections to the new racially-based .local government 
dispensation, but was.prevented from doing so by CPMA 
president Dr T.G. Schlebusc~, who said it was not for the 
congress_ to. enter .into political discussions. The CCC's was· 
the only objection to the new constitutional set-up at the 
conference (The Argus, 2/5/1984). 
At the 1986 CPMA congress the CCC tried to drum up 
support for local o.ptions as a substitute for RS Cs. There 
was, however, little support for the CCC's position. 
Despite its opposition, a ~otion was passed accepting the 
RSCs ~s a starting point for evolutionary. reform (Cape 
Times, 21/4/1986). 
Three indices of the framework of analysis are useful 
when analysing the CCC's local option endeavours. Firstly, 
it was pointed out (in 3.7 Hierarchical Relations) that the 
ultra vires doctrine can be highly restrictive. This is 
clearly the position in South Africa. This case study is a 
good illustration of how local authorities have been allowed 
little leeway to adopt structures of their own choice. 
Furthermore, because of apartheid, the application of 
ultra vires .doctrine in South Africa is more restrictive 
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than in most other countries that have this system. Its 
application has not just meant that local authorities could 
only perform functions or adopt management structures 
authorised by a higher tier of government. It has also 
meant that local bodies have been forced to have segregated 
voters' rolls and racially fragmented local authorities. 
They have alsd had the pattern of their residential 
neighbourhoods demarcated for them on a racial basis by the 
central government, artd major invasions of autonomy in 
respect of African administration. 
The other component of the framework that is of 
relevance is the question of access; viz. th.e ability of 
local government to penetrate national policy-making (see 
3.3 Access). As this case study has shown, the CCC had 
little influence on national policy-making. The reason is 
that, although ostensibly non-party-political, the CCC has 
traditionally pursued liberal anti-apartheid policies. It 
is also a predominantly English-speaking institution in that 
the majority of its councillors and employees are English-
speaking (Cameron, 1986B: 36-45). This English anti-
apartheid ins ti tut ion has, perhaps rather sel f·-evidently, 
had little influence on the Afrikaans-dominated NP, whose 
new local government system of the 1980s was premised on 
neo-apartheid. Conversely, the CCC's policy has raised the 
ire of the NP and has strengthened government attempts to 
curb its autonomy. 
The CCC's limited influence on CPMA has already been 
pointed out. At the time it was trying to engender support 
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for its local option, most Cape local authorities were NP-
controlled.17 Accordingly, its endeavours received little 
sympathy. While the CCC's attempts have had little 
influence on the political aspects of policy, it has had a 
certain amount of influence through its technocrats (also 
see 3.3 Access) on some of the more technical aspects of 
policy. For example, the City Engineer's Report on 
metropolitanisation was used by the CPA when it was drawing 
up the Western Cape RSC. This was, however, only in respect 
of technical regional planning issues18 (Cameron, 19868 : 
25"9) • 
Thirdly, the party politics index (see 3.5 Party 
Politics), although closely linked to that of access, is of 
relevance. The CCC did have a large number of councillors 
who were PFP members and who theoretically could have taken 
up this issue of the CCC's local_ option with national PFP 
representatives in Parliament. . However, the ability of 
anti-apartheid national PFP representatives to persuade the 
NP government to adopt non-racial local government policies 
was non-existent in the 1980s. 
9.9 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it can be said that a certain amount of 
decentralisation of powers to the CCC has occurred. 
However, these powers have by and large not been major in 
nature. In the case of finance, certain minor powers have 
been delegated to local authorities. Offsetting this is 
greater macro-economic control by the Department of Finance 
in the 1980s, particularly in respect of operating expend-
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iture. Furthermore, the inelasticity of its rates base is 
another impediment to CCC's autonomy. It still has a 
reasonable amount of autonomy in terms of the objects on 
which it is allowed to spend its money. 
When it comes to planning, certain minor powers have 
been delegated to local authorities. In addition (depending 
on whether it is a 'general' or 'own' affair) the Adminis-
trator and the Ministerial Representative have the right to 
uphold appeals against local authority decisions. If the 
CCC, however, drew up structure plans for its area of 
jurisdiction, the possibility exists that it could be vested 
with greater powers. Perhaps the most significant piece of 
devolution has been in the field of personnel, where the CCC 
now has the exclusive right to appoint and dismiss its 
staff. Offsetting this is the fact the Remuneration of Town 
Clerks Act has indirectly-linked the remuneration and 
service benefits of all senior officials to those of Deputy 
Director-Generals in the public service. Conversely, in the 
field of constitutional relations, there has been no 
decentralisation of powers at all. The CCC has been allowed 
no leeway to choose a local option system of municipal 
government. 
Finally, in respect of hierarchical relations, it can 
be said the CPA is_ now adopting a more flexible regulatory 
approach towards the CCC but this co-exists with elements of 
its previous promotional approach. The Department of Local 
Government, House of Assembly, however, has a centralist 
promotional approach towards the CCC. 
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CHAPTER X 
CASE STUDY II: ATHLONE AND DISTRICT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Athlone is a Coloured residential area on the Cape Flats, 
within the municipal area of Cape Town. The ADMC was formed 
in 1964. In the 1980s, it was the largest Management 
Committee in the country. 1 Its surface area of 3 120 ha 
encompasses much of the Cape Flats and includes no less than 
six House of Representatives parliamentary seats (Bonte-
heuwel, Hanover Park, Heideveld, Liesbeek, Manenberg and 
Silverton). Its population numbered 214 906 in 1989. It 
has the largest number of low-income council houses in its 
area of jurisdiction. The total number of housing units 
within its area was 35 118 in 1989 (ADMC, 1989) (see 
Annexure D for map). 
Party politics is prominent in ADMC affairs. It was 
LP-controlled throughout the 1980s. Of the four Management 
Committees that the CCC administered throughout the l980s, 2 
ADMC was the one which undoubtedly had the worst relation-
ship with its 'mother' White local authority (see 10.4 
ADMC/CCC Relations : 1980-1984). 
It was pointed out '(in 4.7 Coloured and Indian Local 
Government) that there was opposition to Management 
Committees for a wide variety of reasons. The most 
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important of these were that Management Committees lacked 
executive powers and were apartheid-based structures. In 
the more politicised Cape Flats, where the majority of 
Coloureds live, opposition to these bodies has always beeri 
strong. There exist a number of grassroots-based civic 
associations, commonly known as 'civics', in this area which 
mobilise around local issues. A number of residents use 
these civics, and not Management Committees, through which 
to articulate their grievances (Cameron, 1986B : 113-t14). 
The low level of legitimacy of the.ADMC is reflected in its 
election polls since its establishment (its members were 












Cameron, 1988A 24) . 
Another indication of the low level of support for this 
system is the findings of a survey undertaken by the CCC in 
ADMC's area of jurisdiction. Only 10,5% of respondents 
favoured the Management Committee system compared with 78,3% 
who wanted an integrated council (The Argus, 21/4/1989). 
In this chapter an examination will be undertaken of 
the extent to which power has been decent:r:alised to the 
ADMC. Selected aspects of the framework of analysis will be 
used in this regard. 
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10.2 ACCESS: A CONCEPTUAL. PARADIGM 
It was pointed out (in 2.2. Terminology) that the classical 
English local government model has the following 
characteristics: 
1. Local authorities should be constitutionally separate 
from central government and be responsible for a 
significant range of services. 
2. They should have their own treasury, separate budget 
and accounts and their own taxes to produce a 
substantial part of their revenue. 
3. Local authorities should have their own personnel with 
the right to appoint and dismiss such staff. 
4. Policy should be decided by local c6uncils, pre-
dominantly consisting of elected representatives. 
It is contended that the tricameral system gave these 
Coloured and Indian local structures greater influence. 
Although Management Committees/LACs did not have any of the 
above characteristics, with the exception of part of No. 4 
(these advisory structures being largely elected) the 
concept of access can help clarify this proposition. It is 
the only index of the framework of analysis which is of 
major utility in this chapter. 
Access has been defined as the· ability of local 
government to influence national politicians and policy-
making affecting local authorities (Rhodes, 1980 : 577). 
There are two issues that have to receive attention: 
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(i) How frequent and important are .direct forms of access 
between individual and central actors involving 
bilateral direct relationships .between individual local 
authority actors and central actors? 
( i_i) Do these patterns of access give local government 
privileged access to central government decision-making 
processes? (Rhodes, 1981 : 33; Page and Goldsmith, 
1985 : 8) . (Also see 3.3 Access). 
Herein lies the reason for increased Management Corn-
rnittee/LA.C powers vis-a-vis their mother local authorities. 
Coloureds and Indians now had political representation at 
central level which, as will be shown in this chapter, gave 
the ADMC a cond~it through. which its demands and problems 
could be addressed. 
10.3 THE TRICAMERAL SYSTEM: GREATER ACCESS 
FOR MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES/LACS 
The formation of the Houses of Representatives and Delegates 
in September 1984 gave Management Committees/LA.Cs much 
greater clout in their negotiations with local authorities. 
These local structures now have easy access to Coloured and 
Indian MPs at central level and, at one time, even had 
members in the cabinet taking up the cudgels on their 
behalf. However, access per se is not sufficient to ensure 
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greater influence. It is contended that the reason for this 
greater influence is due to the fact that the interests of 
the government and the Coloured and Indian political parties 
.converged on the issue of giving these local representatives 
greater say in the running of their own areas . 
. From the state's perspective, one of the major aims of 
'Total Strategy' was to strengthen the powers of the White 
minority government by incorporating significant elements of 
the Coloureds and Indians into a multi-racial alliance 
against the force of radicalism. The promotion of Coloured 
and Indian representatives at all levels of government 
accordingly became an important object~ve (see 6.2 Total 
Strategy). 
More specifically, Management Committees/LACs were 
crucial to the extension of ·'own affairs' as well as being 
the building block of RSCs and were consequently promoted by 
the state. 
To understand the perspective of the LP one has to 
examine the close relationship between national MPs and 
Management Committees/LACs. Most Coloured Management 
Committees/LACS are dominated by the LP. Its policy is "to 
keep a tight grip on Management Committees to derive maximum 
political benefit for the party" (Cape Times, 24/6/1985). 
The committees were the powerbase of the party after the 
dissolution o.f the CPRC and many of its MPs graduated from 
their ranks. Minister of Local Goyernment, Agriculture and 
Housing in the House of Representatives, David Curry, was 
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also President of ASSOMAC for a number of years. Until 1988 
a number of Coloured MPs, including Minister Curry and the 
chairman of the Minister's Council of the House of 
Representatives, the Rev. Allan Hendrickse, were 
simultaneously members of Management Committees (see 10.9 
'Two Hats' Phenomenon). All these factors ensured that the 
LP controlled most Coloured third-tier structures in the 
country. 
The thinking of the LP was that the increased powers 
for Management Committees/LACs would give the latter bodies 
greater scope to promote patronage and increasingly broaden 
their support. This would, 'they hoped, lead to greater 
legitimacy for all Coloured (and Indian) participants in 
government structures, given the fact that most Management 
Committees/LACS were controlled by the major political 
parties (Cameron, 1991: 34-35). Various manifestations of 
this greater access will be exa~ined later in this chapter. 
10.4 ATHLONE AND DISTRICT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE/ 
CAPE TOWN CITY COUNCIL RELATIONS: 1980-1984 
Because Management Committees are by law still an integral 
part of the local authority in which they are geographically 
situated, ADMC along with the three other Management 
Committees were controlled and administered by the CCC. 
They had to exercise their functions under the control and 









final decision-making powers. Its function (and that of the 
other three Management Committees) was to promote the 
interests and welfare of the inhabitants of its area by 
bringing matters to the attention of their 'mother' local 
authority. The ADMC had to be consulted on a number of 
issues by the controlling local authority, but the latter 
was under no obligation to heed requests from ADMC or the 
other three committees. 
Despite the fact that the objective of ASSOMAC, viz. 
direct representation on (White) local authorities, is the 
same as the CCC's, the relations between the CCC and its 
committees have often been strained. It was pointed out (in 
4.7 Coloured and Indian Local Government) that until 1971 a 
non-racial voters' roll, albeit based on qualified 
franchise, existed in the Cape. This limited representation 
was effectively ended by provincial legislation in that 
year. The CCC fought tooth and nail against the 
disenfranchisement of Coloureds at local level, without 
success. The council erected a plaque in the entrance foyer 
of the City Hall in dedication to the meritorious services 
rendered to the City of Cape Town by its 'non-white' 
councillors. It also took a 'Day of Vow' pledge that it 
would do everything in its power to get Coloureds back onto 
the roll. It has constantly reaffirmed this pledge and it 
is this Day of Vow that has often dictated its attitude 
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towards Management Committees (Cameron, 1986B 112-113; 
19880 : 55-56). 
Since their introduction the CCC has barely tolerated 
Management Committees, often disregarding regulations 
pertaining to them, or at best· heeding them half-heartedly. 
It has generally regarded these bodies as an extension of 
the apartheid policy that has been imposed upon it. It also 
regards Management Committees as costly, time;...wasting and 
inefficient, arguing that their functioning leads to 
inconsistency, misunderstanding and confrontation (The 
Argus, 20/5/1987). 
The Management Committees, led by ADMC, in turn 
constantly accused the CCC of failing to provide amenities 
and utilities in their areas, of using this 'lily-white' 
attitude to direct representation as an excuse to evade its 
lawful responsibilities. They also accused the ccc of 
keeping them in the dark about policy in their areas. They 
claimed that their recommendations and requests on specific 
items were often ignored, that they were often not advised 
of decisions taken on matters in respect of which they were 
consulted, and that projects were carried out in their areas 
without their being informed. A cardinal issue of 
contention was the CCC's refusal to allow Management· 
Committees permanent representation in respect of their 
areas on CCC standing committees, even on an advisory basis. 
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The CCC argued that to concede to such a request would be a 
'betrayal of its Day of Vow. It maintained that Management 
Committees were treated in exactly the same.way as any 
outside person or body who wished to address a standing 
committee on an issue; viz. by invitation or by a request 
which had to be approved by the respective standing 
committee (CCC, 1978; 1981B; 1981C; 1984B; 1984C) . 3 
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Management Committees have during the years· ceased 
operations and on more than· one occasion suspended relations 
with the CCC because of its alleged non-cooperation. 
Matters between the two bodies reached a nadir in 1981 when 
the SATV allowed Management Committees to make a virulent 
15-minute attack on the CCC's.re£usal to allow them on 
standing committees, while allowing the CCC only two minutes 
to reply. The CCC responded with a full-page statement in 
the newspapers, accusing the Management Committees of ·making 
wild and inaccurate statements (Cape Times, 16/12/1981). 
Management Committees constantly complained to the 
Administrator and on one occasion to the then Minister of 
Internal Affairs, Chris Heunis, 4 about the CCC's attitude. 
The ADMC, being the biggest and largest Management 
Committee, usually took the lead in objecting to the CCC's 
generally scornful attitude to these bodies. over the years 
there was a stream of circular correspondence among the 
Management Committees, the CCC and the CPA. There were also 
meetings between the parties concerned. As a result of 
these representations certain concessions were made by the 
CCC, such as the granting of a monthly liaison meeting 
between EXCO and Management Committees and the creation of 
an extra senior administrative post to liaise with 
Management committees (CCC, 1984B). Further, in 1979 all 
Cape Management Committees were given a. say in the 
preparation and handling of their budgets (SAIRR~ 1978 
24). This was intended to give Management Committees more 
experience in managing their own budgets, and was considered 
a move in the direction of autonomous Coloured local 
authorities. However, this did not confer final decision-
making powers. Their budgets still had to be approved by 
the CCC. 
The NP-controlled CPA was greatly dissatisfied with 
what they considered the political stance of the CCC, which 
they thought was intended to embarrass the government 
(Interview with CPA official, 1988). At the end of 1981 the 
Administrator sent letters to 146 municipalities, requesting 
them to give an account of how relations with their 
Management Committees were faring. Only the feedback of the 
CCC was negative. This further raised the ire of the CPA 
(Cape Provincial Debates, 2/3/1982: Cols. 427-428). 







authorities bedevilled the CPA's attempts to ameliorate the 
situation (see 4.7 Coloured and Indian Local Government). 
10.5 ATHLONE AND DISTRICT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE/ 
CAPE TOWN CITY COUNCIL RELATIONS: 1984-1989 
It was pointed out (in 7.11.2 Financial Decision-Making 
Powers for Management Committees/LACs) that the government 
introduced regulations to allow Management Committees 
greater participation in the running of their areas. One of 
the regulations made provision for the representation of 
Management Cammi ttees on Standing Commi tte.es of councils. 
The CCC Management Committees accordingly requested 
that this regulation be adopted. However, the CCC rejected 
this request in favour of a motion affirming its. support for 
direct representation of all its citizens as "the only 
acceptable and practicable form of local government for Cape 
Town" (Cape Times, 21/12/1984). It did not subsequently 
disregard all the regulations totally, but adopted only some 
of them, excluding the request for representation on 
standing committees. This meant that Management Committees 
did not enjoy a great deal· more participation than before. 
This led to the Management Committees breaking off the 
liaison committee with the CCC, accusing it of deliberately 
deceiving them (The Argus, 18/4/1985). They wanted nothing 
less than control over their budgets and allocation of funds 









ally in the House of Representatives whose lea-der, Rev. 
Hendrickse, had been appointed to the Cabinet. This House 
put pressure on the government to give Management Committees 
final decision-making powers, with Minister of Local 
Government Curry arguing that obstructionism by White local 
authorities could lead to the sabotaging of the new 
constitutional deal (The Argus, 22/3/1985). The Local 
Government Affairs Amendment Act of 1985 accordingly made 
provision for Management Committees to acquire final 
d~cision-making powers (see 7.11.2 Final Decision-Making 
Powers for Management Committees/LACs). 
Despite a broad agreement amongst CCC's Management 
Committees not to accept these powers (because they were 
seen as a step towards independent Coloured local 
authorities and, accordingly, an extension of apartheid), 
ADMC - much to the chagrin of the other committees - reneged 
and asked for decision-making powers in respect of a number 
of substantive items. The powers it requested included the 
appointment and dismissal of staff, the allocation of 
business licenses, the allocation of houses and eviction of 
tenants, the approval and planning of new housing schemes, 
the planning, provision and allocation of sports facilities, 
approval of tenders for projects, and final say in the 
leasing and utilisation of immovable property. The Director 










asking which of these functions could be transferred to the 
~DMC. The following issues, namely financial implications, 
staff requirements and other relevant factors, had to be 
taken into account by the CCC when making such a decision 
(CCC, 19860). 
The CCC vehemently objected to this. It said that if 
these powers were granted, the. anomalous situation would 
arise whereby the committee would be given decision-making 
powers without accountability. The CCC was concerned that 
it would be involved in financial consequences and legal 
disputes arising from imprudent decisions by the committee 
over which it had no control. It argued further that most· 
staff performed their functions on an area basis which 
contained both White and Coloured suburbs. If a committee 
took over a function either it or the CCC could face staff 
shortages. This could lead to costly duplication and the 
creation of unnecessary posts. In view of this, the CCC 
recommended that if transfer of powers to Management 
Committees occurred, this should only take place within 
certain parameters of which the most important were: 
1. The ADMC should only be given decision-making powers in 
respect of 'own services' intended solely for its area. 
2. There should be no transfer of CCC staff to the 









3. Decisions by the Committee on matters involving 
financial consequences should be confined to items on 
an approved set of estimates, or limited to income 
emanating by way of rates, fees or charges from within 
the Committee's area. 
4. The Committee should not be empowered to take decisions 
which would involve the CCC in additional unbudgeted 
costs. 
5. Compensation should be paid for assets transferred to 
the Committee. 
6. The CCC must be indemnified against all costs, claims 
or charges arising directly or indirectly from the 
devolution of power (CCC, 1986C). 
The Administrator subsequently held further meetings 
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with ADMC. The Director of Local Government, CPA then wrote f 
a letter to the CCC suggesting that discussions be held 
between delegates from the CCC and his Administration at the 
earliest possible opportunity, where practical problems 
impeding the assignment of final decision-making authority 
could be addressed (CCC, 1986D) . 
Due to legal and financial difficulties (described- in 
7.11.2 Local Government Affairs Amendment Act of 1985) this 
process became bogged down and ADMC did not, in fact, 
acquire these powers. However, this was not the only 
reason. Certain local authorities, despite these 
impediments, did receive powers. There was a more explicit 
political reason for this, which will now be examined. 
The LP was in favour of Coloured Management Committees 
/LACs acquiring extra decision-making powers. David curry 
said that "until direct representation at local government 
level becomes a reality the transfer of final decision-
making powers to Management Committees is the name of the 
game" (CCC, 1988C). In particular, he saw Management 
Coin.111ittees/LACs having decision-making powers in respect of 
development, viz. housing and urban upgrading, but he 
rejected the creation of a separate administration and 
infrastructure for these communities. This arrangement 
would enable the bodies to utilise their respective White 
local authorities' .staff in development projects. It would 
not involve taking over local authorities' traditional 
functions such as water and electricity supply (Debates of 
Parliament, 20/3/1989 : Cols. 3435-36; 17/6/1989 : Col. 
948) . 
However, the enthusiasm for those 106 powers was not 
shared by all at Coloured and Indian local government level. 
An attempt to foist extra decision-making powers on LACs was 
rejected by the Natal Association of Local Affairs Com-
mittees (cited hereafter as NALAC) because it.viewed this as 
a step towards eventual independent ethnic local authorities 
(Sunday Tribune, 29/3/1987) . 
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Cape Management Committees faced the same dilemma. 
They called for direct representation, yet participated in 
apartheid structures, arguing that there was no alternative 
available to them but to operate in these bodies which they 
were committed to abolishing. The granting of final 
decision-making powers heightened this contradiction - they 
were now moving closer to a position they ostensibly 
abhorred, while conversely moving further away from their 
avowed aim. This contradiction finally erupted at the 
annual ASSOMAC conference in September 1985 when, by a large 
majority, delegates resolved to resign en bloc if direct 
representation on local authorities was not achieved by 
September 19865 (Daily Dispatch, 23-26/9/1985). 
A corollary of this decision was the rejection of these 
powers as a step towards independent racial local author-
ities by a number of Cape local authorities. The chairman 
of the ADMC, Patrick McKenzie, came under heavy criticism 
from the members of a number of other Management Committees 
in the Western Cape as well as the left wing of the LP 
caucus for this decision. As a corollary, while the ADMC 
did not formally withdraw its· request for these powers, it 
did, at least for the next couple of years, show little· 
enthusiasm for pursuing the issue. 6 
Another reason for the ADMC's not pursuing the 
delegation of powers has to do with its lack of viability. 
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Coloured areas are substantially subsidised by the general 
' ·rate funds. Because the CCC does not frame its budget on 
racial lines, exact expenditure on Coloured areas is 
difficult to calculate. However, in 1981 the CCC did 
venture a rough estimate that 13% of their local rates were 
derived from Coloured areas .while more than ·20% of its 
expenditure went on such localities (Cape Times, 
, 
16/12/1981) • CCC low-income housing estates are· also 
subsidised at R4,9m per annum (CCC, 1986E). This is why the 
ADMC was reluctant to accept these final decision-making 
powers. Acceptance would.have. led to itsbeing given its own 
budget within the CCC's broader budget. The ADMC is 
subsidised by the CCC - most of the low~income council 
housing estates fall within the ADMC's area of jurisdiction. 
The formal acceptance of these powers would have put it in 
the politically unenviable position of having either to 
reduce the standard of servic~s or to increase rent charges. 
Analyses which claim that rich White areas financially 
subsidise poorer Coloured areas do not however reveal the 
true picture. Most of the viable commercial areas and 
virtually all industrial areas are located in White 
localities, in particular the CBD which contributes about 
19% of the City's rates (Cape Times, 22/7/1986). Many 
Coloured citizens help maintain the viability of business in 
these White areas in their capacity as consumers of goods 
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and services. For example, the Theron Commission pointed 
out that more than 75% of Coloured consumption expenditure 
occurred in areas outside their designated areas. Simi-
larly, Coloured citizens help to generate the wealth in 
commercial and industrial areas in their capacity as 
workers. In fact, no White residential area, including even 
affluent neighbourhoods such as Bishopscourt, is self-
sufficient. Only 40% of the CCC's rate revenue comes from 
residential rates, showing the council's dependence on 
commercial and industrial areas (CCC, 1982). 
10.6 COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 
In the rest of this chapter various manifestations of 
greater access will be discussed. It was pointed out (in 
6.7 Coordinating Council for Local Government Affairs) that 
all local. government issues requiring legislative changes 
are first referred to the Coordinating Council for 
recommendation. This council generally operated in a top-
down fashion, being dominated by Minister Heunis. Not-
withstanding this, because of the convergence of interests 
between the government and the major Coloured and Indian 
political parties, the Council has generally been rather 
susceptible to the demands of Coloured and Indian 
representatives. Issues such as the delegation of the 106 
powers, greater remuneration and pension benefits for 







1988 municipal elections, all originated from Coloured and 
-Indian representatives. 
10.7 THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
There 'is what a senior official in the Department of Local 
Government, House· of Representatives,· called a 'wailing 
wall' section of the Department where complaints from 
Management Committees/LACS .a.re· .heard .. These are mostly 
problems dealing with their relationships with White local 
authorities. The House of Representatives and the provinces 
attempt to play a peace-making role in these disputes (RSA, 
House of Representatives, 1985). This arrangement gives 
local bodies a certain amount of leverage in their 
deliberations with the 'mother' White local authorities. 
The House of Representatives has successfully interceded in 
ADMC/CCC disputes (Interviews with ADMC chairman, 1990 and 
House of Representatives official, 1990). 
Another manifestation of this greater access is that 
the minutes of meetings of Coloured Management Committees/ 
LACS are forwarded to the House of Representatives and 
scrutinised. Problems which are identified are referred to 
the relevant authorities for attention (RSA, House of 
Representatives, 1985 : 1). 
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10.8 REACTIONAL POWER - ORDINANCE No. 3 OF 1986 
It was pointed out (in 7.13 Cape Municipal Amendment 
Ordinance. No. 3 of 1986) that, as a result of the alleged 
non-cooperation of certain local authorities with their 
Management Committees, the Cape Municipal Amendment 
ordinance No. 3 of 1986 was promulgated. This gave the 
Administrator of the Cape power to remove from off ice 
councillors or even entire councils who, in his opinion, 
were responsible for or contributed to the failure of a 
council to enforce or carry out the provisions of lawful 
400 
legislation or regulations. This was introduced to give the 
Administrator more power to counter White- local authorities' 
intransigence towards the Management Committee system. Both 
liberal and conservative local authorities had been ob-
structionist in this regard, CCC being the foremost of fender 
in the former category. 
It is suggested that the concept of reactional power 
can help make sense of this issue. Reactional power occurs 
when B acts in conformity with A's wishes because he/she 
fears harm by A if he/she does not. It does not involve any 
deliberate activity (De crespigny, 1970 : 47). Although 
this _measure has not yet been used against any council, it 
can be argued that the threat of this measure is sufficient 
to ensure compliance with government policy. Both CCC and 








generally improved in the Cape in the last few years. 
-Perhaps this is partly due to this extreme threat. 
10.9 THE 'TWO HATS' PHENOMENON 
Many members of the House of Representatives began their 
political careers as Management Committee/LAC members. At 
the CPMA conference in 1987 there was a motion condemning 
the fact that a number of House, of Representatives MPs 
(including Hendrickse and Curry) had not resigned their 
Management Committee seats when they'became central 
government representatives. This led to these 'two hats' 
representatives attempting to interfere· unduly in the-
activities of both their White local authorities and 
Management Committees (Interview with Secretary, CPMA, 
1988). The House of Representatives, Department of Local 
Government, received a number.of complaints from Management 
Committees that these MPs were taking control at local level 
(Interviews with House of Representatives officials, 1988). 
The ADMC was a prominent example in this regard. 
Chairman Patrick McKenzie was MP for Bonteheuwel and there 
were two other members, Kenny Lategan and Arthur Stanley, 
who were MPs for Manenberg and Liesbeek respectively. These 
MPs were what can be termed an 'information elite', viz. 
they had access to privileged central government information 
which they could use in their deliberations against local 
authorities and also as an instrument to persuade fellow 
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Management Committee/LAC members to support their point of 
view. It cut right across the concept of democratic 
accountability and council confidentiality. This phenomenon 
was contrary to local decision-making. Decisions were often 
judged in terms of national political concerns which did not 
always coincide with the interests of Management Committees/ 
LACS. 
However, the other side of the coin involved greater 
access for these committees at central level. Because the 
national MP also sat on the committee he was more closely 
attuned to grassroots needs and problems and was in a 
position to bring these to the attention of the senior 
members of the LP who could take remedial decision-making. 
An example of how this 'two hats' phenomenon has had 
positive effects will be discussed later in this chapter (in 
10.11.2 Urban Upgrading). The practice was ended in 1988 
when the party's national executive requested that LP MPs, 
President's Council members and other public representatives 
should not seek election at municipal level (Cameron, 1991 : 
41-42). 
10.10 TOWN PLANNING 
Another area where the ADMC has a reasonable amount of power 
is in the field of town planning. It was pointed out (in 
9.6 Town Planning) that if a Management Committee does not. 
agree with a town planning decision made by its 'mother' 
--- --------------------------------------------
, local authority in its area of jurisdiction, the matter is 
referred to the Administrator .for final approval. Although 
the CCC can legally reject a committee's advice in respect 
of town planning matters, the Administrator, in line with 
the state's strategy to promote Management Committees 
generally, will not approve the item(s) unless the latter 
bodies have agreed with the recommendation~ The ADMC has 
appealed successfully to the Administrator on five or six 
occasions. There has been only one unsuccessful applica-
ti.on .. _ This situation has given the Management Committee--
greater power in its dealings with the CCC (Interviews with 
Secretary, ADMC and Chairman, CCC Town Planning Committee,, 
1990) . 
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10.ll SERVICE DELIVERY 
10.ll.l . Housing 
Housing is the most critical service. delivery issue for 
Coloureds and Indians, with the Group Areas Act having 
caused a massive shortage of units. Under the tricameral 
system, Coloured housing is controlled by the House of 
Representatives (see 7.19.1 Service Delivery). The House of 
Representatives has more money available for its housing 
development schemes than the now defunct Department of Com-
munity Development (which used to control Coloured housing) 
had, and has embarked on extensive housing development 
schemes throughout the country. 
This structual arrangement, whereby the LP-controlled 
House of Representatives is responsible for Coloured 
housing, has given Management Committees greater influence 
in their deliberations with White local authorities. 
Previously the CCC used to carry out major development 
projects in Coloured areas without the assent of the 
Management Committees concerned. One of the first things 
Minister curry did was to remove the development of Blue 
Downs, a massive housing scheme on the Cape Flats with a 
projected residential capacity of 250 000 people, from the 
control of the CCC. There were several reasons for. this, 
one of the most important being that the local authority was 
not prepared to allow Management Committees to be involved 
in the planning of this scheme. Apparently ADMC chairman 
McKenzie was largely instrumental in persuading Minister 
curry to withdraw this.scheme from the CCC (Thomas, 1985 and 
interview with senior CCC official, 1990). 
Another example of this greater access may be seen in 
Minister Curry's threat to withdraw financial support from 
councils who did not involve Management Committees in the 
planning, construction and allocation of houses (CCC, 
1988C). When applications for housing funds are made by the 
CCC, a certificate from the chairman of the Management 
Committee concerned, saying that he/she agrees with the 





Representatives. If not, funds are withheld (Interviews 
with House of Representative~ official, 1990 and ADMC 
secretary, 1990). 
It also means that there are more channels open to 
Coloured and Indian areas to get funds for development. 
However, the amount allocated to the respective Houses for 
development is hopelessly inadequate, considering the 
backlog ·of housing and facilities in Coloured and Indian 
areas. For example, in 1986/7 the House of Representatives 
received a budgetary allocation of Rl,75bn compared to the 
R4,55bn of the House of Assembly. Of this, R342m went to 
the Department of Local Government, Housing and Agriculture 
(The star, 26/3/1988). 
Finally, another problem is the shortage of land for 
development in Coloured and Indian group areas. 
10.11.2 Urban Upgrading 
The impetus for the upgrading of the Cape Flats appears to 
have come from Patrick McKenzie, chairman of the ADMC and MP 
for Bonteheuwel. After the 1985 unrest he wrote a letter to 
the newly appointed Minister of Local Government, Housing 
and Agriculture in the House of Representatives, David 
Curry, listing 18 reasons which he felt were responsible for 
the unrest. Most of these reasons had to do with the poor 
state of the environment, e.g. untarred pavements, no 
lights, no fencing, no landscaping, etc. (ADMC, 1985). 
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McKenzie's opinion as to the causes of the unrest was shared 
by Minister Curry. He thought it was no coincidence that 
the riots in Coloured areas had occurred in the poor estates 
where there was a paucity of basic facilities, and not the 
more middle-class home ownership areas (Cameron, 1988C 
61). 
On Curry's instructions, this issue.was then taken up 
by the fledgling House of Representatives administration. 
After a thorough investigation, the House informed the ADMC 
that the upgrading of Bonteheuwel should be attended to as 
soon as possible. A rehabilitation committee would be 
needed for this purpose (ADMC, 1986). This committee for 
the upgrading of housing estates on the Cape Flats was 
appointed by Minister Curry and consisted of CCC officials 
and councillors, House of Representatives officials, the 
local MP for the area and Management Committee 
representatives for the area concerned. Chief Director of 
the House of Representatives, c. Du Preez, was chairman of 
the committee, whose objective was to bring about the 
general upgrading and upliftment of the Cape Flats area 
(CCC, 1986E and 1986F). 
By this time the House of Representatives was committed 
to large-scale upgrading of needy areas in the Cape Flats 
generally, and Bonteheuwel and Heideveld7 were the initial 






(CCC, l986F and 1986G). The CCC undertook these projects as 
an· agency of the House of Representatives. Th~ design, cost 
estimates, etc. of the individual projects had to be 
approved by the Committee as well as the Department and the 
CCC before· the work was undertaken. These upgrading funds 
could not be used for housing renewal purposes·; rather they 
were used to improve the general urban environment, e.g. 
stormwater drainage, paving of roads and sidewalks, 
landscaping, etc. (CCC, 1986E and l986F). 
It can be argued that the House of Representatives was 
replicating RSC f.unctions. .Thi.s involvement in the 
upgrading of Coloured areas was necessary, however, because 
of the delay in establ.i.sh.ing functioning RSCs. ·Because of 
the urgent political need for this development, Minister 
Curry viewed upgrading as part of the strategy to defuse 
political turmoil in these .areas and the Department did this 
on an interim basis (Interview with David Curry, 1987). It 
was also not coincidental that the protesters were also 
eroding whatever limited support base the LP may have had. 
This upgrading must accordingly also be regarded as a means 
of patronage. When RSCs were established in 1987 the 
Department cea~ed to perform this function (Interview with 
Chief Director, House of Representatives, 1988). 
When it came to the upgrading of Bonteheuwel, McKenzie 
played a major role in determining priorities. The 
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recommendations of his committee were often at variance with 
CCC officials. However, because this rehabilitation 
committee, on instructions of Minister Curry, had determined 
that no money could be spent without Management Committee 
approval, McKenzie's views held sway. Being ADMC chairman 
from 1985 to 1988 enabled him to be closely attuned to the 
needs and problems of the community. McKenzie was also a 
skilful political operator who knew how to work the system 
to his best advantage, as illustrated by the fact that it 
was his prompting that led to the upgrading in the first 
place. He also had the advantage of being in the same 
political party as Minister curry, who in turn was highly 
sympathetic to this upgrading request (Interviews with ADMC 
secretary, 1990 and CCC officials and councillors, 1990). 
This can be compared with the upgrading of Heideveld, 
where priorities were almost exclusively decided by CCC 
officials. The MP for the area, Andries Johannes, was also 
a LP member. However, he was not a Management Committee 
member. Also, because ADMC was not divided into wards, 
there was no-one on the committee from the Heideveld area. 
This meant there was no-one who was seriously concerned 
about, or capable of, adequately identifying upgrading needs 
in Heideveld. 9 Furthermore, Johannes was a rather 
ineffective politician. This gave CCC officials a large 












(Interviews with ADMC secretary, 1990 and CCC officials and 
councillors, 1990). 
It was pointed out (in 3.4 Functions).that the more 
relevant functions (those that can be performed in either a 
devolved or deconcentrated/delegates fashion) that are 




decentralisation. In the case of Bonteheuwel, upgrading 
policy was handled in a devolved way. Conversely, in the 
case of Heideveld it was carried out in a delegated10 way by 
CCC officials. 
The party politics index (see 3~5 Party Politics) is 
also useful here. The fact that the LP controlled ADMC 
meant, in the case of Bonteheuwel, that information and 
demands from grassroots could influence national priorities. 
Conversely, for the reasons outlined, no-one took up the 
cudgels for Heideveld in an effective way at national level. 
10.11.3 community Facilities Account 
The Community Facilities Account (cited hereafter as CFA) is 
a one percent levy on rented housing stocks, which goes into 
a general fund. It is meant.to cover the provision of 
amenities like civic halls, rent offices and libraries. It 
was introduced in the mid-1970s in an attempt to redress the 
backlog of amenities that existed on the Cape Flats (Labour 
Research Commission, 1982 : 79). 
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The amount of money in this fund.is very small, about 
R3m per annum for all the Management Committee areas. More 
money is spent on ADMC's area of jurisdiction out of the 
CCC's General Rates Fund. Nevertheless, the Committee has a 
veto on how this money is spent. Since the introduction of 
the House of Representatives, this money cannot be spent by 
the CCC without the approval of the respective committees .. 
This gives them a certain amount of say over policy 
· (Interviews with ADMC, CCC and House of Representatives 
officials, 1990) r 
10.12 ASSESSMENT 
From the perspective of the ADMC, the impact of the House of 
Representatives has been beneficial. The House made more 
money available for development, which has enabled ADMC to 
respond, to a certain extent, to the demands of its con-
stituents. Furthermore, the CCC can no longer ride 
roughshod over ADMC's wishes when it comes to service 
delivery. If the CCC will not allocate House of Represent-
ative funds in accordance with Management Committee wishes, 
they are withheld by the government Department. This has 
given the committee greater power in its deliberations with 
the CCC (Interviews with Chairman ADMC, 1988 and Secretary, 
ADMC, 1990). 
This is not to say that there is no conflict between 
the ADMC and the House of Representatives. The House has 
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sometimes sided with the CCC, particularly when the issue of 
cost-effectiveness is concerned. For example, the ADMC 
wanted this Department instead of the CCC to develop certain 
land for housing. The request was turned down. The 
Department did not have the necessary professional staff to 
develop the land nor the administrative staff to administer 
the housing scheme (Interview with senior CCC official, 
1990) • 
While things have improved considerably, ADMC 
nevertheless still feels the present system is inadequate. 
Some of its recommendations are still overturned by the CCC 
and .there is·· still no provision for permanent representation 
and voting rights on all the standing committees (where many 
major issues are decided) (ADMC, 1988). In comparison with 
Management Committees that fall under the control of the 
neighbouring WCRSC, ADMC functions are limited. WCSRC 
committees such as Elsies River virtually run their areas, 
having control over functions ranging from housing to sports 
fields (Debates of Parliament, 21/4/1988 : Cols. 6197-6198). 
10.13 COUNCILLORS 
The fact that AOMC councillors are directly elected, as 
opposed to being indirectly elected or appointed by a higher 
tier of government, is conducive to decentralisation (see 
3.4 Other Personnel Indices). 
10~14 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown how ADMC/CCC relationships in the 
1980s have evolved from the situation where the Coloured 
local body made no impact upon policy in its area to that 
where in certain -cases it has. considerable influence. ADMC 
now had greater access in that it had MPs at central level 
412 
who were able to influence local policy-making affecting its 
area of jurisdiction. 
Various manifestations of this greater access were 
discussed; the House of Representatives can intercede on 
behalf of the ADMC when there is a dispute with the CCC; a 
provincial ordinance which threatens to dismiss councillors 
if they do not cooperate with Management Committees, has led 
to improved relationships; and if·there is a dispute over a 
town planning issue between ADMC and CCC, the Administrator 
has the final say and he has tended to side with the former 
body. Also, the 'two hats' phenomenon was discussed, 
whereby ADMC with three MPs in its ranks could bring local 
issues to national politicians who could take remedial 
action. 
When it comes to service delivery, housing funds were 
only made available to the CCC if the proposed schemes were 
in accordance with ADMC wishes. The R2m urban upgrading of 
Bonteheuwel was largely decided by the ADMC because the 
House of Representatives had stipulated that this was one of 
i 
the conditions of the funding. Finally, CFA money could 
only be spent if it was in accordance with ADMC wishes. 
Finally, what can be said about the cardinal issue of 
decentralisation of powers? The type of power that ADMC has 
acquired cannot easily be categorised into any of the 
various forms of decentralisation cited. There seems to 
have been a horizontal transfer of power from the CCC to 
ADMC, but in an informal way.· ADMC has acquired· power 
through enabling others to intercede on its behalf, but does 
not have any formal authority of its own. A·case can 
perhaps be made for saying that ADMC has acquired informal 
delegated powers in the area.of town planning, and informal 
devolved powe·r in the area of th·e ·upgrading of Bonteheuwel 
as well as in the allocation of the CFA funds. However, 
what is indisputable is that ADMC has far more avenues at 
its disposal to get its policy carried out, which in tu~n 
has increased its powers. 
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CHAPTER XI 
CASE STUDY III: WESTERN CAPE REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
The.~CRSC is an indirectly elected body consisting of 64 
Western Cape local authorities. This comprises 19 White 
municipalities, 26 Coloured Management Committees, two 
Indian Management Committees, one Black Town Council, five 
Black Town Committees, one Black Local Authority Committee, 
five White Local Councils, three White Rural Councils and 
two Coloured Boards of Management (CPA, 1990B) (see Annexure 
E). The WCRSC is a grade 14 local authority, i.e. the 
second largest category of local authority in terms of the 
statistical formula of the government (see 7.5 Remuneration 
of Town Clerks Act) . 
The total population within the WCRSC's area of 
jurisdiction is estimated at 2 540 ooo, distributed over an 
area of 3 976 km2 , which is approximately the same size as 
The Netherlands (WCRSC, 1988 : 2-3). 
Although the WCRSC was brought into existence in 
January 1987 it only began functioning formally on 1 July, 
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1987. By the end of the 1980s it had, therefore, only been f 
in operation for two and a half years. For this reason 
there is less extensive material on its functioning and it 
is also perhaps too early to draw any firm conclusions about 
its operation. The coverage of the WCRSC will accordingly 
not be as comprehensive as the previous two case studies. 
Notwithstanding this, selected aspects of the framework of 
analysis will be utilised to gauge the extent to which power 
has been decentralised to the WCRSC. Although the WCRSC is 
performing agency functions for a variety of different 
government departments, this chapter is concerned only with 
the extent to which the WCRSC is performing the services 
specified in the RSC Act as regional fun.ctions. 
11.2 FORMATION OF THE WESTERN CAPE REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCIL 
In order to analyse the extent of autonomy of the WCRSC it 
is necessary to examine the top-down way in which it was 
established, facilitating national objectives and minimising 
any potential opposition to. this new local government 
structure. 
11.2.1 Determination of the western cape 
Regional services council's Boundaries 
The determination of the WCRSC boundaries was surrounded 
with political controversy. It started off with a request 
in late 1985 by the Administrator of the Cape, Eugene Louw, 
for local authorities in the Cape metropolitan area to 
submit their recommendations on the proposed Western Cape 
RSC(s) to him so that he could make representations to the 
government (CCC, 1985B) . 
The CCC submitted a detailed document recommending that 
the WCRSC should be the Greater Cape Town region (see 
Annexure F), which the council argued was an economically 
integrated area (CCC, 1985B). The Divisional Councils of 
Paarl and Stellenbosch recommended that there should be two 
RSCs in the region; firstly, an urban RSC with the 
boundaries roughly approximating to those of the CCC 
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proposals; and secondly, a rural and peri-urban RSC 
consisting of these two Divisional Council areas. Being 
smaller local authorities, they feared they would lose their 
autonomy and not get their fair share of funds from one 
metropolitan-wide RSC which could well be dominated by the 
liberal CCC (The Argus, 5/3/1986). Implicit in these 
objections was that these Divi~ional Councils wanted to 
escape the costs of subsidising poorer Black and Coloured 
areas, the majority of which fell within the proposed 
Greater Cape Town RSC. Some NP-orientated local authorities i 
.also expressed opposition to being included in the same RSCs 
as the CCC, for similar reasons as the Divisional Councils 
of Paarl and Stellenbosch. 
The Provincial Secretary, representing the CPA, 
recommended in his submission to the Demarcation Board that 
the Divisional Councils of the Cape, Paarl and Stellenbosch 
should become the Western Cape RSC. 1 This recommendation 
was based on the criteria which have to be taken into 
consideration when a RSC is being demarcated in terms of 
schedule 1 of the RSC Act (which are criteria for the 
identification of metropolitan areas). The CPA's main 
argument for this area was that a RSC consisting of the 
Divisional Councils of Paarl and Stellenbosch would not be 
financially viable. Projected figures from the Department 
of Finance had estimated that 91% of the services levy and 
89% of the establishment levy would be generated in the CDC 
area. The corresponding figures for Stellenbosch were 4% 








The most persuasive submission at the Demarcation 
Board's meeting was the CCC proposal. On the basis of 
statistical evidence, its delegates argued convincingly that 
the urban local authorities of the CDC did not have the same 
community of interests as the other rural municipalities 
(CCC, 1986J) . 
Most of the other local authorities (despite initial 
misgivings by a number of NP-orientated municipalities) 
supported the Provincial Secretary's recommendation. It has 
been alleged that Minister Chris Heunis of DCDP, who was 
then Cape leader of the party, and the Administrator Eugene 
Louw, who was a senior Cape NP figure, cajoled and persuaded 
a number of local authorities to drop their objections to 
being included in one RSC for the entire metropolitan area. 
(This claim was made by a number of local interviewees, 
including CCC, CPA and WCRSC officials in 1988 and 1989). 
The eventual delimitation of the area was a virtual 
fiasco. The Demarcation Board, no doubt influenced by the 
impressive CCC case, recommended the smaller area. This was 
initially accepted by the new multiracial Provincial EXCO. 
However, at a subsequent meeting, the new MEC for Local 
Government, Pieter Schoeman, announced that the Western Cape 
RSC would consist of the Divisional Councils of cape, Paarl 
and Stellenbosch. It was stated that the altered decision 
was due to other factors which subsequently came under 
consideration, viz. the stimulation of balanced regional 
development, spreading the new regional taxes as widely as 
possible, and generally to minimise the strong leakage 
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effect that a smaller RSC could have on its fringe (CCC, 
1986E). However, it was strongly suspected that Minister 
Heunis was behind the overturning of this decision, orie 
major reason being the belief that the redistribution would 
be more effective if rural areas were included. The other 
reason was the fear that this anti-apartheid body would 
sabotage the objectives of the apartheid-based WSRSC: the 
larger area would reduce.the CCC's voting strength (The 
Argus, 5/2/1987; also see 11.2.3 Voting Representation for 
more detail}. 
11. 2. 2 Exclusion of Commercial and Industrial Areas 
Commercial and industrial areas are excluded from the ambit 
of RSCs, as far as the calculations of the consumption of 
services for voting purposes are concerned. Thus, the 
delimitat~on of industrial and commercial areas is of 
cardinal importance because it directly influences the 
voting powers of the constituent local authorities on the 
RSC. 
The CCC was very aware of this when it submitted its 
proposal on the exclusion of such areas to the CPA. It 
recommended that in the case of ·industrial areas, only areas 
in extent of 20ha or more should be excluded, and in the 
case of commercial areas it proposed either that only the 
CCC's CBD be excluded, or alternatively that only.the CBD of 
each constituent body should be omitted {CCC, 1986K). There 
was the viewpoint within the CPA's Department of Local 
Government that the CCC, if its voting representation were 














the WCRSC. The CCC's vociferous opposition to the ethnic-
based nature of the RSCs has already been discussed (in 9.8 
The CCC's Local Option). The delimitation gave the CPA an 
opportunity to limit the CCC's influence. In terms of the 
criteria that it adopted, no fewer than six of the CCC's 
CBDs and 20 industrial areas were excluded, many more that 
any other.local authority (Cape Town Bulletin, March 1987). 
This has diluted the CCC's voting strength quite· 
considerably (see 11.2.3 Voting Representation). 
11.2.3 Voting Representation. 
The WCRSC initially consisted· of 56 local bod·ies, but after 
the creation of new Management Committees, Black Town 
committees, Local Councils and Rural Councils, there are now 
64 constituent members (CPA, 1987B; 1990B). 
The voting powers of the constituent local authorities 
were determined according to how much each body spends on 
sewerage, water, refuse, civil defence, tourism promotion 
and land use planning (CPA, 1987C). The total voting 
strength of the White bodies initially amounted to 65,89%, 
that of the Coloured bodies to 20,75%, Black local 
structures 12,68% and Indian bodies 0,68%. After the 
creation of these new local structures with seats·on the 
RSC, the voting representation now comprises White bodies 
65,1%, Coloured bodies 19,5%, Black local structures 14,8% 
and Indian bodies 0,.6% (CPA, 1987C; WCRSC, 19908). 
Each local authority can nominate one of its members to 
the RSC for every 10% or part thereof of the total number of 
votes to which it is entitled. In practice this means that 
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each local authority has one representative on the WCRSC, 
with the exception of the CCC which has four repre-
sentatives. The CCC technically had a veto, with 36,52% Of 
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the votes, when the WCRSC began functioning, bearing in mind 
that all decisions require a two-thirds majority. The 
creation of these new bodies, ~n particular three new 
Management committees within its area of jurisdiction,
2 
has 
meant that the CCC's voting representation has dropped below 
the veto threshold limit to 31% (WCRSC, 1990B). 
This can be compared with the voting power o.f Pretoria, .. 
Bloemfontein and Johannesburg municipalities (all of which 
were more sympathetic to the RSC system) on their particular 
RSCs, which initially amounted to 50%, 50% and 48,5% 
respectively (Cape Times, 22/3/1989 and 24/6/1989). 
Although it cannot be incontrovertably verified, it is quite 
likely that the CCC's comparatively small voting strength in 
comparison with other major metropolitan local authorities, 
was due to a deliberate attempt by the CPA to make sure that 
-
the CCC was not in a powerful enough position to obstruct 
the workings of the WCRSC. 
In any event, as pointed out (in 7.2.3 Voting 
Representation), the voting strength of the constituent 
bodies does not seem to have .been as essential to the 
operation of the RSCs after an amendment to the principal 
Act in 1988. In terms of this amendment the Administrator 
can re-apportion votes if he believes that the basis for the 
apportionment of votes cannot be applied to achieve a result 
which in his opinion is fair to all persons concerned. 
Also, the RSC chairman is compelled to refer any matter on 
which a majority vote cannot be obtained to the 
Administrator for decision and, .in so doing, to bypass the 
entire appeal mechanism. This means that the Administrator 
has the final say on any matter in which deadlock is 
reached. 
It is highly probable that these centralising clauses 
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in the Amendment to the Act were included to prevent 
liberal-orientated and CF-controlled local authorities to 
use their numerically powerful voting strength to control 
the RSCs and make.policy in a way not intended by the 
go~ernment. Although these measures have not been used 
against the WCRSC, they certainly facilitate the reaching of 
consensus on issues, which will now be discussed. 
Despite the fact that the formation of the WCRSC was 
shrouded in political controversy, its actual operatiort has 
been characterised by little acrimony among its constituent 
members. At the first WCRSC meeting, the Administrator-
appointed chairman, Piet Loubser, asked delegates not to 
make the RSC a forum for playing out ~olitical differences 
lest the future be spoiled by the past (Cape Times, 
26/6/1987). His chairmanship of WCRSC meetings has been 
characterised by attempts to reach consensus on virtually 
every decision. Loubser is a vastly experienced politician, 
being a former MEC in the cape Provincial Council and a 
senior Cape NP member. This enabled him to mediate 
successfully between the various demands of the WCRsc· 
representatives. In its 15 months of operation, 2 ooo 
decisions were taken by consensus and without the need to 
vote (Die Burger, 25/10/1988). Indeed, during the two and a 
half year period under review, there has only been voting on 
the composition and chairmanship of standing committees and 
the composition of the EXCO (The Argus, 26/10/1989). 
11.3 FUNCTIONAL OPERATION 
In the Cape, unlike the rest of the country, RSCs are not 
newly created structures. The WCRSC took over the 
infrastructure, bureaucracy and functions of the Divisional 
Councils of Cape, Paarl and Stellenbosch, which were 
abolished in June 1987~ The WCRSC began its formal 
operation on 1 July, 1987 (WCRSC, 198~A : 2). These 
functions included both 'general' and 'own' affairs 
services. The WCRSC performs 'own affairs' functions on 
behalf of the respective own Affairs Departments. There 
were also a number of Divisional Council functions which 
were taken over by the WCRSC because they were regional 
services (WCRSC, 1988A 4). The WCRSC was also performing 
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certain agency functions on behalf of the CPA, in particular 
that of rural roads. 
This dual role initially led to a great many teething 
problems. 'Administrative overload' occurred, viz. there 
were excessive delays in completion of the workload of the 
WCRSC, which could not cope with the demands placed on it. 
It had neither the staff nor the resources to operate 
effectively (The Argus, 28/1/1988; Cape Times, 21/4/1988, 
22/4/1988). The WCRSC seemed to concentrate its attentions 
on its 'own affairs' functions, and as a result it was slow 
to begin its regional functions. Although it began 
operating with effect from 1 July 1987, the first budgetary 
allocation of funds for its infrastructure was made only in 
October 1988. 
Although most of these initial problems have been 
overcome, agency functions continue to take up too much of 
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the WCRSC's time. It is not uncommon for the whole of WCRSC 
meetings to be about such agency functions, with·no matters 
concerning regional functions appearing on the agenda. In 
both the 1987 and 1988 annual reviews, agency functions 
received more space than regional functions (WCRSC, 1988A 
and 1989A). Also, staff spend more time on agency than 
regional functions. For example, there are 52 planners busy 
on agency functions, with only 11 on regional functions. 
Also, the WCRSC acts as agent in respect of 37 local areas 
on behalf of the three relevant own Affairs Ministers of 
Local Government, and for five Local Councils on behalf of 
the Department of Local Government, House of Assembly 
(WCRSC, 1990A). This means that 42 separate budgets have to 
be drawn up annually, which is highly time-consuming. 
There has been little activity in terms of the take-
over of regional functions from constituent local 
authorities. While there has been investigation into the 
entrustment of certain services functions as regional 
services, only land use planning has been taken over from 
the Cape Metropolitan Planning Committee (cited hereafter as 
METPLAN), a voluntary body consisting of representatives of 





There are a number of reasons for the WCRSC's 
reluctance to take over regional functions, like bulk supply 
of water, which should logically be provided at metropolitan 
level. Firstly, as pointed out, the WCRSC operates largely 
on a consensual basis, and if it took over regional 
functions this carefully nurtured esprit de corps would 
probably be shattered. In particular, the CCC, the largest 
voting bloc on the WCRSC and bulk supplier of water and 
electricity, would object vociferously to the regional take-
over of these functions because it w6uld reduce its status 
and power in the region (Cameron, 1986B : 260) . The 
attitude seems to be one of least interference and letting 
the WCRSC get on with regional upgrading. 
Secondly, if the WCRSC takes over regional functions, 
it will have to pay the costs of providing these particular 
services. For example, in the 1988/89 financial year, the 
WCRSC estimated that the passenger transport subsidy on bus 
and rail services amounted to Rl29,8 million, while its 
total income was estimated to be Rl33 million (WCRSC, 
1990A) • 3 This would mean that money for urban upgrading, 
' 
which is the major priority of RSCs, would diminish 
drastically. Finally, the sheer logistics involved have 
also proved an obstacle to the take-over of regional 
functions. 
At its first meeting six standing committees were 
created, viz. Finance, Liaison with Local Areas, Works, 
Amenities and Services, Divisional Council Functions, Land 




















Divisional Council areas. Two advisory committees, viz. 
staffing, and Investigation into Priorities, were also 
created at that meeting (The Argus, 30/6/1987). 
11.4 THE UPGRADING PROCESS 
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When it comes to the allocation of RSC funds, the embodiment 
of section 12(6) of the Act, namely that priority should be 
given to the establishment, improvement and maintenance of 
infrastructural services and facilities where the greatest 
need exists, has been the primary focus of WCRSC policy. 
How did the policy process work and, equally as 
important for the purposes of this thesis, to.what extent 
were decisions taken in a decentralised fashion? The RSC 
levies for 1987 were held over until 1988, so the following 
account of the policy process is for two years, i~e. 1988 
and 1989. The process was initiated by a circular from the 
WCRSC to all constituent local authorities in which it asked 
what the greatest needs in their respective areas were. 
From the completed questionnaires it was determined that the 
five major infrastructural requirements in the region, in 
order of prior~ty, were: 
1) roads (streets), stormwater drainage and pavements; 
2) water; 
3) community facilities; 
4) sewerage; 
5) electricity supply, including street lighting. 
(WCRSC, 1988A : 7) 
Local authorities were then required to send estimates for 
consideration to the WCRSC. ·This was accordingly done. 
In order to avoid random and inconsistent recommend-
ations, the council appointed an advisory body, that of the 
Priorities Committee, for the investigation of projects 
applied for by local bodies, with a view to making 
recommendations for financial assistance on a priority basis 
(WCRSC, 1989B: 27; l990A). This committee developed a 
two-dimensional formula to be used in the assessment of 
projects, which was approved by general council. These two 
dimensions were the urgency of the project and the affluence 
of the area. The comprehensive formula is: 
URGENCY OF PROJECT 
A. Absolute priority omission or delay would have 
catastrophic results. 
B. Essential project - cannot be left undone or postponed 
without serious det~iment to the public interest. 
c. Desirable project. - should enjoy priority based on 
particular advantages the community would derive. 
o. Useful project - though non-essential, would neverthe-
less serve a useful purpose and ought to be undertaken 
in the public interest. 
E. Non-essential project - could be dispensed with or 
postponed without materially harming the public 
interest. 
z. Totally unacceptable project - should not be 
considered. 
AFFLUENCE OF AREA 
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b. Sub-economic area - housing. provided for.breadwinners 
·earning less that R450 p •. m.; lacking ce:t;'tain basic 
infrastructure needs. 
c. Lower economic area - housing provided for income group 
R450 to R800 p.m. 
d. Economic area - state-funded housing for buyers/tenants 
in income group R800 to RlOOO p.m. 
e. Self-dependent area - housing predominantly for house-
owners erected from private sector funds. 
f. Affluent area - a self-sufficient area with residents 
predominantly of the middle income group. 
q. Luxurious area - residents predominantly of higher 
income group; area should not qualify for assistance. 
r. Regional project - affecting more than one community. 
(WCRSC, 1990B) . 
After receipt of applications .from the constituent 
local authorities, members of the Priorities Committee pay 
site visits to the area where there are proposed projects. 
These councillors then weigh all these projects in terms of 
the formula. The cut-off point is normally 'C' for both 
urgency of project and affluence of area categories. 
These recommendations are then referred to the Finance 
Committee which prepares and recommends draft capital and 
revenue estimates for consideration by.EXCO. It also 
recommends the terms and conditions attached to council's 
allocations to local bodies, viz. whether they should 
receive loans or grants. In this regard, cognisance is 
taken of the community's ability to pay. The WCRSC's policy 
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'in this regard. is to allocate funds to the lowest income 
groups as outright grants in respect of non-productive 
projects, viz. those that·will not per se generate a return. 
Requests for projects for more affluent communities tend to 
receive loans (WCRSC, 1989B: 27; 1990A). 
The draft estimates are then sent to EXCO, which 
considers them and then refers them to full council for 
debate. There are occasionally deviations. from the 
recommendations of the Priorities Committee. At the special 
council mee-ti-ng held. for· 1evy allocations the town clerk and 
city engin~er of a particulai local authority will sqmetimes 
motivate why their particular project should receive funds. 
However, such changes as do occur are not generally major 
ones. 'C' and 'D' ratings for the urgency of projects 
sometimes change position (WCRSC, 1989B : 4-6; interview 
with senior WCRSC officials, 1991). 
The chairmanship of Loubser is also an important 
consideration. As already pointed out, he has steered the 
debate in a consensual way so that no vote has been taken in 
the two RSC budget meetings under review. This means that 
potential central controls, such as the Appeal Board 
mechanism and the referral of any matter on which a majority 
cannot be obtained to the Administrator, have not been 
utilised. It was suggested (in 3.4 Functions) that the 
more relevant functions which can be performed in either a. 
devolved or deconcentrated fashion that are handled by 
devolved methods, the greater the extent of decentralisation 
to local government. In this case, fairly extensive powers 
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to determine upgrading priorities have been devolved to the 
WCRSC. The WCRSC thus appears to have a reasonable degree 
of devolution in this rega~d. 
What can be said, however, is that the WCRSC does not 
operate in a way that is particularly open or accountable to 
the public. Predictions that it ~ould ·attempt to operate in 
a neutral, technical fashion in order to depoliticise its 
activities, have proved correct (see 7.3.3. Finance). All 
major decisions occur at committee level behind closed doors 
where consensus is reached. ,For example, the WCRSC 
budgetary meeting of 1988 took no longer than 30 minutes 
(Cape Times, 28/5/1988). 
A major reason for this absence of intervention by the 
Administrator is the fact that the councii.1s decisions 
embody the spirit of section 12(6) of the Act, namely that 
funds go to where the greatest need exists.· An examination 
of the 1988/89 budget reveals that 91,7% of: the RSC funds 
went to the upgrading of Coloured and Black areas; 5,6% to 
projects in White areas and 2,7% to regional projects 
affecting more than one race group. In 1989/90, 84,8% of 
RSC funds went to Coloured and Black areas, 7,2% on White 
areas and 18% on regional projects4 (WCRSC, 1988C and 
1989C) • 
Furthermore, the liberal CCC representatives seemed to 
have tempered their initial opposition to the RSC system 
(see 9.8 The CCC's Local Option) and are enthusiastic 
supporters of the upgrading process. Alderman Eulalie 
Stott, a long-standing liberal CCC councillor and .initially 
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·a staunch opponent of RSCs, is on record as saying after the 
WCRSC had made Rl27m available for upgrading in 1988, that 
"it was fantastic to have that amount of money available. I 
have never spent Rl27m before. There are all sorts of 
things that I know of which have needed attention for years" 
(Cape Times, 29/9/1988). 
NP-orientated municipalities, in line with government 
policy, are also generally supportive of this infra-
structural development. 5 Quite logically, impoverished 
Black and Coloured_ communities also support these 
redistributive endeavours. The absence of any radical 
representatives from Black and Coloured councils also 
facilitates consensual politics. This absence is because 
left-wing groups consistently boycotted apartheid-based 
local government elections. There is no CP presence of any 
note on the WCRSC, so right-wing opposition is hardly an 
impediment to the redistributive purposes of the body. 6 In 
any event, the chairmanship of Loubser is such that issues 
get debated in terms of the merit of the project and not on 
party-political grounds. He said at a WCRSC meeting that 
"we must refrain from expressing political viewpoints 
here • • . this is not the forum for that 11 (The Argus, 
25/2/1988). 
The big debate is not whether underprivileged 
communities should receive the bulk of RSC funds, but rather 
whether established Coloured and Black townships or new 
underdeveloped Black areas such as Khayelitsha, consisting 
largely of recent migrants from the Transkei and Ciskei, 
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should receive greater priority when it comes to funds. 
This issue for the moment has:resolved itself in that the 
council has agreed that one-third of funds should go to new 
development and the rest (with the exception of the limited 
funding of regional functions) should be spent on upgrading 
existing townships (Interview with WCRSC officials, 1991). 
11.5 PROVINCIAL HIERARCHICAL. CONTROL 
There is less extensive provincial hierarchical control over 
the activities of the WCRSC when compared to that of PLAs. 
The CPA's main responsibility for the WCRSC appears to have 
been its establishment, except when it has occasion to re-
apportion votes such as when new Local Councils and 
Management Committees were created. There is no provincial 
financial control over the WCRSC's activities. This means 
that the WCRSC's budgetary allocations do not have to go to 
the CPA for scrutiny. 
When it comes to by-laws, decisions in respect of 
regional functions have to go to the CPA for final approval 
(along the lines of the process described in.9.2 Procedure 
for By-Laws). This exists mainly for the regional functions 
taken over from the defunct Divisional Councils. However, 
no by-laws need to be promulgated, let alone approved, in 
respect of the WCRSC's most important function, the 
allocation of funds for the upgrading of infrastructure. 
Certain of the circulars sent out by the CPA's Community 
service Branch are also applicable to RSCs. Yet, as pointed 
out (in 9.3 CCC/CPA Hierarchical Relations), there has been, 
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in line with the government's policy of devolution of 
powers, a move away from the use of directive circulars. 
In terms of De Forges' six forms of hierarchical 
control over local authorities' powers (see 3.7 Hierar-
chichal Relations), the Administrator appears to have all 
these powers at his disposal! with the exception of the 
power of substitution, i.e. that a higher authority can act 
in place of a lower one. In practice, these powers have not 
been invoked by the Administrator. The type of supervisory 
pattern exercised by the CPA over the WCRSC seems to be a 
combination of a laissez-faire approach - that is, minimum 
intervention within the necessary fulfilment of departmental 
duties - and a regulatory approach (a concern to see that 
statutory regulations are upheld) but generally there is 
little intervention in WCRSC's affairs. 
11.6 FINANCIAL CONTROL 
As pointed out (in 7.3.2 Devolution of Power) the RSC's two 
sources of revenue are the regional establishment levy 
initially set at ,lOc per Rand, and the regional services 
levy initially set at ,25c per Rand. 
Although the WCRSC is involved in agency. functions on 
behalf of the relevant Own Affairs Administrations and the 
CPA, by law these two levies cannot .be used for the funding 
of such costs. The RSC funds can only be used for specific 
purposes (which were described in 7.2.4 Finance). 
The policy of the WCRSC is to keep the turnover levy 
more or less constant with inflation. This source of 


























of inflation. This is conducive to devolution of powers 
(s.ee 3.6.2 Elasticity of Tax Base). On. the other hand, it 
is WCRSC policy to keep the services levy rate constant and 
accordingly below the inflation rate because of the concern 
that a tax on wages and salaries of employees would have a 
detrimental effect on job creation (Interview with 
Treasurer, WCRSC, 1991). 
Applications for the provision of capital expenditure 
are far in excess of available WCRSC income. In 1988 
applications for projects totalling approximately 
R250 500 000 were received, while allocations amounted to 
R127 451 387. 7 In 1989 the total applications amounted to 
R368 ooo ooo while allocations amounted to R102 794 390 
(WCRSC, 1990A). In 1989 there were 36 906 businesses paying 
levies (Cape Times, 31/5/1989). Total administration costs 
of collecting the levies in the first three years amounted 
to 1,97% of total levies, a negligible amount (WCRSC, 
1990A) . 
Nevertheless, these sources of revenue have made 
possible vast infrastructural improvements in underdeveloped 
areas which would not have.been viable under the old 
Divisional Council system, where the rates income of the CDC 
amounted to approximately R30m per annum (WCRSC, 1990A). 
The concern that RSCs would not have sufficient revenue to 
perform comprehensive upgrading is only partly justified in 
the case of the WCRSC. What is perhaps of greater· concern 
is the feeling in many poorer areas that the m~intenance of 
housing is a far more of a priority than the upgrading of 
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·the environment. However, in terms of the principal Act, 
RSC funds can only be used for prescribed functions. This 
does not include housing, which is an 'own affair' function 
and accordingly resides under the control of the respective 
Ministers' Councils (Interview with WCRS'C officials, 1991). 
Also, RSC are for capital development only and cannot be 
used to subsidise deficits on operating accounts. 
The government is investigating alternative-sources of 
revenue for RSCs, but this is primarily for rural areas 
where there are few commercial and- industrial enterprises to 
form an adequate tax base (Cape Times, 30/3/1989). 
In terms of Mawhood's-scale of local financing, ranging 
from the "most autonomous" to the "least autonomous" (see 
3.6.1 Revenue Base), WCRSC's two levies can, at least when 
they were first introduced, be classified as a variant of 
number 3 on the six-point scale. The levy rates were 
prescribed by central government without any calculation of 
local resources and needs. However the WCRSC, and not the 
central government, collects this revenue. 
The fact that RSC levies were initially set by the 
Minister of Finance was not conducive to devolution of 
powers. What has been occurring, however, is that various 
RSCs have been motivating for levy increases on the basis of 
their respective requirements. The WCRSC applied for, and 
was granted, an.increase in its turnover levy in 1989 from 
,01% to ,0115% in 1989, which increased its levy income by 
R9m per annum (The Argus, 31/5/1989). To date, no request 


















the Minister (Interview with Treasurer, WCRSC, 1991). There 
is,. accordingly, now increased diversity among RSCs' levy 
rates. This means that there has been a de facto shift 
towards a variant of item No. 2 on Mawhood's six-point 
scale, in the sense that there is now greater determination 
of local resources and needs of each ·RSC area. This 
indicates a greater degree of decentralisation. 
' .. 
When it comes to macro-financial control, inflation-
linked budgetary limits (see 9.5.2 Financial Control 
Procedure) do not apply to the WCRSC. The RSC's financial 
limit is the amount of revenue generated by its levies. In 
practice, the macro-control over the .WCRSC's budget is 
rather lenient, with no substantial objection having been 
raised by the Department of Finance in this regard 
(Interview with Treasurer, WCRSC, 1991). 
What are the reasons for this lenient supervision?. 
Firstly, WCRSC expenditure is virtually all capital in 
nature (with the exception of the. already-mentioned 1,97% 
administrative costs) and, as pointed out (in 9.5.1 Effects 
of Controls on CCC's Revenue Base), the Department of 
Finance tends to be much mare restrictive in terms of 
operating expenditure. Secondly, the index of access Gan 
help explain this mode of supervision (see 3.3 Access). 
Because RSCs exist to facilitate national objectives, they 
appear to have privileged access when it comes to central 
government's decision~making processes. This is reflected 
in more lenient macro-control, in comparison with that 
exercised over PI.As. 
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In terms of Davey's typology of financial discretion 
(see 3.6.3 Financial Discretion over Expenditure) the WCRSC 
was initially highly controlled in terms of scale, namely 
the amount of money it was allowed to spend. This was 
because the Minister of Finance set the rates of their 
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le~es. As pointed out, there is now greater flexibility in 
this regard, with the WCRSC having a certain amount of 
influence-over the. determination of levy rates. ·In terms of 
purpose, namely the objects on which it is allowed to spend 
money, the- WCRSC is circumscribed.. .A variant of item No .. 5 
on Davey's six-point scale of ~escending order of discretion 
is perhaps of most relevance here~ a local body is free to 
allocate money but only within total amo~nts prescribed for 
individual functions by higher tier government. The total 
amounts are not prescribed in financial totals, but rather 
laid down in legislation. Section 12(6) of the RSC Act 
states that priorities in terms of expenditure must go to 
infrastructural development in areas where the greatest need 
exists. In terms of these prescribed functions, however, 
the WCRSC has a fair degree of influence to determine 
policy. 
11.7 PERSONNEL CONTROL 
RSCs are subject to the provisions of the Remuneration of 
Town Clerks Act (see 7.5 Remuneration of Town Clerks Act of 
1984). This means that no senior official can earn a higher 
remuneration payable than that payable to the Chief 
Executive Officer of a RSC, which is one rank lower in 
f 
' r 
accordance with the general determination binding on the 
latter local authority. 
The chairman of the WCRSC is appointed by the central 
government. In practice most chairmen, including that. of 
the WCRSC, are NP office-bearers.·· This is not conducive to 
•. 
extensive devol\ltion of power, nor is the fact that RSCs' 
representatives are indirectly, rather than directly, 
elected (see 3.4 Other Personnel Indices). Conversely, it 
can be argued that the fact that the WCRSC took over the 
qualified staff corps of the Divisional Councils of the 
Cape, Stellenbosch and Paarl, is conducive to devolution .• 
The expertise of these· officials meant that WCRSC could 
handle its affairs with minimal central intervention. In 
particular, these officials were able to advise councillors 
and draw up criteria for the allocation of funds to where 
the greatest need existed. 
11. 8 CONCLUSION 
It was shown in this chapter that the WCRSC was formed in a 
way that facilitated national objectives and minimised 
possible opposition to this system. The WCRSC's potential 
autonomy was thus restricted from the outset. The WCRSC is 
circumscribed when it comes to the determination of its 
policy. Section 12(6) of the RSC Act decrees that priority 
must go to infrastructural development where the greatest 
need exists. Nevertheless, in terms of its restricted 
manoeuvrability, the WCRSC has a fair amount of autonomy to 
decide which areas are in the greatest need of upgrading. 





embody the spirit of section 12(6) of the Act. There is 
limited provincial hierarchical control over the functioning 
.of the WCRSC when it comes to the allocation of funds for 
upgrading. 
When it comes to financial control, there are elements 
of centralisation and devolution. T~e turnover levy is more 
elastic than rates as a source of revenue. 'Although the 
Minister of Finance- sets the levies. 0£_ RSCs, the WCRSC has a 
certain amount of influence on his decision, being able to 
recommend levy rates (which have hitherto always been 
accepted by the Minister) based on locai needs and 
resources. The Department of Finance appears to have rather 
lenient control over the budgets of the WCRSC. The WCRSC is 
restricted in terms of what it can spend its income on. 
In the field of personnel, the fact that the WCRSC 
chairman is appointed_ and that councillors are indirectly 
elected is not conducive to decentralisation. However, the· 
WCRSC has an experienced staff corps whose expertise means 











The objectives of this thesis were three-fold: 
i) to trace the evolution of the South African state's 
policy of devolution of powers to local authorities 
during the 1980s; 
ii) to examine critically the main features of new local 
government legislation, with particular reference to 
the devolution of powers policy; . 
iii) to apply ~· normative~·framework of analysis which can 
help determine the degree of decentralisation that has 
occurred in the cases of selected local authorities. 
In this Conclusion an overall assessment of these 
various objectives will be undertaken. For the sake of 
logical continuity, an evaluation will first be made of 
objective (iii); that is, the application of the .framework 
of analysis at local level and the comparison of the extent 
of autonomy of these respective local bodies. The 
observations reached here will form part of the overall 
assessment of the devolution policy, i.e. objectives (i) and 
(ii), which will be examined in the next two sect1ons. This 
will be followed by a postscript in which a brief look will 
be taken at local government developments in the 1990s. 
\ 
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12.2 EVALUATION OF THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
Appropriate elements of the framework of analysis were 
utilised in the thesis, primarily in the case studies. A 
limited number of indices were, however, applicable when 
looking at local government developments at national level. 
The major feature of the personnel index was the 
classification of three different types of personnel 
systems. It was pointed out (in 7.5 Remuneration of Town 
Clerks Act) that the linking of the remuneration packages of 
senior local authority staff to those of public servants 
introduced elements of the centralised integrated model on 
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local authorities generally, which affected both the CCC and '' 
WCRSC. In addition, it was shown (in 9.7.2 Effects of 
Remuneration of Town Clerks Act on the CCC) that the 
imposition of the MSC on the CCC led to the introduction of 
further components of the unified model, which is less 
centralised than the·integrated model but more centralised 
than the separate model. The ADMC, being administered by 
the CCC, did not have its own separate personnel corps. 
The other personnel index was whether councillors were 
directly or indirectly elected or nominated. The CCC and 
ADMC, being directly elected, must' be considered more 
decentralised than the indirectly elected WCRSC. 
The access index was found to be particularly useful. 
Indeed, the major thrust of the case study on the ADMC was 
that although this body was still an advisory structure, the 
ability of its members to influence C;loured poli~cians at 
='Yt'tf' Zfttr " s+.i!l4F!'1' 
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national level gave this structure a conduit through which 
its demands and problems could be addressed. Access per se 
was not sufficient to ensure greater influence. The major 
reason for this greater influence is because the interests 
of the government and Coloured and Indian political.parties 
converged on the issue of giving their local representatives 
greater say in the running of their affairs (see 10.3 The 
Tricameral Sy~tem: Greater Access for Management 
Committees/LACs). Various-manifestations of this greater 
access were discussed, including the fact that the House of 
Repres·entatives can intercede .on behalf. of. the ADMC when 
there is a dispute w·ith· the CCC; ADMC .with three MPs in its 
ranks could bring local. issues to national politicians who 
could take remedial action; if there is __ Ci __ <;iispute over a 
town-planning issue between ADMC and CCC, the Administrator 
has the final say and he tends to side with the former body; 
and House of Representatives funds for upgrading and housing 
could only be spent by the CCC in accordance with ADMC 
wishes. 
Similarly, in the .case of WCRSC, it was pointed out (in 
11.6 Financial control) tha~ecause RSCs were created to 
facilitate national objectives of the NP, they appear to 
have privileged access when it comes to central government's 
decision-making· processes. This is reflected in more 
lenient macro-control in comparison with that exercised over 
PLAs. 
Conversely, it was pointed out (in 9.8 The CCC's Local 
Option) that the CCC, being a primarily English-speaking 
institution with liberal anti-apartheid-policies, has had 
little influence on the NP whose new local government.system 
of the 1980s was premised on apartheid. This explains why 
the CCC's attempts to introduce its own local option in lieu 
of RSCs were abortive. 
For the function index, the major proposition utilised 
was that the more relevant functions (those that can be 
performed in either a devolved or delegated/deconcentrated 
fashion) that are handled -bY:---devolved method, the. greater 
the extent of decentralisation. For each of the case 
studies, this index was applied to an important function. 
It was pointed out (in 9.6 Town Planning) that -the CCC's 
land-use planning function is handled largely in a delegated 
and deconcent~ated way. The CCC has limited delegated 
powers, but most of the important functions are handled in a 
deconcentrated fashion, with the Administrator having the 
final decision. 
In the case study on the ADMC it was pointed out that 
in the instance of Bon~euwel, urban upgrading was handled 
in a devolved way with the chairman of this body playing a 
major role in determining priorities. However, in the case 
of Heideveld, priorities were almost exclusively decided by 
CCC officials, which can be classified as a form of 
delegation (see 10.11.2 Urban Upgrading). In the case study 











determine upgrading priorities have been devolved to the · 
. WCRSC. (see 11. 4 The Upgrading Process). 
Another aspect of the functions index that can be 
briefly mentioned is why certain relevant functions ended up 
at local level and others at central level. It was pointed 
out (in 4.5.l Reasons for Centralisation) that the need by 
the central state to implement apartheid meant large-scale 
central government control in all spheres of life, including 
.local authorities' functional.activities. For example, the 
Group Areas Act led to the central government zoning local 
~:authorities' residential neighbourhoods on a racial basis, 
--···~ .. --.. • -~-~~··· . - ·-·- ·~ •• - ~- .:_-e:_..;.,._ - ,______ •. . • 
·-·-while the Separate· Amenitie~-::.ftct :Provided .for -separate 
.. _' ':;."~¥:::>- . ::, ':. . :--;, .\'"." .· ... ·~: 
:~menities in, inter alia, local government areas of 
· --------~-jurisdiction. Both. these pieces. of .. legislation were still 
on the statute books at_the _~nd of the 1980s (although the 
new p·. W. de Kl erk government :scrapped both Acts in' the early 
·1990s}. 
The party politics index was applicable-~n the sense 
that ideas, information, experience and dernands-from 
grassroots can influence national policies. It was pointed 
out (in 10.11'.2 Urban Upgrading) that because the ADMC was 
LP-controlled, in the case of Bonteheuwel. local LP 
politicians could bring their demands to the attention of 
national LP politicians, .who took remedial action •. This 
point is, however, merely a_ variant of the .. broader argument 
about .the utility of the access index. The fact that the 
CCC was informally controlled by the PPP, and subsequently 
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the DP, meant that it did not have ready access to NP 
politicians in central government (see 9.8 The CCC's Local . . 
Option). The party politic·s index is not of utility in this 
instance, although a case could possibly be made for its 
relevance by reversing the proposition and suggesting that,. 
precisely because the CCC was informally controlled by the 
anti-apartheid PFP, it did not have ready access to NP 
politicians in central government. The WCRSC was not run on 
party-political grounds. The chairman of the WCRSC, Piet 
Loubser was, however, a senior NP member. There is little 
evidence to suggest t~at Loubser played the party-political 
card. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the WCRSC had 
already been established in a way that facilitated the 
achievement of party-political objectives· of the NP, viz. 
how to share power and redis~ribute wealth without losing 
control (see 11. 2 Formation of the WCRSC) . This, in turn, 
minimised the need for central party-political interference. 
One of the most important indices was that of finance. 
Three different sub-categories, namely the nature of the 
revenue base, elasticity of sources of revenue, and the 
amount of financial discretion in the use of revenue 
sources, were identified and utilised in the case studies on 
the CCC and the WCRSC (ADMC did not have their own sources 
of revenue, being dependent on the CCC for funds). 
When it comes to the nature of the revenue base, the 
CCC has the most autonomous form of local taxation, namely 
local financing. There are limits on its ability to vary 
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the rate of the tax, with permission needed from the 
Administrator to exceed the statutory limit of 2c per Rand 
for the rate levy. However, because the CCC was operating 
on an outdated 1979 general valuation roll in the late 
1980s, this permission tended to be a mere formality in its 
case. CCC's major source of income is its trading services, 
electricity and water. There are restrictions here, with 
only a 10% maximum surplus permitted to be made on these 
undertakings (see 9.5.5 Elasticity of the CCC's Tax Base). 
In the case of the WCRSC1, its regional services and 
establishment levies could initially be classified as a 
variant of the third-most autonomous form of local financing 
on the six-point scale, with the central government 
prescribing the levy rates without any calculation of local 
resources and needs. There has been a de facto shift 
towards the second-most autonomous form of l.ocal financing. 
The WCRSC has motivated for an increase in its turnover levy 
based on local requirements, which was accepted by the 
Minister of Finance. This indicates a greater degree of 
decentralisation (see 11.6 Financial Control). 
Regarding elasticity of the tax base, rates as a source 
of income is highly inelastic. The natural growth of the 
CCC's rate base was between 1,5 and 2% in the 1980s and this 
can be compared with consistent double-digit inflation 
during the same period. Also, at the end of the 1980s, the 
CCC was operating on valuation rolls based on 1979 market 
prices. This must be considered a reduction of the CCC's 
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autonomy (see 9.5.5 Elasticity of the CCC's Tax Base). In 
the case of the WCRSC, its establishment levy is relatively 
elastic, being more or.less constant with the inflation 
rate. On the other hand, because of the concern that the 
services levy would have a detrimental effect on job 
creation, it is the WCRSC's policy to hold the services levy 
rate constant. This means that it consciously kept this tax 
below the inflation rate (see 11.6 Financial Control). 
The final financial category is that of local authority 
financial discretion in respect of expenditure. Because of 
. 
macro-economic control exercised by the Department of 
Finance, the CCC is quite limited in terms of scale, that 
is, the amount of money that it is allowed to spend, 
particularly in respect of operating expenditure. It does, 
however, have greater discretion in terms of purpose: 
namely, the objects on which it is allowed to spend its 
money. In terms of Davey's six-point continuum in 
descending order of discretion, item No. 3 has a certain 
amount of applicability: the CCC may allocate money between 
different services but with a fixed ceiling on expenditure. 
Owing to the fact that the.Department of Finance controls 
the six or seven major operating items, a case can also be 
made for the applicability of item No. 5; namely that the 
CCC can allocate money but only with total amounts 
prescribed by higher tier governments for individual 
functions. There has been a shift from item No. 3 to item 
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No. 5 in the 1980s, indicating greater financial control , 
(see 9.5.7 Delegation of Financial Powers). 
In terms of scale, the WCRSC was initially tightly 
controlled. This was because the Minister of Finance set 
the rate of their levies. As pointed out, the WCRSC now has 
a certain amount of influence over the determination of levy 
rates. In respect of purpose, item no. 5 of the six-point 
scale is of relevance. The WCRSC is bound by section 12(6) 
of the RSC Act, which states that priorities must go to 
infrastructural development in areas where the greatest need 
exists. In terms of these prescribed functions, the WCRSC 
has, however, a fair degree of influence to determine policy 
(see 11.6 Financial Control). 
When it comes to CCC/CPA hierarchical relations, two 
distinct phases can.be identified. The first phase covers 
the early, and to a lesser extent the mid-1980s, an? can be 
classified as promotional, that is, local authorities 
executing functions under the close control and direction of 
a higher tier authority. The second phase can be classified 
as regulatory; an approach which concentrates on upholding 
statutory regulations while not intervening excessively in 
local affairs. This approach became pronounced in the late 
1980s when the CPA attempted to implement the government 1 s 
devolution of power policy (see 9.3 CCC/CPA Hierarchical 
Relations). The House of Assembly 1 s mode of supervision 
towards the CCC is, however, promotional (see 9.6.3 House of 
Assembly/CCC Intergovernmental Relations). 
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The CPA's mode of supervision over the WCRSC seems to 
be a combination of a laissez faire approach (namely, 
minimum intervention wi.thin the necessary fulfillment of 
' 
departmental duties} and a regulatory approach (see 11. 5 
Provincial Hierarchical Control). This index is not 
applicable to the ADMC, because Coloured structures. 
possessed only advisory and not decision-making powers over 
which supervision could be exercised. 
Another form of hierarchical control is De Forges' six 
administrative mechanisms through which higher tier control 
over local authorities' powers can be maintained, i~e. 
approval of decisions, directives/instructions, the power of 
suspension, the power of annulment, the power of reformation 
and the. power of substitution (see 3.7 Hierarchical Rela-
tions}. It was pointed out (in 9.4 Delegation of Powers) 
that the Administrator of the Cape and the Ministerial 
Representative for the Western Cape stil.l have all these 
powers over the functioning of the CCC. It was also shown 
(in 11.5 Provincial Hierarchical Control) that the Adminis-
trator has all these powers bar the power of substitution 
over the functioning of the WCRSC. In practice, there is 
more of a non-interference policy in respect of the WCRSC. 
It was pointed out in Chapter IX that certain of the CCC's 
decisions have been overturned by both the Administrator and 
the White Ministerial Representative, while in Chapter XI it 
was pointed out that the Administrator hitherto has not 














Another aspect of hierarchical relations which is of 
relevance to the CCC case study is that of ultra vires. It 
was shown that this doctrine is applied in a strict way. 
The CCC's attempts to adopt non-racial local government 
structures of its own choice were thwarted because these 
efforts were considered ultra vires by higher tiers of 
government (see 9.8 The CCC's Local Optionf. 
The size index was of limited relevance. It was 
pointed out in (4.2 Constitutional Framework) that South 
Africa was considered too large for a governmental structure 
consisting of central and local authorities only, hence the 
introduction of provincial structures which would supervise 
local governments. 
Which local body has the greatest degree of autonomy? 
At a rather general_ level it can be suggested that the CCC 
has not got as much power as initially presumed, while the 
ADMC and WCRSC have more than originally thought. 
At a more systematic level, one can compare the 
relevant indices across local authorities. One can there-
fore suggest that the WCRSC is more decentralised than the 
CCC in respect of personnel systems, because the head of the 
latter's personnel body was appointed by-the CPA. The 
directly elected CCC and ADMC are more decentralised than 
the indirectly elected WCRSC. The ADMC, in particular, and 
the WCRSC, have greater possibilities of influencing 
I 
national decision-makers than the CCC. The WCRSC's powers 
appear to be most decentralised when it comes to the major 
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functions of each body that was. examined. The process is 
somewhat uneven in the case of the ADMC, with this body-
having a large say in the upgrading of Bonteheuwel but 
little input in the upgrading of Heideveld. The CCC's land 
use planning function is still handled largely in a 
deconcentrated and delegated way. In terms of the party-
political issue, it can be suggested that because ADMC had 
access to LP national politicians who could take· action on 
their behalf, this body was more decentralised than the CCC. 
The latter body, having a large number of PFP councillors, 
could articulate its demands through PFP national 
representatives. However, anti-apartheid MPs had little 
influence on government in the 1980s. 
The CCC is more autonomous than the WCRSC in respect of 
the nature of revenue base, local taxation being more 
decentralised than the centrally set services levies and 
establishment levies. When it comes to the question of the 
elasticity of the tax base, the WCRSC's regional 
establishment levy is more elastic than the CCC's rates. 
The final financial category was that of local authority 
financial discretion over expenditure. It can be suggested 
that the CCC is more autonomous than the WCRSC when it comes 
to both the scale (i.e. the amount) of money it is allowed 
to spend and the objects on which it can spend its money. 
When it comes to hierarchical relations, the WCRSC 
appears to be more decentralised than the CCC. This is 









decentralised laissez faire and a regulatory approach over 
the WCRSC, compared to a combination of the less 
decentralised regulatory and promotional approach over the 
CCC. In addition, the House of Assembly exercises a 
promotional approach over the.CCC. Finally, De Forges' 
administrative controls over the functioning of local 
authorities are applied more tightly by the CPA over the CCC 
than the WCRSC. 
As an overall assessment it can be said, with reference 
to the framework, that none of these bodies has been vested 
with extensive devolution of powers. One can, however, try 
to pinpoint which local authority is the most autonomous. 
Over eight indices compared, the WCRSC is thus the most 
autonomous in respect of four dimensions, the CCC in two and 
ADMC in one, with the last two bodies also being equally 
autonomous in respect of being directly elected. 
Does this mean that the WCRSC is the most autonomous 
local body studied? The answer is inconclusive. Firstly, 
one of the limitations of the framework of analysis is that, 
due to the reasons outlined (in 3.9 Conclusion), only 
selected aspects of the framework could be utilised in the 
case studies. For example, while the WCRSC and ADMC may be 
more autonomous that the CCC when it comes to comparing one 
major function of each of these bodies, this cannot be 
extrapolated into a generalisation. Secondly, the.three 
local authorities that were examined are different types of 
local government structures. This also makes generalisation 
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difficult. Thirdly, are all these indices comparable in 
weight? It is suggested that some indices are more 
conducive to decentralisation than others. In particular, 
local authority financial discretion over expenditure is 
perhaps the most important index. The CCC, with the ability 
largely to determine spending priorities, can arguably be 
considered more decentralised than both. the WCRSC, which is 
circumscribed in terms of what' it can spend on, and the ADMC 
which has no powers but is able to call on national 
politicians to ensure that its wishes are carried out. 
In view of this, it is suggested that the framework of 
analysis is only useful to a limited degree. By pinpointing 
specific indices of decentralisation, it makes for a far 
more comprehensive analysis than the many unsystematic 
empirical accounts of the government's devolution policy. 
However, due to its limitations it can only partially 
. 
compare the degree of decentralisation between local bodies. 
12.3 DEVOLUTION, DELEGATION, DECONCENTRATION 
OR CENTRALISATION? 
In the light of the discussion of the framework of analysis 
in the previous section, has local government reform in the 
1980s then been characterised by devolution, delegation, 
deconcentration or centralisation? Before this question is 
answered, it must be emphasized that the conclusions reached 
here are based on the experiences of three major Cape local 
authorities. There was little coordination among the 
various provinces which were responsible for implementing 
452 
the decentralisation of powers down to the various local 
authorities. This means there could be, and has been, 
provincial differentiation in respect .of the degree of 
powers being decentralised down to local authorities. It 
was, in fact, pointed out (in.9.4 Delegation of Powers) that 
it appeared that the CPA had a. more centralist attitude 
towards local authorities than had the other provinces. 
This means that one must be cautious in extrapolating these 
data into general trends whl.ch ·.are applicable to the whole 
country. 
These shortcomings notwithstanding; it can be suggested 
that local government policy in the 1980s reflects elements 
of devolution, delegation, deconcentration and central-
isation. However, as already pointed out, very little 
devolution of power has occurred. Perha~s the major 
illustration here is that WCRSC councillors are able to 
determine upgrading priorities without central intervention. 
As pointed out, even this has limitations, because the WCRSC 
is obliged in terms of the principal Act to spend its money 
on specified functions (see 11.4 :The Upgrading Process). 
The major form of decentralisation has been delegation. It 
was pointed out that the CPA delegated various powers to the 
CCC, with land use planning being the most prominent 
example. However, this has tended to be a minor form of 
delegation, with a large number of powers still residing in 
the Administrator of the Cape (see 9.6 Town Planning). Some 
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of the powers that the ADMC has managed to acquire for 
itself can also be classified as being delegated. 
A good example of deconcentration is the large-scale 
powers held by the Provincial Administrators in regard to 
the operation of the RSCs. They have the powers, inter 
alia, to establish a RSC, to decide which local authorities 
are going to participate in it,. to appoint the chairman of 
the RSC, to decide which functions the council will perform 
and to determine which CBDs and industrial areas can be 
excluded from the RSC. In the case o·f the WCRSC, it was 
shown how the Administrator of the Cape·used his powers to 
ensure that this body was structured in a way to minimise 
any potential opposition to its operation (see 11.2 
Formation of the WCRSC) . Furthermore, a number of powers in 
respect of local authority activities are still held by the 
Administrator. It was pointed out that the Administrator 
still holds a number of important land use planning powers 
(see 9.6 Town Planning). 
The most prominent form of centralisation has been 
greater macro-economic control by t.he Department of Finance 
over expenditure of local authorities, particularly in 
respect of the operating budgets. This is clearly evident 
in the chapter on the CCC, where it was pointed out that 
such controls are unduly restrictive (see 9.5.1 Effects of 
Controls on CCC's Revenue Base). 
What is the balance between these various concepts? In 
the light of the foregoing discussion, it.can be suggested 
454 
455 
that delegation and deconcentration are-the most prominent 
forms of decentralisation, while elements of centralisation 
are also present. However, there are only limited mani-
festations of devolution evident. In conclusion, it can 
thus be suggested that although the government was committed 
to devolution of powers to local authorities in the 1980s, 
the examination of selected Cape local authorities has sho~n 
that minimal devolution has in fact occurred. 
12. 4 EVALUATION OF THE DEVOLUTION POLIC.Y . 
It was pointed out (in 6~10 Objectives of Devolution) that 
there were three main objectives of devolution of powers to 
local authorities: 
1. It was a mechanism through which group rights could be 
protected. 
2. It was an attempt to devolve highly contentious issues 
from central to local level, i.e. a conflict-defusing 
mechanism, and a way for th~central government to rid 
itself of local development problems. 
3. It was an attempt to introduce more cost-effective and 
efficient service provision through allowing decisions 
to be adapted to local conditions. 
It is suggested that the government has succeeded in 
none of these objectives and that there are, in fact, 
inherent contradictions between them. Devolution as a means 
of protecting group rights was not successful. Municipal 
election results for Blacks, Coloureds and Indians in the 
1980s showed that there was little enthusiasm amongst these 
groups for apartheid-based local authorities. It was shown, 
in the case.study on the CCC, that not all White local 
authorities were in favour of group-based solutions either 
(see· 9.8 The CCC's Local Option). 
Devolution as an. attempt to transfer highly contentious 
issues from central to local level, has been nothing short 
of calamitous. The chapter on BLAs showed how attempts to 
create independent local authorities in Black townships 
without financial resources led- to the resignation of . . -
councillors, the collapse of councils and an on-going rent 
boycott. Instead of ridding itself of local development 
problems, the state ended up with a direct assault on its 
ability to govern certain -townships (see 8.7 The 1984-86 
Urban Uprising against BLAs). There has also been little 
enthusiasm amongst Coloureds and Indian local off ice-bearers 
for Management Committees to accept extra powers, with such 
representatives seeing this as a step towards independent 
local authorities (see 10.6 ADMC/CCC Relations: 1984-1989). 
This brings us to a contradiction between the first two 
objectives. Efforts to decentralise powers on a group basis 
have in fact enhanced, and not reduced, conflict and have 
also contributed to the general failure of the government 
strategy of co-opting a multi-racial alliance to act as a 
bulwark against the forces of radicalism (see 6.2 Total 
Strategy). 
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The third objective, to .increase cost-effectiveness and 
efficiency at local level, has not been a success either. 
The introduction of the 'general affairs'/'own affairs' 
dichotomy has led to a duplication of ·functions, the 
creation of unnecessary structures and the inefficient use 
of resources. This objective also conflicts with the first 
objective of protecting group rights. In order to maximise 
group rights at local level it was necessary to create, from 
an administrative point of view, wasteful racially-based 
structures. 
Furthermore, as the case studies have shown, extensive 
devolution of powers to local authorities has not occurred. 
It is necessary to examine in more detail the reasons ~hy 
devolution as a policy has not succeeded. It was pointed 
out (in 2.11.2 Implementation Studies) that policies may 
fail during the implementation stage due to a whole variety 
of reasons. Some of these factors. are illuminating when 
analysing the devolution process in the 1980s. Lack of 
resources is one of the most important factors that 
prevented the successful implementation of the devolution 
policy. It was pointed out that apartheid cities meant that 
poorer Black, Coloured and Indian townships have been 
divorced from rate-generating commercial and industrial 
areas which are mostly controlled by richer White local 
authorities. Furthermore, general poverty means that most 
township dwellers reside in low-rateable, low-cost housing. 
These factors mean that there is insufficient revenue to 
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sustain most BLAs. The government's decision to establish 
BLAs without sufficient financial resources was the major 
cause of the violent opposition to these structures in the 
/ 
mid-1980s (see 8.7. The 1984-1986 Urban Uprising against 
BLAs). Although BLAs were resurrected in the late 1980s, 
they were still subject to the same financial limitations. 
In Coloured and Indian areas this lack of financial 
resources has contributed to the fact that no Coioured 
Management Committee in the country has evolved into an 
independent local authority~ This was shown in the chapter 
on the ADMC (see 10.5 ADMC/CCC Relations: 1984-1989). 
The introduction of RSCs in 1987 meant that poorer 
local authorities now had access to new sources of revenue. 
However, as the case study on the WCRSC showed, such funds 
are for capital development only; they cannot be used to 
subsidise operating deficits of BLAs. Until a more 
equitable division of revenue across cities occurs, this 
problem of finance is likely to persist. 
Another important ingredient of dev?lution is that of 
human resources. If local authorities are to be responsible 
for many functions they will require many more trained 
staff. In South Africa the shortage of trained staff has 
bedevilled attempts to create properly functioning local 
authorities. There are two different types of employee that 
have to be taken into consideration: skilled adminis-
trative/clerical staff and professional staff. Skilled 














municipalities. White staff often have to be employed in 
·senior administrative positions. This is not such a major 
problem in Coloured/Indian areas. Management Committees'/ 
' LACs' secretaries are trained in-house by White local 
authorities. If Coloured/Indian areas hived off from White 
local authorities and became independent they would have 
these trained staff at their disposal. 
Perhaps an even greater problem is the shortage of 
professional staff. Even smaller White local authorities 
have problems attracting staff of this calibre, let alone 
Black local authorities and any future independent 
Coloured/Indian local authorities. There are few·skilled 
Black, Coloured and Indian profes~ionals such as engineers, 
town planners and doctors. There is also a reluctance among 
people from this limited pool to work for independent local 
authorities, because of .the stigma attached to working for 
racial bodies. Moreover, there are better and more 
remunerative careers in the private sector. This was one of 
the factors that prevented the government from creating 
independent Coloured local authorities (see 4.7 Coloured and 
Indian Local Government). 
The calibre of councillors is another issue that 
warrants attention. Problems of illegal and unethical 
conduct by councillors have been a major issue in Black 
areas and have been prevalent in independent Indian local 
authorities too. In response to this shortage of human 
resources the government established the Training Board, 
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whose objective is to train local government officials and 
provide guidance to councillors. Although these measures 
are likely to ameliorate this lack of human resources in the 
long term, its effects were hardly felt in the 1980s. The 
identification of training needs and the introduction of 
training programmes alone took a couple of years (see 9.7.3 
Effect of Training Board's Activities on CCC). The proper 
training of all the relevant staff is likely to take a great 
deal longer. Also, the major problem of the lack of 
professional staff remains unaddressed. The problem of 
trained staff will remain a major problem under the neo-
apartheid framework which has attempted to divide powers and 
functions on a racial basis. 
It was also pointed out that implementation is more of 
a problem in the Third World than in developed countries. 
This is because in many of these countries, groups/indi-
viduals are excluded from the formulation stage of policy 
and can articulate their interests only during the 
implementation stage. Two examples of this phenomenon can 
be identified in respect of the devolutionary process in 
South Africa: 
i) the attitude of most Coloured Management committees to 
devolution of powers; 
ii) the resistance of many Black township dwellers to the 
BLA system. 
Firstly, one of the major problems in the implement-
ation of devolution of power has been the refusal of most 
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Management Committees to accept greater powers because of 
the concern that this was a step in the direction of 
independent racially-based local authorities. In 1988, 106 
functions were identified which could be delegated to 
Management Committees/LACS. However, very few Cape local 
authorities have accepted these powers because of this 
reason (see 10.5 ADMC/CCC Relations: 1984-1989). Similarly, 
in Natal a list of powers which could be vertically devolved 
to local authorities was drawn up and approved by the 
Provincial EXCO. This draft legislation was, however, 
rejected in the Natal Provincial Standing Committee by the 
Houses of Delegates and Representatives· because this 
devolutionary process was seen as an extension of racially-
based _policies (Interview with Director, NPA, 1988). It was 
also pointed out that the House of Representatives did not 
want the horizontal extension of powers, seeing this process 
as an extension of apartheid. Supervisory powers in respect 
of Coloured and Indian local authorities' 'own affairs' 
functions are accordingly still vested in the respective 
Administrators (see 10.2 Constitutional Relations). 
Besides token Coloured and Indian representation on the 
President's Council's Committee which examined options for a 
new constitution for the country (the LP in fact boycotted 
this body), the major 'collaborationist' Coloured and Indian 
political parties who in turn controlled most of the 
Management Committees/LACS in the country, had limited say 
in the formation of the,new constitution. 1 They disagreed 
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with the nee-apartheid objectives of the 1983 constitution, 
and because they had no say in its formulation they are 
using the implementation phase to frustrate the extension of 
this racial division of powers. 
It was shown in the case study on the ADMC that, 
although this body was initially in favour of acquiring 
extra decision-making powers, pressure from a number of 
quarters (including fellow Management Committees and 
elements of the LP caucus) caused ADMC to retreat from this 
request (see 10.5 ADMC/CCC Relations: 1984-1989). 
Another example of how individuals, who are excluded 
from the policy formation stage, can make their presence 
felt during the implementation stage was the case of BLAs. 
There was no Black input into the formulation of the new 
policy and little enthusiasm for these bodies: as evidenced 
by the generally low polls in 1983. It was only once they 
became functional, viz. during the implementation stage, 
that there was significant Black input on the outcome of 
this policy. Target group opposition was the major reason 
for the collapse of many BLAs. This was due both to 
opposition to imposed apartheid structures and to the fact 
that most of these bodies had to introduce steep rent and 
service charges to accrue sufficient revenue to perform 
their functions (see 8.7 The 1984-86 Urban Uprising Against 
BLAS) . 
It was pointed out (in 2.11.1 Intervention or Control) 
that there are limits to total control in an organisation. 
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All delegated tasks involve some discretion. This means 
that the attitudes of public bureaucrats, whose task it is 
to implement public policies, are an important contributory 
factor to the success of a policy (also see 2.11.2 
Implementation Studies). Departmental empire-building was a 
prominent characteristic of the Vorster·~ra (Geldenhuys, 
1984 : J74) and there is evidence that ·this trend. continued 
during the Botha years. 
Devolution was viewed as a threat to the powers of 
central and provincial departments and bureaucrats were, 
accordingly, half-hearted about implementing this policy. 
Alwyn Schlebush, then Minister in the State President's 
Office responsible for Administration~ said bottlenecks 
between levels of government had been caused by 
functionaries who were either unaware of cabinet guidelines 
on inter-authority relations or who shared a degree of 
resistance to the reducing of their powers. Two major 
groups of dissatisfied employees were identified: 
• CF-orientated ex-Development Board officials who 
objected to the government's reform programme, having 
lost powers and functions with the abolition of 
Development Boards and the introduction of fully-
f ledged BLAs; 
• those who resisted the loss of responsibility and job 
opportunities resulting from the creation of separate 
administrations for Coloureds and Indians. The 
introduction of these ethnic own Affairs Departments 
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meant that a number of jobs, which were previously 
handled by Whites, were now given to Coloureds and 
Indians. This means there are now no real career 
opportunities for Whites in these ethnic Adminis-
trations. This was a source of major discontent in the 
public service (The Argus, 8/9/1987; Sunday Star, 
13/9/1987; Heunis, 1988 : 208). 
It was also shown (in 9.4 Delegation of Powers) that 
CPA bureaucrats were reluctant to devolve extensive powers 
to local authorities because of the.fear that this would 
weaken their own powers. 
There is also evidence which suggested that reformist-
orientated bureaucrats hindered this devolution of power 
policy. Reformist-orientated DCDP officials on the Project 
team investigating the issue of devolution managed to dilute 
the horizontal transfer of powers to the White Minister's 
Council. They saw this process as an extension of, rather 
than a move away from, apartheid structures (see 7.19 own 
Affairs Administrations) . 
It was pointed out that policy goals are often 
multiple, conflicting and vague and that this frequently 
leads to problems during the implementation stage. When 
looking at the main features of new local government 
legislation (in 7.22 Evaluation of State Strategy) it was 
suggested that there was a certain amount of confusion 
amongst policy-makers about what exactly devolution entails. 
































with many components of new legislation reflecting 
deconcentration and delegation rather than devolution. This 
was corroborated when looking in all three case studies, 
with none of these local authorities being vested with 
extensive devolved powers. 
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There were, however, more substantial reasons than 
implementation problems for the reluctance of the NP to 
loosen the control strings over local authorities. Firstly, 
insecure governments with a narrow base of legitimacy are 
reluctant to devolve powers to local authorities because of 
the fear that they may be building up centres of opposition 
to their own rule. It was argued (in 6.1 Introduction) that 
reform policy in the 1980s was made in an elitist fashion; 
generally in order to ensure that the NP could share power 
without losing control. The corollary of this centralist 
policy-making was the tendency of the central government and 
its provincial adjuncts, for security reasons, not to 
devolve extensive powers to local authorities. This becomes 
clear in the chapter on the CCC (see 9.8 The CCC's Local 
Option) where an attempt by this local authority to 
introduce non-racial local government structures was 
thwarted by the central government beGause such an option 
was seen as being contrary to the group-based solutions that 
were deemed essential for continued White minority rule. It 
was also evident in the chapter on the WCRSC where this 
structure was set up in a way that facilitated national 
objectives (see 11.2 Formation of the WCRSC). Even if 
constituent local authorities did not agree with these 
objectives, there were sufficient safeguards to ensure that 
central government's will would be enforced ultimately. 
The second reason for centralised legislation was the 
viewpoint that the local government developmental process 
has to be controlled from the top because of the lack of 
sufficient skills, experience and finance at local level. 
It was shown (in 10.5 ADMC/CCC Relations: 1984-1989) that 
Management Committees could only be granted extra decision-
making powers after an investigation by the Administrator to 
determine whether such bodies were competent to perform 
these extra functions. Furthermore, it was pointed out (in 
8.3 BLA Act of 1982) that tte Minister of DCP had a wide 
range of powers at his disposal to ensure that local 
authorities behaved in an administratively responsible 
fashion. 
The third major reason for the continued need for 
central control was macro-economic objectives .. In the case 
of the CCC, it was shown that there has been little 
delegation of financial powers to this body. Rather, the 
most noticeable trend had been the centralisation of 
financial powers by the Department of Finance (see 9.5.7 
Delegation of Financial Powers). Similarly, in the case of 
the WCRSC it was shown how this body did not have the powers 
to set the rates for its levies (see 11.6 Financial 
Control). 
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A fourth reason for the failure of the NP to implement 
its devolution policy was its viewpoint that, in a unitary 
state, central government is responsible for final 
legislative authority (Thornhill, 1985 : 18) .. This implies 
a relative degree of control over local authorities' 
activities. This was evident in the case study on the CCC 
(see 9.4 Delegation of Powers). The CPA delegated, instead 
of devolving, powers to the CCC because of its viewpoint 
that, in terms of the country's unitary constitution, there 
should always be a higher approving authority. 
If these different reasons are weighted, it can be 
suggested that the first point - that of strategic 
objectives - was the most important obstacle to the 
extensive devolution of powers. As Mawhood (1983 : 253) 
puts it: "where a regime is struggling to survive - at a 
time of civil war, or active hostility between groups in the 
society - it is no time to think about decentralising 
power." 
Concluding then, the major reason for the lack of 
devolution of powers to local authorities in the 1980s was 
that many central and provincial NP politicians, in the face 
of increasing opposition to White minority rule, simply 
lacked the political will to support this policy whole-
heartedly. 
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12.5 POSTSCRIPT : LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE" 1990S 
This thesis concerns itself with the 1980s. An era has 
passed and with the initiatives of the new F.W. de Klerk 
administration there is a possibility that South Africa will 
advance to a more democratic system. 
Major Black political organisations, including the ANC 
and Pan-Africanist Congress (cited hereafter as PAC), were 
unbanned in February 1990. The NSMS system has been 
scrapped. 2 The government is committed to negotiating a 
political settlement with all Black political organisations 
in the country. It is committed to scrapping all vestiges 
of apartheid, including the Group Areas and Population 
Registration Acts, such indispensable pillars of the local 
government system of the 1980s. According to reports, Own 
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Affairs Departments are being downgraded and will eventually 
be scrapped (Sunday Star, 20/5/1990). Non-racial 
municipalities, taboo during the Botha/Heunis era, appear to 
be around the corner. The government has already committed 
itself to allowing representatives of all population groups 
on all levels of government, and on 13 December 1990 
President de Klerk announced his support for the "one city, 
one tax base" policy (The Argus, 15/12/90). 
A major investigation by the Coordinating Council led 
to the recommendation that five models of local government 
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i) separate local authorities for the population groups 
with own areas of jurisdiction, with the provision that 
racially separate cities would be allowed where 
financially viable; 
ii) a mini-RSC wi~h a joint administration constituted by 
autonomous local authorities and local bodies, which 
take some decisions together; 
iii) a Joint Local Authority constituted by neighbourhood 
Management Committees, •on a non-racial basis; 
iv) a simple majoritarian model with or without protection 
for minorities; 
v) any other local negotiated model. (RSA, Coordinating 
council, 1990). 
Models (i) and {ii) are variants of the current neo-
apartheid system, while models. (iii) to (v) make provision 
for the establishment of non-racial municipalities. This 
recommendation has been accepted in principle by the 
government and these models are currently being circulated 
for further comment. 
The previously banned ANC, which opinion surveys have 
consistently shown to have the greatest support amongst all 
South Africans, has also begun to develop its local 
government policy. While it is strongly committed to a 
unitary, central state, provision is made for democratically 
elected 16cal authorities. The extent of powers that these 
bodies are going to have remains unclear; concern has been 
expressed that such bodies will be little more than bodies 
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With delegated functions (Cameron, 1990). However, it is 
perhaps premature to make any final judgments about the 
ANC' s local government policy .• 
Devolution of power to local government seems to be 
receiving far greater priority on the part of the state in 
the 1990s. The older idea that White interests could be 
protected through the creation of federal regions is 
becoming less tenable in state circles as studies show that 
this group will be the minority in virtually every sub-
ordinate region anyway. 3 The·strategy that is increasingly 
coming to the fore is that Whites' interests can be strongly 
protected through decentralisation to small local government 
units which would control their own municipal services, 
schools and police. Although ostensibly non-racial, the 
richer units would, given past inequalities, be primarily 
White. With their own budgets and sources of revenue they 
could continue living in exclusive areas and not contribute 
to the upliftment of the poorer Black areas in the cities. 
This objective was not a major motivation for 
devolution in the 1980s, for the reason that the NP was not 
prepared to relinquish its power at central level. Under de 
Klerk, it appears that the NP is prepared to concede that it 
will no longer have an exclusive monopoly over central 
power. It acknowledges that Blacks will be the majority in 
a post-apartheid government. It still, however, would see 
itself as part of a future multi-racial ruling alliance. 









powers of a predominantly Black-run government, with 
devolution of power to local authorities being one of them. 
A major problem, even for a future· ANC-dominated 
government, is the ongoing rent boycotts in Black townships. 
The ANC may have sown 'dragon's teeth' for itself by 
supporting such campaigns. It is unlikely, even if a 
political settlement is reached in the foreseeable future, 
that large numbers of township residents are going to do a 
sudden turn around and become obedient rent-paying citizens. 
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Nevertheless, a great deal of negotiating and bar-
gaining over the form of. the post-apartheid local government 
system seems likely. What can, however, be said with 
certainty is that the elaborate 'general affairs'/'own 
affairs' system of the 1980s is going to be dismantled in 
the post-apartheid era, rendering some of the material of 
this thesis obsolete. Unfortunately, one of the hazards of 
conducting research in a rapidly changing society is that 
data are dated very quickly. 
Nevertheless, this nee-apartheid system is not going to 
disappear overnight. Even if a political settlement is 
reached in the early 1990s, administrative reorganisation 
will take longer to achieve. The Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act was promulgated in 1983, yet it took six 
years·for the Department of Local Government in the House of 
Assembly to assume supervisory powers over White local 
authorities. The time-consuming process of identifying and 
reallocating functions at a minute micro-level, and bureau-
cratic resistance to the loss of these powers, were the 
major reasons for this. Given that the nature of the public 
service (namely, its present operating procedures and 
predominantly white complexion in middle and senior.-
management) is likely to remain unaltered (at least 
initially) in a post-apartheid era, administrative ration-
alisation of the 1990s is going to be subject to the same 
constraints as those of the 1980s. The institutions 
described in this thesis are likely to remain for some time 
and the structures that .will.succeed them .will inevitably 
carry their birthmarks, making a measure of continuity - in 
substance if not in form - inevitable. 
Finally, although it is not its major aim, the thesis 
describes one important dimension of the state's crisis of 
legitimacy and the ruling NP's efforts at reform. Much of 
the literature dealing with South African politics generally 
has ignored or overlooked important and interesting 
developments in lower tiers of government. In its detailed 
analysis this thesis has, hopefully, shed light on these 
processes. 
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NOTES TO THE TEXT 
CHAPTER I: 
l. The terms 'local authorities', 'local government' and 
'municipality' are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
What exactly constitutes local government will be 
discussed in 2.2 Terminology. 
2. As will be shown in Chapter IV, Black local government 
has, until the 1980s, followed a different constitu-
tional and political route to that of White local 
government. There has been much greater central 
intervention over Black local government. 
3. As the NP policy moved from 'baasskap' (White 
superiority) towards a policy of independence for 
different Black groups, so did its terminology 
generally shift from racial divisions towards ethnic 
differentiation, without completely abandoning its 
previous nomenclature. This is not a concern of this 
thesis and the terms 'racial' and 'ethnic' are used 
interchangeably, although it must be pointed out that 
South Africa does not consist of racial or ethnic 
groups in a sociological sense. Furthermore, it is 
acknowledged that racial nomenclature is a hazardous 
minefield and South African 'official' designations 
sometimes cause offence to those designated; e.g. many 
Coloured people object to the label 'Coloured' and 
preface its use with 'so-called'. To avoid confusion 
this thesis uses official terminology. Accordingly, 
those classified as 'Coloured' will be referred to as 
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such. Likewise, the term 'Blacks' refers only to 
Africans and not, as is the practice in some circles, 
to all those categories previously designated as 'non-
white'. It must, however, be stressed that the use of 
official terminology in no way implies approval of it. 
4. A case study of an Asian local government in this 
region was not examined because of the fact that this 
group constitutes such a small percentage (about one 
percent} of the Western Cape population and is not an 
important political grouping in the region. 
CHAPTER II 
1. -Very little in the way of original material has been 
written on intergovernmental relationship theory in 
south Africa, with the partial exception of Hattingh 
(1986}. 
2. Some experts in the field argue that non-elected 
traditional forms of leadership such as village headmen 
can also be legitimate representatives of local 
communities (Mawhood, 1983 : 10}. 
3. Local government does not have a monopoly on these 
values, nor can local government be judged exclusively 
in terms of these three values (Stewart and Greenwood, 
1985: 9). A number of theorists argue that local 
governments should also embody the value of equity (see 
2.10.4 Equity/Territorial Justice}. 
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4. The current constitutional restructuring in Poland and 
Hungary has been characterised by a heavy emphasis on 
local government reform in order to curb the hitherto 
untrammelled powers of the ruling Communist parties. 
5. This criticism can be levelled at much of Public Choice 
theory (see Ostrom, 1973 : 75-81). 
6. A similar argument has been made in recent times by 
Page (1981), albeit not in such an extreme form. He 
questioned the proposition of whether increased central 
control is necessarily a bad thing and, conversely, 
whether local autonomy is.a good thing. 
7. Panter-Brick (1954 : 346-347) argues the reverse; viz. 
that local government has been historically associated 
with democracy. However, it has already been pointed 
out that this proposition is not true. For a further 
refutation of Panter-Brick's argument see Moulin (1954 
: 433-437). 
8. The somewhat controversial area of which countries 
exactly fit the criteria of being federalist is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. The author will confine 
himself to federal states which show a genuine attempt 
to divide powers between the various tiers of govern-
ment. This will exclude, inter alia, the pseudo 
federalism of the USSR. 
9. In reality, as smith (1981 137) points out, this is 
not the case due to a number of factors such as the 
large number of deputies who constitute a Soviet and 
the infr,equency of their meetings. 
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10. However, sometimes the problem is not size per se; 
large rural local authorities are often sparsely 
populated and lack a sufficient revenue base.· Paddison 
(1983 : 259-260) also discusses the problem of frag-
mentation of local authorities in more detail. 
11. This usage of these terms follows that of the CCC's 
(1982 : 54). Effectiveness is the extent to which the 
objectives of the task have been achieved while 
efficiency is the optimal use of resources to achieve 
this objective. · Efficiency is quantifiable but, as 
indicated in the text, effectiveness cannot always be 
measured. It is also therefore theoretically possible 
to be inefficient and effective. For example, subsi-
dised rates for civic halls is an inefficient use of 
resources, but effective in the sense of promoting 
civic awareness. 
12. This argument has, however, already been refuted when 
looking at the liberty/democracy value of local 
government (see 2.3.l Liberty/Democracy). 
13. There is a certain viewpoint which posits that all 
grants undermine autonomy. The argument is that if a 
local authority is self-financing, the taxation level 
can be adjusted to balance with expected expenditure 
needs. This is not possible if a local authority 
relies on a higher tier of government for its revenue 
sources. This argument is not without merit (see 3.5 
Finance and Autonomy) but it does not change the fact 
that it is possible for a certain amount of local 
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autonomy to co-exist alongside central government 
subsidisation. 
14. This debate is sometimes couched in terms of rational 
vs. incremental decision-making models (Ham and Hill, 
1984 : 76-94). 
15. Attention will be focused primarily on the African 
experience, with particular reference to former British 
colonies. Most countries in tropical Africa (including 
South Africa) are erstwhile British colonies. 
. . 
16. Decentralisation is also used to promote national unity 
in the Third World (see 2.9 National Unity). 
17. For a more detailed account of some of the varieties of 
mixed models, see Conyers {1983 : 123-124). 
CHAPTER III 
CHAPTER IV 
1. For an excellent account of the development of local 
government in the various colonies prior to Union in 
1910 see Green (1957). 
2. Constitutional gerrymandering by the NP in the 1950s 
led to the abolition of the last vestiges of non-racial 
representation at central level, i.e. the Cape Coloured 
franchise. 
3. In reality, this meant that during the pre-1980 era the 
electoral divisions for members of the House of 
Assembly and Provincial Councils were coincidental in 
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the Cape Province and Transvaal, not coincidental in 
the Orange Free State and initially not coincidental 
but later coincidental in Natal. 
4. Police protection has never been a local government 
function. Education was initially a provincial 
functipn but, as pointed out in 4.3 The Provincial 
System, policy-making in respect of this function was 
taken over by central government. Social welfare was 
also initially a provincial function, but was also 
taken over by central government in 1940. Before this 
the provincial administrations had in fact delegated 
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much of the work of social welfare to local authorities 
( F 1 oyd , 19 5 2 : 5 2 ) . 
5. There are different types _of provincial rating systems, 
the examination of which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
6. The major reason for this was the inelasticity of 
rates, which was discussed in 3.6.2 Elasticity of Tax 
Base. 
7. The UP was the official opposition in the House of 
Assembly. It had been the government until its defeat 
by the NP in 1948. 
8. The industrialisation/decentralisation policy was an 
attempt to promote industry in areas where the 
government wanted economic growth for ideological 
reasons, e.g. Black homelands and Coloured resettlement 
areas such as Atlantis in the Western Cape (see Zille, 




9. There was provincial variation in respect of control 
over local authorities~ This summary will concentrate 
. ' 
on the general provincial practice with a slight bias 
in favour of the Cape practice, seeing that the case 
studies are on Cape local authorities. The more· 
specific controls will be discussed in these case 
studies. 
10. A full discussion of valuation procedures is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It can just be mentioned that 
Valuation Courts are quasi-judicial bodies with powers 
to determine valuation rolls and to hear valuation 
appeals. 
11. This was not required by Divisional Councils. Each 
Divisional Council approved its own conditions of 
employment. 
12. Indians were denied rights of residence ~n the Orange 
Free state ,;and had to obtain permission to travel 
through it! 
13. Natal Provincial Ordinance 21 of 1942 provided that 
only Indians whose names appeared on the parliamentary 
voters' roll before 1 July 1924 could be registered as 
municipal voters in that province and could also be 
elected to a town council (RSA, President's Council, 
1982B : 22), 
14. These powers were later transferred to the Minister of 
Coloured Affairs and then to the Minister of Internal 
Affairs. 
15. Colo~red citizens who were registered municipal voters 
in October 1971 in the Cape could, however, retain 
their franchise provided that a Management Committee 
had not yet been created in their area. In Natal it 
was decided in 1956 that no new Coloured names could be 
added to the voters' roll. This, together with the 
already mentioned restrictions on Indian voters dating 
back to 1924, effectively disenfranchised Coloured and 
Indian voters (RSA, President's Council, 1982B : 18-
23) • 
16. There is one independent Coloured local authority in 
Pacaltsdorp, but it did not arrive at this position via 
the Management Committee route .. It had been under the 
control of its own Village Management Board since 1886 
and became independent in 1975 (RSA, President's 
Council, 1982A : 20). 
17. The CPRC was a representative body for Coloureds at 
central level, having merely advisory powers. With its 
dissolution in 1979, these powers reverted ta the 
Provincial Administrations (RSA, President's Council, 
1982A : 28). 
18. ASSOMAC is the representative body for Coloured and 
Indian Management Committees in the Cape. 
CHAPTER V 
1. This thesis concentrates on urban Black local 
authorities in 'White' South Africa. An examination of 
local structures in trust lands (areas earmarked for 
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incorporation into homelands} and homelands is beyond 
its scope. 
2. This was introduced to provide a measure of protection 
for Blacks against unqualified or unscrupulous local 
authority officials (Welsh, 1979 : 137-138}. This was 
rather ironical because, as will be pointed out, such 
officials became notorious for their heavy-handed 
treatment of Blacks, particularly in respect of 
enforcing influx control. 
3. Maud, in his seminal work on city government in 
Johannesburg, shows how little influence Blacks had on 
Johannesburg city_ policy. He argues that "during the 
first 50 years of the town's existence, the White 
section of Johannesburg had assumed, without realising 
it, the responsibilities of a trustee for the non-
European half of the population" (Maud, 1938 : 200} . 
. 
Nevertheless, despite its minimal-powers, major Black 
organisations did use advisory boards for tactical 
reasons, to a limited degree. For example, the African 
National Congress (cited hereafter as ANC} fought 
Advisory Board elections in the 1950s (Stadler, 1984 · 
112} . 
4. There were also strong financial controls which will be 
discussed in 5.7 Financing of Black Areas. 
5. Because Community Councils existed well into the 1980s, 
more attention is given to these bodies than was given 
to its predecessors. 
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·6. Davenport (1987 : 551) points out that in 1963 the 
government limited Black trading in townships through 
the introduction of a _"one man one shop" policy and the 
prohibition of trading in all but the essential 
domestic necessities. 
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6. Because powers could be reviewed by the Minister at the 
end of each year, it can also be cogently argued that 
the form of powers Community Councils had was delegated 
because they could be revoked. However, because 
theoretically they could get final decision-making 
powers, and there was also a need to distinguish 
between these transferred powers and the delegated 
system of local authority control, it was decided to 
give Community Councils the benefit of the doubt and 
call these form of powers devolved. 
CHAPTER VI 
1. Policy content cannot be totally divorced from a 
discussion of the policy process. However, to include 
both these areas of discussion in a single chapter 
would have proved too bulky and cumbersome. Although 
policy content is briefly mentioned in this chapter, it 
will be dealt with comprehensively in the next two 
chapters. The dynamics of implementation will be dealt 
with in the respective case studies and to a lesser 
extent in Chapter VII. 
2. This does not mean that policy was carried out in a 
rational-comprehensive fashion, nor does it mean that 
the state is capable of perfect implementation. It 
also does not mean that policy-making is easy and un-
contentious and capable of being easily solved in an 
environment of inter-bureaucratic power struggles 
(O'Leary and Dunleavy, 1987 : 190). 
3. A similar argument has been made by Atkinson (1987), 
albeit from different theoretical premises. Instead of 
using the elite theory model, she utilises Foucault's 
concept of the Panopticon to illustrate how the DCDP 
controlled the reform process during the 1980s. 
4. It has been reported that the government has been 
following Harvard political scientist Samuel 
Huntington's agenda of reform by stealth. In 1981 
Huntington suggested a strategy the South African 
government should adopt if it wanted to embark on 
fundamental reform in the country. He argued that what 
was needed was a combination of a Fabian gradualist 
approach and Blitzkrieg tactics. The Fabian strategy 
enables reformers to pacify conservatives by minimising 
the significance of any one change and by implying that 
each proposed change will be the last. Blitzkrieg 
tactics, on the other hand, are needed to ensure the 
success of each individual reform. The proposed reform 
is drafted in relative secrecy. It is revealed to a 
small group of political leaders, whose support is 
essential to its success, and then at the appropriate 
moment it is unveiled dramatically. Political support 
for it is galvanised and the reform enacted quickly 
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before its opponents can collectively mobilise and 
organise themselves to stop it (Huntington, 1981). 
Although Huntington's thesis and this elitist policy-
making may have· overlapped in certain aspects, this was 
coincidental. There is no documentary or oral evidence 
to substantiate this claim that the South African 
government was following Huntington's strategic reform 
plan. 
5. These factors are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
6. This is also beyond the scope of this thesis. 
7. The evolution of BLAs in the 1980s is discussed in 
Chapter VII. 
8. The policy to reduce the costs of the public service 
has been a failure. Although state departments were 
cut from 39 to 22, as Marais (1989 : 22) points out, it 
did not involve the integration of existing depart-
ments; rather, it just meant combining departments into 
larger groups. This contributed to the fact that 
contrary to intentions, the public service grew by 
almost 20 percent in the 1980s (The Argus, 25/2/1988). 
9. These intentions were not embodied in practice. In the . 
pre-'general'/'own' affairs era, the sensitive, 
apartheid departments of DCD (which administered Black 
affairs) and Community Development (which administered 
Group Areas) were both headed by conservative Director-
Generals. 
10. This had occurred during the 1976 urban riots. 
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11. This intention was confirmed by the leaked letter of Dr 
Grabler, the Chief Information Officer of the NP, to Dr 
Treurnicht, leader of the right-wing rebels in that 
party. In the letter he stated, "Doctor, I would very 
much like to know your position on the idea that we 
must at all costs attract the Coloureds as a block of 
2,5 million people to the Whites to broaden our power 
base and not to deliver them to the 'Black Power' 
situation" (cited in Pottinger, 1988 : 139-140). This 
letter in fact precipitated the split in the NP. 
12. During the first five years· of the tricameral system, 
virtually every general bill rejected by the Houses of 
Representatives and Delegates and referred to the 
President's Council were assented to by this body (with 
the notable exception of the Group Areas Amendment 
Bill). 
13. "'Own affairs' are matters which specifically or 
differentially affect a population group in relation to 
the maintenance of its identity and the upholding and 
furtherance of its way of life, culture, traditions and 
culture" (RSA, Republic of South Africa Constitution 
Act No. 110 of 1983, section 14). 
14. Sections 14(1) and (2) of the Constitution specifies 
what 'own affairs' matters are. See Note 13 for more 
detail in this regard. 
15. The White Department of Local Government only in fact 
assumed these powers in 1989 (see 9.5.2 Procedure for 
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By-Laws).. The Coloured and Indian houses did not want 
these powers (see 10.2 Constitutional Relations). 
16. Although Lombard and Croeser both pushed for de-
politicisation, it would be incorrect to paint them 
with the same brush. Lombard's rampant free-
marketeerism and his concomitant rejection of 
subsidisation of local authorities (ASSACOM 1985) 
compares starkly with Croeser's call for subsidisation 
to a level of minimum realistic standards (Croeser, 
1985 18). As we will later examine, it was the 
latter position that prevailed. 
17. These Joint Service Commissions must be considered the 
precursors of RSCs. 
18. In 1981 P.W. Botha announced that the country was to be 
divided into eight (later nine) development regions, 
for the purpose of regional economic development. 
RDACs were formed in each of these regions to advise 
the government on regional development matters and to 
coordinate such regional issues on a localised 
geographical basis. They had no executive powers and, 
as pointed out in the text, resided under the control 
of the DCDP (Cameron, 1986B : 197-199). 
19. Marais suggests that this depoliticisation involved 
introducing reform-orientated NP supporters at senior 
level. However, it would probably be more accurate, 
particularly in the case of the DCDP, to say that among 
these reform-orientated recruitments were NP and PFP 
supporters as well as non-aligned technocrats. 
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20. One interviewee went so far as to say that P.W. Botha 
ruled through a reign of terror. 
21. This is a synonym for Orwell's 'doublespeak' . 
22. After the 1988 municipal elections, the majority of 
local authorities in the Transvaal were under CP-
control. 
23. The argument that the Commission for Administration is 
of importance in the policy-making process (Swilling 
and Phillips, 1989 14-16) was not borne out by the 
empirical research of this author. Although the 
Commission was responsible for the implementation of 
the government's policy of decentralisation of power to 
local government level, there is little evidence to 
suggest that this body has affected the outcome of this 
policy in any significant way. The Commission is 
committed to the principles of 'scientific management' 
and its recommendations were made in line with these 
guidelines. What can be said about the Commission is 
that it determines operating procedures in the public 
service which tend to be rule-bound, rigid and 
inflexible. Although it has a conservative adminis-
trative approach the Commission, unlike the DCDP, did 
not appear to have a political agenda. 
22. This concept was developed by the counter-revolutionary 
theorist J.J. Mccuen who argued that revolutionary 
threats could be defused through material upgrading. 
This involved pouring financial and human resources 
into upgrading the most severely neglected areas into 
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showpieces. Such areas were called 'oilspots' (see 
Mccuen, 1966). 
CHAPTER VII 
1. Not all new local government legislation is examined in 
this chapter. Only those Acts which relate to the 
devolution policy are dealt with.· 
2. RSCs were not created ·in Natal because of the 
opposition of the KwaZulu government, a self-governing 
homeland, to the top-down way in which these bodies had 
been established, the plutocratic voting arrangements 
and the fact that RSC representatives were nominated by 
racially-based local authorities (McCarthy, 1988 : 47). 
Seeing that the government was attempting to woo the 
KwaZ~lu government in its multi-racial alliance against 
the forces of radicalism, it agreed not to establish 
RSCs in Natal. Joint Services Boards along the lines 
of RSCs were subsequently established, but with the 
pivotal role of the Administrator being assumed by the 
Joint Executive Authority which consisted of repre-
sentatives of the NPA and KwaZulu government and which 
performed certain executive functions. 
3. Black local government was transferred to DCDP in 1985. 
This issue will be discussed in 8.7 The 1984-1986 Urban 
Uprising Against BLAs. 
4. This was a continuation of the long-standing refusal of 
most White local authorities to subsidise their Black 
Revenue Account. It was pointed out in 5.7 The 
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Financing of Black Areas that by 1971 only 21 out of 
the approximately 400 White local authorities had been 
subsidising these accounts. 
5. The issue of whether white local authorities have in 
fact resisted attempts to redistribute wealth to poorer 
areas will be taken up in 11.4 The Upgrading Process in 
the case ~~udy of the WCRSC. 
6. The issue of whether RSCs are being controlled from the 
top or bottom will be examined in Chapter XIw 
7. What functions were in fact transferred will be 
examined in 11.3 Functional Operation in the case study 
on the WCRSC. 
8. There were also clauses affecting the operation of 
Black local government. These will be discussed in 8.7 
The 1984-1986 Urban Uprising Against BLAs. 
9. Such draconian legislation does not exist in other 
provinces. For example, although the Transvaal 
ordinance makes provision for the Administrator to fire 
councillors this is only for specific cases of 
misconduct. The effect of this legislation on CCC/ADMC 
relations will be discussed further in 10.8 Reactional 
Power - Ordinance No. 3 of 1986. 
10. Farmers are often self-sufficient in respect of certain 
services and therefore have no real need to be 
incorporated into a local authority. 
11. In December 1989 the Department of Finance was 
restructured. The Public Finance branch was scrapped 
and was replaced by a Financial Relations branch which 
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had a section in charge of intergovernmental relations 
(Cape Times, 16/12/1989). 
12. Since the introduction of the new provincial system in 
1986, the provinces have been treated by the central 
government in the same way as state departments. 
Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial Auditor was 
abolished and the province is now subject to the 
' 
control of the Auditor-General, just like all other 
state departments. 
13. The issue of the 1988 municipal elections will be taken 
··up further in 8.9 1988 Municipal Elections. 
CHAPTER VIII 
1. Precisely because of this reason, Riekert was included 
in this chapter on Black.Local Government in the 1980s. 
2. The Report was also strongly critical of the DCD acting 
as a 'public service within a public service'. During 
B.J. Vorster's tenure as Prime Minister the Department 
had assumed overall responsibility for the adminis-
tration of virtually all facets of urban Black life. 
It recommended that specific functions be transferred 
to the relevant functional departments, e.g. Sport, 
Justice (RSA, Riekert, 1979 : 208-209). 
3. It is i~teresting to note that this was a function 
which White local authorities did not have (with the 
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exception of Durban, which had a small municipal police 
force) . 
4. In an interview in 1989 Minister Heunis, who was 
chairman of the Standing c.ommi ttee on the Constitution 
which dealt with the bill, admitted that it was a 
mistake to set BLAs adrift without adequate financial 
resources. He also intimated that Dr Koornhof wanted 
to push the Act through for this strategic reason of 
defusing conflict. 
5. There was an attempt to get a parallel President's 
Council body, deemed a Black Council, off the ground, 
but this was even rejected. by homeland leaders (Mare, 
1983 : 30). 
6. It is sometimes suggested that this uprising was also 
prompted by the exclusion of Blacks from the tricameral 
system. However, there is little evidence to sub-
stantiate this claim. In substantial reviews of the 
urban township revolts neither Swilling (1987) nor 
Seekings (1988) makes any reference to this reason 
making a major contribution to the unrest. Another 
reason for the unrest was advanced by the government, 
which argued that there was an orchestrated plot by 
revolutionaries to make the townships ungovernable. 
The evidence, however, suggests that many of these 
campaigns were in response to crises in local urban 
service delivery rather than any orchestrated effort to 
make the townships ungovernable (Swilling, 1987). 
7. Certain other local authorities were nominally 
functioning, but from the safety of secluded high 






8~ It seems that ·economic reasons were initially the major 
reasons for the boycott. Chaskalson et al (1987 : 58) 
argued that the use of rent boycotts as general weapons 
of protest around national demands only really took off 
in mid-1986. Notwithstanding, economic reasons still 
remained the major mass-based reason for the boycott 
during the 1980s. According to a survey in Soweto by 
Frankel in 1987, 83% of respondents referred to socio-
economic conditions as reasons why the community 
supported the boycott (cited in Planact, 1989 : 25-26). 
9. Most rent increases announced in mid-1984 were 
suspended after the violent protests (Chaskalson, et 
al., 1987 : 62). 
10. As will be examined later, the government soon intro-
duced measures to ensure that Black local government 
administration became operational. 
11. A major reason for this was a belated recognition by 
the government that it was morally undesirable to sell 
liquor in order to render services to the Black 
community (see HAD., 25/6/1986 : Col. 19976). 
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12. Provisions of this sort were included in the 1977 
Community Council Act, but were inexplicably omitted in 
the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act (HAD., 12/6/1985 : 
Cols. 7376-7). 
13. The Department of Development Aid, the successor to the 
DCD, retained responsibility for the south African 
Development Trust land and rural development, while the 
manpower functions went to the Department of Manpower. 
All other functions went to the DCDP. 
14. In reality, only a small proportion of Blacks who had 
been denationalised through the independence of 
Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda regained 
their South African citizenship (Budlender, 1990 69). 
15. This concept of city states had been thoroughly 
investigated by the Cabinet committee on Constitutional 
Affairs in the 1980s and was found to be unviable for 
political, economic and administrative reasons. This 
had been accepted by the NP. It is speculated that 
this idea had been resurrected by P.W. Botha at the 
instigation of securocrats who felt that Black 
uprisings could be more effectively controlled if they 
were isolated in townships rather than being dispersed 
in urban areas as a whole (Interview.with former senior 
DCDP official, 1991). 
16. The Promotion of Constitutional Development Act of 1988 
made provision for such a forum. This National council 
concept which had first been mooted by P.W. Botha in 
1986 had been delayed due to the refusal of legitimate 
African leaders to participate (Swilling, 1988C : 91). 
17. It has been suggested that the state had been slow to 
react to this challenge to its power in a more 
systematic fashion because of the power struggle 
between reformists and militarists that was_ occurring 
in the 1984-1986 period (Phillips et al, 1988 : 29-30). 
(Also see 6.6.3 Minister Heunis's Personality). 
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, 18. This occurred in spite of JMC attempts to obstruct 
talks (Planact, 1989 : 27). 
CHAPTER IX 
1. The CCC's Black population was comprised of Langa, 
Guguletu and KTC. Langa and Guguletu fell under CCC 
control prior to 1971 and now form part of the Ikapa 
Town Council. The more recently established KTC 
squatter camp also falls within the CCC's boundaries. 
Its services are provided directly by the CPA. 
2. Central legislation and control procedures applying to 
the whole cbunt~y have been de~cribed in Chapter VII 
and will not be repeated here. There are, however, 
certain provincial ordinances and control procedures 
which apply exclusively to the Cape and are best 
desc!ibed in this chapter. There are also certain 
control measures which are shared between the central 
government and CPA and are also best suited to this 
chapter. 
3. The CPA restructured its Department of Local Government 
in 1987 to accommodate Black local government which had 
been transferred to it (see 7.18 Provincial Government 
Act of 1986). The Department of Local Government was 
/ 
now called the Community Services Branch. It had two 
main directorates, the one being that of Chief 
Directorate: Local Government and the other being Chief 
Directorate: Community Development. The former direc-
torate performed the functions previously performed by 
the Department of Local Government, while the latter 
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directorate dealt with Black local government (CPA, 
1987A : 29). 
4. The Department of Local Government, House of Assembly 
has been, since 1/4/1989, responsible for the super-
vision of many CCC activities·. This thesis only covers 
nine months of the intergovernmental relationship 
... 
between it and the CCC, so it is difficult to examine 
this issue in the same way as was·done with the CPA. 
However, in 9.6.3 House of Assembly/CCC Intergovern-
mental Relations certain emerging aspects of this 
department's supervisory style will be examined. 
5. There has been little co-ordination between provinces 
when it comes to decentralising powers to local 
authorities. This.is reflected in provincial variation 
in the scope and nature of powers that have been 
decentralised to local authorities. 
6. Since the transfer of certain supervisory powers to the 
Department of Local Government, House of Assembly in 
1989, this process of examining the ordinance for 
further delegations is being handled by a joint 
CPA/House of Assembly committee. At the end of the 
1980s they were examining the ordinance for further 
delegations. However, the delegations referred to here 
were all undertaken by the provincial committee. 
7. This can be compared to the Natal Provincial Adminis-
tration's (cited hereafter as NPA) more laissez faire 
approach. In 1985 the NPA dispensed with the need for 









amendments thereto, except in those instances where 
representations or objections have been lodged and the 
by-law is not amended or modified to meet such 
representations and objections (NPA, 6/9/1985, Clause 
54). According to Dr Donald Craythorne, senior CCC 
official and author of the authoritative textbook 
Municipal Administration, the Transvaal and OFS 
provincial administrations have also devolved more 
powers to local authorities than the CPA has done in 
, the Cape (Interview, 1990). 
8. The major cities consist of the Town Clerks, 
Treasurers, Executive Chairman and Mayor of the five 
large cities, namely Cape Town; Port Elizabeth, 
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban. They meet twice or 
three times a year an a 'need to' basis and make policy 
recommendations to the Management and Executive 
Committees of the cities, UME and the Coordinating 
Council. 
9. The Valuation Courts are quasi-judicial bodies and deal 
with appeals in respect of appeals. In the Cape, a 
Valuation Court is appointed for every Divisional 
Council area. It consists of the magistrate for the 
area or a magistrate appointed by the Administrator, 
one member appointed by the Administrator and one 
member appointed by each local authority within the 
region (Craythorne, 1990: 350). 
10. It may be questioned why rates as a percentage of total 
revenue have in fact risen slightly in the 1980s if the 
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1979 valuation roll was so out of date. This is 
because the rate (levy) in the Rand has been adjusted 
way beyond the two percent statutory maximum in order 
to generate the needed revenue. 
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11. This issue has been a major source of complaint from 
local business organisations in the 1980s. A major 
reason for these high rates that the.CCC has the 
majority of its poorer citizens, namely Coloureds, 
under its control; 38 ooo of the CCC's 147 000 
ratepayers - 26% - stay in low-income housing schemes 
(Cape Town Bulletin, April/May 1987 : 8). In the other 
major metropolitan areas, the majority of the poorer 
population consist of Blacks, who have separate self-
financing BLAs (see Cameron, 1986B: 87-88). It must, 
however, be pointed out that these formal statistics do 
not take account the contribution of these poor 
citizens in their capacities as workers and consumers 
make to the coffers of the city. 
12. This was the position that had existed before. 
13. This section must not be considered an in-depth look at 
the intricacies of land use planning. Rather it 
concentrates on how this process of devolution of power 
has affected the CCC's autonomy in this regard. 
14. According to CPA interviewees, Minister Heunis had in 
fact pressured the institution to transfer powers as 
soon as possible to the House of Assembly., This was to 
mollify right-wing supporters of the government, who 
saw the 'own affairs' concept as a mechanism for 
protecting Whites' rights. 
15. The CPA had in fact argued that local government must 
be considered a 'general affairs' aspect of community 
development. Accordingly, no local government powers 
should be transferred to the 'own affairs' ministries. 
16. Durban, Pretoria and Johannesburg all have MSCs, but 
none of them was comparable to the CCC model. In 
Durban the City Council can establish or abolish the 
MSC without interference from the Administrator. In 
the Transvaal there is no legislative enactment 
providing for the establishment of the MSC. This means 
that the MSCs of Johannesburg and Pretoria are not 
controlled by provincial ordinances (CPA, de Klerk, 
1975 : 13-17). 
17. In the 1988 municipal elections the CP captured a 
number of smaller local authorities in the province. 
18. The whole question of CPMA and UME influence on local 
government policy-making needs more systematic 
investigation along the lines of Rhodes (1986). 
CHAPTER X 
1. Mitchells Plain Management Committee, which was 
established in 1990, is now the biggest in the country. 
2. Four further Management Committees in the CCC's area of 










3. To dispel the possible impression that ADMC minutes 
were not adequately researched, it must be pointed out 
that much of the correspondence between this body and 
the CCC appears in the latter's minut~s, and is 
accordingly cited as such. 
4. The Department of Internal Affairs had overall 
responsibility for Coloured local government prior to 
the introduction of the House of Representatives. 
5. This decision was not enforced in 1986 and Minister 
curry used some unsubtle arm-twisting to persuade 
members not to _resign, pointing out that funds for 
urban upgrading were dependent .on the continuance of 
the Management Committee system (The Argus, 
10/10/1986). 
6. This issue did not in fact appear in ADMC minutes in 
1987 and 1988. 
7. Heideveld was one of the initial beneficiaries of the 
upgrading funding because of a burst water pipe in the 
area which caused extensive damage. 
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8. It has been suggested that the funds for Bonteheuwel 
had been channeled through JMCs, this township having 
been designated as one of the high-risk oilspots by the 
military (see 6.11 The NSMS). There is, however, no 
concrete· proof to support this assertion. The 
Administrator of the Cape, Eugene Louw, did say that 
the emphasis in the Cape would be more on the use of 
formal government structures than JMCs (Weekly Mail, 
16-22/10/1987) . 
~. Johannes had in fact made an unsuccessful attempt to 
create a separate Management Committee for Heideveld on 
the grounds that its interests were not adequately 
I 
catered for by the ADMC (CPA, 1988D) . 
10 .. The form of powers do not fit neatly into any of these 
categories of decentralisation. Delegation is the 
nearest definition because (a) these powers are clearly 
not devolved, with decisions being made by appointed 
officials; and (b) they are not deconcentrated, being 
handled by local and not central officials. 
CHAPTER XI 
1. The Administrator did, at a rather late stage, ask the 
Demarcation Board to look at the desirability of 
including the Divisional Council of Swartland in the 
WCRSC. It is highly doubtful whether the CPA was 
really serious about including Swartland. The proposal 
was probably a sop to swartland business interests who 
were concerned that, if all government transport 
subsidies were phased out and Swartland were excluded 
from the RSC region, the area.would suffer financially. 
The CPA correctly anticipated that the Demarcation 
Board would find no community of interest between 
Swartland and the urban Cape heartland (Cameron, 1988A 
: 19-20). 
2. Before Management Committees were created, the_ voting 
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representation of these three areas was included in the 
CCC's total. When these committees were established, 
the voting representation was deducted from the CCC's 
total and allocated to these respective committees. 
3. This WCRSC 1990A reference, Briefing Meeting 16 July 
1990 with Private Sector Organisations is a bulky 
document which unfortunately is unpaginated. 
4. on the estimates a greater percentage of allocations 
was made to regional functions. The writer has, 
however, allocated these regional functions to the 
totals for the various (so-called} ethnic groups if an 
allocation was primarily for the use of a particular 
group. In respect of certain functions such as 
stormwater drainage, which passes through White and 
Coloured or Black areas, it is clearly to the benefit 
of m6re than one group. Such functions are accordingly 
still classified under the regional category. 
5. Occasionally it is necessary to provide a sop to these 
municipalities, when they start grumbling that their 
White areas are not receiving WCRSC funds. Allocations 
to Bellville and Parow municipalities for their nature 
reserves must be seen in this context. 
6. As far as can be ascertained, Kraaifontein is the only 
WCRSC local authority which is CP-controlled. Presum-
ably its RSC representative is also CP-orientated. 
7. These allocations were for both the 1987 and 1988 
financial year. It has already been pointed out that 
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CHAPTER XII 
1~ The LP did, in fact, approve a draft copy of the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983 
before it was enacted. However, the LP did make it 
quite clear that it disapproved of the nee-apartheid 
premises of the new constitution and that it was going 
into the system to break down apartheid. 
2. There have, however, been accusations that NSMS has 
been resurrected in the form of the National 
Coordinating Mechanism which is based on the same 
pattern as the old system but has ostensibly more 
emphasis on welfare than security. 
3. A report by the Institute of Social and Demographic 
Unit of the Human Sciences Research Council revealed 
that Whites at most form a majority in 10 of the 306 
magisterial districts. The possibility exists that it 
could be even less. The research was based on the 1985 
census figures (Die Burger, 24/9/1988). 
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ANNEXURE A 
METHODOLOGY : QUALITATIVE RESEARCH.METHODS 
It is held that there is no privileged epistemological 
position in social science. No theory can lay an exclusive 
claim to knowledge. This proposition has influenced the 
particular methodological path followed in this thesis, 
namely qualitative research methods. 
~ualitative researchers focus on processes, activities, 
relations and incidents which are not necessarily 
quantifiable. This form of research involves examining 
groups which do not necessarily have formal links but who 
relate to each other causally. Instead of trying to 
discover common properties and general patterns of the 
population as a whole, individuals are selected one by one 
as the research project proceeds and causal links develop. 
This type of research has been ref erred to as epidemio-
logical research. Important in this regard are gatekeepers: 
"by gatekeepers I mean actors with control over key 
resources and avenues of opportunity" (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1983 : 38) 
The gatekeepers are often the conduit through which 
access to strategic actors and settings is attained. How-
ever, because of their pivotal position they can also be an 
impediment. They can prevent access to certain fields and 
steer the researcher in a desired direction (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1983 : 63-68). 
'' 
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Qualitative interviewing, through its flexible frame-
work, is in a much better position to establish substantive 
relations of connection instead of relying on formal 
relations of similarity which tend to be superficial. The 
locus of research can easily be altered if new, and. possibly 
more fruitful, fields of inquiry open up. In fact, the 
research project is seldom finalised before empirical work 
commences. It is only during the course of research that 
the central issues and problems are identified. Often 
research problems differ from what was originally antici-
pated. As Glaser and Strauss (1968 : 112) remark: 
Who is interviewed, when and how, will be 
decided as the research progresses according to 
one's assessment of one's current state of know-
ledge and one's judgment as of how it might best 
be developed further. 
Of course there are limitations to qualitative 
research. Its results are not likely to be representative 
or open to generalisation. Its strength lies in exposin~ 
causal links in a limited number of cases, rather than 
discovering some of the general patterns of a population as 
a who.le (Sayer, 1984 : 222). Further, quantitative 
researchers argue that qualitative interviewing is sub-
jective. This is true, yet quantitative techniques have 
also been severely criticised for being subjective (Marsh, 
1979). But this leads to another issue. If there is no 
methodological monopoly on truth and all knowledge is 
inherently subjective, is there anything worthwhile to be 
gained from research? The author concurs with Gouldner 
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"(1973 : 59), who argues that objectivity is guaranteed only 
by the moral character of the individual: 
Objectivity consists in the capacity to know 
and to use - to seek out, or at least to accept it 
when it is otherwise provided·- information 
inimical to our desires and values, and to over-
come our own fear of such information. 
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ANNEXURE B 506 
The new shape of government 
People often find it difficult to understand the complicated constitutional structure in terms of which South Africa is governed. 
The structure gained a funher dimension with the new extensions proposed last month by the State President, Mr P w Botha. 








REGIONAL OF FICES 
Heading the government is the STATE PRE· 
SIOENT. whose role will t>ecome clear. 
The GENERAL AFFAIRS structure, on the 
right of the graphic, is headed tr'{ a PRIME 
MINISTER who would concern himself with the 
aay-to-day running of the country. He would 
lead a CABINET which could include techno-
crats ond other outsiders as well as politicians, 
and which may include Bicek members. 
The proposed GREAT INDABA - the sug-
gested name for the National Council - would 
operate alongsi~e the Cabinet. In terms of the 
propoSed legislation now before Parliament, its 
auties would be threefold: to negotiate a new 
constitution; to provide Black input to the gov-
ernment, for example tr'{ comment an draft 
legislation and by giving general adVice; and 









PARLIAMENT would continue to function in 
three houses. while the PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL 
in which Blacks could be included, could be· 
come a part-time adVisory body through which 
organisations, such as the Economic Advisory 
Council. would report. Many of its present func· 
tions could be assumed tr'{ the Great lndaba. 
Spanning the gap between central and 
provincial government ore the existing PARLIA· 
MENTARY COMMITTEES for each province. 
These consist of MPs from the three Houses, 
who supervise and scrutinise the activities of 
the PROVINCIAL EXECUTM COMMITTEES ap-
pointed tr'{ the President. These control the 
greatly expanded provincial administrations. 
They olready have Black members, and replace 
the previously elected provincial councils. 
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i ' TIES could be established in the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State to link South Africa and the ' 
six self-governing territories (there are none in l 
the Cope). l 
At the bottom of the general affairs nelWOrk 
ore the REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCILS. mode 
up of nominated local councillors from Bloc!<. 
White. Indian ond Coloured municipalities. 
RSCs are a horizontal general affairs extention 
of the local authorities. 
Also into the general affairs camp fall the 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS operating on a 
national level. 
The OWN AFFAIRS structure, on the left of 
the graphic. 1s much more complex. 
The existing structure consists of the three 
Houses of Parliament, each led by an own of· 
Ko ntinu d on back p.1 e~ 
,ConQnued from paae 2) 
fairs MINISTERS' COUNCIL. The decisions of 
each hOuse 1.Jre executed at ground level by 
separate MINISTERIAL REPRESENTATIVES in a 
senes of separate Qdm1nistrotive REGIONAL 
OFFICES. 
LOCAL AUTHOmTIES form the third level. At 
present Coloured and 1na1on MANAGEMENT 
COMMITIEES report through White local 
authorities. 
Black councils. where functioning. already 
hove autonomy. Their counterparts within the 
self-governing territories con, by agreement. 
operate within the structure by joining RSCs 
and making use of provincial infrastructures. 
The miSSing-stiund is Black 1eprwww110li0n 
obow local ou1h0ri1Y rA RSC IMI. ones ou11id• 
the self-governing t1¥Titories. The own otfoirs 
solution is to establish nine REGIONAL COUN· 
aLS. to be elected by BlockS in the nine 
economic development regions. 
These could function os Block own otfoirs 
administrations in the some Wf1f cs the region· 
cl administrative offices of ttle three Houses of 
Parliament. The government soys BlockS must 
ask for these structures; it will not impose 
ttlem. · 
The members of these committees may 
decide to elect a NATIONAL OWN AFfAIRS 
COMMlmE for Blocks. which the gQY81Tlm8nt 
then sees operating alongside the three 
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HouseS - oltl'IOUgh not as o "fourth cnomber" 
but as tne constrtuent bOdy for tile Gfeot Inda· 
bO and as the means to report bOcK down the 
line to urban BlockS. 
Provision could also be mode for this com· 
mittee to appoint leaders from Within its ronKs: 
in effect. a BLACK MINISTERS' COUNCIL. 
Wl'IOt ties it oil togethei'? 
A new all-race policy-making bOdy, a 
LEADERS' COUNCIL is envisaged sitting astride 
the own and general offoirs lines. 
Ultimately, 011 the threads come together in 
the hands of the State President. He would be 
appointed by on ELECTORAL COLLEGE in which 
BlockS could serve. 
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